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JUSTIN MARTYR: HIS LIFE, WRITINGS, AND OPINIONS.

EDINBURGH:

THOMAS CLARK, 38. GEORGE STREET;

HAMILTON, ADAMS, & CO. LONDON; AND

W. CURRY, JUN. & CO. DUBLIN.

MDCCCXLII.

PRINTED BY J. THOMSON, MILNE SQUARE.

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JUSTIN MARTYR:

HIS LIFE, WRITINGS, AND OPINIONS;

BY THE

REV. CHARLES SEMISCH,

OF TREBNITZ, SILESIA.

TRANSLATED FROM THE GERMAN, WITH THE AUTHOR'S
CONCURRENCE,

BY

J. E. RYLAND.

VOL. II.

Edin
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MDCCCXLIII.

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PROF. E W GURNEY

Above all, let us, with sincere minds, more earnestly endeavour the promoting the interest of religion in itself, of true reformed Christianity, than of this or that party. Let us long to see the religion of Christians become simple, primitive, agreeable to its lovely original state, and again *itself*; and each in our stations, contribute thereto all that we are able, labouring that the internal principle of it may live and flourish in our own souls, and be to our utmost diffused and spread unto other men's. And for its externals, as the ducture of our rule will guide us, so gradually tend towards one common course, that there may at length cease to be any divided parties at all.

Howe.

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ERRATA IN VOL. II.

- Page 202, (note) *for* Verstand *read* Verstand.
 — 209, *for* einem *read* einen.
 — —, *for* gekaunt *read* gekannt.
 — —, *for* herligen *read* heiligen.

BOOK IV.—CONTINUED.

THE DOCTRINE OF JUSTIN MARTYR.

CHAPTER II.

EVIDENCE FOR CHRISTIANITY IN OPPOSITION TO HEATHENISM.

A NEW field of apologetic enterprise opened to Justin, when he turned his attention to the heathen. The Christians were called Apostates by the heathen, as well as by the Jews ; but the vindication of this apostacy necessarily rested on altogether different grounds from that of the transition from Judaism. On the part of the heathen equally with the Jews, along with a sober intelligence, a blind fanaticism raged against the Christian doctrine and practice ; by both parties, to the conflict of opinion and argument, was added that of physical force ; but the Jews exercised the latter only by sufferance ; the heathen were masters of the world : Jewish hatred could vent itself for the most part only in threatenings and abuse,—the animosity of the heathen not unfrequently caused blood to flow. It is true, Judaism was not destitute of adroit and able advocates ; but they seldom or never attained the dialectic acuteness with which the philosophic heathen knew how to defend the faith of his fathers, even when he had no firm personal attachment to it, against the attacks and objections of Christianity. Without being wanting in decision and firmness, (or at times ir

asperity,) Justin spoke more mildly against the heathen than against the Jews. Without surrendering a particle of Christian truth, he sought out, in doctrine and history, all points of connection between Christianity and heathenism. Without denying the consciousness of the justice of his cause, and sinking to unworthy flattery, he intimates, not indistinctly, that he made it an object to maintain a friendly understanding with the ruling powers. The method in which Justin constructed the *Apology for Christianity against Heathenism*, was the same which he adopted in opposition to Judaism; it was both offensive and defensive: he endeavoured first to drive out his enemies from the Christian territory, and then to carry the warfare into their own encampment.

ARTICLE I.

REFUTATION OF HEATHEN OBJECTIONS.

JUSTIN stated and expounded the objections of the heathen against Christianity, as far as they were then brought under his notice, not independently, but as the occasion required, and in the course of proving the injustice of persecuting the Christians. It is impracticable to pursue the same plan in giving an account of them, without sacrificing logical arrangement and perspicuity. We prefer placing the objections, and their answers, in the order which the nature of the subject requires. A twofold series of accusations is presented in Justin's writings: the one attacks Christianity as a doctrine, and the means of securing human happiness,—the other is directed against its professors. We therefore distinguish the accusations which the heathen made against *Christianity*, from those which they made against *Christians*.

I. The objections which they made against Chris-

tians as such, relate partly to their principles and practice, partly to their outward condition.

1. Among the objections belonging to their principles, the accusation of *Atheism* stands prominent.¹ This charge was made as early as the time of Domitian,² and we meet with it in all the Apologists of the following century.³ Most frequently this charge proceeded from the common people; the educated class, without altogether disdaining to use it, laid comparatively little stress upon it; in Justin's writings we find that the philosopher Crescens availed himself of it. The meaning of the accusation was not the same at all times. At first, when they saw the Christians decline taking any part in the public cultus, without establishing any visible tokens and symbols of their own religion, without erecting any peculiar temples or altars, the cry of atheism was raised chiefly by the multitude, with great vehemence, and Christians were looked upon as men who, in relation to theism, maintained the purely negative side. Afterwards, when at least the more intelligent could not help perceiving that the Christians by no means dissevered themselves from all connection with the supersensual, and had, moreover, real objects of religious veneration and wor-

¹ Kortholt, *De Calumniis paganorum in veteris christianos sparsis*, p. 57. Gibbon's *History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*. Tzschirner, *Geschichte der Apologetik*, I. 203, 325. *Fall des Heidenthums*, I. 228, 237; but especially Lange, *expositio argumentorum, quibus patres apologetici religionem Christ. a culpa atheismi ei objecta defenderunt*, in Illgen's *historisch-theologischen Abhandlungen*, (Leipz. 1819.) II. p. 127.

² Dio Cass. *Hist. Roman.* 67, 14, compare Meyer *Vertheidigung und Erläuterung der Geschichte Jesu und der Apostel allein aus griechischen und römischen Profanscribenten*, (Hannover, 1805,) p. 526, and Baur *die Christus-parthei in die korinthischen Gemeinde*, in the *Tübinger Zeitschrift f. Theologie*, 1831, Part IV. p. 209.

³ The fullest examination and refutation of this charge may be found in Athenag. *legat. p. Christ.* c. 4, sqq. p. 282, sqq. (p. 5, sqq.) Compare Clem. *Strom.* 7, 1, 4, T. III. p. 298, sqq. Tertull. *Apolog.* c. 10, sqq. T. V. p. 23, sqq. Arnob. *adv. gent.* 1, 28, T. I. 18.

ship, the accusation of atheism was modified, and Christians were called atheists, inasmuch as they rejected the customary and legalized worship of their countries' gods. In vindicating the Christians, Justin noticed both forms of the accusation, and showed that in each case, Christians were termed atheists with the greatest injustice; he repels the imputation, that the Christians had no religious faith and cultus, by averring that such a prejudice must be an invention of dæmons. These beings, he says, because they are afraid that Christians, who know their whole origin and character, and fearlessly describe them as contemptible, and quite beneath virtuous men, will put an end to the whole system of their worship, which they have hitherto enjoyed, according to their requirements, and, in proportion to their rank, from credulous idolators,—these dæmons have craftily and deceitfully involved Christians in the charge of atheism. In the same manner they acted towards Socrates, their first considerable opponent among the Greeks. When that philosopher, in consequence of rational investigation, and supported by the revelations of the Logos, brought their true nature under general observation, and called off his fellow-citizens from their service, they incited wicked men to accomplish his death, as an abandoned atheist, who endeavoured to bring in new gods.¹ In reference to *them*, the

¹ *Apol.* I. 5, p. 46, (p. 55, E. 56, A), with this passage must be connected *Apol.* II. 10, p. 95, (p. 48, C.D.) αἱ προηγερμμένοι τῷ Χριστῷ κατὰ τὸ ἀνθρώπινον λόγῳ περιεσθίνοντες τὰ πρῶτα Διωρεῖσαι καὶ ἱλιγχαί, ὡς ἀσιβῆς καὶ περιεργοὶ ἐς δικαστήρια ἤχθησαν. Ὁ πάντων δὲ αὐτῶν ἐννοώτερος πρὸς τοῦτο γνώμην Σωκράτης τὰ αὐτὰ ἡμῖν ἐκάλει. Καὶ γὰρ ἔφασαν αὐτὸν καινὰ δαίμονα ἐσφίρειν καὶ οὗς ἢ πᾶσι νομίζει Διούς, μὴ ἡγῆσθαι αὐτόν· ἰδὲ δὲ δαίμονας μὴ τοὺς φεβύλους καὶ τοὺς πρᾶξαντας, ἀ ἔφασαν οἱ ποικταί, ἐκβαλὼν τῆς πολιτείας, καὶ Ὅμηρον καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ποιητὰς παραστῆναι τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἰδιδάξει· πρὸς Διὸς δὲ τῷ ἀγνώστου αὐτοῖς διὰ λόγου ζητήσεως ἐπίγνωσιν προσερίσσειτο.—“And those who existed before Christ, according to his human nature, having attempted to investigate and prove things by reason, were brought to trial as impious and over-curious. The boldest of them all, in this respect, was Socrates, who was accused of the same crimes as our-

Christians certainly might deserve the name of atheists; for they decidedly refused to them all divine honour;¹ but on this account they were by no means atheists in the true sense of the word: for they revered the only true God, the Father of Righteousness, and good order, and all other virtues, exalted above all contact with evil, and the Son who came from him and the host of all the good angels following him, and conformed to him, and the prophetic Spirit, honouring them in spirit and in truth.”² In another passage Justin declares, “What sober-minded man will not confess that we are by no means atheists, for we worship the maker of this universe, declaring, as we have been taught, that he stands not in need of blood and libations and incense: we praise him to the utmost of our ability, by supplication and thanksgiving for all that we enjoy, understanding that this is the only honour that is worthy of him, not to consume by fire what was created by him for our sustenance, but to make use of it for ourselves and the indigent; and we show our gratitude by invocations and hymns, for creation and all the means of a healthy existence, the various qualities of things, and the changes of the sea-

selves; for they said that he introduced new dæmons, and that he did not esteem those to be gods, who were so esteemed by the state. But he having cast out from the state, Homer and the other poets, taught men to reject the evil dæmons, who performed what the poets narrate, and exhorted them to acquaint themselves, by rational enquiry, with that God who was unknown to them.”

¹ *Apol.* I. 5, sq. p. 47. (p. 56, B.) τοὺς ταῦτα πράξαντας δαίμονας ὁ μὲν μὴ ἱεθεὺς εἶναι φασίν, ἀλλὰ κακούς καὶ ἀνοσίους δαίμονας, οἳ οὐδὲ τοῖς ἀρετὴν παθεῖσιν ἀνδράποισι τὰς πράξεις ὁμοίαις ἔχουσιν. Ἐνθιγὸς καὶ ἄθροισι κελεύμεθα καὶ ὁμολογῶμεν τῶν τοιούτων νομιζομένων θεῶν ἄθροισι εἶναι, ἀλλ’ οὐχὶ τῷ ἀληθιστάτῳ θεῷ—

“The dæmons who have done such things, we not only do not call them good, but call them evil and unholy dæmons, who do not act like men who are desirous of virtue. And hence we are called atheists, and we confess that we are atheists with respect to gods of this sort, but not in relation to the most true God, &c.”

² *Apol.* I. 6, p. 47, (p. 56, C.) compare *Athenag. legat. pro Christ.* c. 10, p. 286, sq. (p. 10, B.D. 11, A.)

Christians refuse sacrifices and garlands to the statues of the gods. God, the giver of all things, is exalted above the need of all material things; he has no occasion for either blood or libations, or incense; the sacrifices which are acceptable to him, are temperance, justice, and philanthropy.¹ Moreover, images of the gods are fit for nothing less than to be representatives of the divinity, or symbols of the divine.² In themselves

καὶ δένδρα σεβόμενον καὶ ποταμούς καὶ μῦς καὶ αἰλῶρες καὶ κροκοδείλους καὶ τῶν ἀλόγων ζώων τα πολλά· καὶ οὐ τῶν αὐτῶν ὑπὸ πάντων τιμωμένων, ἀλλὰ ἑλλων ἄλλαχόσε, ὥσθ' ἵναι ἑστέθης ἀλλήλοις πάντας, διὰ τὸ μὴ τὰ αὐτὰ εἶβεν The same conclusion is also drawn from the same fact by later apologists. Thus, Athenagoras *legat. pro Christ.* c. 14, p. 290, (p. 13, D. 14, A. B.) οὐδὲ οἱ ἡμῖν ἐπικαλῦντες ἐξισότητα. ἱσθὲ μὴ τοῦ; αὐτοῦ; οἰς ἴσασιν νομίζομεν. σφίσιν αὐτοῖς συμφωνοῦσι περὶ θιων ματην

"Αν τοίνυν ἡμεῖς, ὅτι μὴ κινῶς ἱεῖνοι; θιοσεβῆμεν, ἀτιθεῖμεν, πᾶσαι μὴ πόλεις, πάντα δὲ Ἱση ἀσεβοῦσιν οὐ γὰρ τοῦ; αὐτοῦ; ἀγνοοῖ θιός. —"Nor do they who accuse us of atheism, because we do not acknowledge the same gods as themselves, agree with one another concerning gods If then we are impious because we have not common objects of worship with them, all cities and all nations are impious, for they do not venerate the same gods. Thus Origen remarks, c. *Cels.* 5, 27. T. i. p. 597, sq. ὅτιον παρὰ τοῖσδε μὲν εἶβεν κροκόδειλον καὶ ἐξείεν τι τῶν παρ' ἄλλοις προσκυνομένων καὶ ὅτιον ἱεῖροις τό εἶβεν τὸν μόσχον καὶ παρ' ἄλλοις, τὸν τράγον νομίζειν θιόν. Οὕτω δ' ἔχει ἡ αὐτοῦ; ὅσα μὲν ποιοῦν, ὡς πρὸς τοῖσδε ἰοῦ; νόμους· ἀνόσια δὲ, ὡς πρὸς ἑτέρας· ἕτερε ἰσθ' ἀσάβων ἀσπῶντες.—"With one nation the crocodile is sacred, while they eat objects worshipped by others; others adore the calf, and elsewhere the goat is esteemed a god. Thus the same person will be considered as acting piously according to the laws of one people, and impiously according to those of another; than which nothing can be more absurd."—Tertull. *ad Scapul.* c. 2, T. iii. p. 158. *Apol.* c. 24.

¹ *Apol.* 1, 10, p. 48, (p. 58, A. B.)—1, 13, p. 50, (p. 60, C.)—Compare Athenag. *legat. pro Christ.* c. 13, p. 289, (p. 13, B.)—Minuc. *Fel. Oct.* c. 32, p. 122, sq.—Tertull. *ad Scapul.* c. 2, p. 159. Itaque et sacrificamus pro salute imperatoris, sed deo nostro et ipsius, sed quomodo præcepit deus, pura prece. Non enim eget deus, conditor universitatis, odoris aut sanguinis alicujus. Hæc enim dæmoniorum pabula sunt.—Arnob. *adv. gent.* 6, 2, T. i. p. 202.

² *Apol.* 1, 9, p. 48, (p. 57, C.) Athenag. *legat. pro Christ.* c. 26, p. 304, (p. 29, B. C.)—Clem. *protrep.* 4, 51, T. i. p. 44.

soulless, lifeless masses; they bear, indeed, the names and forms of *dæmons*, but not the image of God. Originally they are a rude material, till they are worked, polished, and hewn, or cast and hammered; not unfrequently vessels designed for common purposes are converted, by an alteration of their form, into images of the gods.¹ The artists who make these images are frequently given up to all kinds of excess and vice, and dishonour the female slaves in their employ, thus exposing the absurdity of worshipping the work of their impure hands. And these images, after they are finished, are not able to protect themselves, but need numerous guardians to prevent their being stolen.² Not the refusing therefore, but the readiness to give divine honours to such images, is irrational and impious: Christians are least of all atheists in withholding their homage from these lifeless images.

The next charge to atheism brought by the heathen against the Christians, was that of *Thyestean banquets and CEdipodean incest*. Justin discusses the accusation not only in his two Apologies, but in the Dialogue with Trypho, yet without mentioning it under this designation, or accurately distinguishing the two crimes it involved.³ The heathen Cœcilius in Minu-

¹ *Apol.* 1, 9, p. 48, (p. 57, D.)—Clem. *homil.* 10, 8, T. i. p. 687, πῶς θίσι εἶεν κλιστευμένοι, χαυνομένοι, σταθμιζόμενοι, φεουρμένοι:—*recognitt.* 5, 15, p. 544.—Clem. *Strom.* 7, 5, 28, T. iii. p. 225, οὐκίς' οὖν ἱερὰ καὶ θια τῆς εἰχνης τὰ ἱερά.—Arnob. *adv. gent.* 6, 14, T. i. p. 213.

² *Apol.* 1, 9, p. 48, (p. 57, E. 58, A.)—Clem. *homil.* 10, 8, T. i. p. 687.—10, 22, p. 690, ἂν ἦντοι ἱμῶναι ἢ τὰ συμβέβηκα ἡμῶν, . . . τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἐπιβυλιῦσαι θύλωντας καὶ κλιστευοντας ἀπαιθῶντο ἂν . . . νῦν δὲ ταύτων οὐδὲν ποιῶσιν· ἀλλ' ὡς κατὰ δικαίον, καὶ μέγιστα οἱ τιμώμενοι αὐτῶν, φερούμενται.—“If your images were really living, they would escape from those that would lay plots for stealing them—but they do nothing of the sort, and are guarded like criminals, particularly those of them that are most highly honoured.”—Tertull. *Apol.* c. 29, T. v. p. 61. Cyprian. *ad Demetrian.* c. 14, T. ii. p. 218.

³ He merely says; *Dial. c. Tr.* c. 10, p. 111, (p. 227, B.)

cus Felix, goes more into detail. He states, that every one, on becoming a member of the Christian body, was invited to feast on an infant. The murder of this infant, who was slain by the candidate at the bidding of the rest, without knowing what he did, was the act of initiation. No sooner was the deed perpetrated than the whole assembly greedily sipped the blood of the infant, and tore the mangled corpse in pieces, in order by this partnership in guilt to bind themselves reciprocally to silence. He also reports, that at the regular meetings of the Christians, that after the lights were extinguished the most unnatural lusts were indulged.¹ These monstrous reports no doubt took their rise from the nightly meetings and *agapæ* of the Christians,² from misunderstood expressions of "eating the flesh" and "drinking the blood of Christ," at the celebration of the Lord's Supper,³ and, lastly, from an erroneous interpretation of the terms *brethren* and *sisters*, which the Christians applied to one another.⁴ Justin earnestly set himself

μη καὶ ὑμεῖς πιστεύετε περὶ ἡμῶν, ὅτι δὴ ἐσθίμεν ἀνθρώπους καὶ, μετὰ τὴν αἰλαπίνην ἀποσβινύσκει τοὺς λύχνους, ἐθίσμοις μῆξιν ἰγκολίμεθα.—"Do you not also believe concerning us, that we eat men, and that after the banquet we put out the lights and indulge in incestuous intercourse?"—Compare *Apol.* i. 26, p. 59, (p. 70, B.)—2, 12, p. 96, (p. 50, B.) The designations *δυσσεν* *Θυσσεν* and *μῆξιν* *Οιδιποδίου* are found in Athenag. *legat. pro Christ.* c. 3, p. 282, and Euseb. *hist. eccles.* V. 1.

¹ Octav. c. 9, Illic post multas epulas, ubi convivium caluit, et incestæ libidini ebrietatis fervor exarsit, canis qui candelabro nexus est, jactu offuls ultra spatium lineæ, qua vincit, ad impetum et saltum provocatur; sic everso et extincto conscio lumine impudentibus tenebris nexus infandæ cupiditatis involvunt per incertum sortis, &c. The reply to these accusations is given in c. 30, 31.

² Minuc. *Fel. Octav.* c. 10.

³ Tertull. *ad usor.* 2, 4, T. III. p. 73, *quis ad convivium dominicum illud, quod infamant, sine sua suspitione dimittit.* Compare Augusti, *Handbuch der Christ. Archäologie*, (Lipz. 1836,) II. 568. A different view is taken by Marheinecke in his *Essay, Sanctorum patrum de præsentia Christi in cæna domini Sententia triplex* (Heidel. 1811,) p. 11.

⁴ Minuc. *Fel. Octav.* c. 9, p. 27. The expression, "*Bre-*

to refute these slanders. "All the crimes and vices," he said, addressing the heathen, as the persons from whom such reports principally proceeded, "with which you charge us are nothing but mere hearsays, the offspring of prejudice and hatred, always repeated, and never proved.¹ Having received them from the dæmons, their proper authors, you have most zealously engaged in bringing them into general notoriety, because it gratifies you to obtain associates in wickedness. For what we, according to these rumours, do under the covert of secrecy, that you do openly.² As it is reported of the ancients that they nourished herds of cattle, or goats, or sheep, or horses, so you now maintain whole troops of boys and girls for the basest purposes.³ And from these infamous creatures the state derives a revenue, instead of sweeping them from the face of the earth.⁴ Not unfrequently parents and children, brothers and sisters, are guilty of unnatural lewdness:⁵ or prostitute one another for gain. If you, who deem our morals so severe, require special instances to prove to what a depth of moral degradation and worthlessness you are sunk, only think of Anti-

thren and sisters," was employed by the later Romans as an euphemism for incestuous intercourse. Kortholt, *De calumniis paganorum in vet. Christ. sparsis*. p. 168, and *De vita et moribus Christianis per gentilium malitiam afflictis*, p. 137, sq.

¹ *Apol.* 1, 3, p. 45, (p. 54, A.) Minuc. *Fel. Oct.* c. 28, p. 104.

² *Apol.* 1, 10, p. 49, (p. 58, D.)—1, 27, p. 60, (p. 71, A.)—2, 12, p. 96, (p. 50, C.) Athenag. *leg. pro Christ.* c. 34, p. 311, (p. 37, D.)

³ The same odious accusations are to be found in Tatian, *Orat. c. Græc.* c. 28, p. 267, (p. 165, A.) Athenag. *legat. pro Christ.* c. 34, p. 311, (p. 37, C.) and Clem. *praedag.* 3, 4, T. I. p. 296.

⁴ *Apol.* 1, 27, p. 60, (p. 70, E.) Caligula was the first who established a tax from this source, (Sueton. *vit. Calig.* c. 40.) Alexander Severus gives them another use, (*Ael. Lamprid. vit. Alex. Sever.* c. 24.) Justinian first abolished it.

⁵ *Apol.* 1, 27, p. 60, (p. 70, E.) Tertullian, *Apol.* c. 9.—*ad nat.* 1, 16, p. 125.—Lactant. *institut. divin.* 6, 20.

nous ! Although it was known to all of you that he was retained by Hadrian for the vilest purpose, yet, for fear of the emperor's displeasure, none of you refused to pay him divine honours after his death !¹ Truly, such deeds might recal one of the ancients from the tombs to mount the rostrum, and, in tragic tones, to address you ; ' Be ashamed and confounded, to charge upon the innocent, crimes which you yourselves openly commit, and to impute to those who are not in the least degree implicated, actions which belong to you and your gods. Repent and reform yourselves ! ' It cannot serve to justify your conduct, that here and there slaves, and women, and children, have informed against us, and accused us of actually committing these pretended crimes. For the confessions of such persons are only extorted allegations. Terrified by the executions which the dæmons have brought about by means of acknowledged slanders, and overpowered by the agonies of the rack, they have uttered these involuntary accusations which were put into their mouths.² Nor does

¹ The infamous fact here referred to, obtained a deplorable notoriety in the early ages of the church, among both heathens and Christians. There are partial variations in the accounts, but in the main points there is perfect agreement. See Spartianus. *vit. Hadrian*, c. 14. Dio. Cass. *hist. roman.* 69, 11. Justin, *apol.* 1, 29, p. 61, (p. 72, A.) Tatian, *Orat. c. Gr.* c. 10, p. 252, (p. 149, D.) Hegesipp. in *Euseb. hist. eccles.* 4, 8, T. I. p. 309, sq. and Hieronym. *de vir. illustr.* c. 22, T. I. p. 178. Theophil. *ad Autol.* 3, 8, p. 386, (p. 122, C.) Clem. *protrep.* 4, 49, T. I. p. 42, sq. Tertull. *Apol.* c. 13, T. V. p. 30. Origen, *c. Cels.* 3, 36, T. I. p. 470. 8, 9, p. 749. Prudent. *adv. Symmach.* 2, 271. Hieron. *Comment. in Jes.* 2, 6, T. V. p. 13. Also, Van Dale, *de oraculis veterum ethnico-rum*, (ed. 2. Amstel. 1700.) p. 382, sqq. and Vertsch. *Versuch einer Kirchenhistoice*, (Lpz. 1737,) II. 477.

² *Apol.* 2, 12, p. 96, (p. 50, B. C.) During the persecution at Lyons and Vienna attempts were made to obtain by torture confessions from the slaves relative to the imputed crimes of their masters, which, in some instances, succeeded. Euseb. *hist. eccles.* 5, 1, T. II. p. 11. On the other hand, Athenagoras asserts (*leg. ap. Christ.* c. 35, p. 311, [p. 38, B.] *καὶ μὴ*

it prove our guilt that some of our number, as you assert, have been detected and seized in the commission of crimes. It is true, that among Christians, along with those who live after the pattern of their master, some may be found who confess his doctrine only with their lips. But verily among your philosophers, consistency of principle and practice is far from being universal: many a one wears the name and cloak of a philosopher without being such in reality; and many are avowed atheists. But the crimes of an individual are not to be charged upon the whole society.¹ If you will only give ear to the voice of truth, and not resign yourselves to the dominion of prejudice, you might very easily convince yourselves of our innocence. Why should we deny if we had done what is imputed to us? We might pretend that our excesses were symbols of certain hidden ideas, that they were mysteries, as you do!² We might place our misdeeds by the side of the deeds of your gods, as they are exhibited in poetry and on the stage, and might plead celestial precedents for what human laws denounce as crimes.³ We might justify our supposed

*τις αὐτοὺς ἔρηται, εἰ ἰωράκασιν ἢ λήγουσιν, οὐδὲς οὕτως ἀπευθροισ-
μίος, ὥς ἐπὶ τοῖς ἰδεῖν καὶ τοὶ καὶ δεῦλοί εἰσιν ἡμῖν, τοῖς μὲν καὶ ἀλοῖους,
τοῖς δὲ ἰλάττους· οὗς οὐκ ἔστι λαθεῖν· ἀλλὰ καὶ τούτων οὐδὲς καθ' ἡμῶν τὰ θεληκῶτα οὐδὲ κατεψεύσατο.*—“If any one should ask them whether they have seen what they say, none has hardihood enough to assert it. And we have slaves, some more, some fewer, whom we cannot conceal, but none of these have uttered such falsehoods concerning us.”—c. 2, p. 281, (p. 3, A.)

¹ *Apol.* 1, 4, p. 46, (p. 55, B. C.)—1, 7, p. 47, (p. 56, C. D.)—1, 7, p. 47, (p. 56, C. D.)

² *Apol.* 1, 27, p. 60, (p. 70, E.)—2, 12, p. 97, (p. 50, C.) *τίνας χάριν οὐχὶ καὶ ταῦτα δημοσίᾳ ὁμολογούμεν ἀγαθὰ, καὶ φιλοσοφίαν θείαν αὐτὰ ἀστυδίανυμν;*—“What reason is there that we should not publicly avow these things to be good, and hold them forth as a divine philosophy?” *Athenag. leg. p. Christ.* c. 34, p. 311, (p. 37, D.)

³ *Apol.* 2, 12, p. 97, (p. 50, D. E.)—*Clem. Homil.* 4, 12, T. I. p. 652, 4, 17, p. 654.—*Lactant. Institutt. Divin.* 5, 10. How inclined the heathen to excuse their excesses and crimes by referring to the immorality of the gods, as represented in

child-murder by the mysteries of Chronos,¹—our appetite for human blood by the gladiatorial blood which is offered to the statue of Jupiter Latiaris,² at the celebration of his feast,—our rumoured impurities by the libidinous excesses of Jupiter and the

their mythology, on the principle that it was honourable to imitate the gods, is shewn in several instances by Tholuck, in his Essay on the moral influence of Heathenism, in Neander's *Denkwürdigkeiten*, &c. I. 180,—and in Tzschirner's *Fall des Heidenthums*, I. 26.

¹ Of all the ancient heathen modes of worship in which human sacrifices were employed, that of Chronos is the most notorious. The Phœnicians, and still more the Carthaginians, seemed to be possessed by a kind of frenzy to sacrifice their children to Saturn. Notwithstanding human sacrifices were forbidden by law in the Roman empire, and the Emperor Tiberius had even crucified the priests of Saturn in sight of their temple, still the Africans practised these horrible sacrifices in secret. The following works may be consulted on human sacrifices in general, and on the Cultus of Saturn in particular:—Minuc. *Fel. Octav.* c. 30, p. 114, sqq. Clem. *Protrep.* 3, 42, T. I. p. 36. Tertull. *Apolog.* c. 9, T. V. p. 19. Adv. *Gnost.* c. 7, T. II. p. 284. Lactant. *Institut. Divin.* I. 21. Euseb. *Prep. Evang.* 4, 15, sqq. p. 154, sqq. *De Laud. Const.* c. 13, p. 472, sqq. Cyrill. *adv. Julian.* I. 4, T. VI. p. 128, sq. Meiner's *Allgemeine Kritische Geschichte der Religionen* (Hanover, 1807,) II. 68, 79. Creuzer, *Symbolik u. Mythologie der alten Völker, besonders der Griechen*, (Edit. II. 1819—21,) I. 760, II. 270, 280, 550, IV. 346.) Tholuck über das Wesen und den sittlichen Einfluss des Heidenthums, I. 221. Schott über die Opferideen der alten ins besondere der Juden. Klaiber's *Studien der Evangel. Geistlichkeit Wirttemberg.* II. 2, 176.

² Justin does not specify by name Jupiter Latiaris, but plainly refers to him, when he says: “Φάσκεις . . . ἡλῶν τὰ ἴσα ἢ παρ’ ἑμὶ τιμωμένοις ἰδούλῃ, ὃ οὐ μόνον ἀλόγων ζώων αἷματα προσέρχονται, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀνθρώπων, διὰ τῷ παρ’ ἑμὶ πιστευομένῳ καὶ ὑπογεσάσθαι ἀνδρὶ τὴν πρῶτον τῷ τῶν φουδίντων αἵματος ποιούμενῳ.—“A like service is rendered to an idol of your own, to which not only the blood of irrational animals is shed, but also that of human beings, and these bloody libations are performed by the most illustrious and highest born man among you.” This bloody service of the Latiarian Jupiter is the worst, and most frequently quoted example of human sacrifices which we find in the Fathers, since it was continued to their times, within the precincts of the imperial

other gods, as described by Epicurus and the poets. Thus our innocence may be inferred from our constant and unrenowned denial of the crime falsely imputed to us. The purity and strictness of our moral precepts lead to the same conclusion. These precepts not only command us, in general terms, to let our good works shine before men:¹ they not only emphatically remind us, that not every one that saith Lord, Lord, will enter the kingdom of heaven, but those only who do the will of their Father in heaven: they not only present to us the awful declaration of our Lawgiver, "Many shall say unto me, Lord, Lord, have we not eaten and drunken in thy name, and performed mighty works; and then will I say to them, depart from me, ye workers of iniquity! Then shall weeping and gnashing of teeth, when the righteous shall shine as the sun, and the unrighteous shall be sent into everlasting fire."² More than all this, our code of morals forbids looking on a woman with impure desire, as mental adultery: it enjoins the plucking out of a right eye, when it becomes the medium of unlawful desire; and declares that it is preferable to enter the kingdom of heaven with one eye, than having two eyes to be cast into everlasting fire: it denounces marriage with a divorced woman as adultery, and advises a voluntary celibacy on account of the kingdom of heaven.³ We are exhorted, moreover, to a disinterested love of all men, and even to a self-denying love of our ene-

city: hence it is mentioned by all the early Apologists with deep indignation. Among heathen writers a dead silence prevails on the subject. Porphyry is the only one who mentions it, (*de abstinent.* 2, 56, p. 203, ed. Rhör.) But Thirlby (*annot. in Justin. apol.* II. p. 128) has shown how little the fact itself is rendered doubtful by this silence. See also Valesius *annot. in Euseb. de laude Constant.* p. 284, and Tzschirner *Fall des Heidenthums*, I. 44.

¹ *Apol.* 1, 16, p. 53, (p. 63, B.)

² *Apol.* 1, 16, p. 53, (p. 64, A. B.)

³ *Apol.* 1, 15, p. 52, (p. 61, E. 62, A.)—*Athenag. legat. pro Christ.* c. 32, p. 369, (p. 36, B.)—*Theophil. ad Autol.* 3, 13, p. 388, (p. 125, D.)

mies. Is the Christian asked for any thing, he must give it ; is a loan requested from him, he must not refuse it ; if he is smitten on one cheek, he must turn also the other ; if asked for his coat or his cloak, he lends them ; if his company be requested for a mile, he will go two ; if hated, he must love ; if cursed, he must bless ; if persecuted, he must pray for his persecutors. For mere anger our doctrine threatens the punishment of eternal fire.¹ How then can we, as possessors of such a doctrine, be one and all guilty of offences which ye yourselves declare to be detestable?² Our lives also serve to contradict, in the most convincing manner, these abominable imputations. Our Christian communion, everywhere, counts among its members persons of both sexes, sixty or seventy years old, who, from childhood, have been the disciples of Christ, (οἱ ἐκ παιδων ἐμαθητεύθησαν τῷ Χριστῷ,) and continue unpolluted;³ no one among us enters the marriage life unless for the purpose of bringing up a family ; and if we decline marriage, we practise perfect continence.⁴ None of our people expose their new-born children ; for in case of their death, we should be guilty of murder ; or, if they survived, they would, probably, be brought up in vice.⁵ How, then,

¹ *Apol.* 1, 15, sq. p. 52, sq. (p. 62, C.—E. 63, B.)

² *Apol.* 1, 14, p. 52, (p. 61, D.) Theophil. *ad autol.* 3, 15, p. 389, (p. 126, D.) *ἐκείναι τοίνυν, εἰ οἱ τὰ τοιαῦτα μανθάνοντες δύνανται ἀδιαφόρως ζῆν καὶ συμφέρεσθαι ταῖς ἀδελφαῖς μήλειν, ἢ τὸ ἀδίστατον πάντων, σαρκῶν ἀνθρωπίνων ἰφάρτισθαι.*—“Consider, then, whether those who have been thus instructed could lead irregular lives, and indulge in unlawful connexions, or, what is most impious of all, feast on human flesh. Tertul. *Apol.* c. 45, T. v. p. 83, sq. 86. Arnob. *adv. gent.* 4, 36, T. I. p. 163.

³ *Apol.* 1, 15, p. 52, (p. 62, B.) Athenagor. *legat. pro Christ.* c. 33, p. 310, (p. 37, A.)—Minuc. *Fel. Octav.* c. 31, p. 120.—Origen, *c. Cels.* 1, 25.

⁴ *Apol.* 1, 29, p. 61, (p. 71, D.) Athenagor. *legat. p. Christ.* c. 33, p. 310, (p. 36, D. 37, A.) Tertul. *Apol.* c. 9, T. V. p. 23. *Apol.* 1, 29, p. 61, (p. 71, D. E.)

⁵ *Apol.* 1, 27, p. 60, (p. 70, C. D.)—1, 29, p. 61, (p. 71,

can it be supposed, that we, who are so careful in whatever relates to the intercourse of the sexes, can take pleasure in the shedding the blood of innocent children, or in unnatural lusts? Moreover, the cheerfulness and fortitude with which we suffer the loss of property, and life itself, for our faith, is a sufficient evidence of our blameless morals. In most cases, a single word of abjuration would save us from the torture and death which awaits our confession, and yet we would rather die than utter a falsehood. How can any one commit crimes like those which are imputed to us, in whom the dread of falsehood is stronger than the dread of death?¹ How can a man, who is a debauchee and a cannibal, meet death with composure, when he knows it will deprive him of all his enjoyments? Will he not rather strive to live, if it were possible, for ever on earth? Will he not seek, by all means, to escape human judges, instead of voluntarily surrendering himself into their hands?²

With the charges of atheism and laxity of morals the heathen connect the accusation of endangering the state, the two first, in fact, include the latter.³ Re-

D. *Epist. ad Diognet.* c. 5, p. 236, (p. 497, B.) Athenag. *leg. p. Christ.* c. 35, p. 312, p. 38, C. D.)—Tertul. *Apol.* c. 9, p. 22.—Lactant. *institut. divin.* 6, 20.

¹ *Apol.* 1, 8, p. 47, (p. 57, A.); 1, 39, p. 67, (p. 78, B. C.)

² *Apol.* 2, 12, p. 96, (p. 50, A. B.) At the close of the larger Apology, Justin annexes to his vindication of the Christians, against the charge of secret immorality, a short description of the object and nature of their social meetings, in order to eradicate suspicion from the minds of their adversaries, and to show that not sensual indulgence, but the worship of God was the basis and secret of their assemblies. He begins his account in the following manner, *Apol.* 1, 61, p. 79, (p. 93, D.) *ὅς τε πόσον ἀνιδήκαμεν ἑαυτοὺς τῷ Θεῷ, καὶ ποικιλοῖς διὰ τοῦ Χριστοῦ, ἐξηγησόμεθα· ὥστε μὴ εὖτε παραλιπόντες δόξαμεν ποικηλῶς τι ἐν τῷ ἐξηγήσει.*—"In what manner we consecrate ourselves to God, having been renewed by Christ, we will describe; lest by passing this over, we appear to have acted unfairly in our narration."

³ Kortholdt, *de calumniis paganorum in veteres Christianos sparsis*, p. 173. *De vita et moribus Christianes primav. per*

ligion and politics, among the ancients and (the Romans especially) were closely interwoven; the arrangements and oversight of the religious cultus were regarded as a department of the general government; the worship of the acknowledged gods was a law of the state, and the duty of every citizen. An essential alteration of the existing cultus seemed, therefore, to threaten and shake the foundation of the state;¹ an offence against the established religion was an offence against the state itself; a refusal to observe religious ceremonies in the customary and legalised manner involved the idea of opposition to civil order; a rebel against the gods was, at the same time, a rebel against terrestrial powers. Also the secret immoralities with which the Christians were charged, must have made the continued existence of the new sect appear highly dangerous to the ruling powers. For certainly those persons could not be considered good citizens, who reckoned as one of their mysteries the feasting on human flesh; little advantage to the state could be expected from those who violated the most sacred laws of nature, and who, with reckless libertinism, broke through the fences of chastity and good morals.

gentilium malitium affectes, p. 78, 84. Tzschirner, *Geschichte der Apologetik*, I. 218, 330; *Fall des Heidenthums*, I. 231, 246.

¹ Dio-Cassius, *histor. roman.* 52, 36. τοὺς ἐπιζοντας τι περὶ αὐτὰ (θεῶν) καὶ μίση καὶ πολεμῶ, μὴ μόνον τῶν θεῶν ἵνα, ἀν καταφρονήσας οὐδ' ἄλλου ἂν τινος προτιμήσιν, ἀλλ' ὅτι καινὰ τινα δαιμόνια εἰσαγεῖν ἀντιυφίροντες πολλοὺς ἀναπειθουσιν ἁλλοτρινομένῃ· καὶ τοῦτον καὶ συνωμοσίαι καὶ συστάσεις ἱταρῶναι τι γίγνεται, ἅπερ ἥμισυ μοταρχία συμφέρει· μήτ' οὖν ἀθίω τι καὶ μήτε γόνει συγχωρήσας εἶναι.—

"Hate and punish those who introduce novel opinions concerning the deity; not on account of the gods alone, (though, if they are despised, no other being will be held in much esteem), but because persons who introduce new divinities in place of those already acknowledged, persuade numbers to adopt foreign institutions; and, in consequence, combinations, cabals, and secret societies are formed, which are highly injurious to a monarchy; therefore you will not allow an atheist or a magician to exist."

Athenagoras was doubtless justified in attributing to the inventors and propagators of these accusations the secret intention of rendering the Christians politically obnoxious to the emperors.¹ But there were several other circumstances, which gave a degree of plausibility to the political suspicions entertained by the heathen against the Christians. The separation of these new religionists from intercourse with the heathen,—their withdrawal from so many occupations of civil life, their silence on occasions of public rejoicings, betokened not only an unwarrantable apathy in civil concerns, but even a secret misanthropy. According to Tacitus the investigations respecting them in Nero's reign led to the result that the Christians were the enemies of the human race.² What hopes could the state entertain of such men? The secret meetings of the Christians were in direct violation of the laws against secret associations,³ or at least were considered to be so. For, though the law did not directly apply to meetings for religious objects, what pledge could be given that the meetings of Christians were purely religious? The Christians assembled (necessarily) by night; but nightly meetings were absolutely forbidden; for, from time immemorial, night had been the time for concocting treasonable designs and conspiracies. Who could help suspecting that the Christians also were busied in dangerous political schemes? The disinclination of Christians to undertake public offices, their unconditional refusal to take judicial oaths, their not unfrequent unwillingness to take the sword in defence of their country, seemed to justify the apprehen-

¹ *Legat. pro Christ.* c. 31, p. 308, (p. 35, A.)

² *Annal.* xv. 44. Compare Tertull. *Apol.* c. 37, T. V. p. 71, sed hostes maluistis vocare generis humani.

³ Trajan first issued such an edict, and was so determined an enemy of secret associations, that he would not allow, in Nicomedia, the formation of a society of 150 workmen to guard the city against fire. Plin. *Epist.* x. 42, and x. 97. See Augusti's *Handbuch der Christlichen Archäologie*, I. 41. II. 563.

sion that the downfall of the state would be hastened in proportion as the Christian community became more extensive. Celsus says, "If we were all to imitate you, the emperor would be left almost alone and forsaken, and the earth would become the prey of impious and savage barbarians."¹ The unbending firmness with which Christians refused all participation in acts of idolatry which were combined with the grossest flattery and servility towards the Roman emperors, strengthened not a little the political odium under which they lay. That the Christians could be kept back by purely religious scruples from honouring the emperors as divinities, consecrating to them temples and altars, bringing offerings and libations, incense and lights to their statues, and swearing by their genius, was so much the more incomprehensible to the heathen, since they themselves regarded the whole external cultus of religion merely as a ceremony, which might be treated with secret ridicule: in the refusal of the Christians they could perceive nothing but a culpable obstinacy,² or a wan-

¹ The oath by the protecting genius, or by the fortune of the emperor, belonged in the Roman empire from the time of Augustus to the customary forms of adjuration, and maintained such importance that Tertullian could say (*Apol.* c. 28, T. V. p. 61.) *citius apud vos per omnes Deos, quam per unum genium Cæsaris pejeratur*.—"You would sooner perjure yourselves by all the gods than by the genius of Cæsar alone."—Compare *Evangel. Nicodem.* c. 1, in *Thilo. cod. apoc.* N. Ti. I. p. 516, c. 2, p. 582, and *Sozomen. Hist. Eccles.* 9, 7, p. 809. (ed. Vales.) The Christians were in a proportionable degree opposed to the use of it, besides being in general averse from swearing. Origen, c. *Cels.* 8, 65, T. I. p. 790. *τύχην μὴ τι βασιλῆως οὐκ δευνομεν, ὡς οὐδ' ἄλλον νομιζόμενοι θεόν*.—"We do not swear by the fortune of a king, any more than by any other supposed divinity."—*Exhort. ad Mart.* c. 7, p. 278, *σηλῆς οὐκ ἐμάργηται ἀπαινοῦμεν τὸν, τὸ ἐμῶναι τύχην τινός*;—"what an offence it must be thought, to swear by the fortune of a person?"—Hence the usual requisition made by the heathen judges at their tribunals: *ἔμμεν ἐν τῇ Καισαρί; τύχην*. Swear by the fortune of Cæsar!—*Euseb. Hist. Eccles.* iv 15, T. i. p. 349.

² Thus the Irenarch Herod addressed Bishop Polycarp,

ton insult of the imperial majesty,¹ amounting to a haughty rebellion against the supreme power, and a sign of secret hostility against the government and the state.² Lastly, the hope of the impending fall of the Roman empire, with which many of the early Christians deceived themselves,³ and their language respecting the future reign of Christ, which was misunderstood and taken in a political sense,⁴ heightened the

when he was brought before the proconsul's tribunal. Euseb. *hist. eccles.* iv. 15, p. 348, τί γὰρ κακόν ἐστιν εἰπῶν, Κύριε Καίσαρ, καὶ θύραι καὶ διασώζεις.—"For what harm is there in saying, Lord Cæsar, and in sacrificing and saving your life?"—Plin. *Epistol.* x. 97, neque dubitabam, qualecunque esset quod faterentur, perviciaciam certe et inflexibilem obstinationem debere puniri.—"Nor did I doubt, whatever might be confessed, that stubbornness and inflexible obstinacy ought to be punished."—Tertull. *ad nat.* 1, 17, T. v. p. 126.

¹ Tertull. *Apol.* c. 10, T. v. p. 23.—c. 28, p. 61.—c. 29, p. 62.

² Tertull. *Apol.* c. 35, p. 67.

³ The author of the Sybilline Oracles expresses this hope in very decided and unequivocal terms: Sibyll. *oracul.* 1, 4, p. 538, sq. 1, 5, p. 575, sq. 578, particularly in 1, 8, p. 679, sq. 687, sqq. 692, sqq. This was felt by most of the Millenarians, only they did not all explicitly avow it, and in general connected it with the second coming of Christ. Justin does not speak indeed of the speedy overthrow of the Roman government, but he necessarily implies it, since he considered the second coming of Christ as nigh at hand. Thus he addresses the Jews, *Dial. c. Tr.* c. 28, p. 126, (p. 245, C.); μὴ ἀπειροδισθε μὴδὲ διατάζετε πιστεύσαι τῷ ἀπειρομήτῳ ἡμοῖ βραχύς οὗτος ἡμῖν περιλείπεται προσήλυτος χρόνος· ἰὰν φθάσῃ ὁ Χριστὸς ἰλθεῖν, μάτην μετανοήσετε.—"Do not procrastinate nor hesitate to believe me, though one of the uncircumcised; a brief interval only remains for your passing over to our faith; should Christ come before you are aware, in vain would you then repent!"—Kopke *de statu et conditione Christianorum sub imperatoribus Romanis alterius p. Chr. seculi*, p. 3.

⁴ Justin. *Apol.* 1, 11, p. 49, (p. 58, E.) ὑμεῖς, ἀκούσαντες βασιλείαν προσδοκῶντας ἡμᾶς, ἀκρίτως ἀνθρώπινον λέγειν ἡμᾶς ἐπαίλασθαι, ἡμῶν τὴν μετὰ Θεοῦ λιγόντων.—"Having heard that we expect a kingdom, you suspect, for want of discriminating properly, that we mean one of human origin, while we are speaking of one that is divine."—Domitian, it is well known, had

suspensions of the heathen against them, and apparently justified their constant apprehensions, lest the security, and even the existence of the eternal city should be endangered by the Christians. Justin allayed these apprehensions, not by answering in detail all political objections against Christianity, but shows their groundlessness only in reference to two points, the kingdom of Christ and the refusal of Christians to pay religious homage to the emperor, and strengthens his refutation by the position that Christianity rather promoted than endangered, the well-being of the state. He admits that the Christians expected a kingdom, but adds in their justification, that it was not political but divine. As a proof, he adduces the firmness with which Christians professed their faith when brought to trial, though they knew that death awaited this profession. From this fact he draws the correct conclusion :¹ " if we expected a human kingdom, we should deny it in order to save our lives ; and we should endeavour to conceal ourselves in order not to be disappointed in our expectations, but since our hopes are not fixed upon the present, we do not greatly dread those who take away our lives, knowing that sooner or later death is inevitable." He repels the suspicion with which the heathen regarded the political feelings of Christians on account of their refusing to worship the emperor, by asserting that this refusal was entirely on

already been so disturbed by the information that certain relatives of Christ were still living, and that Christians were in expectation of a kingdom of their own, that he ordered these kinsmen of the Lord to be brought before him, in order to satisfy himself whether his fears were well or ill founded. The questions which he put to them, related specifically to the kingdom of Christ. Hegesippus in Euseb. *Hist. Eccles.* iii. 20, T. i. p. 227.

¹ *Apol.* l. 11, p. 49, (p. 58, E. 59, A.) *οἱ γὰρ ἀνθρώπων βασιλείαν περιδοῦμεν, πᾶν ἡμεῖς οὐκ ἐκ τῆς ἀναιρέσεως, καὶ λαοὺς ἀναιρέσειν ἐκ τῆς ἀναιρέσεως ὅτι τῶν περιδοῦμεν τυχόμεν ἀλλ' ἵνα οὐκ ὅτι τὸ νῦν τὰς ἐλπίδας ἔχουσιν, ἀναιρέοντων οὐ πιφροσύναμεν, τῷ καὶ πάντως ἀποθανόντι ὀφειλόμεν.*

religious grounds; that the Christians withheld this homage from Cæsar, only because according to their faith adoration was exclusively due to the Deity. In all other things they readily obeyed the emperor, willingly acknowledged him as their earthly sovereign and ruler, paid him tribute and taxes as punctiliously as any of his subjects, and supplicated the Almighty to grant him, besides the imperial dignity, wisdom and moderation in the use of it. All this they did in conformity with their Lord's injunction, "Give unto Cæsar the things that are Cæsar's and unto God the things that are God's."¹ But how little, in truth, the state had to fear from Christianity, how much rather its design and well-being would be promoted by it, appears at a glance, as Justin remarks,² from that doctrine of our faith, that

¹ *Apol.* 1, 17, p. 54, (p. 64, C. D.) Similar to this reply is that of Tatian. *orat. c. Gr.* c. 4, p. 246, (p. 144, B. C.) *προσάνατο φέρει τιλῶν ὁ βασιλεὺς, ἵταμας παρίχων· δουλείαν δὲ διὰ τῆς; καὶ ὑπεριτεῖν; ἐν τῇ δουλείᾳ γινώσκων. Τὸν μὲν γὰρ ἀνθρώπου ἀνθρώπινος τιμητίον· φοβητίον δὲ μόνον τὸν Θεόν*—"Does the sovereign command me to pay taxes? I am ready to pay them. Does the emperor command me to serve and obey? I acknowledge his title to my service. Man is to be honoured as becomes a man; but God alone is to be feared."—See also Athenager, *legat. p. Christ.* c. 37, p. 313, (p. 39, D. 40, A.)—Theophil. *ad Autol.* 1, 11, p. 344, (p. 76, D. E. 77, A.) 3, 14, p. 389, (p. 126, C.)—Tertull. *ad Scapul.* c. 2, T. iii. p. 169. *Apol.* c. 30, sqq. T. v. p. 62, sqq.

² *Apol.* 1, 12, p. 49, (p. 59, A—C.)—Clem. *Homil.* 4, 23, T. I. p. 655, *ὁ μὲν γὰρ πρὸς ἑαυτὸν ἔχων τὸν σκοπὸν, λατρεῖ τῷ λαθεῖν ταλμῶσαι ἁμαρτάνει· ὁ δὲ Θεὸν παντοκράτην τῇ αὐτοῦ ψυχῇ ἐμυσμένος, εἰδὼς αὐτὸν λαθεῖν μὴ δύνασθαι, καὶ τὸ λάθρα ἁμαρτίᾳ παραιτήσεται*—"For he who regards his fellow-men only, may dare to sin with the hope of concealment; but he who places God before his mind, as an all-seeing inspector, and knows that he cannot conceal himself from him, will avoid sinning, even in secret."—Tertull. *Apol.* c. 45, T. V. p. 83, sq. Lactant. *Institut. Divin.* 5, 8. *De ira Dei*, c. 8. How unintelligible and unpalatable the idea of an all-present and all-knowing Deity was to many of the heathen, may be perceived from the manner in which the heathen Cæcilius expresses himself. Minuc. Fel. *Octav.* c. 10, p. 32.

no evil-doer, nor covetous person, nor deceiver, not less than the virtuous, can remain concealed from God; but every one, according to the desert of his actions, will be consigned to eternal punishment, or obtain eternal happiness. For, if all knew and believed, that it is altogether impossible to conceal any thing whatever from God,—if all were convinced that God knows the thoughts and intentions, as well as overt acts, no one would yield to vice, even for a short season, but would rather practise self-control and be adorned with virtues, in order to escape eternal punishment, and obtain possession of divine blessings. It is always the supposition of the possibility of remaining concealed from human judges, which allures men to transgression.

Atheism, libertinism, political inefficiency and dangerousness, these were the themes of the heaviest complaints which the heathen raised against the Christians,—these were the special grounds on which Christianity was threatened with a war of extermination. But since the hatred of the heathens, once kindled, always sought for fresh aliment, it could not fail, that among the various particulars, on account of which the claims of Christianity to toleration were denied, many things would be brought to light, from which the inference would rather be drawn that the Christians were pitiable enthusiasts or unfortunate fools, rather than dangerous traitors.

2. Hence arose the reproach which was cast upon Christians on account of their outward lot. Justin notices this principally in his second *Apology*. He says,¹ “But if the thought should occur to any one, that if God were our helper, we should not, as we assert, be overpowered and punished by the unjust, I will explain this matter.” The heathen Cœcilius, in Minucius Felix,² urges this objection with much vehemence. “By your present lot, you do not allow yourselves to be convinced how much the vain promise (of

¹ *Apol.* 2, 5, p. 91. (p. 43, E. 44, A.)

² *Minuc. Fel. Octav. c.* 12, p. 35, sqq.

a future resurrection) deceives you : miserable men ! estimate what awaits you by your present condition. Behold ! the greater, and, as you say, the better part of you suffer from want and cold, destitution and hunger ; and God permits all this to happen, as if he saw it not : he either will not, or cannot help his votaries : he is therefore either deficient in power, or unjust . . . Threatenings, punishments, racks, and crosses, and these last not to be adored but to be actually borne, which ye both predict and dread,—this is your portion ! Where is now that God who can succour you, forsooth, when you rise from the dead, but cannot succour you while living ? Do not the Romans rule and govern without your God,—do they not possess the whole globe, and are even your masters ? But all the while you live full of doubts and scruples, and abstaining from every honourable enjoyment.” In the minds of heathens, particularly of the Romans, this objection had considerable weight. The power and benevolence of a deity was universally estimated by the ancients by the power and prosperity which he granted to his worshippers ; and inversely, the misfortunes of a people were regarded as a sign either of the displeasure or the weakness of the being whom they adored. The political catastrophe of the Jews, for instance, was adduced on numberless occasions by the Romans, as a proof of the disfavour in which they stood with the heavenly powers. This circumstance accounts for the zeal with which almost all the Christian apologists endeavoured to reconcile the oppressed suffering condition of their brethren, with the belief of a Divine Providence watching over their welfare. The methods by which they endeavoured to establish this harmony were various.¹ Justin here again had recourse

¹ Several of the Fathers, as Tertullian (*Apol.* c. 27, T. V. p. 60. *De fug. in Persecut.* c. 1; sqq. T. III. p. 133, sqq.) and Lactantius, (*Institut. Divin.* 5, 21, 23,) agree with Justin, so far as to trace to Satan or to dæmons, the origination of the persecutions of the Christians. But they attribute to them, equally or exclusively, an ethical and paedagogical character.

to demonology. The dæmons,¹ he reiterated, are the originators of all the troubles which befall Christians. Nor is it any wonder that the Christians are persecuted by these spirits, with such deadly animosity. Already in ancient times, those who had received a portion of the divine Logos, and strove to live agreeably to it, and to avoid evil, could not escape their snares; how could Christians hope to meet with forbearance, they who possessed not merely a portion of the prolific Logos, but the whole Logos, and lived according to the illumination derived from him?² Christ also appeared for this purpose amongst others, that he might destroy the power of the dæmons, and Christians carry on this destruction, since, throughout the world, and in Rome itself, by the power of the name of Jesus, many dæmons have been expelled from the bodies of men, of which they had taken possession.³ That the persecution of Christians is the work of dæmons, may be learnt from their qualities. They are full of artifice

They sometimes discern in their persecutions a chastisement for past sins,—sometimes a means of testing and exciting faith, —sometimes a discipline in steadfastness and patience, or in the Christian virtues generally. Some, as Clement, (*Strom.* 4, 11, 82, T. II. p. 321,) Tertullian, (*Apol.* c. 41, p. 80,) and Arnobius, (*Adv. Gent.* 2, 76, sq. T. I. p. 105,) deny that martyrdom and death are in general an evil to Christians: they rather esteem them as a good, since Christians are carried by them more speedily to God, the object of their highest aspirations. Lastly, some, like Lactantius, (*Institut. Divin.* v. 22,) dwell upon the fact, that by persecution the Church became enlarged. The steadfastness and cheerfulness with which, in general, Christians suffered and died, aroused the attention and thoughtfulness of the heathen; and the result of this thoughtfulness was frequently a passing over to the Christian church.

¹ *Apol.* 2, 5, p. 92, (p. 44, A—C.)—1, 5, p. 46, (p. 55, D.) *Dial.* c. Tr. c. 39, p. 136, (p. 258, C.)

² *Apol.* 2, 8, p. 94, (p. 46, C.D.) πάντας τοὺς καὶ ἐκινδύνισται κατὰ λόγον βιώνει σπουδαζόμενος καὶ παύσει φεύγει μισῶσθαι καὶ ἐνέργησαν οἱ δαίμονες· οὐδὲν δὲ θαυμάσιον, ὅτι τοὺς ὅ κατὰ σωματικὸν λόγον μέλεις, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν τοῦ παντός λόγον, ὅτι ἐστὶ Χριστοῦ, γινώσκουσιν καὶ θιγγάνουσιν, πολὺ μᾶλλον μισῶσθαι οἱ δαίμονες ἐλιγχνόμενοι ἐν ἐργασίᾳ.

³ *Apol.* 2, 6, p. 93, (p. 45, A.B.)

and injustice. The punishment of death is awarded¹ for reading the predictions of Hystaspes and the Sibyl, as well as those of the Prophets; but every one is permitted to read the unchaste and irreligious writings of a Sotades,² a Philanis,³ and an Epicurus, and to witness the representations and dances of the theatre:⁴ even to represent scenically, according to the tales of the poets, the indecent amours of Jupiter and his sons, is not merely allowed, but if performed with an agreeable voice, gains applause and distinction for the actors.⁵ The philosophers in many points agreed with

¹ *Apol.* 1, 44, p. 70, (p. 82, B.C.) κατ' ἐπίγνωσιν τῶν φαύλων δαιμόνων δόσεις ἐρίσθη κατὰ τῶν τὰς Ὑστάσπευ ἢ Σιβύλλης ἢ τῶν προφητῶν βίβλων ἀπογορευόμενοι πᾶσι δια το φόβου ποιοτέρας ἐκ πτουχαιοῦσας τοὺς ἀνδρώσεως τῶν καλῶν γούσιν λαβεῖν κῦρως δι δαλιούσας κατ' ἔχουσι.—The attempts of Cassaubon (*de reb. saccr. et eccles. exercitat.* 1, 11, p. 66.) Prudentius Maranus, (*prolegomena*, 3, 6, 1, sq. p. 84, sq.) and Fabricius (*Bibliothec. Gr. ed. Harl.* T. 1, p. 362, sq.) are well intended, but fail in giving such a turn to these accounts of Justin's, as will maintain the credibility of the writer, as well as the historic probability of his assertions.

² Strabo, *Geograph.* xiv. 41, T. V. p. 575, (ed. Siebenkees et Tzschucke) ἤρξε Σωτάδης μὲν πρῶτος τοῦ κιναιδολογῆν . . . ἐν ψιλλῇ λέγει.—Sotanes first began to discourse obscenely—in prose.—According to Athenæus, (*Deipnosoph.* xiv. 4, p. 620, ed. Lugd. 1612,) Sotades was a native of Maronea, and, next to his unchastity, was notorious for his slanders, which latter cost him his life. Patroclus, a general of Ptolemy Philadelphus, caused him, for having reviled him during his residence at Alexandria, to be enclosed in a leaden vessel, and thrown into the sea.

³ Athenæus (*Deipnosoph.* viii. 3, p. 335.) ἐς τὴν (φιλανθία) ἀποφρίσσει τὸ περὶ ἀφροδισίων ἀκούστων ἐν γράμματι. Tatian. *orat.* c. Gr. c. 34, p. 272, (p. 170, B.)

⁴ *Apol.* 2, 15, p. 98, (p. 52, B.C.)

⁵ *Apol.* 1, 4, p. 46, (p. 55, D.) With similar indignation, other Apologists animadvert on the indecency of the stage, and on the applause bestowed on the actors; *Theophil.* ad *Autol.* iii. 30, p. 400, (p. 149, B.) τὰς σιβαμίνους αὐτὸν (Θεόν) ἰδί-αζαν καὶ τὸ κατ' ἡμέραν δάσκειν ἐκ τῶν. ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς εὐφώνους ὑβρίζουσι τὸν Θεόν ἄβλα καὶ τιμὰς τιθεῖσιν.—“For hitherto they have persecuted, and daily persecuted the worshippers of God; while, on the contrary, they propose rewards and honours for

the Christians,¹—the Christian heretics assumed the name of Christians, as well as the genuine disciples of Jesus, and some of them, in the height of their arrogance, claimed divine honours; although neither philosophers nor heretics were persecuted, but only true Christians, the heretics indeed were honoured.² Christians were condemned and led to execution, not as being convicted of any crime, but solely on account of their name; and yet the name itself is wholly indifferent, nor can praise or blame be imputed to those who bear it, till their conduct is investigated:³ the

those who, with well modulated voices, insult the Deity,—3, 15, p. 389, (p. 127, A.).—Minuc. Fel. *Octav.* c. 37, p. 140, sq. Tertull. *apol.* c. 15, T. V. p. 32; *ad nat.* 1, 10, p. 118.—Arnob. *adv. gent.* 4, 36, T. I. p. 161, sq. Lactant. *institut.* divin. 5, 20.

¹ *Apol.* 1, 20, p. 55, (p. 66, C. D.) ἡ καὶ ἡμῶς ἐπὶ ταῖς παρ' ἡμῶν τιμαῖς ποικίλεις καὶ φιλοσόφους λόγομεν, ἵνα δὲ καὶ μυζήσῃς καὶ θασυρίζῃς, καὶ μῖνον μετὰ ἀποδείξεως, εἰ παρὰ πάντας ἔδικας μισήμεθα;—"If we utter sentiments similar to those held by the poets and philosophers, whom you honour,—and some things more fully and divinely, and exclusively with demonstrative evidence of their truth, why should we be unjustly hated above all men?"

² *Apol.* 1, 26, p. 59, (p. 69, D. 70, C.)

³ *Apol.* 1, 4, p. 45, (p. 54, D. E.) ἐνόματος προσωνυμίας οὐτις ἀγαθὸν ἔστι κακὸν κρίνεται ἂν τοῦ ὁποιοῦντος τῷ ἐνόματι πράττειν ἵπτι ὃ τῷτο δίκαιον ἡγάμεθα, διὰ τὸ δοῦναι ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς ἡλιγγόμεθα, αἰτῶν ἀφιστάει. πάλιν. εἰ μὴν διὰ τι τὴν προσωνυμίαν τῷ ἐνόματι καὶ διὰ τὴν πολιτείαν ἐξιστοῦμεθα ἀδικούντες, ἡμῶντος ἐγνωσάμεν ἵπτι, μὴ ἀδίκως κολάζοντες τοὺς μὴ ἡλιγγόμενους ἐπὶ δίκῃ κρίσειν ἐφλάσκει.—"Nothing can be decided either for or against persons, by the mere application of a name, apart from the actions that are performed by those who bear it. Since we do not think it just to ask for an acquittal, on account of our name, if we are proved to be evil, so, on the other hand, if we are not in fault, either for our name or our conduct as citizens, you ought to be on your guard, lest by punishing those who are convicted of no crime, you render yourselves obnoxious to justice. We find similar language employed by Athenag. *legat. pro Christ.* c. 1, p. 280, (p. 2, B.) c. 2, p. 281, (p. 3, C.) and by Tertull. *apol.* c. 3, T. V. p. 9, *ad nat.* 1, 3, p. 101.

emperors punish no other persons without due evidence of their guilt.¹ If a mere name could occasion and justify a legal sentence, the accusers of the Christians ought much rather to be condemned than the Christians themselves, for their name denotes goodness, and to hate goodness is never right.² It is also an unrighteous practice, that Christians who deny their profession before the tribunal are dismissed, as no farther guilt could attach to them, while Christians, who adhere firmly to their profession, are punished; since you ought rather to examine the lives of both parties and decide according to the result.³ This manifest injustice and partiality in their judicial proceeding against the Christians is enough to show that both

¹ *Apol.* 1, 4, p. 45, (p. 54, F. 55, A.) Tatian. *orat. c. Gr.* c. 27, p. 266, (p. 164, A.) Athenag. *legat. pro Christ.* c. 2, p. 281, (p. 3, B. C.) Tertull. *apol. c.* 2, p. 4.

² *Apol.* 1, 4, p. 45, (p. 55, A.) *καίπερ, ὅσον γὰρ ἐκ τοῦ ὀνόματος, τὸς κατηγοροῦντας μᾶλλον, καλᾶζεν ὀφείλιν· Χριστιανὸν γὰρ εἶναι κατηγοροῦμεθα· τὸ δὲ χρηστόν μισῶσθαι ἢ δίκαιον·* — 1, 4, p. 45, p. 54, D. *ὅσον ἐκ τοῦ κατηγορουμένου ἡμῶν ὀνόματος, χρηστότατος ἐπείχομεν.* — “Although as far as the name is concerned, you ought rather to punish our accusers. For we are accused of being Christians, but to hate the beneficent, (τὸ χρηστὸν) is not just.—As far as concerns the name of which we are accused, we are most beneficent.”—Several of the Fathers avail themselves of the similarity of the words *χρηστός* and *χριστός*, in order to evince to the heathen, the blamelessness of their name, though etymologically they refer *χριστός* to *χρῆμα*. See besides, Justin. *Apol.* 1, 4, p. 45, (p. 54, D, 55, A.) 1, 12, p. 50, (p. 60, A.) compared with *Apol.* 2, 6, p. 92, (p. 44, E.) *Dial. c. Tr.* c. 36, p. 184, (p. 313, C.) c. 111, p. 204, (p. 338, C.) Theophil. *ad autol.* 1, 1, p. 338, (p. 69, B.) compared with 1, 12, p. 345, (p. 77, A. B.). Perhaps this play upon the words was occasioned by a corrupt pronunciation of the Christian name by the heathen. Tertull. *Apol. c.* 3, p. 9, *sed et cum perperam Christianus pronuntiatur a vobis (nam nec nominis certa est notitia penes vos) de suavitatem vel benignitatem compositum est.* “But even when incorrectly pronounced by you *Christianus*, (for you are not well informed even respecting our name,) it is derived from sweetness and kindness.”

³ *Apol.* 1, 4, p. 46, (p. 55, A. B.)

judges and governors are under the influence of dæmons.¹ But, if the persecutions of Christians are the work of dæmons, they cannot serve as proofs that the Almighty does not concern himself about Christians. It is, indeed, with his permission that dæmons, and unrighteous men in their service, oppress and murder Christians; but all men must die,² and persecutors will find their condign punishment in everlasting fire. The fact that the dæmons, by the power of the name of Jesus, are already subject to men,³ is a pledge of the certain infliction of this punishment; and there is this good reason for the delay of the inevitable chastisement, that God will allow the overthrow and destruction of the world to take place not till all the souls have believed, who, according to his foresight, could be redeemed.⁴

The opposition of heathenism against Christianity, as already delineated, was exclusively founded on the effects which the new faith appeared to have produced on the thinking and acting of its professors. Its origination, as well as its nature, was entirely practical. It proceeded from popular observation,—it was supported by the impression of outward appearances,—without searching for any deeper grounds; it had and required no firmer basis for its justification than life and its necessities,—than external appearance and

¹ *Apol.* 1, 57, p. 77, (p. 91, C.)—2, 1, p. 88, (p. 41, D.) Origen. *c. Cels.* 4, 32, T. I. p. 525, 8, 44, p. 774.—Lactant. *Institut. divin.* 5, 21, non ipsi homines persequuntur . . . , sed illi spiritus contaminati ac perdit, quibus veritas et nota est et invis, insinuant se mentibus eorum et instigant nescios in furorem.—“Men themselves do not persecute, but those polluted and lost spirits who know and hate the truth, insinuate themselves into their minds, and imperceptibly urge them on to madness.”

² *Apol.* 2, 11, p. 95, (p. 49, B.) *ἐκ δὲ ὑπὸ ἰφθυμίουσα οὐδὲ δυνασσομένη ἡμῶν ἔσαν οἱ τοὶ ἀδίκαι.*

³ *Apol.* 2, 8, p. 94, (p. 46, D.)

⁴ *Apol.* 2, 7, p. 93, (p. 45, B. C.)—1, 28, p. 61, (p. 71, B.) *Dial. c. Tr.* c. 39, p. 136, (p. 258, A.)—Tertull. *Apol.* c. 41, T. V. p. 79.

its deceptions. It was natural that this form of opposition should be the first to present itself; but it was equally natural that opposition should not end here as its final form. From the observation of the Christian life the minds of men were directed to the contemplation of the Christian doctrine; after the populace and magistracy had passed their sentence of condemnation on the new institution, philosophy came forward with its opinion; the sentence, that Christianity was highly dangerous in its practical operation, was strengthened by the second impeachment, that its doctrine was unfounded, absurd, and destitute of all refinement. Justin, therefore, besides answering objections against the disposition and practice of Christians, had also,

2. To repel the attacks which were directed against Christianity as a scheme and doctrine of salvation. The apologist, on this subject, touches only two or three points.

1. The first concerns the late introduction of Christianity, by which the heathens endeavoured to set aside its exclusive claims, and to render its divine origin doubtful. "You yourselves," such was their language, in the times of Justin, to the Christians,¹ "admit that your Christ was born only 150 years ago, under Quirinus, and published his doctrine during the government of Pontius Pilate, consequently all who lived before that time were ignorant of your doctrine, and, notwithstanding this ignorance, were blameless. How can it now be necessary for us to conform to your doctrine?" However plausible this subterfuge might be, the answer with which Justin

¹ *Apol.* 1, 46, p. 71, (p. 83, B.) Celsus repeats the same objection, somewhat altered. *Origen. c. Cels.* 4, 7, T. I. p. 506. It was brought forward at a later period by the New Platonists, especially Julian and Porphyry. In reference to the first, see *Cyrrill. adv. Jul.* 1. 3. T. VI. p. 106. C. D.; and to the latter, Hieronym. *epist. ad Ctesiphont.* adv. Pelag. T. II. p. 172. Keil. *de causis alieni platonis recentiorum a religione Christ. animi Opuscul. Academ.* p. 423, sq. Tzschirner, *Geschichte der Apologetik.* I. 225, 342.

sets it aside is admirable. He brings forward his beautiful idea of the antecedent Revelations of the Logos. You are right,¹ he rejoins, in saying that our Christ was born, according to the will of God, in the time of Quirinus, but that time was not the beginning of his redeeming work. As the first born of God,—as the divine Logos, he was, long before that, among the earliest generations of men, active as a teacher; all men, Jews and Greeks, have experienced his enlightening and sanctifying operation; there were, in this sense, Christians before Christianity. Those who gave themselves to the influence of the Logos were Christians, even if they were called atheists; such among the Greeks were Socrates and Heraclitus; among the barbarians Abraham, Elijah, Ananias, Asariah, Mishael, and many others. Christ has, therefore, by no means appeared only in these latter days; he has been present through all ages: the early unacquaintance with the Christian salvation can furnish no excuse for later unbelievers; whoever in former times lived with-

¹ *Apol.* 1, 48, p. 71, (p. 83, C. D.) τὸν Χριστὸν πρὸ χρόνων τοῦ θεοῦ ὄντα διδάχθαι καὶ προσηνέσασθαι λόγοι ὅτι, ὃ πᾶν γένος ἀνθρώπων μίσηχε· καὶ οἱ μετὰ λόγῳ βιώσαντες Χριστιανοὶ εἰσι, καὶ ἄλλοι ἐκμίσθηναι οἶον Ἰνδοὺς καὶ Σουηότας καὶ Ἡρακλεῖτας καὶ οἱ Ἰμακοὶ αὐτοῖς, ἰν βερβάρους δι' Ἀβραάμ καὶ Ἀνανίας καὶ Ἀζαριῆς καὶ Μισαήλ καὶ Ἡλίας καὶ ἄλλοι πολλοί . . . ὥστε καὶ οἱ προσηνέσμενοι ὄντι λόγῳ βιώσαντες ἄχρηστοι καὶ ἰχθῆς τῇ Χριστῷ ἦσαν καὶ φωνῆς τῶν μετὰ λόγῳ βιώτων οἱ δὲ μετὰ λόγῳ βιώσαντες καὶ βιώντες, Χριστιανοὶ καὶ ἄφοβοι καὶ ἀτάραχοι ὑπάσχεσθαι.—The above quoted passage has had the misfortune to be almost entirely misunderstood, even lately, by Von Ammon, (*Die Fortbildung des Christenthums zur Weltreligion*. II. 115.) See the right interpretation in Credner's *Beiträge*, &c. I. 116. Justin's doctrine of the antecedent revelations of the Logos, even among the heathen, is repeated in a more finished form, by the Alexandrine Fathers, Clement and Origen. Clement's language respecting it is peculiarly beautiful, *Strom.* 6, 7, 58, T. III. (p. 133.) That there were Christians, if not in name yet in reality, before Christ, is also remarked by Eusebius, (*Hist. Eccl.* 1, 1, 4, T. I. p. 35.)

out the Logos, lived so by his own fault; by wilful enmity he deprived himself of the Divine light and life.

A second objection which the heathen made to the Christian doctrine, relates to the central point of Christianity—the doctrine of the person of Christ. "It is madness," say they,¹ "to give a crucified man the second place next to the unchangeable, eternal God, the producer of all things." "Lest any one meet us with the question, what should prevent, that he whom we call Christ, being a man of mortal descent, performed his miracles by magical art, and by this showed that he was the Son of God, we shall now give a demonstration."² Not only do they take offence at the divine honours paid to Christ, but especially at this, that it was the apotheosis of a crucified person,³ who was in no way raised above the limited sphere of common human life, and only as a clever Goëts, knew how to impose on the simplicity of his

¹ *Apol.* 1, 13, p. 51, (p. 60, E. 61, A.)

² *Apol.* 1, 30, p. 61, (p. 72, A.) *ἴσως μή τις ἀντιτιθείς ἡμῖν, ὅτι καλῶς καὶ τὸν παρ' ἡμῶν ληγόμενον Χριστὸν, ἀνδρωπῶν ἐξ ἀνδρώπων οὐτα, μαγικῇ τέχνῃ ὡς ληγομὴν δυνάμει πιστοποιεῖται καὶ δόξαι διὰ τούτου οὐδὲν θεῷ ὄναι, τὴν ἀπόδειξιν ἤδη ποιησόμεθα.*

³ All the known heathen opponents of Christianity have represented it as ridiculous and profane to worship a crucified person. Lucian sneeringly says, (*De Morte Peregrin.* c. 11,) *τὸν μέγαν ἐκείνον ἰσὶ σέβουσιν ἀνδρωπῶν, τὸν ἐν τῇ Παλαιστίνῃ ἀνασταλῶσιν.*—"They still worship that great man who was crucified in Palestine."—Celsus indignantly exclaims, (*Origen. c. Cels.* 7, 53, T. I. p. 732,) *τὸν βίῃ μὴ ἐπιήρητοτάτῳ, θανάτῳ δὲ οὐκίτῳ χρεώσμενον θεὸν τίθει.*—"You exhibit a God who experienced a life laden with reproach, and a most miserable death."—With expressions of contempt, Julian says, (*in Cyrill. adv. Julian.* l. 6, T. VI. p. 194, D.) *εἰς τῷτο ἦλθεν ἐλίδεν, ὅτι τοὺς αἰώνιους ἀφέντες θεούς, ἐπὶ τῶν Ἰουδαίων μεταβῆναι νεκρῶν.*—"They have sunk so low, as to leave the immortal Gods, and pass over to the dead one of the Jews."—Equally strong expressions of the heathen are reported by Minuc. Fel. *Octav.* c. 9, p. 29,—c. 29, p. 111. Arnob. *adv. Gent.* 1, 36, T. I. p. 23, and Lactant. *Institut. Divin.* 4, 16.

countrymen.¹ Justin perceived the bearing of this objection; and with all his characteristic energy set himself to answer it. He first draws a parallel between the heathen theology and the Christian doctrine of the person of Christ, in order to combat his opponents with their own weapons, and to convince them that, on the principles of their own theology, they were least of all justified in rejecting the doctrine of the Church as irrational. "According to your theology," he observes, "we are far from broaching a novelty. We only ascribe to Jesus what you believe and teach respecting your gods. Do we call Jesus the Son of God? He deserves, on account of his wisdom, even if he were only in the common sense a human being, to be called the Son of God; for all your writers call God, the Father of Gods and Men.² Do we maintain that, in a peculiar sense, different from ordinary generation, he was begotten of God as his Logos? We have this in common with you, that you call your Hermes the Logos, Interpreter, and Messenger of God.³ Do we assert that Jesus was born of a virgin? This may remind you of your Perseus. Do we report that Jesus healed the lame, and paralytic, and diseased from their birth, yea, even raised the dead? You will find in this a parallel to what you narrate of your Esculapius.⁴ Is it a stumbling-block to you that Jesus was crucified? Can you perceive no similarity to the

¹ The Jews reckoned Christ, even during his residence among them, as a sorcerer. See Justin, *Dial. c. Tr.* c. 69, p. 168, [p. 296, A.] Lactantius, *Institutt. Divin.* 4, 15, 5, 3. The author of the Clementine Recognitions, 1, 58, T. I. p. 501, and several apocryphal writers.—(See Årens, *de Evangel. Apocryph. in Canonicis usu historico, critico, exegetico*. Gotting. 1835.)—Among the heathen, Celsus makes this objection first, and most vehemently. Origen, *c. Cels.* 1, 6, T. I. p. 325.—1, 38, p. 356.—1, 68, p. 382. Compare, besides, Arnob. *adv. Gent.* 1, 43, T. I. p. 28, and Lactant. *Institutt. Divin.* 4, 13, 15, 5, 3.

² *Apol.* 1, 22, p. 57, (p. 67, E.)

³ *Apol.* 1, 21, sq. p. 56, sq. (p. 67, A. E.)

⁴ *Apol.* 1, 22, p. 57, (p. 68, B.)

sufferings of the sons of Zeus? Esculapius was struck with lightning; Bacchus was torn in pieces; Hercules ended his labours by mounting the funeral pile. The variety of modes of dying which these sons of God endured, proves that the peculiar mode in which Jesus ended his life, places him no lower than these heroes.¹ Lastly, are you surprised at Christ's ascension to heaven? For this fact we find analogies in your theology. Esculapius, Bacchus, the Dioscuri, Perseus, Bellerophon, all born of women, were taken up to heaven. Need we mention Ariadne, and others like her, who were placed among the constellations? And when your emperors die, do you not deem them worthy of immortality, and produce witnesses who affirm on oath, that they beheld the deceased emperor ascend from his funeral pile to heaven?² You have therefore reason to give us credit, when we teach that the Logos, the first-begotten of God, was begotten without any sexual intercourse,—that Jesus, our Teacher, was crucified, died, and rose again to heaven; for we only assert that of him, which you report of your gods.³ In

¹ *Apol.* 1, 22, p. 57, (p. 68, A.)

² *Apol.* 1, 21, p. 56, (p. 67, A. B.) Tatian severely censures the Roman custom of honouring their deceased emperors with an apotheosis, and ridicules the translation of men to the stars. *Orat. c. Gr. c. 10*, p. 252, (p. 149, D.)

³ *Apol.* 1, 21, p. 56, (p. 66, E. 67, A.) τῷ δὲ καὶ τὸν λόγον, ὃ ἴσιν πρῶτον γέννημα τοῦ Θεοῦ, ἀνὴρ ἱσχυρίζεται φάσκειν ἡμᾶς γενεῶσθαι Ἰησοῦν Χριστὸν τὸν διδάσκαλον ἡμῶν καὶ τῷτον σταυρωθέντα καὶ ἀποθανόντα καὶ ἀναστάντα ἀνιληλυθέναι εἰς τὸν οὐρανόν, οὐ παρὰ τοὺς παρ' ἡμῖν λεγόμενους υἱὸς τοῦ Θεοῦ. Δὲ καὶ καὶνόν τι φέρομεν. Tatian and Tertullian avail themselves of the same line of argument. The expression of the latter is well known; *Apol.* c. 21, T. v. p. 44. *Recipite interim hanc fabulam, similis est vestris.* The former remarks; (*Orat. c. Gr. c. 21*, p. 262, [p. 159, C. D.]) ὁ μαρτυροῦμεν, ἄνδρες Ἕλληες, ὅτι λέγῃς ἀπαγγέλλομεν, Θεὸν ἐν ἡμεῖς μορφήν γενεῶσθαι καταγγέλλομεν. Οἱ λοιδορῶντες ἡμᾶς συγκρίνεται τοῦς μύθους ἡμῶν τοῖς ἡμετέροις διηγήμασι.—“We do not act like fools, O Grecians, nor repeat idle tales, when we announce that God has existed in the form of man. Do you, who inveigh against us, only compare your myths with our narrations”—and after referring to Athenē who appeared as Dei-

drawing these parallels Justin took evident delight, since he traces them so much at length: yet he by no means laid great stress upon them; they only served as an *argumentum ad hominem*. The objective foundation, on which he based the defence of the doctrine of the church, relating to the nature, work, and sufferings of Christ, against the objections of the heathen, was the Old Testament prophecies. His sentiments were summarily expressed in the following confession. "We have found in the books of the prophets, that a Virgin would bear a son, who, when arrived at manhood, would heal all manner of diseases and infirmities, and raise the dead. Would be despised, rejected, and crucified, would rise from the grave and ascend to heaven, and would *be*, and would be *called* the Son of God, Jesus our Christ;" this forms the substance¹ of his Apology concerning the doctrine of Jesus, both metaphysically and historically considered. But we must for the present defer a full exposition of this argument, for which a more suitable place will occur.

Less important, on account of its dangerousness, (for the doctrine of the resurrection itself is not fundamental) than of its universality, and the violence with which it was undertaken, was the attack made by the heathen on the Christian doctrine of the resurrection of the body. No doctrine was so repulsive and incredible to the heathen as this.² They seldom assailed it with calm and serious argumentation, but almost always with banter and scorn. As soon as Paul began

phobus—to Apollo who fed the herds of Admetus, to Juno, who introduced herself to Semele under the form of an old woman, and further alluding to the death of Esculapius, the funeral pile of Hercules, and to the sufferings of Prometheus fastened to Mount Caucasus, he closes with the sarcastic request; *διότις αποβλιψαντες προς τα οικια αποκηρυγνόμενα, κἂν ὡς ἡμεῖς μυθολογώντας αποδείξωμεν.*—"Wherefore, having studied your own chronicles, you will approve of us as romancers in the same style!"

¹ *Apol.* l. 31, p. 62, (p. 73, A.)

² *Coh. ad Græc.* c. 27, p. 27, (p. 26, C.); ἀπιστημί η παρ' Ἑλληντιν ἀνάστασις.

to speak at Athens of the resurrection of the dead, "some mocked;"¹ Cœcilius calls the expectation of the revivification of bodies once reduced to dust, an old wives' fable;² Celsus—the hope of worms;³ and the antagonist of Lactantius—an airy and silly imagination.⁴ We shall see, said the heathen at Lyons and Vienne, when they cast into the Rhone⁵ the ashes of the martyred Christians, whether they will come to life again. "Point out one person at least," was the request of Autolycus to Theophilus,⁶ "who has been raised from the dead, and the sight of him will convince me." "So long an interval has elapsed," says Cœcilius, "innumerable ages have passed away, but what individual has returned from the shades, were it only for a few hours like Protesilaus, that we might have the evidence of a single example to confirm our faith?" Apart also from the incomprehensibility, and the presumed impossibility of the resurrection of the body, it was by no means an object of desire to a heathen, to return to his once forsaken body. Either his philosophy had taught him to consider death as the termination of all life, and in this case it is self-evident that he would look upon the resurrection of the body as nothing but an absurd fancy; or if he believed in the continuance of his individual being after death, he at least wished to be divested of matter: for matter appeared to him as a prison of the soul, and the

¹ Acts xvii. 32.—*Constitut. Apostol.* 5, 7, T. i. p. 306, *χλιναῖζουσιν Ἑλλῆνες*.

² *Minuc. Fel. Octav.* c. 11, p. 33, *aniles fabulas adstruunt . . . renasci se ferunt post mortem et cineres et favillas*.

³ Origen. c. *Cels.* 5, 14, T. i. p. 587, *ἀτιχινῶς σκολῆμων ἡ λιλπίς*.

⁴ Lactant. *institut. divin.* 7, 26, *tanquam stultitiam vanitatemque derident*. Compare Tertull. *ad nat.* 1, 19, T. v. p. 12, *ridete quantum libet stupidissimas mentes, quæ moriuntur ut vivant, sed . . .*

⁵ Euseb. *hist. eccles.* 5, 1. T. ii. p. 35, sq.

⁶ Theophil. *ad Autol.* 1, 13, p. 345, (p. 77, C.) Compare Justin. *Apol.* 1, 19, p. 55, (p. 65, D.) *διὰ τὸ μέγα ἰσχυαίαις ὁμῶς ἀναστάναι νεκρῶν, ἀπιστία ἔχει*.

stripping it off as the first step toward the true freedom of the psychical life ; to be released from it, was therefore an object of desire ; even those who held the doctrine of metempsychoses, regarded the lodgment of the soul in material vehicles only as a punishment. All were struck with the apparent uselessness of the restoration of a decayed body, and with the repulsive appearance of matter in a state of putrefaction : with such views Celsus declared,¹ " I will not deny that God can bestow eternal life on the soul ; but dead bodies, as Heraclitus says, are more despicable than dung, and the Deity has the will as little as the power to give immortality, against all reason, to flesh which is composed of materials that one can hardly bear to name." This incessantly expressed mockery and aversion of the heathen regarding the doctrine of the resurrection of the dead, kindled, among all the ancient Christians to whom the disputed doctrine was endeared, for more reasons than one, a proportionate zeal in its defence.² Not merely in their general Apologies, but in numerous treatises exclusively devoted to it, they sought to justify, establish, and recommend it.³ Justin bestowed upon it particular attention ; he not only defended it in his larger Apology, and probably in his lost treatise against Marcion, but devoted to it a separate Vindication, of which the greater part is come down to us in the well known fragment on the subject. This treatise, indeed, is not directed exclusively against the heathen, but enters the list also with the Christian heretics ; most of the objections, however, which he combats are of heathen

¹ Origen. *c. Cels.* 5, 14, T. i. p. 588.

² Eisenlohr (*argumenta ab apologetis sæculi secundæ, &c.* T. ii. p. 168, sq.) has collected some other reasons besides those mentioned above, which make it clear why the ancient Apologists so earnestly defend the doctrine of the resurrection.

³ Teller's *Fides dogmatis de Resurrectione per quatuor priora secula.* (Hal. & Helms. 1766,) p. 75, and Clausen's *apologeta eccles. christ. ante-theodosiani Platonis ejusque philosopha arbitri,* (Havn. 1817,) p. 122.

origin and character, and the weapons he employs are for the most part the same as those which are used in the larger Apology. There were four points on which Justin had to defend the doctrine of the resurrection.

First of all, the opponents of this doctrine termed it *absurd and contradictory*. They propounded the following dilemma: the body will be restored either perfectly with all its members, or imperfectly. If the first be true, then the functions of each particular member would be continued, and, consequently, the human race would be propagated in the same manner as at present. But this is not only absurd in itself, but contradicts also the express declaration of Christ, (Matt. xxii. 30,) that "in the resurrection they neither marry nor are given in marriage, but are as the angels of God in heaven." If the latter be true, this would imply weakness on the part of the Deity; for it would be a sign of weakness to redeem part from destruction and not the whole. It would also follow, that individuals would be raised as they were buried; the one-eyed with one eye; the lame with lame feet; the maimed with deficient limbs. But this is absurd, and therefore incredible.¹ Justin parries the force of this

¹ *De Resurrect. c. 2*, p. 589, *A. c. 4*, p. 590, *B.* Tertullian also partially examines the two members of this antagonist dilemma: *De Resurrect. carn. c. 57*, *T. iii.* p. 259, hinc jam illa vulgaris incredulitatis argutia est; si, inquit, ipsa eademque substantia revocatur cum sua forma, linea, qualitate, ergo et cum insignibus suis reliquis; itaque et caeci et claudi et paralytici, et ut quis insignis excesserit, ita et revertetur—*c. 60*, p. 263. ecce autem, ut adhuc controversiam exaggerent carne maxime eidem, de officiis quoque membrorum argumentantur, aut et ipsa dicentes permanere debere in suis operibus et fructibus, ut eidem, corpulentiae adscripta, aut quia constat discessura esse officia membrorum, corpulentiam quoque eradant, cujus scilicet perseverantia credenda non sit, utique sine membris quia nec membra credenda sint sine officiis.—"Hence that vulgar cavilling of infidelity—if, say they, the same substance be recalled with its form, outline, and quality, and, therefore, with all its other marks, then the blind, and the lame, and paralytic, and those distinguished by any particular marks will

dilemma by acknowledging the partial correctness of the decayed member. His answer is to this effect: the decayed bodies will be raised again in their full complexity, with all their members. This is proved by the wonderful cures which Christ performed on earth by the magic of his word. For when he cured the maimed, when he made the blind to see, and the lame to walk, he did all this with the avowed design to convince men that, at the future resurrection, he would restore the bodies of men to the full integrity of their members.¹ But though the body, at the resurrection, shall be in every respect complete, and none of its members be wanting, it does not follow, that all the members so restored will come into use in the future state; especially this will not be the case with that part of the bodily structure which is here required for the propagation of the human race. Here on earth many females are barren, and others, as well as men, strictly practise for a time, or all their lives, a voluntary continence.² Even animals are to be found, which, though

be restored exactly the same at the resurrection."—c. 60, p. 263. "But behold, as they have raised a controversy respecting the identity of the body, they argue respecting the functions of members, saying that they must continue to perform the same offices, or belonging to the same corporeal system, or, since it is evident that certain functions will be no longer needed, they obliterate the bodily substance of which the contrivance is not to be believed apart from its members, because members cannot be believed to exist without functions!!" Compare Hieronym. *Epist.* 27, *ad Eustach. epitaph.* *Paul.* T. i. p. 116, sq. *Epist.* 61, *ad Pammach.* T. ii. p. 117, sq. *Epist.* 65, *ad Pammach. et Ocean.* T. ii. p. 130.

¹ *De Resurrect.* c. 4, p. 590, C. *Dial. c. Tr.* c. 69, p. 168, (p. 295, D. 296, A.) These passages have been already quoted. Compare Tertullian, *de Resurrect. carn.* c. 57, p. 260.

² To this circumstance Tertullian also adverts in passing, when he wishes to refute the assertion of certain heretics, that if the human body be restored at the resurrection in its full integrity, its individual members must perform the same functions as they do on earth. *De Resurrect. carn.* c. 61, p. 266. Compare also Hieronym. *epist.* 61, *ad Pammach.* T. ii. p. 119, nec statim superflua videbitur membrorum resurrectio, quæ caritura sint officio suo, cum adhuc in hac vita positi nitamur

their structure is complete, do not propagate their kind, such as mules. Christ also has shown that the necessity of employing this part of the corporeal structure is only relative. He subjected himself to all the necessities of human nature, he ate and drank, and clothed himself, but never indulged the sexual appetite. He thereby evinced that the existence of the human body does not depend on the activity of that principle, as it does on eating, drinking, and being clothed. Christ, moreover, was born of a virgin; this birth had the special design to place a check to the indulgence of unlawful desire, and to show that God could form man without the intervention of the ordinary method. Lastly, Christ had expressly declared, that after the resurrection, mankind would not be propagated as at

opera non implere membrorum. But the peculiar and principal reason for which Tertullian held the restoration of the former body, with all its constituent parts, to be necessary, not withstanding the non-employment of several members, is *the Judgment; de resurrect. carnis.* c. 60, p. 264, *liberabuntur membra ab officiis, nec ideo non erunt necessaria. Licet enim officia liberentur, sed judiciis retinentur ut quis referat per corpus, prout gessit; saluum enim hominem tribuna dei exigit; saluum vero sine membris non licet esse, ex quorum officiis, sed substantiis.*—"Though the members will be freed from their present functions, it does not follow that they will be unnecessary. Though freed from their respective offices, they will be retained for judgment, that every one may report by the body how he has acted; for the divine tribunal requires the whole man; but he cannot be whole without its members, of whose substance, not of whose offices the body is made up." The future judgment serves the ancient Fathers in general, as one of the strongest arguments for the resurrection of the body, since they considered it unjust that the soul should be alone answerable, should alone receive good or evil, for that which it performed on earth in conjunction with the body. See Tatian. *orat. o. Gr.* c. 6, p. 248, (p. 145, D.)—*Constitut. Apostol.* 5, 7, T. i. p. 305.—Athenag. *de Resurrect. carn.* c. 14, p. 183. *Apol.* c. 48, T. v. p. 91. Not unfrequently the doctrine of the resurrection is grounded solely on the Judgment, so that Athenagoras found himself obliged to point out the insufficiency of so partial an argument. *De Resurrect.* c. 14, p. 327, (p. 55, C.)

present; "The children of this world marry and are given in marriage; but they which shall be counted worthy to obtain that world, and the resurrection from the dead, neither marry nor are given in marriage, neither shall they die any more, for they shall be equal to the angels." Luke xx. 34, &c.¹

But the opponents of the doctrine of the resurrection did not content themselves with rejecting this doctrine, on account of their inability to form a distinct and tenable conception of the nature of the expected resurrection, but they pushed this presumed incongruity to the extent of a physical impossibility. The restoration of a body once dissolved, they maintained God himself could not effect. Against this assumed impossibility, Justin appeals first to the almightiness of God. We maintain,² (he replied), that nothing is impossible to God, and are of opinion, that it is better to believe what appears impossible according to human nature, than to yield to unbelief with others; for Jesus Christ our Master has said, "the things which are impossible with men are possible with God."

¹ *De Resurrect.* c. 3, sq. p. 589, sq. It is remarkable, that Justin entirely passes over, in silence, the consequence which his opponents deduced from the words of Christ, "They shall be as the angels in heaven." We may here probably introduce the answer which Jerome gave to it, (*Epist.* 27, *ad Eustach.* T. I. p. 117,) "Quod si opposueris, quomodo ergo erimus similes angelorum cum inter angelos non sit masculus et femina, breviter ausculta; non substantiam nobis angelorum, sed conversationem et beatitudinem dominus repromittit." (*Epist.* 61, *ad Pammach.* T. II. p. 119,) "Angelorum nobis similitudo promittitur, id est beatitudo illa, in qua sine carne et sexu sunt angeli, nobis in carne et sexu nostro donabitur." Compare Tertullian, *de Resurrect. carn.* c. 62, p. 267.

² *Apol.* 1, 19, p. 55, (p. 65, C. 66, A.) This appeal to the almightiness of God excited to the highest pitch the displeasure and scorn of Celsus. Origen. *c. Cels.* 5, 14, T. I. p. 587. οὐδὲν ἰχθυεὶς ἀναστρέφεται, καταφύγουσιν οὐς ἀποπνεύσκει ἀναχρόσει, ἵτι πᾶν δυνατὸν τῷ Θεῷ· ἀλλ' οὐτε γὰρ ἀλεχθὰ ἰ θείῳ δυναταὶ οὐδὲ τὰ παρά φύσιν βούλειται. "And when at loss for a reply, they fly to this most absurd defence, that with God all things are possible, as if God could do anything base, or will what is contrary to nature."

Luke xviii. 27. Besides (he goes on to say) we must be more unbelieving than the heathen, if we do not allow to our God the possibility of raising the dead.¹

The heathen were convinced that these idols, which could not see though they had eyes, and could not hear though they had ears, could do all things, as one of their own poets, Homer, says: "The gods can do all things, and easily;" how then can we set limits to the power of God, since too, we have facts before our eyes which leave no doubt that God can do that which to us appears inconceivable and impossible? He created the first man on earth,—a most palpable proof assuredly, of his power.² Still more wonderful is the formation of the succeeding generations of mankind. Certainly, if we did not possess the bodies which we really do, and a painting of the human body were shown us, and the minute portion of the impregnating fluid necessary to produce it, we should think it incredible that, from such a source, so large a body, with all its flesh, muscles, and bones, could be developed. Every one would reject the possibility of such a formation. Nevertheless, incredible as it might appear, we know it actually comes to pass. In the same manner, though it seems impossible, God will call forth, in his own time, the human bodies that are laid and dissolved in the earth like seed-corn, and clothe them with immortality.³ Justin strengthens this proof of the possibility

¹ *De Resurrect.* c. 5, p. 590, D E.

² *De Resurrect.* c. 5, p. 590, E. ἰσχυρίζομαι τῷ Θεῷ ἅμην πιστεύειν, ἔχοντι τεκμήρια· καὶ πρῶτον μὲν τὴν τοῦ πρωτοπλάστου γίνεσιν, ὅτι ἐκ γῆς ἐκείνη διὸ γέγονεν ἰκανὸν γὰρ τοῦτο δι᾽ ἔργου τῆς τοῦ Θεοῦ δυνάμεως. Justin also alludes, in passing, to the creation of the world; *Apol.* i, 19, p. 55, (p. 66, A.) Compare *Constitt. Apostol.* 5, 7, T. I. p. 308. τῆς αὐτῆς δυνάμεως ἴσιν ἔργον, τὸ δημιουργῆται πᾶσι καὶ τὸ νεκρῶς ἀναστῆσαι.

³ *Apol.* i, 19, p. 55, (p. 65, C-E.) *De Resurrect.* c. 5, p. 591, A. The agreement is remarkable, with which almost all the apologists, and other writers of the ancient Church, adduce the creation of the first man, and the birth of all his posterity, as a demon-

of the resurrection of the body, founded on the divine power as far as it is manifested in the creation and propagation of the human race, by another, from the

stration of the power of God, and as a parallel to the future resurrection of the body. In their mode of conceiving this analogy, it is true, they differ from one another, and especially from Justin, but the substance in all is essentially the same. It may not be uninteresting or unprofitable to lay before the reader some instances of this agreement. Theophilus of Antioch, and the author of the Apostolic Constitutions, most closely resembles Justin. Theophil. *ad Autol.* i. 8, p. 343, (p. 75, A.):—"Αλλὰ ἀπιστοῖς μικροῦς ἡγίρισθαι· ὅτι ἴσται, τότε πιστεύουσιν θίλων καὶ μὴ θίλων· καὶ ἡ πίστις σου εἰς ἀπιστίαν λογισθήσεται, ἴαν μὴ νῦν πιστεύσης· πρὸς τι δὲ καὶ ἀπιστοῖς; ἢ οὐκ οἶδας ὅτι ἀπάντων πραγμάτων ἡ πίστις προηγίται; τίς γὰρ δύναται θιρεῖσαι γιωργὸς, ἴαν μὴ πρῶτον πιστεύσῃ τὸ σπέρμα τῇ γῇ; ἢ τίς δύναται διαπιδᾶσαι τὴν θάλατταν, ἴαν μὴ πρῶτον αὐτὸν πιστεύσῃ· τῷ πλοίῳ καὶ τῷ κυβερνήτῃ; τίς δὲ κάμνῃ δύναται θραπυθῆναι ἴαν μὴ πρῶτον αὐτὸν πιστεύσῃ τῷ ἰατρῷ; ποῖαν δὲ τίχνην ἢ ἱππιστήμην δύναται τις μαθεῖν, ἴαν μὴ πρῶτον ἰπιδῷ αὐτὸν καὶ πιστεύσῃ τῷ διδασκάλῳ; εἰ οὖν γιωργὸς πιστεύει τῇ γῇ, καὶ ὁ πλῖον τῷ πλοίῳ, καὶ ὁ κάμνῃ τῷ ἱατρῷ, σὺ οὐ βούλει σιαυτὸν πιστεῦσαι τῷ θεῷ, τοσούτους ἀρραβῶνας ἔχων παρ' αὐτοῦ; πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ ὅτι ἐπίσπῃ σε ἐξ οὐκ ὄντος εἰς τὸ εἶναι· εἰ γὰρ ὁ πατήρ σου οὐκ ἦν, οὐδὲ ἡ μητὴρ, πολὺ μᾶλλον οὐδὲ σὺ ἦς ποτε· καὶ ἱππασί σε ἐξ ὄγρῶς οὐσίας μικρᾶς, καὶ ἱλαχίστης βανίδος, ἢ τις οὐδὲ αὐτὴ ἦν ποτε." But you disbelieve that the dead are raised; but when it takes place, you will believe, willing or unwilling, and your belief will then be reckoned as unbelief, if you do not now believe. And why do you disbelieve? or, do you not know, that in all the affairs of life, belief (or trust) takes the lead? for how can the husbandman reap unless he first trust the seed to the earth? And what man can pass over the sea, unless he first trust himself to the ship and to the steersman? And what sick person can be cured unless he first trust himself to the physician? And what craft or science can any one learn, unless he first surrender and trust himself to the teacher? If, then, the husbandman trusts the earth, the passenger the vessel, and the patient the physician, will you not be willing to trust yourself to God, having received such pledges from him: in the first place, seeing that he has brought you out of not-being into being, for if your father and your mother once were not, much more were you not; and he fashioned you from a minute fluid substance, and from the smallest drop which itself once was not."—*Constitut. Apostol.* 5, 7. T. i. p. 3. 306. ὁ τοῦ Ἀδάμ τὸ σῶμα ἐκ γῆς ποιήσας, καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν καὶ τοῦ πρώτου μετὰ διάλυσιν

axioms of the Grecian philosophy. The systems of the various schools of philosophy, he observes, differ so much from one another—for, to name only the

τὸ σῶμα ἀναστήσει.—“He who made the body of Adam from the earth, will raise the body after dissolution, both of other men and of the first man.”—P. 308. ὁ ἐν τῇ κοιλίᾳ τὸν ἀνδρῶν ἐκ μικροῦ σπέρματος μορφῶν καὶ ψυχὴν αὐτῷ οὐκ οὖσαν ἐνδημιουργῶν.—“He who formed man in the womb from a minute seed, and created therein a soul for him not till then existing.” In a rather different manner, Tatian, Athenagoras, Irenæus, Minucius Felix, Tertullian, Lactantius, Hilary of Poitiers, Cyrill of Alexandria, and Prudentius, express themselves, and refer either only to the wonderful original creation of man, or merely to the continued wonder of human propagation. Sometimes they speak of the production of man as incomparably more difficult than the resurrection of the mouldering body.—See Tatian, *Orat. c. Gr. c. 6*, p. 248. (P. 146, A.) ὥστε οὐκ ἂν, πρὶν ἢ γινώσκειν, τίς ἦμιν οὐκ ἐγέννησεν, μόνον δὲ ἐν ὑστερότατοις τῆς σαρκικῆς ἕλης ὑπῆρχον, γιγνῶντι δὲ ὁ μὴ πάλαι, διὰ τῆς γενέσεως τὸ εἶναι πιστῶσταινα· τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ὁ γινώμενος καὶ διὰ θαύτου μηκέτι ἂν αὐθις τι μηκέτι ὁράμενος, ἴσμεν πάλιν, ὥστε μὴ πάλαι γιγνῶντι εἶτα γινώσκεις.—“For, not existing before I was born, I knew not who I was; and only existed in the first principle of fleshly material; and I being begotten who once was not, believe that I exist by generation; in the same manner, having been brought into existence, and through death no longer being, and being seen no longer, I shall be again, as formerly not having been, and then being begotten.”—Athenagoras *de Resurrect. c. 3*, p. 317, (p. 43, A.) Minuc. *Fel. Oct. c. 34*, p. 129.—“Quis tam stultus aut brutus est sit ut audeat repugnare, hominem a deo, ut primum potuit fungi, ita posse denuo reformari? Nihil esse post obitum et ante ortum nihil fuisse? Sicut de nihilo nasci licuit, ita de nihilo licere reparari? Porro difficilior est id quod non sit, incipere, quam id quod fuerit iterare.”—“For who is so foolish or brutish as to dare to dispute, that as man was first formed by God, so, by the same Being, he can be formed anew? that he is nothing after death, and was nothing before his birth? that, as he could be produced from nothing, so from nothing he can be reproduced? Moreover, it is more difficult to begin that which is not, than to repeat that which has been.”—Iren. *adv. hæres. 5, 3*, p. 295.—ὅτι δυνατός ἐστιν ἐν ταῖς τοιαύταις πᾶσι (ὁ Θεὸς) ἐκ τῆς ἀρχῆς ἡμῶν συνοῦν ἐφάλομεν· ὅτι λαβὼν ὁ Θεὸς χεῖρ ἀπὸ τῆς γῆς, ἀποίησεν ἄνθρωπον καί τις πολλὰ δυσκολώτερον καὶ ἀπιστότερον ἢ, ἐκ μὴ ὄντων ὁσίων τι καὶ νύκτωρ . . . καὶ τῆς λοιπῆς τῆς κατὰ τὸν ἄνθρωπον εἰκονομίας ποιῆσαι εἰς τὸ εἶναι καὶ

principal, Plato deduces the existence of the universe from God and matter, Epicurus, from atoms and a void, the Stoics, from the four elements, fire, water, air, and earth, which were pervaded by God : so that there are only two fundamental principles in the reception of which all agree.¹ These are : that what is, neither arose from nothing nor dissolves into nothing,—and, secondly, that the elements from which individual things are formed, are unchangeable. From these principles the resurrection of the body appears quite possible. If we adopt the Platonic view of the universe, then God sustains the character of an artist, and matter is as the clay, or wax, or what substance you please, in his hands. Now, as an artist can restore to its former shape a figure which he has made of clay or wax, and, after finishing, has destroyed again ; if he mixes the materials afresh, since the substance remains, though the form changes ; even so can God, (since He and the substance of which human bodies are made, are unchangeable) restore the body after it has been dissolved, and in the very form which it had before its dissolution. If we adopt the philosophy of Epicurus, then the universe is to be regarded as a whole formed by the accidental concurrence of atoms floating in space, and the human body is

ἡμψυχον καὶ λογικὸν ἀπεργάσασθαι ζῶον, ἢ τὸ γεγονὸς
 ἰσχυτὰ ἀναλῶθιν εἰς τὴν γῆν αὐτοῖς ἀποκαταστήσαι,
 εἰς ἰκτίνα χωρῆσαι, ὅθεν τὴν ἀρχὴν μηδὲν γεγονὸς ἰγγίνοι δ' ἀν-
 θρώπων.—“That God is possessed of power in all such cases, we ought to learn from our origin ; for God, taking dust of the earth, made man ; although it was much more difficult and incredible, to make of bones and sinews not yet in existence, and of the rest of the human organization, and to fashion into a living and rational being, than when what has been made is dissolved in the earth, to restore it again, after it has gone into those parts whence at first, when it was not in existence, man was made.”—Tertull. *Apolog.* c. 48, T. V. p. 91. sq.—Lactant. *Institut. divin.* 7, 23.—Hilar. *enarrat. in Psalm.* 63, p. 228, H.—Cyrill. *adv. Julian.* l. 7, T. vi. p. 250.—Prudent. *adv. Symmach.* 2, 194.

¹ *De Resurrect.* c. 6, p. 591, sq.

nothing but an aggregate of such atoms. Now as the body, on its first formation, began by the atoms of which it is composed voluntarily placing themselves in a certain order and position, so when the atoms have been again separated, and the body is thereby dissolved, nothing more is needful, owing to the indestructibility of these indivisible substances, but a renewed combination of these atoms, in their former order and position, in order to restore the body that has been destroyed: in a similar manner, a maker of mosaic work, if he has separated a figure composed of a number of small stones, needs only to collect together the scattered stones, and place them in the same order as before, in order to renew the figure he has taken to pieces. And lastly, suppose we adopt the leading representations of the Stoics, the human body will be considered as a mixture of the four elements. Now, as the body was formed originally by the union of these four elements, so after death, since death is nothing but the separation of the four elements, and the component parts are indestructible, it can be renewed without difficulty, in its first form, and the blending of the separated elements may take place as at first. In like manner a vessel of gold, silver, brass, and tin, is destroyed, by separating the various metals of which it is composed, and regains its form by pouring them again into the original mould. "How then," exclaims Justin at the close of this induction, "can the resurrection of the dead appear impossible, since, according to principles acknowledged by the heathens themselves, it is possible!"¹

Nevertheless the opponents of the doctrine of the resurrection might already have felt, that the assumed impossibility of that event was not perfectly certain;

¹ *De Resurrect.* c. 7, p. 592, C. *ὅ κατὰ τοὺς ἀπίστους οὐχ εὐρίσκται ἀδύνατος ἡ ἀνάστασις τῆς σαρκός, πόσω μᾶλλον κατὰ τοὺς πιστοὺς*;—"If, according to unbelievers, the resurrection of the flesh is not found impossible, how much rather according to believers?"

they sought, therefore, to strengthen their denial, by the farther antitheses, that the body was not worthy of a resurrection and reception into heaven; for, in the first place, it was of earthly materials, and consequently, must be the seat of sin, and hurry the soul into sin.¹ To counteract this undervaluation of the human body, Justin appeals to the scripture account of the creation of man, and the reciprocal influences of the psychical and material being. The human body, he remarks, is made after the image of God, as is evident from the declaration of the Creator, Gen. i. 26, "Let us make man in our image, after our likeness," taken in connection with the narrative in Gen. ii. 7, "And the Lord God formed man of the dust of the ground;" and all other creatures are destined for his service and use. No one would be inclined to deny that the flesh must be esteemed valuable in God's sight, since it bears his image; for his own image is dear to every artist and painter; and among all created things, this must be the most valuable, since other things were created on its account. It must therefore be absurd to maintain, that a work which bears the lineaments of the Creator, is worthless and useless.² And as to the other allegation, that the body is exclusively the seat and source of sin in man, it is untrue and unjust.

¹ *De Resurrect.* c. 7, 592, D. ἡξῆς λιπτότερον πρὸς τοὺς ἀτιμάζοντας τὴν σάρκα καὶ φάσκοντας, μὴ ἀξίαν εἶναι τῆς ἀναστάσεως μηδὲ τῆς οὐρανίου πολιτείας· ὅτι πρῶτον αὐτῆς ἔστιν ἡ ἐσία γῆ, μιστίπεται δὲ καὶ μιστὴ γίγνεται πάσης ἁμαρτίας, ὥστε καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ἀναγκάζει συναμαρτάνειν — "In the next place, I must address those who depreciate the flesh, and say that it is not worthy of the resurrection, nor of the heavenly state; because, first it is composed of earth, and next it has become full of all manner of sin, so that the soul is necessitated to sin along with it."

² *De Resurrect.* c. 7, p. 592, E. αὐτοὶ ἐκ ἄτοπον, τὴν ἀπὸ Θεοῦ σάρκα πλασθεῖσαν κατ' εἰκόνα τὴν ἑαυτοῦ φάσκοντες ἀτιμῶν εἶναι καὶ ἐδιδόσθαι; οἱ δὲ τιμίον κτῆμα ἡ σὰρξ παρὰ Θεοῦ δῆλον· πρῶτον μὲν ἐκ τοῦ πρὸς αὐτὴν πεπλάσθαι εἶγε καὶ εἰκὼν τῆς πλαστῆς καὶ ζωγράφου τιμίας γινομμένη, καὶ ἐκ τῆς λοιπῆς δὲ κοσμοποιίας μαθεῖν παρῆσθαι· οὐ γὰρ ἵκεν γίγναι τὰ λοιπά, τῷτο πάντων τῶ ποιήσαντι τιμιάτατον.

Body and soul are yoked together like a team of cattle; if their connexion be dissolved, they can as little effect anything in their isolated state, as one ox can plough alone. The flesh therefore sins in no case for itself alone, but always follows the leading and enticement of the soul.¹ But even supposing that the flesh alone produced sin; this would form a ground of hope for its preservation, for then the Redeemer has appeared in its behalf, agreeably to his declaration, "I came not to call the righteous, but sinners to repentance." (Mark ii. 17.)

By this last remark, Justin was unawares approaching, or more correctly speaking, actually combating the last argument which his opponents urged against the Christian doctrine of the Resurrection, namely, that the flesh had not the promise of a resurrection.² He carried on his refutation, by observing that the care with which the Creator had formed the human body, and the pre-eminence he had attached to it before all others, was a tacit promise of its immortality. Every artist and painter, he says, is desirous that the figure which he has completed, should be preserved to his honour; and if it were injured, he would renovate it. And shall not God be desirous to preserve his work from destruction? If that happened, how could he be clear from the charge of having formed the human body for no purpose. For certainly the work of

¹ *De Resurrect.* c. 8, p. 593, A. πῦ καδ' ἑαυτὴν ἡ σὰρξ ἀμαρτῆσαι δυνήσεται, ἰὰν μὴ τὴν ψυχὴν ἔχῃ προσηγουμένην καὶ προκαλεῖσθαι αὐτήν; Ὡς οἱ γὰρ ζῆντες βῶν λυθίντων ἀπ' ἀλλήλων τοῦ ζυγοῦ, ὑδίστηται αὐτῶν κατ' ἰδίαν ἄρῃ δύναται οὕτως ἐπὶ ψυχῇ καὶ σῶμα λυθίντα τῆς συζυγίας, καδ' ἑαυτὰ παῖσαι τι δύνανται. Εἰ δὲ καὶ ἡ σὰρξ ἀμαρτωλός, μόνος ταύτης ἵσταν ἡλθὲν ὁ σωτὴρ, καδὲς φησιν. (*Maro.* 2, 17.) It is worth while to compare what Tertullian says, *De Resurrect. carn.* c. 15, T. iii. p. 184, c. 34, p. 215.

² *De Resurrect.* c. 8, p. 593, B. λιατίον οὖν πρὸς τοὺς λίγοντας, ὅτι ἐὶ καὶ τὰ μάλιστα θιοῦ ποίημα τυγχάνουσα καὶ τιμία αὐτῇ παρὰ πάντα, καὶ ἑαυτῆς καὶ τὴν ἰσαγγιλίαν τῆς ἀναστασεως ἔχει.

an architect would be for no purpose, who, after building a house, pulled it down again, or suffered it to remain in ruins, although he could have restored it? But the supreme Intelligence is not chargeable with such folly; his creation of man is a pledge of the resurrection of man. Besides, the resurrection is peculiarly and expressly promised to the body. For when eternal life is promised to the man, it is at the same time promised to the flesh. Neither the soul by itself, nor the body by itself, forms the man, but body and soul united. Therefore, if man be called to life and to a resurrection, we are not to suppose that one part only is meant, such as the soul or the body is in an insulated state, but the whole man, consisting of body and soul.¹

The preceding statement contains, in brief, the essential points by which Justin attempted to meet the objections against the Christian doctrine of the resurrection. But so far his task was only half finished: to this negative development, he added a series of independent arguments, by which to establish, on positive grounds, the truth he had been defending. He inferred the truth and certainty of the resurrection from the justice and goodness of God,—from the idea of the resurrection,—from the design of Christ's advent,—and, lastly, from the resurrection of Jesus.

In reference to the first topic,—the justice and goodness of God,—Justin argues in the following manner: If the flesh were not to be raised again, it

¹ *De Resurrect.* c. 8, p. 593, D. ἵνα τὸν ἀνθρώπου ἐναγγελίζηται σώσει, καὶ τῇ σαρκὶ ἐναγγελιζέται. Τί γὰρ ἴσιν ὁ ἀνθρώπος, ἀλλ' ἢ τὸ ἐκ ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος συνετός ζῶν λογικόν; μὴ οὖν κατ' ἑαυτὴν ψυχὴ ἀνθρώπος, οὐκ, ἀλλ' ἀνθρώπου ψυχὴ· μὴ οὖν καλεῖται σῶμα ἀνθρώπος; οὐκ ἀλλ' ἀνθρώπου σῶμα καλεῖται. Εἴτις οὖν κατ' ἰδίαν μὴ τούτων οὐδέτις ἀνθρώπος ἴσιν, τὸ δὲ ἐκ τῆς ἀμφοτέρων συμπλοκῆς καλεῖται ἀνθρώπος, κίκληκε δι' οὗτος εἰς ζωὴν καὶ ἀνάστασιν τὸν ἀνθρώπον, οὐ τὸ μέρος, ἀλλὰ τὸ ὅλον κίκληκε, ὅτις ἴσιν, τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ τὸ σῶμα. Compare *Athenag. de Resurrect.* c. 15, p. 327, sq. (p. 56, B. 57, C.) Iren. *adv. hæres.* 5, 6, p. 299. *Tertull. adv. Marc.* 4, 37, T. I. p. 291, sq. *De Resurrect. carn.* c. 34, T. III. p. 215.

could be attributed only to envy and injustice on the part of God. For the resurrection is in itself possible, and the connexion between body and soul is most intimate: nor does the Gospel relate only to the soul; both body and soul have believed in Christ,—both have received baptism,—both have performed works of righteousness. But God is not envious, but gracious, and willeth that all should be saved; and he is not unjust; therefore no ground remains for doubting the resurrection of the flesh.¹ It would not ward off from God the imputation of envy and unrighteousness, if we were to say, “The soul is imperishable as a part, and an inspiration of God: in redeeming it, God redeems what is his own, and bears an affinity to himself; but the flesh is not of God, and therefore is liable to destruction.” On the contrary, this evasion would only render more glaring the want of goodness on the part of God. For he who redeems his own possession redeems himself: he who preserves a part

¹ *De Resurrect.* c. 8, p. 593. E. πῶς οὐκ ἔστιν, ἀμφοτέρων ὄντων κατὰ το αὐτὸ καὶ ἐν τῇ αὐτῇ. τὸ μὲν σώζειν, τὸ δὲ μὴ; Οὐκ ἂν οὕτως δι' ἐνός, . . . τὴν σάρκα ἔχει τὴν καλιγγισίαν, τίς ἢ δι' ἐκείνης, ὥστε τὴν μὲν ψυχὴν σώζειν, τὴν δὲ σάρκα μὴ; “Ἡ θῶν-
ρον ποιῶσι τὸν θῶν; ἀλλὰ ἀγαθός ἐστι καὶ σώζειν πάντας θῶν, καὶ δὴ αὐτῷ καὶ τοῦ πνεύματος αὐτῷ οὐχὶ μόνον ἤκουσι ἢ ψυχὴ ἡμῶν καὶ τὸν αὐτῷ ἢ σὰρξ, καὶ ἐκείνην εἰς Χριστὸν ἰησοῦν. Ἀλλ’ ἀμφοτέρω ἰλουσάντο καὶ ἀμφοτέρω τὴν δικαιοσύνην ἐργάσαντο. Ἄρα οὐκ ἀχάριστοι ἢ ἄδικοι ἀποφαίνονται τὸν θῶν, εἰ τῶν ἀμφοτέρων πιστευόντων εἰς αὐτὸν τὴν μὲν σώζειν θῶν, τὴν δὲ οὐ; compare Irenæus, *adv. hæres.* 2. 50, p. 159. “Si animæ perituræ essent, nisi justæ fuissent; justitia potens est salvare et corpora; quid utique non saluabit, quæ et ipsæ participaverunt justitiæ? . . . Aut enim impotens aut injusta apparebit in hujusmodi justitia, si quædam quidem salvat propter suam participationem quædam autem non.”—“If souls will perish unless they are righteous; righteousness is efficacious to save bodies also; how indeed should it not save those bodies which themselves partake of righteousness? For righteousness will appear impotent or unjust, if it save some things on account of participating its own nature, and does not save other things.”—2, 51, p. 160. Tertull. *de Resurrect. carn.* c. 8, T. III. p. 176.

of his own being only preserves himself, in order not to be deprived of that part. No one would call that man benevolent, who shewed kindness merely to his own children and grandchildren. For even the most savage brutes do as much as this, and even, when necessary, risk their lives for their young. And if Christ has commanded us to love our enemies, and has shewn us that true goodness consists in loving strangers as well as relations, has he not himself done what he has commanded us?—So that such a justification would charge God with weakness. For if the soul be a part of the Divine Being, it has the ground of its preservation in itself; indestructibility is its essential attribute. Therefore, if God saves only the soul, in so doing he performs no extraordinary act.¹

Next to the argument drawn from the divine nature, Justin based the certainty of the resurrection on the very idea of this hope. “It is not the spirit that falls,” (these are his words) “but the flesh.” When the soul forsakes the body, the latter is no more, for without the soul, the body has no life. But if the body falls, it also rises again; for the promise of the resurrection only relates to that which has fallen.²

This hope, he adds, is confirmed by the design of the advent and doctrine of Christ. That the soul will be immortal, while the body, after its dissolution, cannot

¹ *De Resurrect. c. 8, p. 594, A. B.*—Iren. *adv. hæres. 5, 4, p. 297*, quum dicant ea, quæ omnibus sunt manifesta quoniam perseverant immortalia, ut puta spiritus et anima et quæ sunt talia, quoniam vivificantur a patre; aliud autem, quod non alias vivificatur nisi illi deus præstet, vita derelinqui; aut impotentem et infirmum ostendit patrem ipsorum aut invidum et lividum.

² *De Resurrect. c. 10, p. 595, A.* ἀνάστασις ἵστι τοῦ νεκροῦ σώματος καὶ οὐ πάλιν τοῦ σώματος — Iertull. *adv. Marc. 5, 9, T. i. p. 317*, si resurrectio mortui est, mortuum autem non aliud est quam corpus corporis erit resurrectio. Sic et resurrectiones vocabulum non aliam rem vindicat, quam quæ cecidit. Surgere enim potest dici et quod omnino non cecidit, quod semper retro jecuit. Resurgere autem non est nisi ejus quod cecidit. *De Resurrect. carn. c. 18, p. 196, sq.*—*Constitutæ Apostol. 5, 7, T. i. p. 308.*

live again, had been already taught by Pythagoras and Plato. Had Christ, at his appearing in this world, promised nothing more than the continued existence of the soul, he would have announced nothing new. But he came, to impart to men a new and surprising hope; and new and surprising assuredly was the announcement, that not merely the imperishable would not perish, but that the corruptible would also be made imperishable.¹ And for what end did Christ lay on men the restraint of self-government, why did he require them to moderate their desires, if the flesh was not to rise again? In this case, would it not have been more advisable to give free indulgence to their desires, somewhat in the same way as a physician allows a patient the gratification of all his wishes when all hopes of recovery are lost, and as in fact is done by many who regard the body only a perishable corpse? But Christ, the divine physician, when he prescribes the abstinence of the flesh from its sinful lusts, gives at the same time the certain hope of its preservation, as a human physician imposes the denial of their inclinations on those sick persons, of whose recovery he still has hopes.²

Finally, the healing of the sick and raising of the dead, and the resurrection of Christ itself—Justin considers as pledges, that not only the soul, but also the body, will be raised again and preserved imperishable. If the flesh was of no profit, why did Christ heal it? And what is the most important, why did he raise the dead? And these dead—how did he raise them? Soul or body alone? By no means, but both together. Christ himself rose from the dead. Did he leave his body in the grave, and show himself as pure spirit? No. Christ arose in his crucified flesh, and thereby made it evident that the future resurrection would be not pneumatical, but a resurrection of the flesh.³ At first, indeed, his disciples took him to be a spirit, but,

¹ *De Resurrect.* c. 10, p. 595, B. C.

² *De Resurrect.* c. 10, p. 595, D. E.

³ *De Resurrect.* c. 9, p. 594, D. E.

in order to convince them that he had risen corporeally, he met them with the question, "Do you not believe? behold, it is I!" and thereupon allowed them to touch him, and showed them the marks of the nails in his hands. And in order to do away with the least doubt of his corporeity, he invited them to partake with him of honey and fish. And lastly, in order to prove by actual fact that the flesh could be admitted into heaven, he ascended as he was, before the eyes of his disciples, to heaven.

So much is preserved to us of the arguments by which Justin undertook to vindicate the Christian doctrine of the resurrection. It is strange, that among them one argument is wholly wanting, on which so much stress is laid by contemporary and succeeding fathers,—the argument from the analogies of nature.¹ It cannot be alleged that Justin considered it too superficial and unworthy of notice, for several of the proofs he adduces are not deeper or more weighty. We can only conjecture that it occupied a place in one of the parts where the Fragment on the Resurrection is defective, or in one of his treatises that has been totally lost. What Justin has given in the remainder, corresponds essentially to his object, especially if the antithetical part be taken into account; where the attempted justification is unsuccessful, the gross repre-

¹ This argument was brought forward by Clement of Rome, and even in the time of Epiphanius retained its ancient weight. The Fathers sought witnesses for the resurrection in heaven and earth, in the vegetable and animal kingdoms. The alternations of day and night, the change of seasons, the waning and waxing of the moon, the decay and renewal of the grasses, flowers, and trees, the decay of the grains of wheat, and the growth of the stalk, sleeping and awaking, the sickness and restoration of human bodies are the most common analogies of which they avail themselves. A great stress is laid by some on the supposed renovation to youth of the fabled Arabian bird, the Phœnix. See Clem. *Epistol.* 1, *ad Cor.* c. 24. *Minuc. Fel. Oct.* c. 34. Theophil. *ad Autol.* c. 13. Iren. *adv. hæres.* 5, 2, p. 294. Tertull. *de resurrect. carn.* c. 12, T. iii. p. 180. *Apolog.* c. 48. Epiphan. *ancorat.* c. 84, sq. T. i. p. 88, sq.

sentation of the resurrection of the body, to which Justin adheres like most of the ancient Fathers, with the exception of the Alexandrian, must bear the greater part of the blame. For he attempts an impossibility, namely, to maintain against all the objections to which such a scheme lies open, that the deceased body will be raised again in the full entirety of its substance, form, and members. In reference to the remaining points, the task of the Apologist was easier, and here his defence may on the whole be termed a successful one. Yet even here, we sometimes meet with erroneous suppositions and incorrect remarks. Thus it is only opposing one superstition by another, when Justin, to obviate the consequence which the heathen drew from the depressed condition of Christians, referred to the power of dæmons: thus it was a sort of pitiful makeshift when the Apologist attempted to meet the doubt raised against this reply, how this power of dæmons could be reconciled with the idea of the Divine Providence and the declared love of God for Christians, by remarking, that Christians only suffer the death which is the lot of all men, and that the dæmons at the future judgment will receive their merited punishment; thus it was a strange and superfluous notion that the dæmons were the special author of the slanderous reports which were circulated against the Christians. On the other hand, it was appropriate, when Justin, to justify Christians against the charge of atheism, appealed to the manifold mode of worship among different nations, and to the absurdity of worshipping dead lifeless images; and when also he specified the subjects which formed the materials of the Christian cultus. It was indeed suited to clear the Christians from the suspicion of gross immorality, that Justin pointed out how the Christians, if they had really indulged in the excesses imputed to them, had no ground whatever for concealing the truth, owing to the universality and openness with which the heathen practised similar vices, and the possibility of excusing such indulgences by the example of the gods; how their

guilt might be readily believed, but yet never proved, since the allegations of a few worthless associates, and the forced depositions of tortured slaves, wives, and children, could not possibly be received as evidence; and how the possibility of their guilt was taken away by the readiness with which the Christians died for their faith,—by the strictness of the moral doctrines to which they professed their adherence,—by the firmness with which they either apparently or really abstained from lawful things, and, lastly, by the object and plan of their so much decried assemblies. The political innoxiousness of the Christians was also put beyond all question, when Justin pointed out that the dreaded kingdom of Christ was not an earthly but a spiritual one, and that only religious scruples prevented the Christians from paying the same homage as others to the Emperor. Indeed, the assurance that the Christian doctrine of God's omniscience, better and with more certainty, advanced the objects of civil government, than all human laws, would favourably dispose the state-authorities towards the Christians. Lastly, what Justin said of the antecedent revelations of the Logos among the heathen, and the resemblance of several Grecian myths to particulars in the history of Jesus, was well designed.¹ The former justified the claims of Christianity to universality, notwithstanding its appearing at so late a period; and the latter silenced the heathen objections to the Christology of the Church. If we survey the collective instruments of vindication with which Justin repelled the heathen attacks on

¹ Hess,—*Bibliothek der heiligen Geschichte* (Frankf. u. Lpz. 1791,) I. 326. Some persons have regarded these representations as very unskilful, and, in fact, as a proof of the weakness of this apologist. But, if we only transport ourselves into their situation, nothing would be more skilful and natural than what he says of those who held the evangelical narratives to be incredible, and yet believed things of their gods which had a certain outward resemblance to the former, but yet went far beyond them in extravagance and strangeness. Here he attacked his opponents on their weakest side, and with their own weapons.

Christianity, they will be found, on the whole, not unadapted to realize the object which Justin wished to attain by them, namely, toleration for the Christian profession. The words with which Justin introduces his larger Apology might very properly be taken as a motto for this vindication;—"We desire that the accusations against us may be examined, and if it can be shown that they are well-founded, let us be punished, as is just, like other delinquents. Every reasonable person will allow that it is only an equitable and praiseworthy procedure, for subjects to give a straightforward and impartial account of their conduct and opinions; and that rulers should pass sentence, not according to violence and tyranny, but obeying the dictates of piety and philosophy, for then both governors and the governed would derive advantage; for one of the Ancients has somewhere said, 'unless rulers and subjects are guided by philosophy, states can never flourish.'"

But the admission of Christianity among the number of tolerated religions was not the final aim of Justin; in accordance with its destiny of being the universal religion, he desired, along with its toleration, the acceptance of the Christian faith by the heathen. He therefore laid down the weapons of defence, only to take up those of attack. With the vindication of Christianity Justin combined,

ARTICLE II.

THE ATTACK UPON HEATHENISM.

This attack did not comprehend everything in heathenism which was offensive to Justin's christian principles. He contented himself with striking at the enemy's vitals; he aimed solely at making good the position that heathenism, as such, was not in possession of religious truth; that error and deception constituted its essence; that, therefore, no one who de-

sired a true satisfying knowledge of God could continue in it. This ground of controversy was well chosen; if he were able to maintain it, heathenism would receive a fatal wound, and, sooner or later, its vigour must sink. In order to accomplish this object, Justin subjected the three sources from which the heathens drew their theology to a critical examination.

Who are the men, he exclaims, in his treatise against the Greeks,¹ who give themselves out for teachers of truth? Are they the poets? But can you deny that their theology is ridiculous, degrading, and demoralizing? It is ridiculous to teach a theogony, as your principal poets, Homer and Hesiod have done. Does not Homer assure us that the gods sprung from water?² It is degrading and dangerous to ascribe to the gods, as the same poets have done,³ human weaknesses, passions, and excesses. According to their representations, your gods are subject to the decrees of the Parcæ; the highest of them, Jupiter, cannot protect Sarpedon against Patroclus, nor Hector against Achilles, but must content himself with unavailing la-

¹ *Coh. ad Græc.* c. 1, p. 7, (p. 2, B.) τίνας, ὡς ἄνδρες Ἑλληνες, τῆς Διοσιβείας ὑμῶν διδασκάλους εἶναι φασί; τοὺς ποιητάς; ἀλλ' οὐ συνίστοι ὑμῖν πρὸς ἄνδρας τὰ τοῖς ποιητῶν ἐδότας λόγους.

² *Coh. ad Græc.* c. 1, p. 7, (p. 2, B.) ἴσασι τὴν ὑπ' αὐτῶν γαλοιστάτην περὶ θεῶν διανομίαν λυγρομένην. Compare c. 2, p. 8, (p. 4, A.) Tatian often speaks sarcastically respecting the Hellenic Theogony. *Orat. c. Græc.* c. 21, p. 262, (p. 160, A.) γίνεσιν ἔν λίγῃς θεῶν, καὶ θνητοὺς αὐτοὺς ἀποφανίσδε· διὰ τί γὰρ οὐ κύμα νῦν ἢ Ἑρα; πότερον γιγῆσκαν; ἢ τοῦ μνηστῆρας ὑμῖν ἀπορῶντι; Athenag. *Legat. pro Christ.* c. 18, p. 294, (p. 18, sq.)—Theophil. *ad Autol.* 2, 5, p. 350, (p. 83, A.)

³ The same charges, and, in part, supported by the same instances, are brought by most of the other apologists against the Grecian, and especially the Homeric, mythology. Compare Athenag. *legat. pro Christ.* c. 21, p. 296, sqq., (p. 20, C.—22, C.)—Theophil. *ad Autol.* 1, 9, p. 343, (p. 75, B.—D.)—3, 8, p. 386, (p. 122, B. C.)—Minuc. Fel. Octav. c. 22, p. 77, sqq.—Tertull. *Apolog.* c. 14, T. V. p. 31, *ad nat.* 1, 10, p. 117, sq.—Clem. *Protrept.* 2, 32, sqq. T. I. p. 27, sqq.—Clem. *homil.* 4, 15, sqq. T. I. p. 654, sqq.—Cyrill. *adv. Julian.* I. 2, T. VI. p. 41, B. See Stühr's *General View of the History of Ancient Myths* in Bauer's *Zeitschrift für spekulative Theologie*, II. 1, p. 83.

mentations.¹ The gods opposed one another in tumult and war;² and Jupiter could escape from the fetters designed for him by Neptune, Juno and Minerva, only by the help of the hundred-armed Briareus.³ Even mortals had the superiority over the gods, and could terrify and wound them. Mars wore, for thirteen months, the fetters which the giants Otus and Ephialtes laid upon him, and was wounded by Diomedes. The son of Amphitryon pierced Juno's right breast with a three-headed dart. Even the terrific Orcus received a wound in the shoulder from Hercules.⁴ On Jupiter rests the crime of parricide;⁵ he lighted the flames of war among the nations;⁶ he sacrificed thousands of Greeks to the wrath of Achilles on account of Briseis,⁷ and, by means of his daughter, induced the Trojans to violate their oaths.⁸ The females are countless with whom this father of gods and men had unlawful intercourse. The wife of Ixion, Danaë, Europa, Semele, Alcmena, and Latona, are named by himself in his quarrel with Juno.⁹ Beautiful youths, such as Ganymede, were the objects of his lust. In this he was imitated by Bacchus and Apollo; Venus also indulged in an unseemly passion for Adonis.¹⁰ These are the tales of your poets respecting your gods!¹¹ tales which are written only to corrupt and seduce those who hear them; for every one thinks it glorious to imitate the gods.¹² If, therefore, the

¹ *Coh. ad Græc.* c. 1, p. 7, (p. 2, D.)—*Tatian. orat. c. Græc.* c. 8, p. 250, (p. 147, C.)

² *Coh. ad Græc.* c. 2, p. 8, (p. 3, E. 4, A.)

³ *Coh. ad Græc.* c. 1, p. 7, (p. 2, E. 3, A.)—*Apol.* 1, 25, p. 58, (p. 69, B.)

⁴ *Coh. ad Græc.* c. 2, p. 8, (p. 3, C. D.)

⁵ *Apol.* 1, 21, p. 56, (p. 67, C.)

⁶ *Coh. ad Græc.* c. 1, p. 7, (p. 2, C.)

⁷ *Apol.* 1, 25, p. 58, (p. 69, C.)

⁸ *Coh. ad Græc.* c. 1, p. 7, (p. 2, C.)

⁹ *Coh. ad Græc.* c. 1, p. 7, (p. 3, A. B.)

¹⁰ *Apol.* 1, 25, p. 58, (p. 69, A. B.)

¹¹ *Coh. ad Græc.* c. 2, p. 8, (p. 4, A.)

¹² *Apol.* 1, 21, p. 56, (p. 67, C.)

poets are the sources of your religious knowledge, you must believe all the unseemly and degrading things which they narrate of your gods. But far from all sound minds be such notions of the gods! abhorred be the thought that the Lord and Producer of all things, Zeus himself, destroyed his Father, and, burning with shameless lust, corrupted Ganymede and so many females!¹ or must you content yourselves with a physiological explanation of your mythology? but then the gods cease to be gods, and you have no gods!²

But you yourselves reject the poets as mythologists, as Plato excluded from his republic the poems of

¹ *Apol.* 1, 21, p. 56, (p. 67, C. D.)

² *Coh. ad Græc.* c. 2, p. 8, (p. 4, A.) *ὁ πιστεύων τοῖς ποιηταῖς, τοῖς καὶ γενεαλογήσας τοὺς θεοὺς ὁμῶν, ἀνάγκη ὑμᾶς ἢ τοιοῦτους αὐτοὺς εἶναι νομίζειν ἢ μὴδ' ἄλλως θεοὺς αὐτοὺς εἶναι πιστεύειν.*—"If you believe the most distinguished of your poets, who have given the genealogy of your gods, you must either believe that such were their characters, or that they were no gods at all."—The allegorical explanation of the poetic mythology is not distinctly mentioned by Justin in this passage, but the alternative which he proposes points to it. This is rendered probable, by the universality with which the educated heathens attempted to soften or explain away the offensive parts of their mythology by allegorical interpretation, and by the almost universal agreement with which the Christian Apologists, in combating the heathen theology, took notice of the physiological explanation. Compare Tatian, *orat. c. Græc.* c. 21, p. 262, (p. 160, A.) *μηδὲ τοὺς μυθῶν μηδὲ τοὺς θεῶν ὁμῶν ἀλληγοῦσιν.* *Κἂν γὰρ τῦτο πραττεῖν ἐπιχειρήσῃς, θύσῃς ἢ καὶ ὑμᾶς ἀνηρηται καὶ ὅψ' ὁμῶν. Οἱ γὰρ τοῦτοι παρ' ὅμιν ὄντες οἱ δαίμονες; ὁλοῖσι καὶ λίγονται φαῦλοι τὸν τρέπον ἐσὶν ἢ μεταγόμενοι πρὸς το φυσικώτερον, οὐκ εἰσὶν οἱ καὶ λίγονται.*—"You will not turn your myths and gods to allegory. For if you attempt to do so, you destroy your deities with your own hands. For these dæmons, if such as you describe, are vicious; and if transferred to natural objects, they are not what you assert them to be."—*Athenag. legat. pro Christ.* c. 22, p. 298, sqq. (p. 22, C.—24, D.)—*Clem. Homil.* 4, 24, sq. T. I. p. 655, G. 2, sqq. p. 664, sqq. G. 17, 20, p. 668, sq. *Recognit.* 10, 30, sqq. T. I. p. 589, sqq. *Tertull. adv. Marc.* 1, 13, T. I. p. 20. *Arnob. adv. Gent.* 3, 29, sqq. T. I. p. 126, sqq. 4, 33, p. 160, 5, 32, sqq. p. 191, sqq. *Euseb. Præpar. Evangel.* 3, 1, sqq. p. 83, sqq.

Homer, on account of their seductive contents,¹ and allow that they have often wandered from the truth. With greater confidence you betake yourselves to the philosophers, and consider them as the purest sources of truth, and behind them entrench yourselves, as behind an impregnable wall.² But when Socrates, wisest of men, to whom the oracle solemnly accorded this title, earnestly maintained that he knew nothing; when he expressly declared, that the epithet of *wisest* was granted to him, solely because he avowed his ignorance, while other men concealed theirs under a show of knowledge,³ what could be expected from other philosophers besides ignorance and error? It is true, they demeaned themselves in general, as if they had seen the Deity with their own eyes;⁴ but the ridiculousness of their theories, which surpassed in extravagance the poetic mythology,⁵ and particularly the contradictions, in which they stood both with one another and with themselves, sufficiently showed that their philosophy was a false wisdom.⁶ They are not unanimous respecting any thing divine or human. If you ask, — What are the first principles of things? Thales would say, water; Anaximander, infinity; Anaximenes, air; Heraclitus, fire; Anaxagoras, infinite divisibility; Archelaus, the atmosphere, and its peculiar condensation and rarification; Pythagoras, numbers and their symmetry, the harmony contained in them, and the elements formed from both, unity and indefinite duality; Empedocles,

¹ *Coh. ad Græc.* c. 5, p. 10, (p. 6, C.) *Apol.* 2, 10, p. 95, (p. 48, D.)

² *Coh. ad Græc.* c. 3, p. 9, (p. 4, B. C.)

³ *Coh. ad Græc.* c. 36, p. 32, sq. (p. 33, C. D.) That Socrates made that confession, not ironically, but in earnest Justin infers from the words with which Socrates closed his Apology before the Areopagus: "It is true that we are going; I to death, you to longer life; but which of us will obtain the better portion, no one knows, save God." Compare Baur, *das Christliche des Platonismus*, (Tubing. 1837,) p. 148.

⁴ *Coh. ad Græc.* c. 5, p. 10, (p. 6, A.)—c. 36, p. 33, (p. 34, A.)

⁵ *Coh. ad Græc.* c. 3, p. 9, (p. 4, C.)

⁶ *Coh. ad Græc.* c. 36, p. 32, (p. 33, A.)

the four elements, fire, air, water, and earth, and the two fundamental powers, concord and discord, of which one united and the other separated; lastly, Epicurus says, that the first principles are atoms, not perceptible by the senses, hard, eternal, indestructible, indivisible, and unchangeable.¹ Do you ask after the nature of the soul, one of them tells you it is fire; another air; another intelligence; another motion; another breath; another an element of the stars; another number in motion; another a productive fluid. Some sought for the seat of the soul *in* man, others *about* man.² Even Plato and Aristotle, whom you give out for the most accomplished teachers of philosophy, the purest sources of true theology, are not free from contradictions.³ Plato excludes Homer from his republic as a liar, and the third copier of the image of truth;⁴ while Aristotle takes him as security for the truth of his doctrines.⁵ Plato lays down three principles of things, God as the artificer of the universe, matter as the material, and ideas as the patterns of all individual things; while

¹ *Coh. ad Græc.* c. 4, p. 9, sq. (p. 4, C.—E. 5, A. B.)

² *Coh. ad Græc.* c. 7, p. 12, (p. 8, C. D.) *Dial. c. Tr.* c. 5, p. 107, (p. 222, E.)

³ *Coh. ad Græc.* c. 5, p. 10, (p. 5, D. E.) It not unfrequently happens that Justin erroneously represents the doctrines of the philosophers whom he combats, especially Plato's; but this is not the place to point out his errors and correct them.

⁴ Plato's words, to which Justin refers, are in the Xth Book of his Republic, (c. 3, p. 315, Stallbaums's ed.) ὁ φίλος Ὁμηρος τριῖτος ἀπὸ τῆς ἀληθείας ὁ ἀρετῆς περί τινος ἰδωλοῦ δημιουργός (ὃν δὴ μιμητὴν ἀριστάμεθα.) Plato furnishes the key to understand these words at the beginning of the book. He there remarks: that every artist or workman forms the work which he completes, always according to the idea which God has implanted in him, and which alone includes in itself true being. The painter and the poet, who delineates an object, forms this not according to the idea, but takes the copy (*abbild*) of the idea, as the artist or workman has presented it, for a pattern; he never represents a thing according to its own true quality, but according to its outward appearance, he therefore stands at the third step from the idea which alone is the truth.

⁵ *Coh. ad Græc.* c. 5, p. 10, (p. 6, C. D.)

Aristotle speaks only of two, God and matter.¹ Plato places the deity in a fiery substance, while Aristotle discovers a fifth ætherial and unchangeable body, in which he supposes God to dwell.² Plato maintains that the supreme God dwells with ideas in the first immoveable circle of the highest heavens; while Aristotle, instead of ideas, places certain intelligible divinities nearest the supreme God.³ Also, in reference to the doctrine of the soul, Plato and Aristotle contradict one another. According to Plato, the soul is tripartite, and consists of the rational, the wrathful, the appetitive; Aristotle, on the other hand, denies that the soul is so composite as to have perishable parts, and attributes to it merely the rational faculty. Plato held that the soul is eternal, and that it is in perpetual motion; Aristotle considered it as mortal, though he calls it the active principle of life: and immoveable though the cause of all motion.⁴ Plato frequently contradicts himself. Sometimes he assumes that there are three principles of things, God, matter, and ideas; sometimes four, since he adds to the former the soul of the world; sometimes he considers matter as unproduced, and then, again, as produced; sometimes he ascribes to ideas substantiality and independence; sometimes he reduces them to mere images of thought; sometimes he considers all that is made (*πᾶν τὸ γεγόμενον*, *alles Gewordene*) as perishable; and then, again, he excepts something, to which he attributes indestructibility and incorruption.⁵ Thus you see the intellectual confusion of the men whom you have regarded as the possessors of wisdom; the opinions of your philo-

¹ *Coh. ad Græc.* c. 6, p. 11, (p. 7, B. C.)

² *Coh. ad Græc.* c. 5, p. 10, (p. 6, A. B.—c. 36, p. 33, (p. 34, A.) See Clausen, *Apologietæ Eccles. Christ. ante-Theodosiani*, p. 64; and Ackermann's *das Christliche im Plato und in der Platonischen Philosophie*, (Hamb. 1835,) p. 40.

³ *Coh. ad Græc.* c. 6, p. 11, (p. 7, C.)

⁴ *Coh. ad Græc.* c. 6, p. 11, (p. 7, D. E. 8, A.)

⁵ *Coh. ad Græc.* c. 7, p. 12, (p. 8, A. B.)—c. 25, p. 25, (p. 23, C.)

⁶ *Coh. ad Græc.* c. 4, p. 10, (p. 5, B.)

sophers form a perpetual series of contradictions.¹ How, then, can you think it safe to seek among them for the true religion, and to trust the salvation of your souls to men who have never yet attained to any unanimity of sentiment?² In fact, nothing true is to be learned from them; their books are full of ignorance and deception; the earthly, no less than the heavenly, is hidden from their view. It is well that their disagreement is so palpable, as to put it beyond a doubt that they do not possess the truth; for contradiction, and especially contradiction in first principles, is a sure sign of ignorance.³ If the discovery of truth be the end of philosophy, how can they, who have not attained the knowledge of truth, assume the name of philosophers?⁴ Their talent lies in an artificial rhetoric, by which they varnish and propagate their errors, falsify and repress the truth, and with a seductive power, like that of the fabled Syrens, draw off many from the true knowledge of God. Therefore the phi-

¹ *Coh. ad Græc.* c. 7, p. 12, (p. 8, D) ὅλος ἀτακτός τις καὶ ἀσύμφωνος ἢ παρ' αὐτοῖς κινεῖται διζῆα.

² *Coh. ad Græc.* c. 4, p. 10, (p. 5, C. D)

³ *Coh. ad Græc.* c. 5, p. 10, (p. 6, A.) εἰ καὶ τάς τε μὴ συμφωνοῦντας ἀλλήλους ἰδρῶμιεν ῥᾶδιον, οἷμαι καὶ τὴν τούτων ἀγνοίαν γινώσκων σαφῶς. — c. 35, p. 32, (p. 33, B.) ὅδιν, ὁδότης ἰλίγγονται, ὡς καὶ αὐτὰ ὁμολογεῖν καὶ ἄκοντες ἀναγκάζονται, δι' ὧν ἡ σὺν ἑστέῃ ἀλλήλων συνασιάζουσι μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰς ἑαυτῶν ἄλλοις ἄλλως ἐκτιθεῖνται διζῆα. Almost all the ancient Apologists object to the heathen the multiplicity and contradictions of their philosophical systems and schools, and hence draw the conclusion, that they were all destitute of true knowledge. See Tatian *Orat. c. Gr.* c. 25, p. 265, (p. 162, C.). c. 26, p. 266, (p. 163, C.) Theophil. *ad autol.* 2, 8, p. 353, sq. (p. 86, B.—87, B.) 3, 3, p. 382, (p. 118, B.) 3, 7, p. 384, sq. (p. 120, D.—121, D.) Tertull. *de Anim.* c. 2, T. iv. p. 183, sq. *Apol.* c. 47, *ad Nat.* 2, 2, p. 132. Lactant. *Institut. divin.* 3, 4. Euseb. *præp. evangel.* 14, 2, p. 717, sq. Cyrill. *adv. Julian.* l. 1, T. VI. p. 7, c. 28, E. 29, A. Clausen's *Apologetas eccles. christ. ante-theodosiani*, p. 163. On the other hand, the heathen did not omit to recriminate and reproach the Christians with the multitude of their sects and parties. See *Clem. Strom.* 7, 15, 89, T. III. p. 276, and Origen. *c. Cels.* 3, 10, T. I. p. 453.

⁴ *Coh. ad Gr.* c. 36, p. 32, (p. 33, C.)

losophers are anything, rather than competent teachers of religion ; and furnish no satisfaction to the religious necessities of mankind.¹

In the last place, you appeal to the oracles. But I need only remind you of one expression of these oracles, which I formerly heard repeated by you, to convince you of the futility of this appeal. It is this :—

The Chaldeans alone possess wisdom, and the Hebrews
Who purely worship God the self-begotten King.

Μοῦνοι Χαλδαῖοι σοφίην λαχόντες ἃς ἄλλοι Ἑβραῖοι
Αὐτογέννητον ἄνακτα σεβάζόμενοι Θεὸν ἀγνῶσιν.

Thus your oracles teach you to seek for true wisdom beyond the bounds of heathenism.² Whatever, therefore, you may pretend, your faith has never indicated a sure and infallible source of truth.

Against this mode of contemplating heathenism, which pursued its object with unwavering pertinacity, and shrunk not from the harshest conclusions, with which too, most of the early Christians agreed, an exception was naturally taken by the heathen, and as a refutation of it, they could point to the partial agreement between their philosophy and the Christian doctrine. An implied reference of this kind is contained in the assertion of Celsus, that whatever good belonged to the Christian doctrine, had already been better and more clearly expounded by the philosophers. And Justin was sufficiently open and impressible to remark, of his own accord, the manifold points of agreement with Christian truth, which were scattered through the writings of the Greeks, particularly the philosophers. These points must have been impressed more strongly on his mind, since he had become acquainted with many of the ancient poets, in which a

¹ *Coh. ad Gr.* c. 4, p. 10, (p. 5, C. c. 35, p. 32, (p. 32, D. 33, B). c. 36, p. 33, (p. 34, B.C.)

² *Coh. ad Gr.* c. 11, p. 15, (p. 12, A.B.)

Christian hand had introduced Christian ideas and maxims, in this interpolated form, without being aware of any such falsification. He therefore, of his own motion, dwelt upon this agreement between heathen and Christian doctrine, though apparently at least in contradiction to his previous assertion respecting the absolute ignorance of the Grecian poets and philosophers.

"Among all," he allows, "grains of truth are to be found;" and,¹ "Plato's doctrines are not throughout different from Christ's, but neither are they similar throughout; and this is the case with the rest, the Stoics, the poets, and other writers;" and again,² "some of our doctrines we have in common with the poets and philosophers who are held in honour by you; but in other things we have more elevated views, and worthy of the Deity." And not content with these general admissions, the apologist sets this agreement in a clearer light, by adducing specific doctrines. "If we maintain,"³ he observes, "that all things are created and ordained by God, we shall appear to deliver a doctrine of Plato's; if we say that there will be a conflagration (*ἐκπύρωσιν*), an opinion of the Stoics; if we assert that the souls of men will exist in a state of consciousness after death, that the unrighteous will be punished, and that the good will be happy, free from all suffering, we appear to express the conviction of your poets and philosophers; when we say that we ought not to worship the work of men's hands, we shall agree with the comic poet Menander, and others." To the Christian doctrine of the conscious existence of the soul after death, he presents as parallels, the heathen

¹ *Apol.* 1, 44, p. 70, (p. 82, A.) *παρὰ πᾶσι σέγματα ἀληθείας δοκῶ εἶναι*. Tertull. *de anim.* c. 2, T. iv. p. 182. Lactant. *institut. divin.* 3, 18, 20, 6, 24.

² *Apol.* 2, 13, p. 97, (p. 51, B. C.) *Apol.* 2, 8, p. 94, (p. 46, B.) *Στωϊκοὶ . . . τὸν ἡθικὸν λόγον κόσμῳ γιγνώσκουσιν, ὡς καὶ ἡ τίσιν οἱ ποιηταί.*

³ *Apol.* 1, 20, p. 55, (p. 66, C.)

⁴ *Apol.* 1, 20, p. 55, (p. 66, D. E.) Compare *Cohor. ad Gr.* c. 1, p. 6, (p. 2, A.)—c. 14, p. 17, (p. 15, A.) *Apol.* 1, 8, p. 47, sq. (p. 57, B.)

necromancy,¹ the inspection of the bodies of pure children, the calling forth of human souls, and those whom the magicians called dream-senders and their assistants—the opinion that the unhappy beings, who are generally called demoniacs and madmen, are seized and thrown down by the souls of the departed,—the trench (βέστρον. Od. λ. 25, 37,) of Homer—and the descent of Ulysses to see these things, while, for the further confirmation of the agreement with the Christian doctrine respecting the consummation of all things (or eschatology) he referred to the Amphilocheian, Dodonian, and Delphic Oracles, to the writings of Pythagoras and Empedocles, to Socrates and Plato.²

But, notwithstanding this acknowledgment of the agreement in many points of the heathen and Christian doctrine—notwithstanding the admission, that in the writings of the Grecian poets and philosophers, isolated fragments of religious truth are here and there to be found—Justin abates not one jot of the position he contends for—that heathenism, as such, was radically defective in religious truth, that it was a totally inadequate and unsafe guide in the pursuit of eternal happiness. In maintaining his position he carefully limits his concessions, by asserting, that those fragments of correct religious knowledge which were found in heathenism were not the independent results of free philosophic inquiry, but borrowed wealth, not produced by heathenism itself, but received from a foreign source.

Human reason, he affirmed, is in itself incapable of comprehending such great and divine objects;³ no one

¹ These various operations of magic are also enumerated by Tertullian, though for a different purpose, *Apol.* c. 23. On the nature of these arts see Grabe's remarks in his edition of Justin, p. 34.

² *Apol.* 1, 18, p. 54, (p. 65, A. B.)

³ Compare Theophil. *ad Autol.* 3, 2, p. 381, (p. 117, B. C.) and Lactant. *Institut. Divin.* 3, 1, loqui bene potuerunt (philosophi) ut homines eruditi; vere autem loqui nullo modo, quia veritatem non didicerant ab eo qui ejus potens est. Ten-neman, *Geschichte der Philosophie* (Leipz. 1809,) vii. p. 89.

by himself is able to behold God.¹ Ammon calls God the perfectly hidden being, and Hermes Trismegistus and Socrates allowed that it was difficult to know God, but wholly impossible to describe his nature.² Whatever of truth and goodness the heathen had taught, belonged originally to Christians, by whose means they had obtained some light in divine things. The same divine Logos, which appeared in the person of Christ, in its totality for the sake of Christians, and had been efficacious among them in all the riches of its enlightening and sanctifying energy, had also communicated some rays of its intelligence to men, in the times preceding the Messiah, and had led susceptible dispositions to a practical knowledge of the truth, and to a holy life.³ Whatever of truth the heathens had found and expressed, in the departments of philosophy or legislation, is the reflection of the illumination imparted by the Logos.⁴ In all the Logos has been

¹ *Dial. c. Tr. c. 4*, p. 105, (p. 221, C) τὸν Διὸν ἀνθρώπου νῦν ὁφείσθαι ποιεῖν, μὴ ἀγίῳ πνεύματι μιμεσσημένους. Clem. *Strom.* 6, 14, 165, sq. T. iii. p. 202, sq. Origen, *c. Cels.* 7, 42, T. i. p. 725.

² *Coh. ad Græc.* c. 38, p. 35, (p. 37, A. B.) *Apol.* 2, 10, p. 95, (p. 48, E.) Plato's striking confessions, and those of the much misused fabulous Hermes Trismegistus were brought by many of the fathers into the service of Christian truth. Besides Justin, references to the language of Hermes are found in Cyprian (*de idol. vanil.* c. 6, T. ii. p. 13.) Lactantius (*epitome*, c. 4.) and Cyrill. (*adv. Julian.* l. i. T. vi. p. 31, C.) the two latter by direct quotation, the former only by allusion.

³ *Apol.* 2, 13, p. 97, (p. 51, C.) ὅσα παρὰ πάνσι καλῶς εἰρηται, ἡμῶν τῶν Χριστιανῶν ἵσται· τὸν γὰρ ἀπὸ ἀγεννήτου καὶ ἀβήτου Θεοῦ λόγον μετὰ τὸν Διὸς προσκυνούμεν καὶ ἀγαπῶμεν, ἰσχυρὰ καὶ δι' ἡμᾶς ἀνθρώπων γίγνεται.—“Whatever excellent things have been said amongst all (other men) belong to us Christians, for, next to God, we adore and love the Logos (proceeding) from the unbegotten and ineffable God, since, on our account, he became man.”—*Apol.* 1, 60, p. 79, (p. 93, C.) ἐὰν αὐτὰ ἡμεῖς ἄλλως δοξάζομεν, ἀλλ' οἱ πάντες τὰ ἡμέτερα μιμούμενοι λίσσονται.—“We, therefore, do not adopt the opinions of others, but all men speak in imitation of ours.”

⁴ *Apol.* 2, 10, p. 95, (p. 48, C.) Origen, *c. Cels.* 6, 3, T. I. p. 631.

active ;¹ the collective human race have had a share in it ;² every man has partaken of this operative revelation, which thus forms a common bond for the whole race.³ As the sparks of religious truth, which glimmered in the heathen writings, were shown to be the original possession of Christianity, by this participation of the heathen in the revelations of the Logos, which, in a prominent sense, belonged to Christians, so Justin maintained that the same fact was proved by another circumstance, namely, that many of the educated Greeks, during their travels in the east, had become familiar with the writings of the Jewish prophets, particularly Moses. "At least some of you, I believe, know," he said, addressing the heathen, "that Orpheus and Homer, and Solon the Athenian law-giver, and Pythagoras and Plato, and some others, were in Egypt, and, in consequence of their acquaintance with the Mosaic history, altered and corrected their earlier erroneous notions of the gods."⁴ "All," he remarks, in another passage, "which the philosophers and poets have said respecting retribution after death, or on the contemplation of heavenly things, and similar topics, they have learned to conceive and express them from the writings of the prophets."⁵ Justin dwells with remarkable earnestness on the proof of this assertion. He gives an exact catalogue of

¹ *Apol.* 2, 10, p. 95, (p. 48, E.) λόγος ἦν καὶ ἰστέον ἰς ἅπαντας. Clem. *protrep.* 6, 68, T. I. p. 59. See *Dommerich de λόγων patrum philosophiæ fonte*, p. 8, sqq., and Keil *Opuscul. academ.* p. 415.

² *Apol.* 1, 46, p. 71, (p. 83, C.) λόγον, οὗ πᾶν γένος ἀνθρώπων μετέσχε. — 2, 8, p. 94, (p. 46, C.) τὸ ἱμῶνται παντὶ γένει ἀνθρώπων σπέρμα τοῦ λόγου.

³ *Apol.* 2, 13, p. 97, (p. 51, C.) ἵκανοι τις ἀπὸ μέρους τοῦ σπριμαστικοῦ Θεοῦ λόγου τὸ συγγενὲς ἑρῶν καλῶς ἐφειλέται. On the interpretation of this passage see Wurm's *die Apologie des Christenthums von Justin*, &c. in Klaiber's *Studien der Evangelischen Geistlichkeit*, Wirttemberg, I. 2, p. 12. Clem. *Protrep.* 7, 74, T. I. p. 64.

⁴ *Coh. ad Græc.* c. 14, p. 18, (p. 15, B.)

⁵ *Apol.* 1, 44, p. 70, (p. 82, A.)

doctrines and representations which, in his opinion, had been copied from the Old Testament into the writings of the Greeks.¹ Among these doctrines, that of the unity of God holds a conspicuous place. Orpheus, he says, learned in Egypt the truths from the prophets, for he writes, in the following manner, to Musseus, and his other genuine disciples.²

Εἷς ἔστ', αὐτογενής· ἑνὸς ἔκγονα πάντα τίτυκται,
 Ἐν δ' αὐτοῖς αὐτὸς περιγίγνεται· οὐδὲ τις αὐτὸν
 Εἰσοράα θνητῶν, αὐτὸς δὲ γι πάντας ὁρᾶται.
 Οὗτος δ' ἐξ ἀγαθοῦ κακὸν θνητοῖσι δίδωσι
 Καὶ πόλεμον κρύοντα, καὶ ἄλγεια δρακυόοντα
 Οὐδὲ τις ἔσθ' ἕτερος χωρὶς μεγάλου βασιλῆος.
 Αὐτὸν δ' οὐχ ὁρώω περὶ γὰρ νήρο· ἐστήρικται

¹ Justin finds in Plato a direct mention (though not by name) of the Mosaic law and the prophets. He understands the Mosaic law to be the *παλαιὰς λόγους* to which Plato appeals, (*de legib.* I. 4, T. VI. p. 128,) and takes, as an allusion to Moses and the prophets, the confession of the same philosopher, (*Timæus*, T. vii. p. 49,) that the origin and formation of fire and water, earth and air, was known only to God and the men who were beloved by him. *Coh. ad Græc.* c. 25, sqq. p. 26, sqq. (p. 24, B—E.) The former opinion is not peculiar to Justin. It is indicated in the pseudo-orphic verses, which Eusebius has preserved from Aristobulus. *Euseb. Præp. Evang.* 13, 12, p. 665, sqq. v. 9 and 36.

² *Coh. ad Græc.* c. 15, p. 18, (p. 15, C—E. 16, A.) These verses are, at all events, not Orphic, but, certainly, the copy of them, which Justin inserts in his Treatise, *de monarch.* c. 2, p. 37, sq. (p. 105, A. B.) and Clemens partially, (*Protrept.* 7, 74, T. I. p. 63, *Strom.* 5, 14, 125, T. III. p. 85, 5, 14, 127, p. 86,) is older than the very different recension given by Aristobulus, (*Euseb. Præp. Evang.* 13, 12, p. 644,) and which either this Jew, or some other philosopher of the Jewish-Alexandrian school, had interpolated with ideas of Alexandrian Judaism. Compare Wesseling's *Lectio publica de Fragmenta Orphei*, &c. in the Appendix to Valcknaer's *Diatribæ de Aristobulo Judæo*, ed. Luzac. p. 132. *Orphica* edid. Hermann. (Lips. 1805) p. 447, 452. Gfrörer's *Philo and the Alexandrian Theosophy*, II. 79. Dähne's *Geschichtliche Darstellung der Jüdisch-Alexandrinischen Religions Philosophie*, II. 89. Finally, Tzschirner (*Fall des Heidenthums*, I. 242,) is unquestionably right, in believing that the above verses express not Christian theism but philosophical pantheism.

Πᾶσιν γὰρ Διητοῖς Διηται κίραι εἰσὶν ἐν ὅσσοις
 Ἀσθενεῖς δ' ἰδέειν Δία τὸν πάντων μεδέοντα
 Οὗτος γὰρ χαλκεῖον ἐς οὐρανὸν ἐστήρικται
 Χρυσῷ ἐνὶ θρόνῳ, γαίης δ' ἐπὶ ποσσὶ βέβηκε
 Χεῖρά τε δεξιτερὴν ἐπὶ τέρματος ὠκεανοῦ
 Πάντοθεν ἰκτέτακεν· περὶ γὰρ τρίμει οὖρεα μακρὰ,
 Καὶ ποταμοὶ, πολλῆς τε βάρους χαροποῦ θαλάσσης.

"One Being there is, self-originated; of that one all are the offspring; and in them he himself abides: Him no mortal beholds, but he sees all. And he gives evil from (consequent on) good to mortals, and appalling war, and tearful woes. Nor is there any other besides this great Sovereign. But him I see not; a dense cloud surrounds him. For the pupils of all mortals' eyes are mortal, and too feeble to behold Zeus, the ruler of the universe. For he is seated in the brazen heavens on a golden throne, and sets his feet upon the earth; he stretches forth his right hand to the limits of the ocean; and the great mountains tremble, and the rivers, and the depth of the hoary, glistering sea."

After Orpheus, the same conviction is expressed by Homer. He not merely ascribes universal dominion to Zeus, by the image of the golden chain;¹ he not merely places the other gods so far below Zeus, that he names them after men, when he represents Ulysses as saying of Hector,²—

Ἐκτωρ δὲ μέγα σθένει βλεμμαίωνων
 μαίνεται ἐκπάγλως, πίσηνος Διὶ, οὐδὲ τι τίει
 ἀνέρας οὐδὲ θεούς.

Il. IX. 238.

"Hector glares revenge
 Infuriate, and by Jove assisted, heeds
 Nor men nor gods."——

But he also distinctly reproaches polytheism.³

¹ *Coh. ad Gr. c. 24, p. 24, (p. 22, C.)* Compare Homer, *Il. VIII. 19.*

² *Coh. ad Gr. c. 24, p. 24, (p. 22, C. D.)*

³ *Coh. ad Gr. c. 17, p. 20, (p. 17, D.)*

Οὐκ ἀγαθὸν πολυκοιρανίη· εἷς κοίρανος ἔστω—

II. II. 204.

“ A multitude of rulers is not good ; let there be one ruler.”

And refers to the true God, when he puts into the mouth of Phoenix, the words :¹

——εὐδ' εἴ κέν μοι ὑποσταίῃ θεὸς αὐτίς
γῆρας ἀποξύσας, θήσεν νῖον ἡβώνοντα.

II. IX. 445.

The dramatic poets, also, are explicit on the unity of God. Sophocles says,

“ One God in truth there is, and only One.”

And is equally zealous against image-worship and a cultus of sacrifices and feasts.² To the poets may be added the philosophers. For when Pythagoras spoke of unity, and represented it as the original ground of all things, as the cause of all perfection, he indicated, though in different phraseology, the Christian doctrine of one God : on another occasion, he avows this doctrine in so many words, when he says, “ God is one.”³ And what is true of Pythagoras, may be affirmed in a still higher degree of Plato. In his *Timæus*, this philo-

¹ *Coh. ad Gr.* c. 17, p. 20, (p. 17, C.) c. 24, p. 24, (p. 22, E.) compare II. IX. 445. Justin in this passage lays great stress on the pronoun αὐτίς, and believes that the ἰδὲ τῷ; αὐτίς is intended by it ; ἡ γὰρ αὐτὸς ἑστανυμία τὸν ἰδὲ τῷ; ὅτι σημαίνει θεόν.

² *Coh. ad Gr.* c. 18, p. 20, (p. 17, E. 18, A.)—*De Monarch.* c. 2, p. 37, (p. 104, C.)—*Athenag. leg. p. Christ.* c. 5, p. 283, (p. 6, A.)—*Clem. Protrep.* 7, 74, T. I. p. 63.—*Strom.* 5, 14, 114, T. III. p. 79. On the spuriousness of this supposed passage of Sophocles, see Böckh's *Græcæ Tragediæ principum Æschyli, Sophoclis, Euripidis num ea quæ supersunt et genuina omnia sunt et forma primitiva servata, an eorum familiis aliquid debeat ex iis tribui*, (Heidelb. 1808) p. 148, sq. 159.

³ *Coh. ad Gr.* c. 19, p. 20, (p. 18, B. C.)—*Clem. Protrep.* 6, 72, T. I. p. 62

sopher denominates God, *The being that always is, but has no origin*, τὸ ὄν μὲν αἰεὶ, γένεσιν δὲ οὐκ ἔχον, and repeats verbally what Moses said, (allowing for the slight difference in the article,) who called God *The Being*—(I AM) ὁ ὢν.¹ Along with the unity of God, the Grecian poets and philosophers have also taken other doctrines from the Mosaic and prophetic books of the Old Testament. When Orpheus sings,

“By Heaven, work of God the great, the wise, I adjure thee!

By the voice of the Father which he uttered first
When he founded the whole universe according to his
counsels, I adjure thee!”

What is this but the Christian doctrine of the all-creative Logos?² When Plato in his *Meno*, speaks of a virtuous capability granted to man by divine grace, and divided into four different powers, when in an *Epistle* to Dionysius, he uses the mysterious expression, τὰ ῥήματα περὶ τὸν ῥήτορα, to what else can he refer than the doctrine of the Holy Spirit, who assumes the third place after the Creator of the World, who was bestowed on holy men as a heavenly gift, and whom the prophets, though he abides for ever one and the same, describe as seven-fold.³ When the same Plato teaches the formation of the world from shapeless matter;⁴—the origination of time together with the heavens;⁵—

¹ *Coh. ad Gr.* c. 20, p. 21, (p. 19, B.) c. 22, p. 22, (p. 20, D.E.) compare *Timæus*, T. VII. p. 16.

² *Coh. ad Gr.* c. 15, p. 19, (p. 16, B.C.) Vol. I. of this work, p. 123, 124. *Cyrrill. adv. Julian.* l. 1, T. VI. p. 33, A. B.

³ *Coh. ad Gr.* c. 32, p. 30, sq. (p. 30, D.E. 31, A.D.) Compare Plato's *Meno*, c. 42, T. III. p. 273, sq. *Apol.* 1, 69, p. 79, (p. 93, B.C.) Compare Plato's *Epist.* 2, to *Dionysius*. T. VII. p. 118, sq. The spuriousness of this *Epistle* admits now of no doubt. See *Ast's Platon's Leben und Schriften*. (Leipz. 1816,) p. 508.

⁴ *Apol.* 1, 59, p. 78, (p. 92, C.D.)

⁵ *Coh. ad Gr.* c. 33, p. 31, (p. 31, D. E. 32, A.) Compare *Plat. Tim.* T. vii. p. 27.

the freedom of the human will ;¹—the future resurrection and judgment of men ;²—as well as the final dissolution of the heavens ;³—moreover, when Homer intimates the formation of the human body from the earth ;⁴—when the poets describe an infernal world,⁵—and the Stoics announce a conflagration,⁶—whence had these men all these doctrines, if not from Moses and the Prophets ? And besides doctrines, the Greeks had also borrowed historical delineations from the books of the Old Testament, and transferred them, with alterations, to their own writings. Who does not perceive in the figures which Homer represents Vulcan as engraving on the shield of Achilles, a copy of the Mosaic history of the creation.⁷

Ἐν μὲν γαῖαν ἔτευξ' ἐν δ' οὐρανὸν, ἐν δὲ θάλασσαν
Ἡελίον τ' ἀκάμαντα, Σελήνην τε πλῆθυσαν
Ἐν δὲ τὰ τεῖρεα πάντα, τὰτ' οὐρανὸς ἰστεφάνωται.

Il. XVIII. 483.

There he described the earth, the heaven, the sea,
The sun that rests not, and the moon full-orb'd,
There also all the stars which round about
As with a radiant frontlet bind the skies.

(COWPER.)

Who can help seeing in the description of the gardens of Alcinous, king of the Phœacians, a copy of the scriptural paradise ;⁸ in the narrative of the attempt of the giants Otus and Ephialtes to take heaven by storm, an imitation of the Mosaic account of the Tower of Ba-

¹ *Apol.* 1, 44, p. 70, (p. 81, E.) Compare *Plat. de repub.* 1, 10, T. V. p. 382.

² *Coh. ad Gr.* c. 26, p. 26, (p. 24, E. 26, C.) Compare *Plat. de repub.* I. p. 6, X. p. 379.

³ *Coh. ad Gr.* c. 33, p. 31, (p. 32, A.)

⁴ *Coh. ad Gr.* c. 30, p. 29, sq. (p. 29, D.E. 30, A.) Compare Homer, *Il.* vii. 99, xxiv. 54.

⁵ *Apol.* 1, 59, p. 78, (p. 92, E.) Compare *Deut.* xxxii. 22.

⁶ *Apol.* 1, 60, p. 79, (p. 93, C.)

⁷ *Coh. ad Gr.* c. 28, (p. 27, B.C.)

⁸ *Coh. ad Gr.* c. 28, p. 28, p. (p. 27, C.E. 28, A.) Compare *Odyss.* vii. 114, sq.

bel;¹ in the legend of the expulsion of Ate from heaven, a copy of Isaiah's representation of Satan's being cast down from heaven.²

The attempt was bold, though not by any means novel, to represent the partially acknowledged wisdom of the Greeks as borrowed from the writings of Moses and the prophets³. Goaded by it to the utmost, how reasonable must it have appeared to the minds of the heathen to retort the accusation on the Christians; to hold up Christianity as pilfered from heathenism; to represent the prophets as copyists of the poets and philosophers. Celsus, for example, calls the Mosaic account of the Tower of Babel, and the confusion of tongues, a distorted imitation of the Homeric lay of

¹ *Coh. ad Gr.* c. 28, (p. 28, A.B.) Compare *Odys.* xi. 312.

² *Coh. ad Gr.* c. 28, p. 28, sq. (p. 28, B.C.) Compare *Iliad.* xix. 126.

³ The originator of the opinion that several Greeks, the philosophers especially, were acquainted with the Old Testament, and were indebted to it for many of their sentiments, was the Jew Aristobulus (see *Clem. Strom.* 1, 22, 150, T. ii. p. 100, 5, 14, 98, T. iii. p. 69, sq. and *Euseb. præp. evang.* 13, 12, p. 663, sqq.) After him Philo adopted the same view (*quod Deus immutat.* c. 32, T. ii. p. 96, *quis rer. divin. hæc.* c. 43, T. iii. p. 47, *vit. Mos.* 2, 4, T. iv. p. 189, *de judic.* c. 2, T. v. p. 127, *quod omn. prob. liber.* c. 8, p. 281,) and Josephus (c. Apion. 1, 22, T. vi. p. 194, 2, 16, p. 244) The numerous passages of the Fathers in which this question is discussed, have been collected with greater or less completeness by Kortholt, in his work *de origine et natura christianismi ex impia lactantii ethnicorum sententia*, p. 21, sqq. Baltus, *defensio dei sancti patris accusæ de Platonismo*, p. 377, sqq. Ode, *commentarius de angelis*, (Traj. ad Rhen. 1731,) p. 247, sqq. Clausen, *apologeta eccles. christ. ante-theodosiani*, p. 177. The independence with which Lactantius expresses himself against the supposition that the Greeks had made use of the Old Testament is very striking, on account of his submission on other occasions to the prevailing notions of the age, and the established opinions of the church: *Institut. divin.* 4, 2, *equidem soleo mirari, quod quum Pythagores et postea Plato, amore indagandæ veritatis accensi, ad Egyptios et Magos et Persas usque penetrassent, ut earum gentium rebus et sacra cognoscere . . . , ad Judæos tamen non accesserint penes quos tum solos erat, et quo facilius ire potuissent.* Compare Baltus I. c. p. 609, sqq. 612, sq.

the storming of heaven by the son of Alceus; the narrative of the flood, a copy of the history of Deucalion, and that of the destruction of Sodom and Gomorrah, an extract from the myth of Phaeton.¹ However ridiculous this inversion of the proper genetic relation between the Old Testament doctrine and Grecian philosophy might be, it served as an acceptable support of ignorance, and the obligation still rested on the Christian apologists to prove its unsoundness, to prevent the dependance of heathenism on Christianity from itself becoming ridiculous, and the causal priority of the Christian doctrine from having only some show of probability. The encounter was not difficult; chronology supplied the weapons. From your own writers (thus Justin addressed his opponents)² I will show you that the first and earliest teacher of our religion, Moses, is far more ancient than all your sages, poets, and historians, your philosophers and lawgivers; for your own chroniclers relate that he was the leader and chief of the Jewish nation in the times of Ogyges and Inachus, who, in the opinion of some, were the original inhabitants of the soil. He then appeals to the testimony of Hellanius, Philochorus, Polemo, Alexander Polyhistor, Castor, Thalys, Diodorus Siculus, Ptolemæus of Mendes and Apio,³ and lastly, to the works of Philo and Josephus; and strangely infers the high antiquity of the Jewish history from the title given by Josephus to his principal work. The *Archæologia* ('Ιουδαϊκή Ἀρχαιολογία.) In order to set the subject in a still clearer light, he then treats of the late origin of Grecian literature. Your most celebrated writers (addressing the Grecians, he says),⁴ as Plato and Aristotle among the philosophers, and among the orators Demosthenes, lived as late as the time of Philip and Alexander of Macedon, you have not a single his-

¹ Origen. *c. Cels.* 4, 21, T. i. p. 515, 4, 42, p. 536.

² *Coh. ad Gr.* c. 9, p. 13, (p. 9, D.)

³ *Coh. ad Gr.* c. 12, p. 15, (p. 12, C.)

⁴ *Coh. ad Gr.* c. 12, p. 15, sq. (p. 12, C—13 C.)—c. 25, p. 26, (p. 24, C.)

tory carefully written before the Olympiad; your whole literature, compared with the Mosaic, is quite youthful. When Moses, under the inspiration of the Divine Spirit, wrote his history in the Hebrew language, you had no written language; you cannot deny that you first received it through Cadmus and the Phœnicians. Your Plato tells us in his *Timæus*, that the wise Solon, after his return from Egypt, informed Critius that one not very aged Egyptian priest,¹ had exclaimed to him, "O Solon! Solon! you Greeks are always children; there is not an old man among you!" and added, "You are all intellectually juvenile, for you have no ancient doctrine from early tradition, and no philosophy of ancient origin, but the past is hidden from you, since those who survived the events died many generations ago, without leaving any historical records. To whatever poet, or lawgiver, or historian, or philosopher, or orator, you may choose to point, their antiquity, compared with the date of the Mosaic records, is very trifling; they have all written in the Greek language, and are, therefore, one and all younger than the Grecian alphabet.

If, in consequence of this argumentation, the heathen were obliged to admit the high antiquity of the Old Testament books,² and hence the possibility that these books might have been used by their own sages,

¹ In Plato's text *Timæus*, T. vii. p. 8.) the reading is *εἰς τὸν ἱερὸν ἐδ' ἄλλα παλαιῶν* (one of the very aged priests) and this reading Prudentius Maranus has admitted into Justin's text instead of the common one *ἐδ' ἄλλα*, on the authority of a marginal correction (*Randscriptur*) in one manuscript of Justin, but certainly not fairly. The change of the Platonic *ἐδ'* to *ἐδ'* unquestionably belongs to Justin.

² It could only create a momentary difficulty when the heathen, in order to escape from acknowledging this high antiquity of the Old Testament books, objected that these books, as well as the writings of the Greeks, were in the Greek language. This objection might sometimes be made in pure ignorance of the real fact. To meet it, it would only be necessary to remark that the Greek text of the Old Testament writings was not the original, but a translation; *Coh. ad Græc.* c. 13, p. 16, sq. (p. 13, D.—14, C.)

they endeavoured to neutralize the advantage which might accrue to the Christian cause from this concession, by disputing the right of the Christians to regard the writings of the Old Testament as *their* sacred books. These writings, they said, do not belong to you, but to the Jews;¹ they have been preserved in the Jewish synagogues. This objection Justin converted to his own advantage. Not to the Jews, he rejoiced, but to us belong the books of Scripture. The proof of this lies in their contents, which comprise no other doctrine than our own. We alone understand their contents, and regulate our lives by them.² For our sakes they have been preserved in the Jewish synagogues. This is a work of divine providence, which intended to prevent the possibility of our being charged with falsifying these writings.³

Thus Justin believed that he might consider his position as sufficiently established, that even the fragments of true relation which were scattered through the writings of the Greeks, were not the product of their own independent enquiries, but an in-

¹ *Coh. ad Græc.* c. 13, p. 17, (p. 14, D.) The Jews also denied that the Christians had a right to regard the Old Testament as the source of their religion. See Barnabas, *Epist.* c. 4, and Euseb. *præp. evang.* 1, 2, p. 5, 15, 62, p. 856.

² *Dial. c. Tr.* c. 29, p. 127, (p. 246, D.)

³ *Coh. ad Græc.* c. 13, p. 17, (p. 14, D.) τὸ παρ' Ἰουδαίους ἔστι καὶ νῦν τὰς τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ διανοίᾳ διαφερούσας σαφισθαι βίβλους, θύμης προσηίας ἔργον ὅτις ἡμῶν γίγονιν. "Ἰνα γὰρ μὴ ἐκ τῆς ἐκκλησίας προσημίζοντες, πρέψασιν βιβλιοτεχνίας τοῖς βουλομένοις βλασφημῶν ἡμᾶς παρεσχωμῆναι, ἀπὸ τῆς τῶν Ἰουδαίων συναγωγῆς ταύτας ἀξιουμὲν παρακαλεσθαι, ἵνα ἐκ' αὐτῶν τῶν ἔστι παρ' αὐτοῖς σαφισθῶν βιβλίον ὡς ἡμῖν τα πρὸς διδασκαλίαν ὑπὸ τῶν ἀγίων ἀνδρῶν γραφίτα δίκαια σαφῶς καὶ φανερῶς προσήκει, φανῇ.—"That the books relating to our religion have been preserved among the Jews, has been an arrangement of divine providence on our behalf; for, lest by bringing them out of the church, we should expose ourselves to be suspected of fraud by those who are ready to speak evil of us, we require them to be brought from the synagogue of the Jews, that, from the very books which are still preserved by them, that the laws which were written for instruction by holy men may clearly and evidently appear to be ours."

heritance of the Christians, and, at the close, he breaks out triumphantly, "and why am I impelled to mention these things, O Grecians? That ye may know that the true religion cannot be learned from those who cannot write any thing of their own on subjects for which they are admired by strangers, but only announce, in a sort of allegory, what they have taken from Moses and the Prophets."

But the unfitness of the heathen sages to be teachers of truth was not yet completely shown. There still was room for objecting that, if these sages had not found out the truth by themselves, but had received it from without through the medium of Christians, still they might be useful guides in the way of salvation, since they possessed the truth, though only in a derived manner. Justin, therefore, clenches and completes his proof by the further assertion, that the heathens themselves, on those points which they taught in harmony with the Christians, did not deliver the pure perfect truth, but only a mixture of truth and error. For, in fact, the knowledge of the truth, which they had attained, was originally defective, and, in part, they had intentionally adulterated¹ the truths which they knew; and, lastly, they were under the influence of dæmons, whose interest it was to deform truth by fable.

First of all, Justin maintains, the knowledge of the truth among the heathen sages remained defective because they received only a fragmentary illumination by the Logos, and frequently misunderstood the writings of the Old Testament. "They had not learned the whole fulness of the Logos," he observes,² "and therefore often contradicted themselves. Even Socrates knew Christ only in part;³ and again; "all

¹ Clem. *Strom.* I, 17, 87, T. II. p. 61.—Tertull. *Apol.* c. 47, T. V. p. 88.

² *Apol.* 2, 10, p. 95, (p. 48, C.) ἵστανται οὐ πάντα τὰ τοῦ λόγου ἐγνώσαν; ἢ; ἵσιν Χριστός, καὶ ἰσπαντῶς ἑαυτοῖς πολλάκις ἵσταν.

³ *Apol.* 2, 10, p. 95, (p. 48, E.) Χριστὸν τὸν καὶ ὑπὸ Σωκράτους ἀπὸ μίσεως γνωσθῆναι.

these writers, by means of the implanted seed of the word, were only able to see things indistinctly,¹ for different individuals received fragments and reflections of truth according to their measure of susceptibility, and according to the grace of him from whom their communications proceeded." Of the alleged misconceptions of the heathen, in the explanation of the Old Testament, Justin brings forward numerous examples, which are furnished in abundance from Plato's writings. From a mistaken view of Ezekiel xi. 22, he explains the representation that Zeus was borne through heaven in a winged chariot; he finds a misunderstanding of 1 Kings xix. 12, in the statement that the Deity dwells in a fiery substance;² from an erroneous explanation of the Mosaic narrative in Numbers xxi. 6—9, he deduces Plato's supposed assertion, that the Son of God was impressed on the universe in the form of an X.³ Plato's doctrine of ideas he also considers a product of an erroneous interpretation of the Old Testament. He finds their

¹ *Apol.* 2, 13, p. 98, (p. 51, D) ἡ συγγραφὴ πάντης διὰ τῆς ἐκείνης ἰμφοῦς τῷ λόγῳ σπερμῶς ἀμυδρῶς ἰδύναντο ἰρᾶν τὰ ὄντα. "Ἐτερον γὰρ ἐστὶ σπέρμα ἥνός καὶ μίμημα κατὰ δύναμιν δοθὲν καὶ ἴσμεν αὐτὸ, οὗ κατὰ χάριν τὴν ἀπ' ἐκείνου ἡ μίμησης καὶ μίμησις γίνεται. *Clem. protrept.* 7, 74, T. I. p. 64. *Strom.* 6, 7, 56, T. III. p. 131.

² *Coh. ad Gr.* c. 31, p. 30, (p. 30, B. C.). Compare *Plat. Phædr.* T. VIII. p. 29.

³ *Apol.* 1, 60, p. 78, sq. (p. 92, E., 93, A. B.) Compare *Plat. Tim.* T. VII. At first glance, we cannot see how Justin could have fallen into the error of seeking, in the Mosaic account of the brazen serpent, for the ground-work of the supposed representation of Plato, that the Son was impressed on the universe in the form of an X. But it must be observed that Justin says that Moses "took brass and made it into the form of a cross," λαβεῖν τὸν Μωϋσῆς χαλκὸν καὶ ποιῆσαι τύπον σταυροῦ, "and placed it on the holy Tabernacle;" and that Justin, like many of the Fathers, regarded the Tabernacle as a symbol of the universe. On such premises, a man like Justin was easily led to deduce the supposed Platonic representation from a substitution of the sign of the letter X, for the cross erected on the Tabernacle.

origin in Exodus xxv. 9, 40, and believes that Plato took from the pattern there given of the Tabernacle, his model of the visible universe as the third hypostatical principle of being next to God and Matter.¹ He could even trace individual Platonic ideas to a biblical source. Plato arrived at his notion of an eternal intelligible type of the visible heavens and visible earth, after reading in Gen. i. 1, of the creation of a visible heaven and visible earth, from finding in Ps. cxv. 16, mention of a *heaven of heavens*, and in Gen. i. 2, that the earth was *invisible*. (ἀόρατος. LXX. תָּהוָה Heb.) The philosopher believed in the pre-existence of an intelligible type of the visible man, because, in addition to the brief account in Gen. i. 26, he found in Gen. ii. 7, a more minute description of the formation of man out of the dust of the ground.²

But it was not enough that the heathen sages involuntarily distorted the knowledge of the truth, in consequence of defective and incorrect perceptions—Justin complains that they intentionally adulterated it. This charge he applies, more particularly, to the doctrine of the Divine Unity. Homer, for example, knew and admitted the doctrine of one God, but from slavish deference to Orpheus, and not to oppose too decidedly the popular polytheism, he recounts the myths of a multiplicity of gods.³ So also Plato was

¹ *Coh. ad Gr. c. 29, p. 29, (p. 28, D. E. 29, A.)* In this passage the pattern of the tabernacle is considered as a type of the universe. Only on this supposition is it conceivable that Justin could have deduced Plato's representation of hypostatical types of all visible things, from a misunderstanding of the account of the pattern given to Moses on Sinai for building the tabernacle. This view of the tabernacle Justin learned from Philo (*de vit. Mos.* 3, 3, sqq. T. iv. p. 201, sqq. *quæst. in Exod.* 2, 82, T. vii. p. 329,) or from Josephus (*antiquit. Jud.* 3, 7, 7, T. i. p. 49.)

² *Coh. ad Gr. c. 30, p. 29, sq. (p. 29, B—D.)* The distinction between Gen. i. 26, and ii. 7, here attributed to Plato, is actually brought forward by Philo, *De Mund. ossific.* c. 46, T. i. p. 43, sq. *leg. alleg.* 2, 4, p. 95.

³ *Coh. ad Gr. c. 17, p. 19, sq. (p. 17, B. C.)*

decidedly in favour of Christian monotheism, but, appalled by the hemlock of Socrates, afraid lest some Anytus or Melitus should come forward and accuse him to the Athenians as an unauthorised innovator, and an enemy of his country's gods, he did not express his convictions clearly and directly, but concealed them under a wavering and ambiguous representation.¹ To the reflective friends of the monotheistic belief, he made known his real convictions by asserting that all visible things were composed of Matter, the seed of evil, and in themselves were perishable, that even the gods were formed by the Supreme Deity, the maker of the universe; to this class of persons he said, "according to my opinion,² we must first determine what that is, which always *is*, without being *produced* (*τί τὸ ὄν μὲν αἰεὶ, γέννησιν δὲ οὐκ ἔχον*), and what that is which is always *produced*, but never *is*; (*τί τὸ γενόμενον μὲν αἰεὶ, ὄν δὲ οὐδέποτε*) the one may be apprehended by reflection through the reason, since it remains always the same; but the other is found through conjecture by means of sensuous perceptions, since it is produced and passes away without ever *being*." But in order to pacify the adherents of polytheism, Plato puts into the mouth of the Maker of the universe an address to the gods, in direct contradiction³ to his other sentiments; "since you are produced, you are not immortal nor naturally indestructible; yet you will not perish nor be subject to the fate of death; my will, a greater and stronger bond, upholds you."

Besides this wilful falsification of truth arising from timidity, there was another source of error. The heathen sages were under the influence of dæmons, who made use of them as involuntary instruments for the seduction of mankind. Inspired by these dæmons, poets, mythographers, and priests copied the most remarkable events of the life of Christ, and the princi-

¹ *Coh. ad Gr.* c. 20, p. 21, (p. 18, D. E.)

² *Coh. ad Gr.* c. 20, p. 21, (p. 19, A. c. 22, p. 23, (p. 21, A. B.))

³ *Coh. ad Græc.* c. 23, p. 23, (p. 21, C—E.)

pal usages of the church in the narratives of their mythology, and the ceremonies of their cultus. The prophecies of Scripture furnished materials for these fabrications, and hence the design was formed of presenting the Evangelical history under the garb of a myth, and thus rendering its credibility questionable. The dæmons wished to distort the truth, since they had well grounded fears of what would befall them after Christ's advent, of which they had read in the books of the Old Testament. But involuntary mistakes also crept in, since it happened not unfrequently that the dæmons themselves did not understand the prophecies which they attempted to copy. In every case mere distortions of truth were the result; all the myths and ceremonies of heathenism, which bear any relation to the facts of Christian history and the usages of the Christian Church, are caricatures.¹ The legend

¹ *Apol.* 1, 54, p. 75, (p. 89, A—C.) οἱ παραδιδόντες τὰ μυθολογηθέντα ὑπὸ τῶν ποιητῶν, ὁδὶ μίαν ἀποδείξει φέρει τοῖς ἰκμασθένσι νόις· καὶ ἐπὶ ἀπατῇ καὶ ἀπαγωγῇ τῷ ἀνδραπέδιον γίνε· ἐκείσθαι ἀπαδύουμι κατ' ἐπίγνωσιν τῶν φαύλων δαιμόνων. Ἀύτατοις γὰρ διὰ τῶν προφητῶν κηρυσσόμενοι παραγινεσόμενοι τὸν Χριστὸν καὶ πολλὰς ζητομένης διὰ πύρεος τῶν δαιμόνων τῶν ἀνδρώπων, προβάλλοντο πολλοὺς ληχθῆναι γινόμενης υἱὸς τοῦ Διὸς, νομίζοντες δυνήσεσθαι ἐνεργῆσαι τερατολογίαν ἡγήσεσθαι τοὺς ἀνδράπων· τὰ περὶ τὸν Χριστόν, καὶ ὁμῶς τοῖς ὑπὸ τῶν ποιητῶν ληχθεῖσι. Καὶ ταῦτα ὁ ἱλίσθη καὶ ἐν Ἑλληνισμῷ καὶ ἐν Ἰουδαίᾳ πᾶσι, ὅπου μᾶλλον ἰσχυροὶ τῶν προφητῶν πιστευθῆσεσθαι τὸν Χριστὸν προκηρυσσόντων. "Οσοι δὲ καὶ ἀκούοντες τὰ διὰ τῶν προφητῶν λεγόμενα οὐκ ἰδέοντες ἀκριβῶς ἀλλ' ὡς πλατόμενοι ἱμμήσαντο τὰ περὶ τοὺς ἡμίτερον Χριστόν, διασαφήςσμεν.—" Those who teach the myths invented by the poets, give no evidence of their truth to the young who learn them; but we have proved that such things are said through the influence of evil dæmons, in order to deceive and seduce mankind. For having heard it announced by the prophets that Christ would come, and that impious men would be punished by fire, they brought forward many who were said to be sons of Zeus, thinking that they should be able to induce men to consider the things relating to Christ as a mere tale of wonder, like the stories of the poets. And these reports were circulated among the Greeks and all nations, wherever they understood from the prophets that the Christian faith would be most prevalent. But we shall make it evident that they did not accurately understand

of Bacchus is a fallacious copy of Gen. xlix. 10. On the basis of this prophecy Bacchus was made the son of Jupiter and inventor of the vine, at his death translated to heaven, and in the celebration of his mysteries he was honoured by the use of wine.¹ From the same prophecies was derived the myth of Bellerophon; and as in this prophecy it is not expressly said, whether the promised ruler was to be a son of God, whether the foal was to be that of a horse or an ass, and whether it was to be used on earth or ascend to heaven—the mythographs supposed that Bellerophon was born a man in a natural way, and that he ascended on Pegasus to heaven.² By a misinterpretation of Gen. i.

the things said by the prophets, but erroneously imitated the things relating to our Christ.”—In like manner Tatian. *orat. c. Gr. c. 40*, p. 275, (p. 173, B.) and Tertull. *Apol. c. 47*, T. v. p. 89, omnia adversus veritatem de ipsa veritate constructa sunt, operantibus æmulationem istam spiritibus erroris. Ab iis adulteria hujusmodi salutaris disciplinæ subornatæ, ab his quædam etiam fabulæ immisæ, quæ de similitudine fidem infirmarent veritatis vel eam sibi potius evincerent, ut quis ideo non putet Christianis credendum, quia nec poetis nec philosophis, vel ideo magis poetis et philosophis existimet credendum quia non Christianis.—“All contradictions to the truth have been framed out of the truth itself, the spirits of error thus exercising their rivalry. By them have the corruptions of this wholesome kind of discipline been privily introduced; by them also have certain fables been let in, which from their likeness to it, might weaken the credit of the truth, or rather gain it over to their own side; so that a man may think that he must put no faith in the Christians, because he can put none in poets and philosophers; or suppose that he ought to put the more faith in poets and philosophers, because he can put none in the Christians.”—(Rev. C. Dodgson’s Transl.)—*c. 21*, p. 44—*c. 22*, p. 49, *de præscript. hæret. c. 40*, T. ii. p. 40.

¹ *Apol. 1*, 54, p. 75, (p. 89, C. D.)—*Dial. c. Tr. c. 69*, p. 167, (p. 294, D. 295, A.)

² *Apol. 1*, 54, p. 75, (p. 89, D. E.) Justin’s strange representation, that the dæmons and their organs the mythologists, were in doubt whether the foal mentioned in Gen. xlix. 11, was that of a horse or an ass, could be owing only to a defect of memory. The Apologist did not refer to his manuscript of the Septuagint when he quoted this passage, and passed over

2, Proserpine possessed the dignity of a daughter of Jupiter and a statue by the water-courses. Minerva also, by a false interpretation of the Old Testament, was exalted into a daughter of Jupiter, and received the rank of the first *ἑνωσα* of God, because in the Old Testament it was taught that God *ἐνωσεν* *δαίς* having deliberated, made the world by the *Logos*.¹ The legend of the birth of Mithras from a rock, and the choice of a cavern for the initiation of his disciples, was founded on Daniel ii. 34, and Isaiah xxxiii. 16.² Isaiah vii. 14, suggested the fable of the birth of Perseus from a virgin, and Ps. xix. 6, the myth of the wanderings of the mighty Hercules over the earth; and Is. xxxv. 1, the legend of healing the sick and raising the dead by Esculapius.³ Even distorted resemblances of Christian baptism and the Lord's Supper, were practised by anticipation in heathenism, Isa. i. 16, originated the custom of sprinkling those who wished to sacrifice to the gods, before their entrance into the temple, and of bathing completely before they entered the inner sanctuary. Those who presided over the worship of Mithras, introduced the custom of presenting to the initiated bread and a cup of water, accompanied by certain prayers.⁴

With these statements Justin sums up, and concludes the argumentation, with which he proposed to effect the destruction of heathenism. The apologist is

the words “καὶ τῇ ἑλίκῃ τὸν πῶλον τῆς ἰου αὐτοῦ.” In the Dialogue with Trypho, these words are quoted, c. 52, p. 148, [p. 271, D.]

¹ *Apol.* 1, 64, p. 82, (p. 96, E. 97, A. B.)

² *Dial. c. Tr.* c. 70, p. 168, (p. 296, B. D.) Compare on the worship of Mithras, Zoega's treatise edited by Welcker, (Gotting. 1817,) p. 94, 136, 144. Crenzer's *Symbolik und Mythologie der alten Völker, besonders der Griechen*. (2 Aufl.) I. 728, 753, 759. Tzschirner's *Fall des Heidenthums*. I. 77, 125.

³ *Apol.* 1, 54, p. 76, (p. 90, A. B.)—*Dial. c. Tr.* c. 69, p. 167, (p. 295, A. B.) c. 70, p. 169, (p. 297, A. B.)

⁴ *Apol.* 1, 62, p. 80, (p. 94, E. 95, A.)—1, 66, p. 83, (p. 98, C.) Tertull. *de præscript. hæret.* c. 40, T. II. p. 40, sq.

so certain of victory,—so free from every doubt of having produced the clearest evidence for the untenableness and religious insufficiency of heathenism, that he concludes his exhortation to the Greeks with this confident appeal: “Therefore reasons from every quarter urge you to acknowledge, that by no other means you can be informed respecting God and true religion than by the prophets alone, who have taught us by a divine inspiration.”¹ He, therefore, does not hesitate to make his presumed victory the basis of a call to submission; with the triumphant tone of a conqueror, he requires his opponents to join the Christian cause. Yet he would not obtain this accession to the church at any rate; he would not have conversion without conviction. Accordingly, he endeavours to rectify and obviate certain minute scruples, which, in one instance and another, might lessen the force of internal conviction. He addresses the hesitating in a half entreating, half threatening tone: “You fear, lest by passing over to us, you should sin against your fathers; but a careful examination not unfrequently places, what before appeared excellent, in a quite different light, and to exchange an old error for a new truth is, under all circumstances, a duty.”² Reason commands that we should honour and love nothing but the truth, and renounce, without hesitation, the opinions of our ancestors, when they are proved to be incorrect; more than this, reason requires that the truth should be dearer to us than life itself, and that we should say and do what is right, under all circumstances, in the sight of death itself.³ Your fathers, instead of blaming, will approve your renunciation of the errors of antiquity; they would gladly, if it were possible, return to the earth,

¹ *Coh. ad Græc.* c. 38, p. 35, (p. 37, B.) πανταχόθεν ἰδίῳι προφηταῖς, ἵνα οὐδαμῶς ἴσμεν περὶ τοῦ θεοῦ ἢ τῆς ἐξουσίας τοῦ θεοῦ μανθάνειν ἢν τι, ἢ παρὰ τῶν προφητῶν μόνον, τῶν διὰ τῆς θείας ἰσχυρίας διδασκόντων ἡμᾶς.

² *Coh. ad Gr.* c. 1, p. 6, (p. 1, B.)—c. 14, p. 17, (p. 15, A)

³ *Apol.* 1, 2, p. 44, (p. 53, C.)

and testify what misery, after the end of this life, he escapes who is converted to the truth, since they themselves, in the lower regions, are seized by a too late repentance, and suffer for their former adherence to error.¹ Be not afraid, then, to take up the books of the prophets;² or, if attachment to what is established and customary will not allow you to do this, attend first to the sounds of truth, which are echoed by your own writers.³ For it has not happened fortuitously that even they have gained some knowledge of the truth: we acknowledge in this an arrangement of divine providence, that sometimes they have involuntarily taught, respecting God, what harmonizes with the prophets.⁴ The Sybil herself may become a guide to the truth;⁵ nor will she deceive you; the knowledge of her prophecies will be a useful preliminary to those of the Old Testament."⁶ Such was the address of entreaty, mingled with reproof, which Justin incorporated with his attack on heathenism; while he forced his opponents to quit their own ground, he endeavoured to provide them with a bridge for passing over to Christianity. Yet with all the confidence he felt in the keenness of his polemical weapons, and the

¹ *Coh. ad Gr.* c. 35, p. 32, (p. 32, E. 33, A.)

² *Coh. ad Gr.* c. 35, p. 32, (p. 32, C. E.)—c. 36, p. 33, (p. 34, C.)

³ *Coh. ad Gr.* c. 36, p. 33, (p. 34, C. D.)—c. 38, p. 35, (p. 36, C. D.)

⁴ *Coh. ad Gr.* c. 36, p. 33, (p. 34, D.) *Θείας ὑπὲρ ὁμῶν προνοίας ἔργον γίγνεται, τὸ καὶ ἀκούσας τούτους μαρτυρεῖν τὰ ὑπὸ τῶν προφητῶν περὶ ἱνὸς Θεοῦ εἰρημίνα ἀληθῆ εἶναι, ἵνα παρὰ πάντων ἡ τοῦ πολυθιότητος ἀειτούμενος λόγος ἀφορμὴν ὑμῖν παρέχῃ τῆς ἀληθείας γνώσεως.*—c. 14, p. 17, (p. 15, A.)—*Theophil. ad Autol.* 2, 37, sq. p. 378, (p. 115, D. 116, A. B.)—*Clem. protrep.* 6, 68, T. 1. p. 59.

⁵ *Coh. ad Gr.* c. 37, p. 33, (p. 34, E.) *ἴσται ὁμῖν ῥηδίως. τὴν δοθῆναι διορίσιναι ἐν μέρους παρὰ τῆς παλαιᾶς Σιβύλλης ἐκ τινὸς δυνατῆς ἱστανόμηναι διὰ χρησμῶν ὁμῶς διδασκούσης μανθάνειν ταῦτ' ἀτιε ἰγγυδ' εἶναι δεκτῆ τῆς τῶν προφητῶν διδασκαλίας.*—c. 38, p. 34, (p. 36, C.)

⁶ *Coh. ad Gr.* c. 38, p. 35, (p. 37, A.) *ἴσται ὁμῖν ἀναγκαῖον προγύμνασμα ἢ τούτων γνώσεως τῆς τῶν ἱερῶν ἀνδρῶν προφητείας.*

force of his persuasion, he never deceived himself with the hasty expectation, that his bridge would be used to the extent of his wishes; however strong might be his presumption that he had struck a blow at the vitals of heathenism,—he never gave himself to the delusion that it would soon cease to exist as a religious power.¹ He rather indulged the apprehension, like Tertullian at a later period, that the church would continue in a state of conflict and depression till the second coming of Christ.²—His watch-word is conviction; “if we convince only a few, we have the greatest gain; we shall receive a reward from the Lord as good labourers.” As that apprehension was not literally fulfilled,—for, according to its nature, it could not,—yet it really required centuries before public opinion was decidedly in favour of the Christian faith,—before the heathen philosophy of history perished. The individual naturally did not bear the blame of this delay. For had Justin, for example, possessed the sagacity of a Socrates; had he been endowed with the philosophical acuteness and depth of a Plato; had he commanded the glowing eloquence of a Demosthenes, yet Christianity would not have won the trophies much earlier, which it really began to win in the first half of the fourth century. But, on the other hand, it cannot be denied that Justin’s method of controversy did not contain the elements of great success. The exposition he gave of the contradictions and immoralities of the common heathen mythology must indeed have been sufficient to have awakened a feeling

¹ *Apol.* c. 21, T. V. p. 47.

² *Dial.* c. *Tr.* c. 39, p. 136, (p. 258, C.) *ἵνα μὴ διώκησθε ἐν τῷ τῶν ἀρχόντων ἐλθὼν παύσονται ἀπὸ τῆς τοῦ πονηροῦ καὶ πλάνου τυφύματος. τοῦ ἔθνους, ἐνέργειας θανατοῦντος καὶ διώκοντος τοὺς τὸ ὄνομα τοῦ Χριστοῦ ὁμολογούντας, ἵνα πάλιν παρῇ.*—“That you may not be persecuted by the rulers who do not cease, under the influence of the wicked and devouring spirit, the serpent, to persecute and put to death all who confess the name of Christ, till he appear again.”

of want, and a longing after a better theology in the minds of those heathens, whose attention had not already been directed, by the labours of their own sages, and especially the philosophers, to the degrading quality of their poetic myths; the exhibition of the contradictions also, in which the systems of Grecian philosophy were involved towards each other, must have had the power of exciting doubts in susceptible spirits, respecting the truth and sufficiency of the philosophical doctrines. But, in every case, the method was defective by which Justin, notwithstanding the admitted partial agreement between the heathen and Christian doctrine, sought to demonstrate to his opponents the necessity of exchanging philosophy for the Christian faith. For what heathen could subscribe to the conclusion, that since the Logos, who appeared in his totality for Christians, had imparted also to heathen sages the sparks of knowledge which they possessed, the heathen were indebted to the Christians for all their religious wisdom? What heathen could credit the fable, invented by Jewish conceit, that Pythagoras, Plato, and other Grecian sages, had been plagiarists of the despised writings of the Jews? And it certainly did not facilitate the attainment of his object, that Justin attacked the philosophers, not merely in the tone of earnest controversy, but sometimes with the scourge of keen ridicule,¹ that he charged them not merely with being incapable of understanding the Jewish Scriptures, but even with hypocrisy, and even considered them as being, with the poets and priests, the organs of dæmons.

Justin thus completed his vindication of Christianity against the attacks of Jews and heathens, and showed that the new faith stood at least on a par with Judaism

¹ Justin, for example, treats with a tone of contempt the account of the death of Aristotle, according to which this philosopher, from vexation that he could not discover the cause of the tides, committed suicide, *Coh. ad Gr.* c. 36, p. 33, (p. 34, B.)

and heathenism ; from simple defence he proceeded, in part unconsciously, but in part designedly, to aggressive measures, and showed that Christianity stood *above* Judaism and heathenism. Only one thing now remained to prove the absolute truth and authority, or the pure divinity of Christianity. Justin discussed this point with peculiar care, well knowing that the claims of Christianity were by no means fully set forth, if only its pre-eminence was shown above Judaism and heathenism ; he was animated, too, with the desire that the last and perfect revelation of God to man might be known and received by all.

CHAPTER III.

EVIDENCE FOR THE ABSOLUTE DIVINITY OF CHRISTIANITY.

WE cannot hesitate one moment in determining on what grounds Justin rested the pure divinity of Christianity. The Apologist himself enumerates them, in a passage of his Dialogue with Trypho, where he says, " We pray for you as we do for all who hate us, that you may alter your minds as we have done, and not blaspheme Christ, who has been proved to be altogether spotless and unblameable by his works, and the miracles performed in his name,—by the words of his doctrine, and by the prophecies that have been uttered respecting him." Justin, therefore, attributes to Christianity the character of the exclusive religion, on account of the doctrine it announced,—the effects it produced, and, lastly, on account of the miracles and prophecies by which it was preceded, introduced, and propagated.

ARTICLE I.

PROOF OF THE DIVINITY OF CHRISTIANITY FROM ITS
DOCTRINE.

When the ancient apologists discussed (as most of them did) the divine origin and character of the Christian doctrine, they did not attempt to show (according to the plan frequently adopted by the moderns) the absolute correspondence of the Christian doctrine with the laws and requirements of human reason, as well as with the necessities of the human heart, and its complete independence of temporal or local restrictions; but they appealed either to the divine illumination of the human instruments, by whom the Christian doctrine was imparted, (a method which often involved their reasonings in a circle); or they extolled the absolute perfection of this doctrine in a simple categorical manner, without referring to any other standard, as the witness of their Christian consciousness, and the decided inferiority of all heathen doctrines. It happened comparatively seldom, that they showed the reasonableness of a doctrine, and even then they guarded themselves by qualifying expressions; thus, for example, Athenagoras, at the close of his attempt at a speculative demonstration of the unity of God,¹ says: "If we satisfied ourselves with such reasons, our doctrine might be esteemed as merely human; but our conclusions are accredited by the declarations of the prophets." Justin, also, in proof of the specific divinity of the Christian doctrine, makes an appeal to nothing but the divine illumination of its publishers, accompanied by impassioned panegyrics on its incomparable sublimity. And, even when he appeals to the inspiration of its promulgators, it is merely in relation to the prophets of the Old Testament. The preaching of Christ and his Apostles must receive the certificate of its credibility and divine origin from the prophets.

¹ *Legat. pro Christ.* c. 9, p. 286, (p. 9, C. D.)

The internal excellence and glory of the Christian doctrine, Justin indeed extols in a diversity of phrases. Sometimes he asserts defensively,¹ "We believe not mere fables, nor suppositions which are incapable of proof, but a doctrine full of the divine spirit,"—and,² "our doctrines are not disgraced by a cautious examination, but are more exalted than all human philosophy,"—and again,³ "Our doctrines are more glorious than all human instruction." Sometimes he directly asserts,⁴ "All that we have learned and been taught by Christ, and the prophets who preceded him, is alone true,"—and,⁵ "we know that they are truly excellent." Nothing more can be found than these isolated expressions. From his immediate feeling of the truth (*Wahrheitsgefühle*), the Apologist concluded that all doctrinal evidence of the truth (*Wahrheitsbeweis*), might be dispensed with. But he treats more fully of the effects of Christianity.

ARTICLE II.

EVIDENCE FOR THE DIVINITY OF CHRISTIANITY FROM ITS EFFECTS.

The founder of the Christian Church was a crucified person, and this crucified person, in a short time,

¹ *Dial. c. Tr. c. 9*, p. 110, (p. 226, C. D.) ὅτι οὐκ ἐπιστεύουσιν μύθοις ἢ ἀκαταλόγητοις λόγοις, ἀλλὰ μυστοῖς πνεύματος θείου καὶ δυνάμει βρῦσιν καὶ τεδηλῶσι χάριτι.

² *Apol. 2*, 15, p. 98, (p. 52, B.) ἢ ἵσμεν ὅτι ἡμῶν τὰ διδάγματα παρὰ κρίσιν εὐφρονα ἀισχρά, ἀλλὰ πάσης μὲν φιλοσοφίας ἐνδεσπότερα.—*Tatian Orat. c. Gr. c. 12*, p. 254, (p. 152, B.)

³ *Apol. 2*, 10, p. 95, (p. 48, B.) μεγαλειότερα πάσης ἀνθρωπείου διδασκαλίας φαίνεται τὰ ἡμῶν.

⁴ *Apol. 1*, 23, p. 57, (p. 68, B.) ἴσμεν λόγῳ μὲν μαθόντες παρὰ τοῦ Χριστοῦ καὶ τῶν προειδόντων αὐτὸν προφητῶν, μόνῃ ἀληθῆ ἴσμεν. *Dial. c. Tr. c. 7*, p. 109, (p. 224, E.). *Clem. Strom. 6*, 15, 122, T. III. p. 173.

⁵ *Apol. 2*, 11, p. 96, (p. 49, E.) οἱ εὐνοηκότες τὰ προσέοντα τῇ ὄντι καλῶ.

gained by the simple might of his word, a recognition of his claims, such as none of the most renowned and venerated philosophers or lawgivers ever found. Christianity, soon after its open promulgation, was threatened and assailed on all sides, but every attempt to check it, so far from endangering it, only gave a fresh impulse to its propagation. Among people of the lower class, even among slaves and females, the new faith found at first its most numerous adherents, and these individuals, for the most part, gained by it such firmness of religious conviction, and such strength of character, that even philosophers found reason to be ashamed before them, and the most exquisite tortures were not sufficient to make them waver in their profession. The Christian doctrine came into a world full of licentiousness and vice, full of injustice and unkindness, and wherever it found acceptance, it changed laxity of manners into purity, the love of the world was expelled by the love of God, and selfishness gave way to self-denial. These extraordinary effects of Christianity did not long remain unmarked, and wherever they were observed, they were involuntarily considered as indicating something divine. Men wonder, says Tertullian,¹ when they see persons suddenly reformed, who, before they joined the society of the Christians, were idle and worthless:—and according to another account of the same Father, the heathen, when they noticed the indications of Christian brotherly love, were wont to exclaim,² “See how they love one another, and are ready to die for their brethren!” In this quarter Apologetics met with their strongest support, the immediate exhibition of divine power and conversion in a concrete appearance which was constantly repeated. The ancient apologists exerted themselves with distinguished success in this department; they evinced the divine character of Christianity, from its extraordinary effects, with impressive

¹ *Ad Nation.* 1, 4, T. V. p. 103.

² *Apolog.* c. 39, T. V. p. 74.

eloquence. Justin considered Christianity, in reference to its effects, in a twofold light, as a doctrine, and as a principle of life. In proof of its divine sublimity, he brought forward its influence on the intelligence, as well as upon the morals of mankind. He combines both views, when he says ;—" the word of Christ is a power of God ;¹ it is full of a divine spirit, full of rich power and grace,² this word of truth and wisdom is warmer and clearer than even the rays of the sun, and penetrates into the depths of the heart and mind :³ the words of the Redeemer carry with them an awful authority, and can strike those persons with shame, who have wandered from the right way ; but those who have remained faithful enjoy the sweetest repose."⁴

In reference to the doctrinal view, Justin places the divine character of Christianity in this, that it is not a system for the schools, but for the people ; that it makes doctrines, which even the wisest among the Grecian philosophers could not correctly apprehend and represent, so easy to be apprehended and understood, that even the most illiterate could understand, and not merely understand, but likewise teach. " Christ," he avers " was no sophist,"⁵—and, " among us, these things may be heard and learned from persons who do not even know their letters, rude and barbarous in their utterance, but wise and believing in their minds, and some of them even maimed and blind ; so that it may be understood that these things are not the effect of human wisdom, but are uttered by the power of God."⁶

¹ *Apol.* 1, 14, p. 52, (p. 61, D.)

² *Dial.* c. Tr. c. 9, p. 110, (p. 226, D.)

³ *Dial.* c. Tr. c. 121, p. 214, (p. 350, A.)

⁴ *Dial.* c. Tr. c. 8, p. 109, (p. 225, C.)

⁵ *Apol.* 1, 14, p. 52, (p. 61, D.)

⁶ *Apol.* 1, 60, p. 79, (p. 93, C. D.) *παρ' ἡμῶν ἔστι ταῦτα ἀκούσαι καὶ μαθεῖν παρὰ τῶν ἄλλοις τοῖς χαλεκτέρας τῶν στοιχείων πιστομένων, ἰδιωτῶν μὲν καὶ βεβήκων το φθίγμα σοφῶν δὲ καὶ πιστῶν ἴσων ὅτι οὐκ, καὶ πηλῶν καὶ χήρων τινῶν τὰς ὀφθαλμοὺς τυφλοὶ καὶ σοφῶν*

In a moral point of view, Justin seeks for the credentials of the divine origin and power of Christianity, principally in the universality and powerfulness of its effects.¹ This is the leading thought which gives a

αἰθεράσια ταῦτα γιγνίσθαι, ἀλλὰ δύναμει θεῷ λίσσασθαι. — Athenag. *legat. pro Christ.* c. 11, p. 288, (p. 12, A.) Tertull. *Apolog.* c. 46, T. V. p. 86, deum quilibet opifex christianus et invenit et ostendit et exinde totum, quod a deo quaeritur, re quoque assignat; licet Plato affirmet, factitorem universitatis neque inveniri facilem et inventum enarrari in omnes difficilem. — “Every Christian labourer both findeth out God, and sheweth him, and hence really ascribeth to God all that in God is looked for; notwithstanding that Plato affirmeth that the maker of the world is both hard to be found out, and when found out, hard to be declared unto all.”—Tertullian, translated by the Rev. C. Dodgson, M. A. vol. I. p. 94. Oxford, 1842. Theodoret. *græco. affect. curat. disputat.* 5, T. IV. p. 840.

¹ What a high rank the ancient apologists assigned to the moral energy of Christianity in their system of Apologetics, the language employed by Eusebius sufficiently testifies, *præp. evang.* 1, 4, p. 11, ὁ καὶ μάλιστα μίγνιστον ἡγῆμαι τεκμήριον συγχάσαντος τῆς ἰσθῆς καὶ ἀπορήτου δυνάμεως τοῦ σωτῆρος ἡμῶν.—“Which I think by far the greatest proof of the divinely inspired, and ineffable power of our Saviour.”—5, 1, p. 179,—*de laud. Constant.* c. 17, p. 493, sq. Compare Paetz *de vi quam religio christ. per tria priora sæcula ad hominum animos, mores ac vitam habuit.* (Gotting. 1799,) p. 14, sqq. But none of the ancient Fathers have described the moral omnipotence of Christianity in more bold and strong language, (not without a degree of extravagance that borders on the magical,) than Lactantius, *Institut. Divin.* 3, 26, dei præcepta, quia et simplicia et vera sunt quantum valeant in animis hominum, quotidianis experimenta demonstrant. Da mihi virum, qui sit iracundus, maledicus, effrenatus; paucissimis dei verbis tam placidum quam ovem reddam. Da cupidum, avarum, tenacem; jam tibi eum liberalem dabo et pecuniam suam plenius manibus largientem. Da tumidum doloris ac mortis; jam cruces et ignes et Phalaridis taurum contemnet. Da libidinosum, adulterum, ganeonem; jam sobrium, castum, continentem videbis. Da crudelum et sanguinis adpetentem; jam in veram clementiam furor ille mutabitur. Da injustum insipientem peccatorem; continuo et æquus et prudens et innocens erit Pauca dei præcepta sic totum hominem immutant et, exposito vetere, novum reddunt, ut non cognoscas erundem esse.—“Daily experiments prove what power the precepts of God, inasmuch as they are simple and true,

unity to the expressions respecting these effects, which are scattered through his works, apparently without connection. Justin evidently attaches great weight to its universality, when he exclaims: "What shall we say of the innumerable multitude of those who have been made free by it from licentiousness?¹ We see and believe it, that men, by the name of the crucified Jesus Christ, are turned from idols and their former unrighteousness to God;² his mighty word has determined many to forsake the dæmons whom they had served, and, through him, believe in the all-seeing God; he has manifested such splendour and such power that he has remained unknown to no nation; and men everywhere have laid aside their old vicious manners.³ The strength and decisiveness of the exhibition of moral power, which Justin regarded as the second proof (next to the universality) of the divinity of Christianity, he placed partly in raising and transforming men who were sunk in the lowest depravity, —and partly in its advancing men who had been thus transformed, to a moral elevation which was never reached beyond the limits of the Christian communion. On the first point, he boasted that Christianity changed the unchaste into chaste,—the friends of magical arts

have over the minds of men. Give me a man passionate, foul-mouthed, without self-controul, with a few words of God, I will return him gentle as a lamb. Give me a man grasping, avaritious, griping; anon I will give him back to you liberal, and distributing his wealth with ready hands. Give me a man fearful of pain and death; anon he will contemn the cross, the flames, and the Phalarian bull. Give me a man of lust, an adulterer, a debauchee; anon you shall see him sober, chaste, continent. Give me a man cruel and blood-thirsty; anon that madness shall be changed into true clemency. Give me a man unjust, imprudent, and a sinner; forthwith he shall be just, and prudent, and blameless. A few precepts of God thus change the whole man, and the old being put off, they restore him a new creature, so that you would not know him to be the same."

¹ *Apol.* 1, 15, p. 52, (p. 62, B.)

² *Dial. c. Tr. c.* 11, p. 112, (p. 228, D.)

³ *Dial. c. Tr. c.* 121, p. 214, (p. 350, A.)

into servants of the true God,—that it made the avaricious benevolent,—the overbearing and tyrannical, gentle and patient; and the haters of men, lovers of mankind.¹ On the latter point, he refers to the self-denial with which the Christians loved even their enemies, and prayed for their persecutors, and to the steadfastness with which they sacrificed their property and blood rather than violate their fidelity to their faith. He often introduces both points, in various applications. Respecting the love of our enemies, he affirms, “we pray for our enemies, and seek out those who hate us unjustly, to induce them to follow the glorious doctrine of Christ, and to lay hold of the

¹ *Apol.* 1, 14, p. 51, (p. 61, B. C.) 1, 16, p. 53, (p. 63, C.) The first passage, see Vol. I. The second is as follows:—“Christ has required us, by patience and gentleness, to draw off men from dishonourable things, and from the love of evil. This we can show has taken place in many who once belonged to you. Many have laid aside their overbearing and tyrannical disposition, either by means of the enduring patience which they witness in their neighbours, or through the extraordinary forbearance of those with whom they travelled, when they were defrauded; or the faithfulness of those with whom they transacted business.”—The conclusion to be drawn from facts of this kind, which, in Justin, is not brought forward, Origen states in express terms, *c. Cels.* 2, 79, T. I. p. 446: οὐκ οἶδα, εἰ ἀνθρώπος, τολμήσας ἰσχυεῖσθαι πάσῃ τῇ οἰκῇ. μὴν ἦν παρ’ αὐτὸν διεδόξατο καὶ διδασκαλίαν, δύναται ἂν οὕτως εἰς βούλησιν. . . . Πῶς ἀνθρώπου φύσις, μηδὲν ἔχουσα πρῶτον ἐν αὐτῇ, δύναται ἰσχυεῖσθαι πολλὰς; καὶ οὐ θαυμάσιόν, εἰ ἴαν φρονίμων, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ἀλογώζοντων καὶ ταῖς πάθουσιν ἰγκυμίσουν, καὶ, ὅσον ἐπὶ τῇ ἀλογίᾳ, χαλιπρότερον μετὰ τιμῆς εἰς τὸ σωχερίστειν. Ἄλλ’ ἐπὶ δύναμει τοῦ τοῦ θεοῦ ὁ Χριστὸς ἦν καὶ σοφία τοῦ πατρὸς, διὰ τοῦτο ταῦτα πεποιήκει καὶ ἵτι ποιεῖ.—“I know not whether a man, attempting to propagate, through all the world, his own religion and teaching, is able to do what he wishes without divine assistance. . . . How can the nature of man, having nothing better in itself, convert so great a multitude; and the wonder is not respecting the intelligent, but the unreasonable and those enthralled by their passions, and those who, through irrationality, are, with far more difficulty, changed to sobriety. But since Christ was the power of God and the wisdom of the Father, on this account he has done, and is still doing, these things.

joyful hope, that they may receive equal blessings with ourselves from God the Ruler of all."¹ "You," he says in another place to the Jews, "curse in your synagogues all Christians;"² other nations do the same, and even carry their curses into effect, for these put to death those whose only crime is, that they

¹ *Apol.* 1, 14, p. 52, (p. 61, C.) 1, 57, p. 77, (p. 91, D.) The love of enemies is, under all circumstances, something noble and divine; but since the value of every true good rises with its scarcity, so must the self-denying love of the Christians have appeared far more splendid in contrast with a world which was actuated almost entirely by selfishness and avarice, and did homage to a grosser or more refined self-idolatry. (*Autotheismus*) that it would have done simply by its own nature. Hence, all the apologists, in writing on the excellency of the Christian life, aim, with more or less eloquence, to give prominence to this trait of it. Tertull. *ad Scapul.* c. 1, T. III. p. 157.—*Ita disciplina jubemur diligere inimicos quoque et orare pro eis, qui nos persequuntur, ut hæc sit perfecta et propria bonitas nostra, non communis; amicos enim diligere omnium est, inimicos autem solum Christianorum.*—"For so we are commanded by the law of our religion to love even our enemies, and to pray for them which persecute us, that this our goodness may be perfect, and specially our own, not the goodness of the world in general. For to love their friends belongeth to all, but to love their enemies, to the Christians only." (Dodgson's Tertullian, Vol. I. p. 142.) Compare *Epist. ad Diognet.* c. 5, p. 236, (p. 497, B. C.) Athenag. *leg. p. Christ.* c. II. p. 288, (p. 11. D.) *Cyprian. ad Demetr.* c. 25, T. II. p. 224, &c. This love promoted the cause of Christianity not a little. The Emperor Julian expressed much vexation on account of it, in an Epistle to Arsacius, a priest of Galatia. Sozomen. *hist. eccles.* 5, 16, p. 619—*μάλιστα τὴν ἀθρησκίαν συνύψησεν ἡ περὶ τοῦ ζῆντος φιλανθρωπία καὶ ἡ περὶ τὰς ταφὰς τῶν νεκρῶν προσηύδοια καὶ ἡ πεπλάσμινη σιμνότης κατὰ τὸν βίον. . . . Τρίψουσι οἱ δυσσεβεῖς Γαλιλαῖοι πρὸς τοῖς ἱαντῶν καὶ τοῖς ἡμῶν.* "Their philanthropy towards strangers has especially promoted the growth of Atheism, (disregard of the gods) and attention to the tombs of the dead, and an artificial sanctity of behaviour. The impious Galileans maintain their own (poor), and ours too." See Paetz *de vi quam relig. christ. per tria priora sæc. ad hominum animos mores ac vitam habuit*, p. 108, sq. 112, sqq.

² *Dial.* c. Tr. c. 96, p. 193, (p. 323, C. D. Compare c. 35, p. 133, (p. 254, B.)—c. 108, p. 202, (p. 335, D.)—c. 133, p. 226, (p. 368, C. D.)

confess that they are Christians. To all these we say, ye are our brethren, learn to know the truth of God. . . . Yea, we pray for you, that Christ may have pity upon you, for he has taught us to pray even for our enemies." The attachment of Christians to their faith, their readiness to die for the profession of it, is not merely mentioned by Justin often, and with emphasis: as when he says,¹ "Although the punishment of death hangs over those who publish the name of Christ, or only profess it, yet we profess and publish it everywhere;"—and,² "None on the whole earth can bring us who believe in Jesus, into fear and bondage; for if we are beheaded, or crucified, or thrown to wild beasts, whether our lot be a prison or the flames, or any other torture, yet we do not renounce our profession; on the contrary, the more frequently we suffer such things, greater numbers become pious and believers through the name of Jesus." As I have said, Justin does not merely mention this readiness of Christians to die for their faith, often and emphatically, but by a parallel, which he draws between the Christians on the one hand, and the sun-worshippers and scholars of Socrates on the other, he makes it evident that this contempt of death, with which Christianity inspired its professors, vouched for its being a divine institution.³ "The sun," he says, "God, as

¹ *Apol.* 1, 45, p. 70, (p. 83, A.)

² *Dial. c. Tr.* c. 110, p. 203, (p. 337, B) Compare c. 119, p. 212, (p. 348, A.)—c. 131, p. 223, (p. 360, C.)—*Apol.* 1, 23, p. 58, (p. 69, B.)

³ Those heathens, who were incapable of acknowledging the power of God in the martyrdom of Christians, generally saw in it obstinacy or fanaticism, or a vain desire of glory, Kortholt, *de vita et moribus Christianis*, &c. p. 168, 170; and Paetz *de vi quam relig. Christ.*, &c. p. 41. In displeasure at the numbers which not seldom (imprudently indeed) thronged to martyrdom,—perhaps, also, from a more praiseworthy feeling, a reluctance to shed so much innocent blood, the judges frequently reprimanded the Christians, by the sarcastic expression. *ἀδελφοί, οὐκ ἑαυτοὺς φονεύετε προεὐχόμενοι ἢ τῇ παρὰ τὸν θεόν, καὶ ἡμῖν πείγματα μὴ πείχετε.*—"Commit suicide, and go forthwith to your God, without giving us trouble."—Jus-

it is written, (Deut. iv. 19,) gave for an object of adoration, but there have never been men who would die for their faith in the sun; but, for the name of Jesus, men out of all nations have endured the extremest sufferings, and yet have never been induced to deny him."¹ "Socrates," (Plato)² he says, "exhorted men to seek the knowledge of the unknown God, when he said: It is not easy to find out the Father and Maker of all things; but it is not safe, when he is found out, to announce him to all." Our Christ has effected this by his power. No one ever so attached himself to Socrates as to die for this expression; but not only philosophers and learned men, but also artisans and illiterate men have followed Christ, and condemned glory, and fear, and death. Truly this is the power of the ineffable Father, and not the instrumentality of human reason!"

To these two internal proofs of the divinity of Christianity, founded on the sublimity of the doctrine, and the power of its spiritual effects, Justin adds another more external, which is founded on the extraordinary manner in which Christianity was prepared for, introduced and propagated.

tin, *Apol.* 2, 4, p. 91, (p. 43, C.)—Or, as Tertullian tells us of Arrius Antoninus, the proconsul of Asia, (*ad Scap.* c. 5, T. III. p. 163,) *ὁ δὲ διὰ τὴν εἰς τὸν ἀποθνήσκον, κρημνὸς ἢ βέλος οὐκ ἔχον*: "Wretches! if ye wish to die, there are precipices and halts for you!"—Justin takes pains to give the reason why the Christians felt themselves not at liberty to adopt the course thus recommended.—"We do not commit suicide," he replies, "since, by so doing, we should, as far as in us lay, contravene the purpose of God, who means that the human race should be preserved and brought to the faith."

¹ *Dial. c. Tr. c.* 121, p. 214, (p. 349, D. 350, A.)

² *Apol.* 2, 10, p. 95, (p. 48, E. 49, A.) See Neander's *das Christliche Leben der drei ersten Jahrhunderte* in his *Denkwürdigkeiten aus der Geschichte des Christenthums*, I. 26.

ARTICLE III.

EVIDENCE FOR THE DIVINITY OF CHRISTIANITY, FROM
THE MIRACLES AND PROPHECIES BY WHICH IT WAS
PREPARED FOR, INTRODUCED, AND PROPAGATED.

In all ages miracles have been considered as indispensably requisite for accrediting a religion as divine. All founders of religions, both in ancient and modern times, who were anxious to be acknowledged as messengers and interpreters from a higher world, have assumed miracles as the insignia of their office, or have been invested with them by their disciples. Whether these insignia were the workmanship of truth, or of involuntary delusion, or wilful deceit, still there was a relative necessity for employing them. No person can seriously lay claim to be acknowledged as the bearer of a divine revelation, unless he can prove himself to be such by trust-worthy credentials. The peculiar nature of the doctrine he announces cannot be taken as an adequate credential, since this doctrine (at least by supposition,) rises above the standing-point of those to whom it is communicated, and has, first, for its object, to place those who may become its professors in a position where they will be able to recognise the divine with greater or less clearness and truth. Also the effects, (whatever they were,) of the doctrine can not come under consideration, since the reference to them presupposes a longer estimate of the doctrine. The only effective credential of a pretended or real divine messenger, in the first stage of his appearance, is the manifestation of powers which, either apparently or really and truly surpass the common powers of man;—the unfolding of effects, which either find, or generally can find, no explanation in natural causes; in part, also, a series of events, either apparently or truly wonderful, which shed a glory on the life of the messenger of God, independently of his

co-operation.¹ So, then, it was natural that Christ, after he had announced himself as the founder of a new, an exclusive religious community, should exert himself to gain credit for his assertion, that he came forth from God and taught divine truth by the display of divine creative powers and that, independently of his carnal co-operation, his life should be distinguished by events which elevated him far above the lot and experiences of common men. Throughout all ages, have these miracles been appealed to as witnesses for the divine mission, or for the divinity of Christ, though opinions have been divided whether a temporally or perpetual relative or absolute force of evidence was to be attributed to these miracles. The oldest Christian apologetics coincide with the modern in granting only a very subordinate apologetic importance to the miracles in a stricter sense so called.² None of the ancient Fathers, indeed, doubted the full historical truth of the miracles narrated by the Evangelists; it never entered their thoughts to regard them as any thing else than real emanations of divine power; and some of them at least, as Quadratus,³ Melito,⁴ the author of the Clementine homilies,⁵ and

¹ Strauss. *die Christliche Glaubenslehre*, (Tub. und Stuttg. 1840,) I. 84.

² Eisenlohr's *argumenta ab apologetis seculi secundi*, T. II. p. 191, sqq. Tzschirner's *Geschichte der Apologetik*, I. 148.

³ The fragment in which Quadratus notices miracles of Christ, and particularly remarks that, in his times, some of those who were healed and raised from the dead by Christ, were still living, is preserved by Eusebius. *Hist. Eccles.* 4, 3, T. I. p. 292.

⁴ In a fragment by Anastasius of Sinai; *hadeg.* c. 13, p. 260, (ed Gretzer.) τὰ μετὰ τὸ βάπτισμα, φησίν, ὑπὸ Χριστοῦ παραχρῆστα καὶ μάλιστα ἢ σιμῶα τὴν αὐτοῦ περυσμένην ἐν σαρκὶ διόκητα ἰδῆλουν καὶ ἐπεσοῦντο τῷ κόσμῳ — "The things performed by Christ after his baptism, and especially the miracles, manifested his deity hidden in the flesh, and gave a pledge of it to the world."

⁵ *Clem. homil.* 1, 6, T. I. p. 616.

Hippolytus,¹ give them a higher rank; but most of the ancient apologists either pass them over altogether in proving the divinity of Christianity, or touch upon them slightly, or even assert their relative inutility.² The ground of this indifference towards a branch of evidence, in other times so highly valued, lies in the prevalent belief in miracles of that age. To do a miracle was then thought nothing extraordinary; the presumption was universal, that the ordinary power of man could make use of the invisible higher spiritual world, and accomplish extraordinary things by the help of good or evil dæmons. Theurgy was an esteemed and widely spread art; magic was a lucrative profession; Goetæ swarmed in all directions; asleep or awake, men's minds were familiar with miracles. Even the educated and intelligent caught the infection of the age. Suetonius³ and Tacitus⁴ relate that Vespasian, during his residence at Alexandria, cured a blind man with his spittle, and a lame man by touching him with his foot, and neither of these writers intimates the slightest suspicion of the correctness of these accounts. Spartianus⁵ tells us that two blind men obtained their sight merely by Hadrian's touch, and avows his firm belief, though he was aware that doubts were entertained on the subject. Philostratus⁶ wrote the life of the Thaumaturgist Apollonius of Tyana, and admires, with

¹ Hippolytus, in very decided language, infers the divinity of Christ from his miracles. The fragment is to be found in Theodoret. Dial. 2, Inconfus. T. IV. p. 133.

² Tertul. *adv. Marc.* 3, 3, T. I. p. 104, non fuit inquis, ordo ejusmodi necessarius, quia statim se et filium et missum et dei Christum rebus ipsis esset probaturus, per documenta virtutum. At ego negabo, solam hanc illi speciem ad testimonium competisse quam et ipse postmodum exauctoravit. Si-quidem . . . temerariam signorum, &c.

³ *Vit. Vespasian*, c. 7.

⁴ *Histor.* 4, 81.

⁵ *Vit. Hadrian.* c. 25. Compare *Baron. annal. eccles. ad a. Chr. 130*, (ed noviss. Colon. Agripp. 1624, II. 106.)

⁶ *Baur's Apollonius von Tyana und Christus*, in the *Tubingen Theological Journal*, 1832, Part IV. p. 32.

the most credulous reverence, all the monstrous performances with which the history of this wonder-worker is crammed. The Fathers themselves never doubted that it was possible, by means of the assistance of dæmons, to produce the most astounding and extraordinary effects. Justin mentions that Simon and Menander, at Rome, had performed miracles of magic by the help of dæmons.¹ Others asserted as much and more.² Under these circumstances, the ancient apologists could not adduce the miracles of Christ, in and for themselves as witnesses for the divine mission or the divine nature of Christ, without apprehending an objection, on the part of the heathen, that these miracles of Christ were only a superior magic, which at most substantiated his claim to be a favourite of the gods, but by no means God himself. The heathens, indeed, frequently raised this objection, and placed by the side of Christ other famed workers of miracles: thus the Proconnesian Aristeas, the Hyperborean Abaris, the Clazomenian Hermodotus, and Astypalænsian Cleomedes were brought forward by Celsus;³ Apuleius by Porphyry;⁴ Apollonius of Tyana, by Hierocles;⁵ and with the express design of shewing the Christians how little they were justified in exalting to the rank of a god their Christ, on account of a few miracles which he had wrought, since they (the heathen) had not deified their Thaumaturgists, who had performed more and greater miracles. That the miracles of Jesus might acquire some degree of apologetical importance, it was needful to

¹ *Apol.* 1, 56, p. 77, (p. 91, B.)

² Minuc. Fel. Octav. c. 26, p. 99. Tertull. *Apolog.* c. 23, T. V. p. 50.—Clem. *protrep.* 4, 58, T. I. p. 51. Origen. *c. Cels.* 7, 69, T. I. p. 743.—Lactant. *institut. divin.* 2, 14.

³ Origen *c. Cels.* 3, 26, T. I. p. 462, sq. 3, 31, sq. p. 467, sq.

⁴ Hieronym. *comment. in Psalm.* 81, T. VIII. p. 97.

⁵ Lactant. *institut. divin.* 5, 3; and Euseb. *Cont. Hierocl.* p. 512, (in an Appendix to *Demonstr. Evang.* ed. Viger. Col. 1688. See Baltus' *defense des saints pères.* p. 269, sq.; and Keil *de causis alieni platon. recent. a relig. Christ. animi*: Opusc. Academ. p. 428, sq.)

find some marks by which they might be distinguished from dæmoniacal miracles, and be accredited as divine. Justin made the first attempt to settle such criteria. He laid down, as a characteristic of a true miracle wrought by divine power, in distinction from a dæmoniacal one, that there was a preparatory prediction as a historical foundation,¹ and that it served to glorify the true God; that it was not a mere spectacle or a vehicle of dæmoniacal error.² But notwithstanding

¹ *Apol.* 1, 30, p. 61, (p. 72, A.) *ὅπως μὴ τις ἀντιτιθείῃ ἡμῖν, τί καλεῖται καὶ ἴδῃ παρ' ἡμῶν λεγόμενον Χριστὸν μαγικῇ τέχνῃ ἢ; λίγους δὲ ἡμῖς ποιούμενους καὶ δόξαι δὲ τοῦ υἱοῦ τοῦ θεοῦ εἶναι, τὴν ἀποδείξιν ἥδη ποιήσασθαι, οὐ τοῖς λίγους πιστεύοις, ἀλλὰ τοῖς περὶ ἡμετέρας κατ' ἀνάγκην πιστόμενοι.*—“And that no one may object to us, what forbids the supposition that he whom we call Christ performed the miracles we have mentioned, by magical art, and on this account was thought to be the Son of God; we shall now give a demonstration, not relying on those who have told us, but being necessarily persuaded by those who prophesied before the event.”—In the same manner, and even more decidedly, Lactantius makes the Old Testament prophecies the fundamental proof of miracles, *Institut. divin.* 5, 3. *disce igitur . . . non solum iccirco a nobis deum creditum Christum, quia mirabilia fecit, verum etiam, quia videmus in eo facta esse omnia, quæ nobis annuntiata sunt vaticinio prophetarum. Fecit mirabilia; magum putassemus, ut et vos nunc putatis et Judæi tunc putaverunt, si non illa ipsa facturum Christum prophetæ omnes uno spiritu prædicassent.* Compare also *Iren. adv. hæres.* 2, 57, p. 166. *Origen. c. Cel.* 2, 48, T. i. p. 422. *Hilar. Comment. in Matth. can.* 3, p. 150, B.

² *Dial. c. Tr.* c. 7, p. 109, (p. 225, A.) *καὶ τοί γι καὶ διὰ τὰς δυνάμεις ἃς ἐκτελεῖται πιστεύσασθαι δικαίως ἡσανίαν δὲ καὶ τὸν ποιητὴν τῶν ὅλων θεὸν καὶ πατέρα εὐχόμενον καὶ τὸν παρ' αὐτοῦ Χριστὸν υἱὸν αὐτοῦ κατήγγελλον ὅτι οἱ ἄσπο τοῦ πλάνου καὶ ἀκαθάρτου πνεύματος ἡμιπτελάμενοι ψευδοπροφῆται οὕτως ἐποίησαν οὕτως ποιοῦσιν, ἀλλὰ δυνάμεις τινὲς ἐνέργειαι εἰς κατὰ πλῆξιν τῶν ἀνθρώπων τολμῶσι καὶ τὰ τῆς πλάνης πνεύματα καὶ δαίμονα δοξολογοῦσιν.*—“And, on account of the mighty deeds they performed, they were worthy of being believed; since they glorify the Creator of all things (who is) God and Father, and announce Christ his Son sent from him; which the false prophets, inspired by a deceiving and unclean spirit, never have done nor do, but dare to perform certain wonderful works, in order to strike men with amazement, and celebrate the dæmons and spirits of error.”—The distinction

these distinctions, by which a measure of apologetic value was secured to the miracles of Jesus beyond all mere magical effects, Justin, like most of the ancient Fathers, made only a sparing use of these miracles. The whole value which he attributed to them was that of exciting the attention of persons living at the time to Jesus. "Jesus," he says, "healed those who were blind, and deaf, and lame, from their birth, causing by his word, one to leap, another to hear, and another to see. He even raised the dead, and restored to life, and by his mighty works, he moved the people of that age to acknowledge him. But they imputed his works to magical illusion, and dared to call him a magician, and a deceiver of the people."¹

between genuine and spurious miracles, which is made in these words, does not apply immediately to the miracles of Christ, but stands in direct relation to the miracles of the Old Testament prophets. But what is said of the latter, naturally admits of a full application to the former. This first attempt of Justin's to defend the miracles of Scripture against the imputation of magic, and to represent them as a true manifestation of divine power, was soon followed by others, on the part of the later Fathers. According to Origen, (*c. Cels.* I. 68, T. I. p. 383, 3, 28, p. 464,) a divine miracle is known by the morality of its author, and its own moral tendency. According to the Clementine Homilies and Recognitions, (*Homil.* 2, 33, T. I. p. 630; *Recogn.* 3, 59, p. 529,) it is characterized by its salutary tendency, while a dæmoniacal miracle is useless and pernicious. Arnobius, also, (*adv. gent.* I, 43, sq. T. I. p. 29, 1, 48, p. 32, 2, 11, p. 64,) expresses his agreement with this view, but adds, by way of corroboration, that Christ performed his miracles without using any formula whatever, or any herbs,—without a punctilious observation of ceremonies and times, by the mere power of his word and name. See the distinctions made by the later Fathers in Donner's *Sententiam de miraculis Jesu Christi recensens ex patribus sæc. priorum seculorum*, (Lips. 1810,) p. 9, sqq. 14, sq.

¹ *Dial. c. Tr.* c. 69, p. 168, (p. 296, A.) διὰ τῶν ἔργων ἰδυσώται, τὰς τότε ὄντας ἀνθρώπους, ἰωγινῶσαι αὐτόν. Still more undoubtedly and directly, Origen limits the efficacy of miracles in producing conviction, to the times when they were performed. *Comment. in Joan.* 2, 28, T. IV. p. 87, καὶ τότε ἰωρισωτίαν ἵτι αἱ μὲν τιεάσται δυνάμεις τὰς κατὰ τὸν χρόνον τῷ Χριστῷ γινόμενης προκαλεῖσθαι ἰωὶ τὸ πιστεύειν ἰδύσαντο· ἔκ τῶν δὲ τὸ ἰμφοτικὸν

Justin attached more importance to the miracles which were performed in the Church during his own times. It is allowed that the Christians of the first century boasted of continuing to possess the apostolic gifts, both prophetic and miraculous. Nearly all the Apologists, the most intelligent and free-thinking not excepted, speak on this point with the utmost confidence. Even Origen is among the reporters, and avows that he had been an eye witness of miraculous agency. The facts most frequently described, are healing of the sick, the expulsion of dæmons by means of the sign of the cross, or the name of Jesus, and the prediction of future events.¹ Justin speaks only of the two latter. Once he asserts in general terms, "Among us there are men and women who possess

μιτὰ χρόνους πλείοντας. ἤδη καὶ μύθους εἶναι ὑπονοηθεῖται. Πλείων γὰρ τῶν τότε γινομένων δυνάμιων ἰσχύει πρὸς πειθῶν ἢ νῦν συνήξετα-
ζομένηται δυνάμει προφητείας ἀκακίας ἀπιστοῦσθαι ὑπὸ τῶν ἐριυνόων-
των αὐτὰς καλύψα.—"This too is to be considered, that mira-
cles were able to lead many to believe in the life-time of Christ,
but they did not preserve their efficiency after a lapse of years,
and are now regarded with suspicion as myths. For prophecy
being compared with miracles, avails more for persuasion than
past miracles, and prevents those who investigate them from
disbelieving them."

¹ It is difficult, if not impossible, to pass a perfectly unex-
ceptionable judgment on the alleged phenomena. Yet it may
be asserted, that nothing short of an implicit faith can accept
all the miraculous accounts of the Fathers as genuine coins :
and, on the other hand, a person must be involved in the
trammels of a very superficial philosophy, or labour under an
absolute mistrust of the ancient Christians, who can charge
these narratives in the gross, with being unfounded and false.
The question has often been discussed, and has been decided
in different ways. Compare Dodwell, *Dissertatiō Cypriani*. p.
10, sq. Cave, *Antiquitates patrum et eccles.* p. 22. Gibbon's
Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire. Mosheim, *de
rebus Christ. ante Constant.* Magn. Comment. p. 221, sq.
Cramer, *Fortsetzung von Bossuet's Einleitung in die Geschichte
der Welt und der Religion*, II. 440. Tzschirner, *Geschichte
der Apologetik*, I. 175. Neander, *des christ. Leben der drei
ersten Jahrhunderte* : in *Denkwürdigkeiten u. s. w.* I. 154.
Rudelbach, *Hieronymus Savonarola und seine Zeit*, (Hamb.
1835,) 282, 290, &c.

the gifts of the divine spirit."¹ The prophetic gift in particular, he mentions only once;² on the other hand, he frequently speaks of the power of Christians over dæmons, and this it is especially from which, next to Christ's exaltation above dæmons, he infers his divine mission and dignity. From the works of Christians, "and the power that accompanies them," he says,³ "all may know that Christ is the new law and the new covenant,"—and,⁴ "whatever is done in the name of Jesus, proves that he is the Christ." In the two following passages he distinctly declares⁵ "that Jesus was born as a man, according to the will of God the Father, for the salvation of believing men, and for the ruin of dæmons, you may learn from what passes under your own eyes; for many of our people have cured many dæmoniacs throughout the world, and in your city of Rome, by adjuring them in the name of Jesus Christ, who was crucified under Pontius Pilate, whom none of your exorcists, and enchanters, and sorcerers could cure, and even now cure them, discomfiting and ejecting the dæmons who hold possession of men," and "that Christ is the Lord of (miraculous) powers, as you can easily put to the test by what passes under the eyes of all: for in the name of the Son of God, the first born of all creatures, who was born of a virgin, suffered as a man, and was crucified under Pontius Pilate, was raised from the dead, and ascended to heaven, whatever dæmon is adjured, is thereby overcome, and reduced to obedience." Justin indeed, could not consistently estimate the miracles of his own times as essentially superior to the miracles of Jesus, for they were exposed to the same suspicion of

¹ *Dial. c. Tr.* c. 88, p. 185, (p. 315, B.)

² *Dial. c. Tr.* c. 82, p. 179, sq. (p. 308, B.)

³ *Dial. c. Tr.* c. 11, p. 112, (p. 228, E.)

⁴ *Dial. c. Tr.* c. 39, p. 136, (p. 258, C.)

⁵ *Apol.* 2, 6, p. 93, (p. 45, A. B.) and *Dial. c. Tr.* c. 85, p. 182, (p. 311, B.) Compare c. 76, p. 173, (p. 302, A.) and c. 121, p. 214, (p. 350, B.)

dæmoniactal origin,¹ and he himself allowed that Jews and heathens, as well as Christians, had the ability of exorcising evil spirits.² Yet the miracles of Christians had this advantage at least before the miracles of Christ, that they belonged to the present time, and therefore immediately arrested the attention of contemporaries; and Justin lessened the effect of the comparison of the Jewish and heathen exorcisms with the Christian, by pointing out, that along with the resemblance between them, there was this essential difference, that the heathen and Jewish attempts at exorcising frequently were abortive, while the dæmons always yielded to the Christians, and that the heathen exorcists were obliged to use charms and fumigations, while the Christian needed only to utter the name of Jesus in order to effect the expulsion of the dæmons.³

If, agreeably to the preceding remarks, it must be regarded as a peculiarity of the ancient church, easily explicable from the circumstances of the times, that in general they valued far too little the evidence of miracles, particularly the miracles of Jesus—it must with equal truth be noted as another peculiarity, that in an inverse proportion the evidence of prophecy was overvalued. When Origen calls this evidence the greatest and strongest, the special evidence of the Spirit⁴—when Tertullian and Lactantius make the personal credibility of Jesus dependent on the agreement of his discourses and actions with the Old Testament prophecies⁵—these sentiments are not to be

¹ See Celsus, in Origen. *c. Cels.* 6, 39, sq. T. I. p. 661, sq.

² *Dial. c. Tr.* c. 85, p. 182, (p. 311, C.) He attributed the power of expelling dæmons to adjuration, in the name of the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob. Compare Irenæus *ad Hæres.* 2, 5, p. 122, and Origen. *c. Cels.* 1, 22, T. I. p. 339, 4, 33, p. 526, sq. 5, 45, p. 612.

³ *Apol.* 2, 6, p. 93, (p. 45, B.—*Dial. c. Tr.* c. 30, p. 128, (p. 247, C.) c. 85, p. 182, (p. 311, B. C.)

⁴ Origen. *c. Cels.* 1, 2, T. i. p. 320, 1, 49, p. 365, 2, 28, p. 411.

⁵ Tertull. *apolog. c.* 20, T. v. p. 41, Idoneum, opina, testi-

regarded as the private opinions of individual teachers, but as the convictions of collective Christendom. A variety of reasons have been alleged to explain the excessive value which the ancient Church attached to prophecy. But we may fairly allow one reason to be decisive on the question, namely, the belief of the Fathers in the irresistible force of the evidence of prophecy. This faith, which had its root in the conviction so immoveably fixed, even in opposition to the oracles of heathenism and the faculty of divination bestowed by dæmons, that a peculiar knowledge of the future, such as lies at the basis of true prophecy, belongs to God alone; this belief is the special, we may say the exclusive source of the enthusiasm with which the Fathers enumerated and historically explained the Old Testament prophecies. On this ground Justin also rested his evidence from prophecy, which he represented from the first as the main pillar of Christianity.¹ He found, in surveying the evangelical history and doctrine, a variety of incomprehensible and apparently incredible things. What can furnish a pledge, he asked himself, that these things, notwithstanding their incomprehensibility and seeming impossibility, are true, and have moreover the divine appointment and sanction? Not the naked assertion of their performers and reporters, not even the simple declaration of Christ and his Apostles.² Who would take a crucified man at

monium divinitatis, veritas divinationis.—“The truth of the divination is, methinks, sufficient proof that it is divine,”—e. 21, p. 45, *prædixerat et ipse (Christus) ita facturos, parum hoc, si non et prophætæ retro.*—“He had himself foretold that they would do this. This were but a small thing, if the prophets also had not done so before.”—Lactant. *institut. divin.* 5, 3, non suo testimonio (cui enim de se decenti potest credi) sed prophetarum testimonio, qui omnia quæ fecit ac passus est multo ante cecinerunt, fidem divinitatis accepit.—“The claims of his divinity were admitted, not on his own testimony (for who can be believed merely on his own word,) but on the testimony of the prophets, who long before sung what he did and suffered.”

¹ *Apol.* 1, 30, p. 62, (p. 72, B.) ἥτις μεγίστη καὶ ἀληθιστάτη ἐπακοῦς καὶ ὑμῖν, ὡς νομίζομεν, φανήσεται.

² *Apol.* 1, 30, p. 62, (p. 72, B.) οὐ τοῦς λόγους πιστεύοιτε, ἀλ-

his word, that he was the first begotten Son of the unbegotten God, and that he was to be the judge of the whole human race?¹ Only the fact that things so incomprehensible and incredible, had been really foretold hundreds, nay even thousands of years before they actually occurred,² could produce full credence in their truth; but this fact produces credence with compulsive force.³ For where a precise fore-announcement of future contingencies, which corresponds with the event, exists; where a representation embodies future events in strict accordance with its historical counterpart; there is the finger of God; there is the visible operation of God. Contingent events no being but God can foreknow and foretell.⁴ So far are dæmons and men from possessing this ability, that they are not capable of thoroughly conceiving and understanding the real prophecies as they are given by God in the Old Testament, before they are set in a clear light by their actual fulfilment; thus, for example, they cannot comprehend the description of the sufferings and death of the Messiah, till it has become historic fact in the person of Jesus.⁵ From the harmony of

λὰ τοῖς προφητεύουσι, πρὶν ἢ γινέσθαι.—1, 33, p. 64, (p. 75, B.)
ὡς οἱ ἀποκηρυχθέντες πάντα τὰ περὶ τοῦ σωτῆρος ἡμῶν.

¹ *Apol.* 1, 53, p. 74, (p. 88, A.) τίς ἂν λογῇ ἀνθρώπου σταυρωθῆναι ἱκετόμεθα, οἷον πρωτότοκος τῷ ἀγνήτῳ θεῷ ἴσθαι καὶ αὐτὸς τὴν κρίσιν τῷ παντί; ἀνθρώπου γίνεσθαι ποιήσεται; εἰ μὴ μετῴμεν, πρὶν ἢ ἰλθεῖν αὐτὸν ἀνθρώποις γινόμενοι, κληρυγμένα περὶ αὐτοῦ εἶραμεν καὶ οὕτως γινόμενα ὁρώμεν.—These remarks are only of force on the hypothetical position of pure unbelief; let Christ be once acknowledged as the Son of God, and his Apostles as the organs of the Divine Spirit, and their declarations carry with them the testimony of their credibility and of their divine origin.

² *Apol.* 1, 31, p. 62, (p. 73, B.)

³ *Apol.* 1, 30, p. 62, (p. 72, B.) τοῖς προφητεύουσι, πρὶν ἢ γινέσθαι, κατ' ἀνάγκην πειθόμενοι, διὰ τὸ καὶ εἶπαι. ὡς προφητεύον, ὅταν γινόμενα καὶ γινόμενα.—*Dial. c. Tr. c. 7.* p. 109, (p. 225, A.) τὰ ἀποβάντα καὶ ἀποβάνοντα ἱζητωγάζει συντίθισθαι τοῖς λαλελημένοις δι' αὐτῶν (προφητῶν.)

⁴ *Apol.* 1, 12, p. 50, (p. 60, A. B.)

⁵ *Apol.* 1, 32, p. 63, (p. 73, C.)—*Dial. c. Tr. c. 76*, p. 173,

prophecy and Scripture Justin concludes,¹ we derive the full certainty of our faith; that an individual prophecy has preceded all events, settles the certainty of our conviction that every thing which Jesus and his Apostles did and taught, is a divine message and work, that every thing which befalls Jesus and his church is founded in God's ordinance or permission; that Jesus is indeed the Son of God.

In filling up this outline of his apologetic argument, the canonical books of the Old Testament furnished Justin with the most abundant materials. Yet he did not refuse to avail himself of the treasures of the heathen Sibyll,² and of the comparatively unknown Hystaspes.³ Judea he regarded as the original classic land of inspiration;⁴ but his liberal mind would not

(n. 302, A.) εἰ διὰ τῶν προφητῶν παρακικαλυμμένης κηρύσσεται πα-
θητὸς γινησόμενος ὁ Χριστὸς καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα πάλιν κυριεύων,
ἀλλ' οὖν γε ὅτ' οὐδινὸς νῆυσθαι ἰδύνατο, μέχρις αὐτοῦ ἔπαισε
τοὺς ἀποστόλους ἐν ταῖς γραφαῖς ταῦτα κηρυχθῆναι διαβήδην.—
“For though it was announced, in a covert manner, by the pro-
phets, that the Messiah was to be a sufferer, and after that
would be Lord of all, yet this could not be conceived by any
one, till he himself convinced his Apostles that these things
were distinctly announced in the Scriptures.”

¹ *Dial. c. Tr. c. 53, p. 149, (p. 273, C.)* ἔστιν καὶ ἡμῖς βέ-
βαιος ἐστί.

² *Coh. ad Gr. c. 37, sq. p. 33, sqq. (p. 34, E. 36, B. C. 37, A.)* *Apol. I, 20, p. 55, (p. 66, B. C.)* I, 44, p. 70, (p. 82, B. C.)
From the frequent use of the Sibylline oracles, the Christians,
it is well known, were in derision called Sibyllists. Origen
c. Cels. 5, 61, T. I. p. 625.

³ *Apol. I, 20, p. 55, (p. 66, B. C.)* I, 44, p. 70, (p. 82, B. C.)
Next to Justin the Prophecies of Hystaspes are mentioned
in Christian writers, in the Sermon of Peter, (*Clem. Strom.*
6, 5, § 43,) and in Lactantius (*Institut. divin.*) 7, 15, § 18.
Compare Fabric. *Biblioth. Gr. ed. Harl. T. I. p. 108, sq.*
Corrodi, *Krit. Geschichte des Chiliasmus*, II. 121. Lücke,
Versuch. einer vollständigen Einleitung in die Offenbarung
Johannis, 45.

⁴ Justin also refers to Christ's own prophecies, and adduces
them as evidence of his credibility and divine mission. But
he touches upon them very slightly, perhaps because they
wanted the charm of antiquity. He merely brings forward
two points, the rise of heretics and the persecution of true

allow him to make this its exclusive distinction; he did not regard heathenism as wholly disqualified to furnish suitable organs of prophecy for the Holy Spirit. He assumes the historical truths of the evangelical word respecting the life and sufferings, the discourses and actions of Jesus, since, in all the important points they were not called in doubt. For the fact of the birth of Jesus at Bethlehem, he appeals to the tables of the Roman Census;¹ and the historical truth of the miracles of Jesus, as well as the circumstances attend-

Christians. On the first he remarks: *Dial. c. Tr. c. 35, p. 132. (p. 253, B)* ἡμεῖς. οἱ τῆς ἀληθείης Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ καὶ καθεστῆς διδασκαλίας μαθῆναι πιστότεροι καὶ βιβαιοίτεροι γινόμεθα ἐν τῇ ἱστορίᾳ τῇ κατηγγελαμένην ὑπ' αὐτοῦ ἃ γὰρ προλαβὼν μίλλαι γίνεσθαι ἐν ὀνόματι αὐτοῦ ἔφη, ταῦτα ἔφη καὶ ἐργεῖα ἐρῶμεν τελέμενα. Ἐἴπε γὰρ· ἰλιθύνονται, &c. (Matt. vii. 15.)—"We who are disciples of the true and pure doctrine of Jesus, have become more faithful and confirmed in the hope which is announced to us by him; for those things which he anticipated and said would come to pass in his name, these things we see actually accomplished before our eyes. For he said many shall come in my name," &c. — Respecting the foreknowledge of the latter on the part of Jesus, he says. *Apol. 1, 12. p. 50, (p. 60), (A.)* γινώσκουσι ταῦτα πάντα προῦπι ὁ ἡμέτερος διδάσκαλος . . .

. . . ὅθιν καὶ βιβαιοὶ γινόμεθα πρὸς τὰ διδασγμένα ὑπ' αὐτοῦ πάντα, ὡς ἐργα φαίνονται γινόμενα, ὡς φέρεται γινώσκουσι προῦπι. — "Our teacher foretold that all these things would come to pass . . . Whenever we are confirmed in all that he has taught since those events have actually appeared, which he foretold would happen;" and *Dial. c. Tr. c. 35, p. 133, (p. 254, A.)* ὡς καὶ ἐκ τούτων ἡμεῖς ἡμεῖς τὸν Ἰησοῦν καὶ τὸν μετ' αὐτοῦ γινωσκόμενον προγνωσθέντα πιστάμεθα καὶ ἐκ ἄλλων δὲ πολλῶν, ὧν προῦπι γινώσκουσι ἡμεῖς αἰσθύνουσι καὶ ἐμολογῶσιν αὐτὸν Χρῆστον. Καὶ γὰρ ἃ ποσχομεν πάντα, ἀναγινώσκουσι ὡς τῶν οἰκίων, προῦπι ἡμῖν μίλλαι γινώσκουσι, ὡς κατὰ μνήματα τρέπον ἐπιληψίμους αὐτοῦ λόγους ἢ προῦπι φαίνονται. — "Wherefore, from these things we are assured that Jesus foreknew what would happen to himself, as well as from many other things which he foretold would befall those who would believe and confess him to be the Messiah. For all which we suffer, and our being put to death by our own kindred, he foretold would happen, so that in no respect, either as to word or deed, can blame be attached to him."—c. 82, p. 179, (p. 308, C.)

¹ *Apol. 1, 34, p. 65, (p. 75, E.)*

ing his crucifixion, were corroborated by the (supposed) report of the procurator Pilate.¹

Justin considers the Old Testament as a continued prophecy of Christ and the Christian dispensation; in every letter he perceives a reference to the history and doctrine of Jesus,—to the church and its development there is no aspect of Christianity of which he does not find an indication by the finger of prophecy. When he asserts,² “of all the institutes of Moses, I can show that they are types, symbols, and prophecies of what would happen to Jesus and to those who believe on him;” this assertion forms the basis of his method of interpretation. By means of it he invests every point of Christ’s life and doctrine,—every step in the development of the church, with the sanctity of a divine origination and appointment; and gives to Christianity as a whole, and in all its parts, the impress of divinity.

He exhibits the Israelitish leader, Joshua, as a personal typical representative of Jesus; he views his life as an emblem both of the work and power of the Redeemer.³ The son of Naue (*Navē*) was originally called Ause (*’Auseh*, LXX. *עֲשֵׂה*, Heb. *Oshea*, Auth. Vern. Num. xiii. 8,) at a later period received the name of Jesus; (“and Moses called Oshea the son of Nun, Jehoshua,” Num. xiii. 16, *Ἰησοῦν*, LXX. *עֲשֵׂה*, Heb.) the same name which Jesus bears. Joshua led the Jewish people into the Holy Land, which

¹ *Apol.* 1, 35, p. 65, (p. 76, C.)—1, 48, p. 72, (p. 84, C.) Compare Kleuker *über die Apocryphen des N. T.* Hamb. 1798, p. 215. Meyer, *Veilheidigung und Erläuterung der Geschichte Zem und der Apostel allein aus gleich, und rom. Profanskribenten*, 35. Winer, *biblischer Realwörterbuch*, II. 312.

² *Dial. c. Tr. c.* 42, p. 138, (p. 261, B.)

³ Lactant. *institut. divin.* 4, 17. Christi figuram gerebat ille Jesus; qui quum primum Auses vocaretur, Moyses futura præsentens supit eum Jesum vocari.

he divided among the tribes. Christ himself collects the dispersion of the people, (τὴν διασπορὰν τοῦ λαοῦ) and gives them the Holy Land for an everlasting possession.¹ Joshua circumcised the people a second time with sharp flints, (Joshua v. 2,) and Christ circumcises his people with the sharp flint of his word, that they may forsake the service of idols of stone. Whatever the son of Naue² achieved was owing to the power of the name of Jesus. When he stood with this name, at the head of the Israelitish host, while Moses stretched out his arms in the form of a cross—Israel conquered, (Exod. xvii. 8.) Inasmuch as he received power from the spirit of Jesus, after whose name he was called, he was able to stay the sun in its course.³ All the other passages in the life of Christ, and all the forms of his redeeming work,—all the stages of development in the kingdom of God, Justin goes on to say, were represented by the other prophets, in a detached and aphoristic manner, but with traits which were harmonized by a higher unity, and met in one collective image. Under different aspects the pencil of prophecy delineates the birth and

¹ *Dial. c. Tr. c.* 113, p. 206, (p. 340, A. B.) compare c. 75, p. 172, (p. 300, C.)—c. 106, p. 201, (p. 334, A.)—c. 132, p. 224, sq. (p. 361, D. 362, C.) Euseb. *hist. eccles.* 1, 3, T. I. p. 29. *Demonstrat. evang.* 4, 17, p. 195, sq.

² *Dial. c. Tr. c.* 115, p. 208, (p. 343, A. B.) διὰ τοῦ ἱεροῦ ονόματος; τὸν Ναυὴ υἱὸν καὶ δυνάμεις καὶ πρᾶξεις τινὰς προφητευσούσας τὰ ὑπὲρ τοῦ ἡμετέρου κυρίου μίλλοντα γίνεσθαι πεποιτημένοι ἔφη.

³ *Dial. c. Tr. c.* 113, p. 206, sq. (p. 340, C. D. 341, A. B.) Compare c. 90, p. 188, (p. 318, A.)—c. 111, p. 204, (p. 338, A.)—c. 131, sq. p. 224, (p. 361, A. B. D.) As a particular mark of the mysterious power of the name of Jesus, Justin brings forward the circumstance, that the kine, which the Philistines employed to carry back the ark to the Israelites of their own accord, stood still in the field of a man named Auses, "Joshua," (1 Sam. vi. 14.) This standing still he conjectures must have been owing to the name of the person being the same as that of the son of Nun, (Naue) who afterwards was called Joshua, (Jesus) and, therefore, was owing to the power of the name Jesus. *Dial. c. Tr. c.* 132, p. 225, (p. 362, A.—C.)

sufferings of Christ, and the calling of the Gentiles. Isaiah¹ and a Psalmist cxxxii. 11,² knew that Jesus was to descend from David, (xi. 1.) Micah announced his birth at Bethlehem, v. 1.³ That he would be born of a virgin, Isaiah had clearly declared, (vii. 14),⁴ and several seers had indicated the same event in figurative language; Jacob, in the promise, "he shall wash his garment in the blood of the grape," (Gen. xlix. 11;) David, in the divine apostrophe, "I have begotten thee from the womb, before the morning star;" Isaiah in the question, "who can declare his generation?" Daniel (ii. 34; vii. 13,) in the description, "there came one in the clouds of heaven like a Son of Man;" and "the stone cut out without hands" in Nebuchadnezzar's dream.⁵ The

¹ *Apol.* 1, 32, p. 64, (p. 74, C. D.)

² *Dial. c. Tr.* c. 68, p. 166, (p. 293, C. D.) Trypho makes use of Ps. cxxxii. 11, and especially the words, ἀπὸ τῆς ἑσφύρας (LXX. ἐκ κερπυῖ τῆς κοιλίας) σου θήσεται ἐπὶ τοῦ θρόνου σου, in order to refute the assertion of the Christians, that in the Old Testament it was declared that the Messiah would be born of a virgin. Justin properly exposes this subterfuge, by repeating that the descent of the Messiah from David by no means excluded his miraculous conception; that Isaiah vii. 14 was addressed to the house of David, and that this prophecy, as the most concrete, must be used to interpret the meaning of the more indefinite prophecy in Ps. cxxxii. 11. Compare Irenæus *adv. hæres.* 3, 27, p. 217; and Tertull. *adv. Marc.* 3, 20, T. I. p. 142.

³ *Apol.* 1, 34, p. 65, (p. 75, D. E.)

⁴ *Apol.* 1, 33, p. 64, (p. 74, D.)—*Dial. c. Tr.* c. 43, p. 139, (p. 262, C.)—c. 66, sq. p. 163, (p. 291, A. B.)—c. 68, p. 166, (p. 294, A. B.)—c. 77, p. 174, (p. 302, C. D. 303, A.)—c. 78, p. 176, (p. 304, D. 305, A.)—c. 84, p. 181, (p. 310, A. B.) The miraculous conception of Christ, maintained by Christians, was one of the points which the Jews employed to impugn his Messiahship. The evidence that this event was foretold in the Old Testament, forms Justin's answer.

⁵ *Apol.* 1, 32, p. 63, sq. (p. 74, B. C.)—*Dial. c. Tr.* c. 54, p. 149, sq. (p. 274, A.)—c. 63, p. 160, (p. 286, C. D.)—c. 68, p. 166, (p. 293, C.)—c. 76, p. 172, sq. (p. 301, A. B.) On Ps. cx. 4. Justin remarks; τὰ ὑπὸ Δαβὶδ ἐρημίαι, ἐν ταῖς λαμπρότησι τῶν ἁγίων σου ἐκ γαστρὸς πρὸ ἰωφὶν ἐγέννησά σε εἰ

flight of the infant Messiah into Egypt is intimated by David in Ps. xxii. 10, when he says, "Thou art my hope from my mother's breast."¹ The appearance and preaching of John the Baptist, the forerunner of the Messiah, are fully described by Isaiah (xl. 1—17);² and more obscurely intimated by Malachi (iv. 5.) And though this latter prophecy will receive its full accomplishment in the second glorious return of Jesus, and so far Elias will prepare the way for this event, yet the name Elias includes also the person of John the Baptist, for this John received a portion of the same spirit which Elias possessed pure and undivided, even as God transferred to Joshua a portion of the spirit with which Moses was filled, during the lifetime of that leader and lawgiver.³ David in Ps. ii. 7, makes use of the words uttered from heaven at the baptism in Jordan. "This is my Son."⁴ Jacob represented the temptation in the wilderness, by his nocturnal wrestling⁵ (Gen. xxxii. 24,) and Isaiah refers to the miracles of Christ (xxxv. 5).⁶ The prophets descend to the minutest particulars when they depict the earthly sorrows and sufferings of the Redeemer.⁷ Since

σημαίνει ἡμῖν, ὅτι ἄνωθεν καὶ διὰ γαστρὸς ἀνδραπόδας ὁ υἱὸς καὶ πα-
τὴρ τῶν ἑλῶν γενῆσθαι αὐτὸν ἔμιλλαι;

¹ *Dial. c. Tr. c.* 192, p. 196, (p. 328, D.)

² *Dial. c. Tr. c.* 50, p. 146, sq. (p. 269, D. 270.)

³ *Dial. c. Tr. c.* 49, p. 145, sq. (p. 268, sq.) the Jews entertained the notion that Elias would appear again before the birth of the Messiah, in order to consecrate him for his office, and denied, as we have mentioned above, the Messiahship of Jesus, because Elias had not yet appeared. Compare Lightfoot, *Horæ Heb. et Talm.* (Lips. 1675,) p. 384, sq. Eisenmeiger, *Entdecktes Judenthum* (Königsb. 1711,) II. 696, and Gfrörer, *Geschichte des Urchristenthums* (Stutg. 1838,) II. 2, 227. The reference and interpretation of the prophecy in Mal. iv. 5, is the reply which Justin gives to that objection.

⁴ *Apol. I.* 40, p. 67, sq. (p. 79, A. D.)

⁵ *Dial. c. Tr. c.* 125, p. 218, (p. 354, C. D.)

⁶ *Apol. I.* 48, p. 72, (p. 84, C.)

⁷ The meanness of his outward condition, the disavowal of political influence, and last, the death of Jesus on the cross, formed the weightiest argument by which the Messiahship of the Redeemer was impugned by the Jews; hence the anxiety

they distinguish two advents of the Messiah, which are both symbolically represented by the two goats on the great day of atonement¹ (Levit. xvi. 5,) they describe the first in explicit terms as devoid of glory and splendour, as full of suffering and ignominy.² The allusions to the death of Jesus are peculiarly striking. Jacob (Gen. xlix. 11,) points out this event, when he foretells that the future chief of the tribe of Judah shall wash his garment in blood.³ Moses (Exod. xii. 7, 12, 21,) refers to it when he commands the Israelites to sprinkle their door-posts with the blood of the Pascal lamb, and attaches the hope of preserving their lives to this act.⁴ Rahab typified it when she took a scarlet thread in order to let down the Jewish spies from the walls of Jericho,⁵ and Isaiah (lvii. 1,) commemorates it, when he mourns over the death of the righteous.⁶ There are numerous types and predictions besides these, in the Old Testament, of the peculiar mode of Christ's death. All nature, the human body, and the common concerns of life, are prophets of the crucifixion. No one can cross the seas, unless the sign of victory, the sail, remains uninjured; no

with which Justin exerts himself, to prove, on the ground of the prophecies, that all these singular phenomena in the life of the Redeemer were divinely ordained.

¹ *Dial. c. Tr. c.* 40, p. 137, (p. 259, C.) Compare *Barnab. epist. c. 7*, T. i. p. 21, sqq.—Tertull. *adv. Marc.* 3, 7, T. i. p. 115, *adv. Jud.* c. 14, T. ii. p. 264, sq.

² *Apol.* 1, 50, p. 72, sq. (p. 85, C—E.)—1, 52, p. 73, (p. 87, A. B.)—*Dial. c. Tr. c.* 14, p. 115, (p. 232, D.—c. 32, p. 129, (p. 249, C. D.)—c. 49, p. 145, (p. 268, B.)—c. 89, p. 187, (p. 317, A. B.)—c. 110, p. 203, (p. 336, D.)

³ *Apol.* 1, 32, p. 63, (p. 74, A.)—*Dial. c. Tr. c.* 54, p. 149, (p. 273, D.)

⁴ *Dial. c. Tr. c.* 40, p. 136, sq. (p. 259, A.—c. 111, p. 204, (p. 338, C. D.) Compare Irenæus *adv. hæres.* 4, 23, p. 239. Lactant. *institut. divin.* 4, 26.—Cyrill. *adv. Julian.* 1, 8, T. vi. p. 281, 1, 10, p. 346.

⁵ *Dial. c. Tr. c.* 111, p. 205, (p. 338, D.) Compare *Clem. Epist. 1, ad Corinth.* c. 12, T. 153, and the passages quoted by Cotelierius from other Fathers.

⁶ *Apol.* 1, 48, p. 72, p. 84, D.

one can plough or dig or perform any manual labour, without using an instrument which has the form of a cross; the structure of the human body differs from that of brutes by its cross-like shape, formed by the upright neck, the outstretched hands, and the nose projecting from the forehead; even the banners and trophies which the Romans bore in their triumphal processions, as marks of their power and supremacy, and the statues which were erected to the emperors after their death, have the form of the cross.¹ In the Old Testament we find many other symbols of the cross. The tree of life planted in Paradise was a type of the cross;² the ark in which Noah was preserved with his family, reflected the redeeming power of the cross.³ Under a tree, the oak of Mamre, God appeared to Abraham (Gen. xviii. 4, 8.) Jacob saw in a dream a ladder, and God (the Son) upon it, (Gen. xxviii. 12.) The same Jacob put rods in the troughs of his uncle's flocks, in order to make the cattle fruitful. Gen. xxx. 37. On his departure from Laban, he boasted that only with his staff he had passed over Jordan.⁴ It was a staff by which Tamar proved that she was pregnant by Judah, Gen. xxxviii. 35. With a staff Moses was sent to deliver the people of Israel, (Exod. iv. 17.) with this staff he divided the Red Sea, (Exod. xiv. 16); by virtue of the staff water gushed forth from the rock, (Exod. xvii. 5. Numb. xx. 8); by a piece of wood the waters of Marah were sweetened,

¹ *Apol.* 1, 55, p. 76, sq. (p. 90, B—E.—Minuc. Fel. Octav. c. 29, p. 112.—Tertull. *Apol.* c. 16, T. v. p. 35, *ad nation.* 1, 12, p. 120, sq.—Prudent. *peristeph.* 10, 621, sqq.

Cruz illa Christi, quam novellam dicitis
Nascente mundo factus ut primum est homo,
Expressa signis, expedita est literis.
Advertus ejus nulle per miracula
Prænuntiatus ore vatium consono.

² *Dial. c. Tr.* c. 86, p. 183, (p. 312, D.)

³ *Dial. c. Tr.* c. 138, p. 229, (p. 367, D.)

⁴ *Dial. c. Tr.* c. 86, p. 183, sq. (p. 313.) Compare Irenæus, *-adv. hæres.* 5, 17, p. 314. Tertull. *adv. Jud.* c. 13, T. ii. p. sq. Prudentius, *Cathem.* 5, 93, sqq.

(Exod. xvi. 25.) The people found seventy willows (palms) at their resting-place at Elim, (Exod. xv. 27. Num. xxxiii. 9.) In consequence of the budding of his reed Aaron was made high-priest, (Numb. xvii. 8.) David compares the righteous to a green and fruitful tree, (Ps. i. 3) : by God's rod and staff the same prophet acknowledges he was comforted, (Ps. xxiii. 4.) By means of a piece of wood Elisha recovered the iron axe, which one of the sons of the prophets had lost in the Jordan while felling wood for building a school for the prophets, (2 Kings vi. 5.) Isaiah denominates the promised Messiah a rod from the stem of Jesse, (Is. xl. 1.) Moreover, when Moses, in blessing the tribe of Joseph, says, "his horns are the horns of an unicorn, with them he shall push the nations to the ends of the earth,"¹ (Deut. xxxiii. 17); when the Psalmist, in distress and anguish, exclaims, "hear me against the horns of the unicorn," (Ps. xxii. 21);² when Moses, during the battle with the Amalekites, stretched out his arms, supported by Hur and Aaron, the whole day, and thus essentially contributed to the overthrow of the enemy;³ when the same Moses, at

¹ *Dial. c. Tr. c. 91*, p. 188, (p. 318, C. D.) Compare Tertull. *adv. Marc.* 3, 18, T. i. p. 137. *adv. Jud. c. 10*, T. ii. p. 246.

² *Dial. c. Tr. c. 105*, p. 200, (p. 332, D.) The possibility of seeing in the horns of the unicorn a type of the cross resulted from Justin's regarding the cross as composed of unicorn's horns. The cross, he says, consisted of one straight piece of wood—a second piece is added to this transversely, and thus the highest part of the first piece appears a horn, and the two projecting ends of the transverse have also the appearance of horns; lastly, the peg which is placed in the middle of the upright, and on which the person crucified rests, forms a fourth horn. See Bynæus *de morte Jesu Christi* (Amstel. 1698) iii. 234.

³ *Dial. c. Tr. c. 90*, p. 187, sq. (p. 317, D. 318, A.)—c. 111, p. 204, (p. 338, A. B.) Compare *Barnab. Epist. c. 12*, T. i. p. 59. Tertull. *adv. Marc.* 3, 18, T. i. p. 138. *adv. Jud. c. 10*, T. ii. p. 247. Cyprian, *exhort. Martyr. c. 8*, T. ii. p. 197. Prudent. *Cathem.* 12, 169, sqq. Justin professes his conviction that the outstretched arms of Moses, by thus assuming

God's command, made a brazen serpent, and placed it on a pole, for the cure of the Israelites who were bitten by the poisonous serpents (Numbers xxi. 6.);¹ all these were prophetic intimations of the crucifixion of Jesus. The horns of the unicorn, as well as the outstretched hands of Moses, and the pole on which the brazen serpent was raised, typified the cross. In Isaiah, the Messiah declares in direct terms, that his hands would be stretched out all day on the cross; and by David he speaks in the clearest language of the piercing of his hands and feet (Ps. xxii. 17).² The pro-

form of the cross, contributed to the victory of the Israelites over the Amalekites. He expressly guards against the supposition that the prayers of Moses led to this result. Prayer, he allows, offered up with cries and tears, with bended knees and downcast looks, may prevail with God. But Moses prayed not thus, nor any one else during the battle.

¹ *Apol.* i, 60, p. 79, (p. 93, A.) *Dial. c. Tr.* c. 91, p. 189, (p. 319, A. B.)—c. 94, p. 191, (p. 321, D. 322, A.)—c. 112, p. 205, (p. 339, A.)—c. 131, p. 224, (p. 361, A.)

² *Apol.* i, 35, p. 65, (p. 76, A. B.) *Dial. c. Tr.* c. 97, p. 193, (p. 324, B. C.)—c. 104, p. 199, (p. 332, A.) The Jew Trypho appealed expressly to Deut. xxi. 23, as a proof that the crucifixion of Jesus was a decisive fact against his Messiahship. Justin does not satisfy himself with showing, by a reference to other prophetic passages of the Old Testament, that the crucifixion was not inconsistent with the office and dignity of the Messiah; but enters into particulars relative to the alleged curse pronounced by Moses; in order to point out how unjustifiable was the inference which Trypho drew from it. In the first place, he instructs his opponent, that the passage ought not to be interpreted with stringent literality. Although it says that "Every one is cursed who hangeth on a tree," yet the crucified Christ was as little included in his own person in this curse, as God could be charged with violating his own command, because, after he had forbidden, by Moses, the making of any graven image, he nevertheless ordered the erection of the brazen serpent. So, then, he proceeds to say, it is easy to perceive how the Old Testament prophecies could call the crucified Messiah accursed, without his being regarded personally as one accursed by God. This is the fact which was prophetically announced, that Christ, in dying, took upon himself the curse under which Jews and Gentiles lay for their sins, and became accursed with his followers, by Jews and Gentiles both in word and deed. *Dial. c. Tr.* c. 94, sqq. p. 191, sq. (p. 321, D.—323, C.)

phets predicted not only the crucifixion of Jesus, but the particular circumstances under which it would take place. Jacob (Gen. xlix. 11.) and Zechariah (Zech. ix. 9.) both testified of the last entry into Jerusalem, and alluded to the ass and the foal of which Christ made use.¹ The hymn which Christ sang at the last supper with his disciples,² (Matt. xxvi. 30, and Ps. xxii. 23); the agony he endured in the garden of Gethsemane, when he prayed, "Father, if it be possible, let this cup pass from me," (Matt. xxvi. 39, and Ps. xxii. 3.) when his heart and his bones trembled, and the sweat fell from him like drops of blood,³ (Luke xxii. 44, and Ps. xxii. 15); the band of soldiers who seized him in the Mount of Olives (Ps. xxii. 13), and the desertion to which he was abandoned⁴ in this captivity (Ps. xxii. 12,)—are all commemorated by David. Zechariah declares that he would be deserted by his disciples,⁵ and that they would be scattered at his crucifixion.⁶ (Zech. xiii. 7.) The meetings of the Sanhedrim⁷ (Ps. xxii. 17); the silence of the accused before Pilate⁸ (Ps. xxii. 16); the combination of the Jews and Herod with the Roman soldiers and Pilate against Jesus⁹ (Ps. ii. 1), and his being sent to Herod Antipas¹⁰ (Luke xxiii. 7, Ps. xxii. 14); the casting lots for his garments¹⁰ (Ps. xxii. 19); the scorn with which the

¹ *Apol.* i, 32, p. 63, (p. 73, E. 74, A.)—i, 35, p. 65, (p. 76, C. D.) *Dial. c. Tr.* c. 53, p. 149, (p. 272, D. 273, A.)

² *Dial. c. Tr.* c. 106, p. 200, sq. (p. 333, C. D.)

³ *Dial. c. Tr.* c. 99, p. 194, (p. 326, A.)—c. 103, p. 199, (p. 331, C. D.)

⁴ *Dial. c. Tr.* c. 103, p. 198, (p. 330, A—C.)

⁵ *Dial. c. Tr.* c. 53, p. 149, (p. 273, B—D.)

⁶ *Dial. c. Tr.* c. 104, p. 199, (p. 332, B.)

⁷ *Dial. c. Tr.* c. 102, p. 197, (p. 329, B. C.)—c. 103, p. 199, (p. 332, A.) Justin believed that the silence of Jesus before Pilate was intimated in Isa. i. 4.

⁸ *Apol.* i, 40, p. 67, (p. 78, E. 79, C.)

⁹ *Dial. c. Tr.* c. 103, p. 198, (p. 330, C. 331, A.) Hosea also prophesied the sending of Jesus to Herod (x. 6). Compare Tertull. *adv. Marc.* 4, 42, T. I. p. 307, sq.

¹⁰ *Apol.* i, 35, p. 65, (p. 76, C.)—*Dial. c. Tr.* c. 97, p. 193, (p. 324, C.)—c. 104, p. 199, (p. 332, B.)

Jews treated him both by words and gestures while he hung upon the cross¹ (Matt. xxvii. 39, and Ps. xxii. 8); the cry of anguish which he uttered on the cross, "My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me?"² (Ps. xxii. 2); his expiring words, "Father, into thy hands I commend my spirit,"³ (Ps. xxii. 21)—all these events David saw in spirit, and depicted in prophetic language. That Christ would hang till evening on the cross, was declared by the prophets, and typified by Moses, when, during the battle against the Amalekites, he stretched out his arms in the form of a cross till evening.⁴ (Exod. xvii. 12.) And the prophets of the Old Testament have acknowledged and described the exaltation and glorification of Christ after the termination of his sufferings, if not with the same fulness and particularity, yet with not less truth and distinctness than his humiliation. David (Ps. iii. 5, xxii. 23) and Isaiah (Isa. liii. 9. lvii. 2) give general intimations of his resurrection.⁵ That this resurrection would take place on the eighth day of the week, is intimated by the number of persons who entered Noah's ark;⁶ and that the day of the resurrection would be the third from that of the crucifixion, is prefigured by Jonah's staying three days in the belly of the fish.⁷ David describes the ascension of Jesus into heaven (Ps. xxiv. 7, and cx. 1).⁸ The laying waste of Judea, which the divine justice inflicted a few years after the ascension, and the expatriation of the Jews, which the Emperor Hadrian decreed after the suppression of the rebellion

¹ *Apol.* i, 38, p. 66, (p. 77, E.)—*Dial. c. Tr.* c. 101, p. 196, (p. 328, B.)

² *Dial. c. Tr.* c. 99, p. 194, (p. 325, D. 326, A.)

³ *Dial. c. Tr.* c. 105, p. 200, (p. 333, A. B.)

⁴ *Dial. c. Tr.* c. 97, p. 193, (p. 324, A.)

⁵ *Dial. c. Tr.* c. 97, p. 193, (p. 324, B.)—c. 106, p. 200, sq. (p. 333, C. D.)

⁶ *Dial. c. Tr.* c. 138, p. 229, (p. 367, C.)

⁷ *Dial. c. Tr.* c. 107, p. 201, (p. 334, B. C.)

⁸ *Apol.* i, 45, p. 70, (p. 82, D. E.)—i, 51, p. 73, (p. 86, D. E.)—*Dial. c. Tr.* c. 36, p. 134, (p. 254, D. E. 255.)

under Bar-Kochba, are threatened by Isaiah (lxiv. 10, and i. 7).¹

The prophets testified of the conversion of the heathen to Jesus,² under many beautiful images, and in elevated, glowing language. When Jacob expresses the expectation (Gen. xlix. 10), that a Prince from Judah should be the hope of the Gentiles; when David (Ps. ii. 5) calls the heathen the inheritance of the Messiah; when the Messiah himself, by the mouth of the prophet Isaiah, (lxv. 1), in mingled terms of joy and sorrow, exclaims, "I have revealed myself to them that ask not for me; I am found of them who sought me not; I have said to the heathen who called not on my name, Behold! here am I! I have stretched out my hands unto a disobedient and rebellious people;" when God, by the same prophet Isaiah, promises, "More shall be the children of the desolate than the children of the married wife," (Isa. liv. 1); when the prophetic Spirit says, by David, of the heralds of the Christian doctrine (Ps. xix. 4), "their sound is gone out through all the earth, and the words to the end of the world;" when Malachi, (i. 11,) speaking for Jehovah, says, "from the rising of the sun to its going down, my name shall be glorified among the heathen." Who does not recognize, in all these passages, a true prophetic mirror of

¹ *Apol.* 1, 47, p. 71, (p. 84, A. B.) See the remarks of Prudentius Maranus (*Dial. c. Tr. c.* 16, p. 116), on the law which forbade the Jews from entering their father-land.

² *Clem. Recognit.* 5, 11, T. I. p. 543. Quod Judæorum propheta predixit eum a gentibus expectandum, supra modum in eo fidem veri confirmat. Si enim dixisset a Judæis expectandum, non aliquid eximium prophetasse videretur, quod a contribuli populo et a propria gente speraretur is, cujus adventus ad salutem mundi fuerat repromissus; videretur enim magis consequentiæ ratio esse, ut hoc fieret, quam magnificentia prophetalis. Nunc autem cum propheta dicunt, omnem illam spem quæ de salute mundi repromittitur, et novitatem regni, quæ instituenda per Christum est, atque omnia, quæ de eo indicantur, ad gentes esse transferenda; jam non secundum consequentiam rerum sed incredibili quodam vaticinationis eventu magnificentia prophetica confirmatur.

the history of the church; who does not discern in them a faithful lively image of the success which the Gospel has had among the Gentiles since its first promulgation? The Jews, who were in possession of the prophecies, and constantly expected a Messiah, when he came, knew him not, but put him to death; the Gentiles, on the contrary, who had never heard of a Messiah, full of joy and faith, renounced their idols and devoted themselves, through Jesus, to the unbegotten God, after the Apostles, going forth from Jerusalem, had delivered to them the prophecies, and published the Gospel.¹ Already (in Justin's time) the Church counts a far greater number of members from among the Gentiles than from among the Jews and Samaritans.² Men of all races place their expectations on him who was crucified in Judea;³ there is not a single race, either among the barbarians or among the Greeks, or by whatever name they are called, Hamaxobii, (those who live in waggons as the ancient Scythians,) or Acæci, (those who are destitute of habitations,) or shepherds living in tents, who do not present sacrifices of prayer and thanksgiving to the Father and Creator of all things, in the name of the crucified Jesus.⁴ In what striking colours does

¹ *Apol.* 1, 49, p. 72, (p. 84, E. 85, A.)

² *Apol.* 1, 53, p. 74, (p. 88, C.)

³ *Apol.* 1, 32, p. 63, (p. 73, D.)—*Dial. c. Tr. c.* 122, p. 215, (p. 351, B. C.)

⁴ *Apol.* 1, 40, p. 67, (p. 78, C. D.) *Dial. c. Tr. c.* 117, p. 210, sq. (p. 344, D. 345, C.) ἔτι ἰς ὅλους ἐπὶ τὸ γένος ἀνθρώπων, ὅτι βαρβάρων αὐτοὶ Ἕλλησιν ὅτι ἀπλῶς ὅτινῃν ὀνόματι προσεγορευομένων, ἢ ἀμαξοβίων ἢ ἀόικων καλυμμένων ἢ ἐν σπηταῖς πενηστέρεθρον οἰκούντων, ἐν οἷς μὴ διὰ τοῦ ὀνόματος τοῦ σταυρωθέντος Ἰησοῦ εὐχαλὶ καὶ ὑψαρεσίαις τοῦ πατρὸς καὶ ποιητῆς τῶν ὅλων γίνονται. The hyperbole, that Christianity had already been propagated and received among the farthest nations of the earth, is a standing patristical paradox. It is to be met with in the Fathers of every century. *Herm. post.* 3, 9, 17, T. I. p. 118. *Iren. adv. hæres.* 3, 11, p. 190, κατισμαρταῖς ἢ ἐκκλησια ἐπὶ πάσης τῆς γῆς. 1, 2, p. 48. *Tertull. adv. Marc.* 3, 20, T. I. p. 141. Christus . . . totum jam orbem evangelii sui fide capit.—*adv. Jud.* c. 7, T. II. p. 227, sq. *Clem. Strom.* 6, 18, 167, T. III. p. 203, ἡ εὐ

Micah paint the joyful haste with which the heathen repair to the mountain of the Lord, to receive the new law which came forth from Zion and Jerusalem, and to take possession of the Holy Land.¹ The conversion of the Gentiles to Jesus, and their reception into the Christian church is, in part, symbolically represented in the history of Noah, and especially of Jacob. When Noah, in consequence of the offence committed by his son Ham, prophetically declared that the posterity of Shem would occupy the dwellings and possessions of Canaan, and that Japheth's posterity would succeed to the Shemites, and should possess what the latter had formerly taken from the Canaanites,—this prophetic announcement first obtained its full accomplishment in the conversion of the Gentiles. The Jews, the descendants of Shem, according to the divine will, invaded the land of the Canaanites and possessed it; but after Christ had come and had called men to repentance, to love and union, and the reception of the blessing, his saints, the Gentiles, received this land; men of all countries, bond and free, were taught, that if they acknowledged the truths which was announced by Jesus and the prophets, and believed in the Saviour, they would live with him in that land, and inherit eternal unchangeable blessings.² Jacob, finally, married, besides his two free wives, bonds-women, by whom he had children, for no other reason but to intimate, prophetically, that Christ would admit the

διδασκαλὸν τοῦ ἡμετέρου λόγου οὐκ ἔμενεν ἐν Ἰουδαίᾳ μόνῃ, καὶ θάνατον ἐν τῇ Ἑλλάδι ἡ φιλοσοφία ἐχύθη δι' ἀνὰ πάντας τὴν οἰκουμένην πλάθων Ἑλλήνων τε ἡμῶ καὶ βαρβάρων κατὰ ἴδους καὶ πάμην καὶ πόλιν πάντας, οἷους ὄντες καὶ ἰδίᾳ ἔνασεν τῶν ἰσακηκούστων καὶ αὐτῶν γε τῶν φιλοσόφων οὐκ ὀλίγους ἦδη ἐπὶ τὴν ἀλήθειαν μεθίσταται. Origen. *c. Cels.* 1, 27, T. I. p. 346, 2, 13, p. 400. Arnob. *adv. gent.* 2, 5, T. I. p. 49, 2, 12, p. 56. Lactant. *de mort. persecut.* c. 3. Euseb. *praep. evang.* I, 3, p. 8, 4, 15, p. 154. Compare Bynæres *de morte Jesu Christi*, (Amstel. 1691,) I. p. 322, sqq. and Cave, *antiquitates patrum et eccles.* p. 15, sqq.

¹ *Dial. c. Tr.* c. 109, sq. p. 202, sq. (p. 336, A.—C.)

² *Dial. c. Tr.* c. 139, p. 230, (p. 368, B. 369, A.)

Canaanites among the descendants of Japheth, all alike free, and make them coheirs.¹

This imposing array of fulfilled prophecies, this striking embodying of prophetic shadows in historic truth within the pale of Christianity, forms, as we have said, for Justin, the basis of his final and invulnerable proof of the divine origin and consecration of the Church. The fulfilment that had already taken place of so many events, presented him, at the same time, with a pledge of the divine dignity and truth of those parts of the Old Testament prophecies, to which, for a time, there was no historical counterpart, since their contents reached beyond his age. To these belong the future dominion of Jesus over all his enemies, (Ps. ii. 8, xcvi. 10.);² his second advent in resplendent glory, (Dan. vii. 13);³ the resurrection of the dead, (Ezek. xxxvii. 7); the lamentation and wailing of the Jews, when they shall again see the crucified one in the splendour of his majesty. (Is. lxiii. 17, lxiv. 11. Zach. xii. 10.)⁴

¹ *Dial. c. Tr. c.* 140, p. 230, (p. 369, B.) Wurm remarks, "it would be a forced construction if we took the words, καὶ τοὺς ἰσχυροὺς ἱερεῖς ὅντας ἀπὸ τοῦ Χαναάν πάντας, as meaning, 'those of Japheth's descendants who share the fate of Canaan's, i. e. are slaves.' Justin considered all slaves among the various nations of the earth as descendants of Canaan, because Noah had denounced on his grandson the curse of slavery. For these Canaanites, scattered among the posterity of Shem and Japheth, Jesus had won freedom. Justin designedly remarks that Jesus had bestowed freedom on all the Canaanites who lived among the race of Japheth; for he wishes to show that all the gentiles, without distinction, are received without distinction among the new people of God. On this account, when he represents Jacob's family as a type of this union of the children of Noah, he attaches particular weight to the circumstance, that the sons of the two bonds-women were placed on an equality with those of Leah and Rachel." *Apologetic der Christenthums von Justin, &c.* in Klaiber's *Studien der evangel. Geistlichkeit Württemberg's*, I. 2. 32.

² *Apol.* 1, 40, sq. p. 67, sq. (p. 79, A. DE. 80, A.)

³ *Apol.* 1, 51, p. 73, (p. 86, E.)

⁴ *Apol.* 1, 52, p. 74, (p. 87, B. D.)

In reference to these, and similar prophecies, Justin makes the following observation: " Since we have shewn that every thing which has already come to pass, was foretold by the prophets before it actually happened, it is necessary to believe also in the unconditional occurrence of all that has in like manner been foretold, but has not yet happened. For as what has already come to pass has been, according to the preceding announcement, notwithstanding it seemed incredible, so that which still remains, will assuredly be fulfilled, however inconceivable and incredible it may appear."¹

The importance which Justin, and after him the whole ancient Church, attached to the evidence of prophecy, we have already charged with being disproportionate, and we must here repeat the censure, without disputing that this imputed over-valuation, in the first striking impression which the strict connection between the Old and New Testaments,—the palpable, undeniable connection between the *Idea* of the Messiah and the historical Christ, must have made on a heathen Neophyte, had a very natural basis in the strict theory of inspiration to which Justin was pledged, and in the allegorical method of interpretation which attached itself to this theory. At all events, we must condemn Justin's lawless treatment of prophecy, the arbitrary manner in which he sought for concrete references to events of the New Dispensation, in the most general statements and irrelevant narratives of the Old Testament. Celsus,² not without justice, observed in reference to such a method; " No one can prove that there is a God, and a Son of God, on the ground of such obscure images, such foolish interpretations, and such insignificant marks." Who, for ex-

¹ *Apol.* 1, 52, p. 73, (p. 87, A.) Theophil. *ad autol.* 2, 9, p. 335, (p. 88, A.) Tertull. *apolog.* c. 23, T. V. p. 41, hinc apud nos futurorum quoque fides tuta est, jam scilicet probatorum, quia cum illis, quæ quotidie probantur, prædicebantur. Clem. *homil.* 2, 10, T. I. p. 624.

² Origen. c. *Cels.* 2, 30, T. I. p. 412.

ample, could be convinced of the divine foreknowledge and foretelling of the crucifixion of Jesus, merely because Justin believed he could discern symbols of the cross in all natural objects, and in every piece of wood which is mentioned in the Old Testament? The ease also must appear singular with which the Apologist handled the evidence to which he assigned the first rank before all others, in so dogmatical a manner, that he does not make the slightest allusion to the scruples of heathen opponents,¹ which he did not pass over in reference to miracles, and with which he could not be unacquainted. Without doubt, by this negligence, as well as by the want of discrimination and selection, the convincing power which belongs to the evidence from prophecy, was much weakened, and what ought to have been an instrument of triumph to Christianity, rather tended to increase the triumph of its opponents. Only in a community which understood how to distinguish properly the solid foundation from the slight superstructure, the omission might pass without injury. Beyond all contradiction, Justin advocated the Christian cause more successfully when he undertook to prove its divine glory, by its incomparable elevation above all human philosophy, and by its astonishing influence on the morals of its professors. Here there was no occasion for a subtlety of thought, of which Justin was little capable—here he required only the testimony of his personal experience in order to attain a correct perception of facts that fell under his own observation. Here all the energies of his heart and mind were brought out; and we have only to regret that they were not displayed more frequently. Had the Martyr made this department of *Apologetics* the corner-stone of his argumentation, his name would have been still more illustrious, occupying, as it does, the first place in point of time, in the history of that science.

¹ Compare the remarks of Celsus, in Origen. *c. Cels.* 2, 23, T. I. p. 411, and 7, 8, sqq. p. 699, sqq.

SECTION IV.

PARTICULAR DOCTRINES.

INTRODUCTORY OBSERVATIONS ON JUSTIN'S DOCTRINAL
POINT OF VIEW.

THE substance of religious truth is given in the books of Scripture ; but the reception of this truth by the individual mind exists under manifold forms. Though these forms may vary considerably, since they are human, yet the substance itself cannot be subject to similar variations, or it would be no longer Christian. All scientific investigation in the province of Christian dogmatics, can and must have no higher aim, than to find the most adequate form possible for the Christian doctrine, as it is given in the books of Scripture, and is evolved by a sound interpretation. The character of this form determines the doctrinal position of the theologian. According as the investigator frames a more or less perfect body for the Christian Spirit, he is more or less orthodox. Complete orthodoxy is the complete solution of this problem. In general, many causes co-operate to give a peculiar impression to individual attempts at the solution. The most influential are the power of individuality, and the spirit of the times to which the individual belongs. By these two factors Justin's doctrinal position is to be determined. Hence his orthodoxy is only a very imperfect approximation to the ideal ; his dogmatics are never wholly free from fluctuation. The Apologist believes, indeed, that he is standing on thoroughly scriptural ground ; but the troubled waves of the age visibly enough dash over the soil ; he represses his individuality, it is true, as much as possible, but he also succumbs to the often lamented, but seldom avoided lot, that secretly mingles what is human with what is divine. In his case the influence of the age is very visible. His dogmatics in several respects, are a faithful reflection of the senti-

ments that were predominant or coming into vogue in his times. We do not mean to assert that Justin was slavishly attached to the philosophy of the day, or devoted to any party that stood beyond the circle of scriptural Christianity. Justin owned allegiance to no philosophy save the Gospel; he symbolized with no party which did not hold Christ for its head, and the apostolic doctrine for its confession. But in particular points, and without a fixed adherence to a determinate system, his representation of Christian doctrine is sometimes mingled with ingredients, which were more or less the productions of the age, elements of an exuberant speculative tendency, and in some measure unsound accretions on the body of scriptural doctrine. The contrary assertion, that Justin was in a state of perpetual and unjustifiable dependency to one definite philosophy or sect, has been made both in reference to Platonism and Ebionitism, but in each case falsely.¹

The controversy respecting the Platonism of the Fathers is well known. The charge brought, at an early period, by Marcellus of Ancyra² and Jerome³ against Origen, that he mingled the elements of the Platonic philosophy with the Christian doctrines, was repeated in the seventeenth, and more vehemently still in the eighteenth century, and extended to several others of the Fathers, especially to the teachers of the second century.⁴ Among those to whom such an unjustifiable mixture of Platonic philosophy with Christianity has been imputed, Justin generally stands foremost.⁵ It is singular that, even to this day, the ques-

¹ Though this assertion has generally been presented in a separate form, Hagenbach has united them, and charged Justin "with much Judaism along with his Hellenistic partialities," (*Lehrbuch der Dogmengeschichte*, I. 58.)

² Euseb. *c. Marcell.* 1, 4, p. 23, A. B. (Col. 1688.)

³ Hieronym. *ad Pammach. advers. errores Joan. Hierosol.* T. II. p. 115.

⁴ Keil gives an account of the authors on this subject in his work *de doctoribus veteris ecclesiæ culpa corrupta per platonicas sententias theologiæ liberandis.* Opusc. Academ. ed. Goldh. p. 444, sq.

⁵ Souverain, (*Versuch über den Platonismus der Kirchenväter*

tion has not been settled in what this mixture of Platonism and Christianity consists. While some persons talk of a transference of doctrines peculiarly Platonic to Christianity, others profess to detect nothing more than methods of proofs, imagery, figures of speech, and turns of expression, which have been borrowed from Plato. It is clear that the controversy has a real meaning and character only if made according to the former representation. Who would seriously think of maintaining that, against a philosophy to which many of the most influential believers in Christianity previously belonged,—which, for ages, formed the most important instrument of general mental cultivation,—which, not unfrequently, was honoured with the title of *a Christianity before Christ*,¹ which exactly in the age immediately succeeding the birth of Christ, attained a renovated though very metamorphosed existence,—that, against this philosophy, the church had so hermetically sealed itself, that, in no single point, was it touched, penetrated, or aided by it. Who would seriously hesitate to subscribe to the remark of Baumgarten-Crusius?—"The universal influence of Platonism was the strongest and most determinate of civilized heathenism, which was pre-eminently shewn in the fact, that the dogmatic or speculative tendency more and more gained the ascendancy over the simple practical spirit of the Christian world; in the language of the dogmatics of the church, much that is Platonic

übersetzt und herausgeg. von Löffler, 2 Aufl. Züllich. 1792, s. 295, says, "it must be allowed, whether we like it or not, that Justin first introduced a new mode of expression, on religious subjects,—that he first made use of a style which was wholly unknown to his predecessors, to a Clement, a Barnabas, a Hermas, and a Polycarp, and that he first introduced a philosophical phraseology, in which Platonic magniloquence is everywhere apparent, but not the simplicity of Jesus Christ." Compare Colberg's *Platonisch. hermetisches Christenthum*, (Frank. und Leipz. 1690,) I. 26. Pertsch's *Versuch einer Kirchenhistorie*, II. 66, 70, and Augusti's *Lehrbuch der christlichen Dogmengeschichte*, (4 Aufl.) 47.

¹ See Ackermann's *Das Christliche im Plato und in der Platonischen Philosophie*, 2, 14.

remains fixed for ever."¹ If no farther extension be given to the Platonism of the Church Fathers than this, then beyond a doubt Justin must be reckoned among the Platonists.² He brought to Christianity a decidedly Grecian education; he introduced Platonic dialectics; he adopted and employed Platonic distinctions; as, for example, terming prophetic inspiration an ecstasy, and Platonic expressions and phrases, such as ἀμορφος, ὕλη, and the like. But in this sense the imputation of Platonism is seldom made. More commonly it is alleged that Justin, like many church teachers after him, actually introduced into the scheme of Christian doctrine, (and in so doing deformed it,) specific Platonic doctrines which had no foundation in the sacred Scriptures.³ In this sense, however, the imputation must be rejected. Justin must have involved himself in self-contradiction, he must have been unfaithful to his own principles, if he had, knowingly, transplanted Platonic maxims into Christianity. Moreover, it would remain to be explained, why he had received merely Platonism, and no other philosophical dogmas into his religious faith. He allowed no specific pre-eminence to Platonism over the other Grecian systems. Once, indeed, he calls Plato the first among the philosophers,⁴ but on other occasions he ranks him with Pythagoras and Aristotle.⁵ Sometimes, indeed, he

¹ *Compendium der Christlichen Dogmengeschichte*, (Leipz. 1840,) I. 67.

² Justin's Platonism is reduced to a mere empty name, in the view taken of it by the anonymous author of *Histoire critique de l'eclectisme ou des nouveaux Platoniciens*, (Avrg. 1766,) II. 144. "Le Platonisme de Saint Justin se réduit à adopter les sentimens, que Platon a puisés dans l'écriture, et à condamner ce, qu'il a enseigné de contraire à l'écriture.

³ Souverain includes Justin among those church teachers "who breathe nothing but Platonism." 298, 354.

⁴ *Coh. ad. Gr. c. 12*, p. 16, (p. 13, A.) ὁ πρῶτος τῶν φιλοσόφων.

⁵ *Coh. ad Gr. c. 5*, p. 10, (p. 5, D.) τῶν ἰνδοξοτάτων καὶ τιμιωτάτων ἐν ἀριστῇ νομισθίντων εἶναι φιλοσόφων, Πλάτωνα καὶ Ἀριστοτέλους.—*Dial. c. Tr. c. 5*, p. 108, (p. 224, A.) Πλάτων καὶ Πυθαγόρας σοφοὺς ἄνδρας, οἳ ὡς περὶ τῆς ἡμῶν καὶ ἔρισμα φιλοσοφίας ἐκτείνοντο.

mentions the Platonic philosophy with a kind of distinction, but he allows it to possess no nearer relationship than the other renowned Grecian systems to the Christian faith; its periphery remains essentially the same in which the latter moved round Christianity.¹ Why then, we are compelled to ask, did Justin, if he really transferred the theorism of Plato to Christianity, so narrow his point of view, and not extend his Platonism to Hellenism?² It would be difficult to find an answer to this question. For neither the predominant esteem which the Platonic philosophy obtained in the age of Justin, nor the circumstance that Justin passed from the Academy into the Church, can furnish a satisfactory reply. Aristotelism had eminent advocates in Justin's time; Stoicism ruled the throne itself; and Pythagoreism had revived. But Justin left the Platonic school, because he had at last arrived at the conviction, that in the most important points of enquiry, it could offer no greater certainty than other philosophical systems. But besides its not being easy to perceive why Justin should merely adopt Platonism, a second reason may be given, why it was impossible that he could knowingly transplant Platonic doctrines into Christianity. Inasmuch as he considered Platonism to be essentially equally distant from the centre of Christian truth with the other Grecian systems of philosophy, he must have regarded every admission of

¹ *Apol.* 2, 13, p. 97, (p. 51, B.) The false interpretation of this passage by Brucker, (*Hist. Crit. Philos.* T. iii. p. 371,) is corrected by Keil. (*Opusc. Academ.* p. 453.) *Dial.* c. *Tr.* c. 2, p. 102, sq. (p. 218, C.): *τί ποτε δὲ ἴσσι φιλοσοφία καὶ οὐ χάριν κατετίμωσθαι εἰς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους, τοὺς πολλοὺς λίσσασθαι. Οὐ γὰρ ἂν Πλατωνικοὶ ἦσαν οὐδὲ Στωικοὶ οὐδὲ Περιπατητικοὶ οὐδὲ Σωκρατικοὶ οὐδὲ Πυθαγορικοὶ, μᾶς οὗτος ταύτης ἐπιστήμης.*

² An attempt at such an extension has been made by Brucker, (*hist. Crit. Philosoph.* T. VI. p. 535.) Rau (*diatribe de philos. sanct. patr. Justin. Mart. et Athenag.* p. 23, 30, liquido ex his consequitur, Justinum cum eclecticis fecisse), and lately by Ammon, (*die Fortbildung des Christenth. u. Woltreligion.* 2 Auf. II. 71.) "thus an eclectic school was formed to which Justin Martyr belonged, who adopted the Platonic and Stoical principles, and hence often confounded together Jewish, Christian, and heathen sentiments."

Platonic speculations into Christian dogmatics, as a departure from truth into error. According to him, the essential nature of heathenism was error; Christianity alone had absolute truth; even the good and the true, of which the Grecian sages had spoken, belonged not peculiarly to them; it was only a scanty and alloyed fragment of what Christianity possessed in all its fulness, and in unclouded splendour; it was only a dim reflexion of the full divine knowledge which was embodied in the Christian doctrine. Justin could no more wish to borrow from the Platonic system than from any other heathen philosophy, or independent product of the speculative reason, and incorporate it with Christian doctrines, without appearing and reproaching himself as being a corrupter of Christianity. If, in addition to this general view of the case, we add Justin's remark, that Christ claimed for his followers an independence on all human doctrine, and would have them take only his doctrine and that of the prophets,¹ as their sole guide, and if, again, we compare with this remark, the confession of the Martyr, that his Christian consciousness, perfectly free from the authority of human wisdom, acknowledged that only as Christian truth which approved itself to him as such from the Scriptures,²—the supposition of a conscious transference of Platonic doctrine into Christianity, by Justin, loses the least shadow of probability.

There now remains only the supposition, (in itself a possible one,) that Justin, not consciously but unconsciously, had effected that amalgamation of Platonism and Christianity; that since his general habits of thought had been so governed by Platonic contemplations, Platonism and Christianity had, unnoticed

¹ *Dial. c. Tr. c. 48, p. 145, (p. 267, D.)* οὐκ ἀνθρωπίνως διδάγματα κικλήσκειν ὅτι αὐτοῦ τοῦ Χριστοῦ πισθισθῆναι, ἀλλὰ τοῖς διὰ τὸν μακαρίων προφητῶν κηρυχθῆναι καὶ δι' αὐτοῦ διδασθῆναι.

² *Dial. c. Tr. c. 80, p. 171, (p. 306, U.)*; οὐκ ἀνθρώποις μᾶλλον ἢ ἀνθρώποις διδύμεται αἰετοῦμαι ἀπολυθῆναι, ἀλλὰ θείῃ καὶ τοῖς πατρὶ τοῖς διδάγμασιν.

by himself, mingled themselves in his mind; and that, particularly when he found a certain harmony (*Assonanz*,) between the Platonic and Christian doctrine, he unconsciously substituted the former for the latter. We say that this supposition is possible, but can by no means be historically supported. No one has yet succeeded, though many have made the attempt, to point out doctrines in Justin of unequivocal Platonic origin. All the deductions on which this opinion has been founded, arise either from pure misconception or false assumptions. Either that has been supposed to be Platonic doctrine which a closer examination proves is not such, or opinions have been attributed to Justin which, in reality, he never held; or he has been supposed to borrow sentiments from the Platonic philosophy which have their root in the general religious nature of man, or are natural deductions from Scriptural intimations, or are connected with the theology of the later Jews. We shall not omit to set all this in a proper light, in reference to the particular doctrines which have been regarded as borrowed from the Platonic system. For the present, we abstain from entering on this development, in order not to anticipate later representations.

The other side on which Justin is supposed to have wandered from Catholicity, is his alleged approximation to the sentiments of the uncatholic Jewish Christians.¹ This Ebionitism of Justin's has had, from the first, something startling and contradictory. What!—the free-thinking disciple of Grecian philosophy,—the man who speaks so frankly and unreservedly on the Jews and their errors,—who opposes Jewish exclusiveness (*particularismus*) in its grosser

¹ This charge has been brought forward by many learned men, for example, by Rosenmüller, (*histor. interpret. librorum. sacr.* I. p. 158, sqq.) Flügel *Versuch einer Geschichte der theologischen Wissenschaften*, I. 332.) Zustrau, (*de Justin. Martyr. bibl. stud.* II. 39.) Hävernick, *Einleitung in das A. T.* I. 2, 51.) Yet only Credner has attempted to substantiate it, (*Beiträge zur Einleitung*, &c. I. 96, 278, 378.)

and more refined forms,¹ so decidedly and unweariedly,—who, in a spirit so truly apostolic, combats the Jewish-Christian notion of the absolute value and perpetual obligation of the Mosaic institutions,—and who, without circumlocution, places the Gentile above the Jewish-Christians;²—could such a man, at the same time, place himself on the contracted standing point of the narrow-hearted Jewish-Christians? But, in fact, this paradox is totally destitute of historical truth. Justin is any thing rather than a friend of sectarian Jewish-Christianity; he belongs, as Neander admirably remarks, most entirely to the number of the moderate Paulinians.³ This may easily be shown in contradiction to the allegations by which his attachment to the Ebionitish Jewish-Christians has been attempted to be proved. If we consider more closely the first allegation, namely, the mildness of his judgment on the Jewish-Christians compared with the strictness, the severity with which he condemns the Gnostics;—it is, indeed, true that he assails the Gnostics in the most unsparing manner,—ascribed their doctrines to satanic suggestion,—deems them undeserving of any intercourse, and entertains the worst suspicions of them;—while he not only associated with the Jewish-Christians, but promises them salvation in the continued observance of the Mosaic ritual,⁴ and opposes their doubts

¹ *Dial. c. Tr. c. 28, p. 126, (p. 246, A.)*

² *Apol. 1, 53, p. 74, (p. 88, B.)* πλείονάς τε καὶ ἀληθινότερας τὰς ἐξ ἰσθῶν τῶν ἀπὸ Ἰουδαίων, καὶ Σαμαρείων Χριστιανοὺς οὐδένως. 1, 53, p. 75, (p. 88, E.) ἀληθινοὶ οἱ ἀπὸ τῶν ἰσθῶν καὶ πιστότεροι.

³ *Allgemeine Geschichte der Christlichen Religion und Kirche, I. 2, 402.*

⁴ *Dial. c. Tr. c. 47, p. 142, (p. 265, D. 266, A.)* In reply to Trypho's question, whether a Jewish Christian who acknowledged Jesus as the Messiah, and followed him in faith and practice, but still adhered to the law, could be saved,—Justin says, ὡς μὲν ἡμεῖς δοκῶ, λίγω ὅτι σωθήσεται ὁ τοιοῦτος, ἰὰν μὴ τὰς ἄλλας ἀνδρώσας, λίγω δὲ τὰς ἀπὸ τῶν ἰσθῶν, διὰ τὸ Χριστοῦ ἀπὸ τῆς πλάνης περιτμηθίντας ἰν παντὶς πέδαν ἀγωνίζονται, ταῦτα αὐτῷ φυλάσσαν, λίγων οὐ σωθήσονται αὐτές, ἰὰν μὴ τοῦτα φυλάξουσιν. . . . Εἰς ἡν καὶ μηδὲ κοινοῖσιν ἡμιλίας ἢ ἰστίαις τοῖς τοιοῦτοις τελμασταις, οἷς ἰγὼ οὐ συναινέω ἑμει.—“As it appears to me, I should

on the miraculous conception of the Redeemer, with the simple expression, "I do not agree with them."¹ But this difference of judgment and conduct is only the natural consequence of the different position in which the Gnostics and the Ebionitish Jewish Christians stood to the Catholic church. In the Gnostics Justin had to deal with opponents, as we have already intimated, who more or less forsook the historical ground of Christianity, almost called in question the real humanity of Christ, and had reduced the most important events in the life of the Redeemer to mere points of connection for their extravagant speculations. Several of them represented Christianity as a dispensation abruptly established in the world, and denied any genetic connection between Christianity and Judaism.² Many looked with theosophic or ascetic disdain on Catholic Christians as common beings, mere natural men *ψυχικοί*, who were utterly incapable of rising to the Divine, and took every opportunity of ridiculing them.³ Others surrendered themselves to an unbridled libertinism, which spared not the holiest things, regarded the public confession of faith as indif-

say that such a man will be saved, unless he labours to persuade other men, I mean those belonging to the Gentiles who have been circumcised from error by Christ, to observe the same things as himself, telling them that they cannot be saved unless they observe these things. . . . There are persons who do not dare to converse with them, or to show them hospitality; with whom I do not agree."

¹ *Dial. c. Tr. c.* 48, p. 144, (p. 267, D.) *ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἡμετέρου γένους, ἀπολογούντες αὐτὸν Χριστὸν εἶναι, ἀνθρώπου δὲ ἐκ ἀνθρώπων γεγέννητον ἀποφατόμενοι· οἷς οὐ συντίθεται.*—"There are some of our people who confess that he was Christ, but declare that he was a man begotten of men, with whom I do not agree." It may be remarked, in passing, that Justin (*Dial. c. Tr. c.* 5, p. 107, [p. 223, A.]) sets aside the heathenish principle of the eternity of the world, with the simple declaration, *οὐ συντίθεται ἡγώ.*

² This tendency of Gnosticism was peculiarly offensive to Justin. The charge of blasphemy made against the Gnostics refers principally to this. *Apol. 1*, 26, p. 59, (p. 70, A.) *Dial. c. Tr. c.* 35, p. 132, (p. 253, C.)

³ *Apol. 1*, 58, p. 78, (p. 92, A.)

ferent, and martyrdom as folly, and took part without reserve in heathen feasts and excesses.¹ Nevertheless, they wished to be thought Christians.² Since Justin, as his own point of view required, fixed his attention on these worst features of Gnosticism—since he estimated only the immediate practical injury which the youthful church must suffer from this tendency—since probably in his own sphere of action he had opportunities of observing its destructive effects—he could scarcely do otherwise than express himself concerning the Gnostics with the anguish of a mind wounded in its holiest feelings.³ With respect to the Jewish Christians of whom Justin speaks, the case was altogether different. They were merely perplexed timorous minds, who could hardly prevail on themselves to give up a possession divinely sanctioned, and venerable by the lapse of centuries. They complied with all the fundamental conditions on which Justin made a claim to the honour of the Christian name depend. They maintained the ground of historical Christianity, they recognised the Messiah in the person of Jesus of Nazareth—they founded on him their hopes of salvation—they did not stifle free morality by outward legality—they did not oppose the unexclusive character of Christianity—they rather regarded Gentile Christians as brethren—and without burdening others with the observance of the Mosaic law, they only desired for themselves to be allowed the unrestricted exercise of the rites of their forefathers.⁴ Their mode of think-

¹ *Dial. c. Tr. c. 35, p. 132, (p. 253, D.) ἀνόμους καὶ ᾠδίας ἐκλιπταῖς παντοῦν.*

² *Dial. c. Tr. c. 35, p. 132, (p. 253, D.) Χριστιανὸς ἐαυτὸν λέγουσι, ὃν τρόπον αἱ ἐν ταῖς ἑθνεῖσι τὸ ὄνομα τοῦ θεοῦ ἐκτελεῖται.*

³ The ancient church teachers in general, for similar reasons, express the strongest condemnation of the Gnostics. A collection of their opinions may be found in Rothe's *Die Anfänge der Christlichen Kirche*, I. 589.

⁴ Justin's milder judgment relates only to this class of Jewish Christians. He judged far more severely the more violent party, who required the observance of the Mosaic law, even

ing was contracted, but not hostile and dangerous.¹ The whole of Palestinian Christianity had, till the second century, a Jewish-Christian complexion.² It was to be expected that the contractedness of these views would be gradually removed. The opinion, likewise, of the merely human origin of Jesus, which had been transferred from Jewish faith in the Messiah to the conceptions of these Jewish Christians, could not be retained for any length of time in the Christian consciousness; its gradual rectification might be expected with good reason from the power of the Christian spirit. The difference of judgment with which Justin treated the Gnostics and the Jewish Christians, is therefore utterly unavailable as evidence of the supposed Ebionitish leaning of this father; it rather weighs in the opposite scales, and serves to evince his genuine apostolic spirit. Paul acted in a similar manner under similar circumstances. The same Apostle who "delivered Hymenæus and Alexander over to Satan, that they might learn not to blaspheme," (1 Tim. i. 20. 2 Tim. ii. 17,) advocated the cause of the Jewish Christians at Rome against the Gentile members of the church, who were not disposed to make due allowance for their scruples, (Rom. xiv. 1.)

Besides the mildness of his judgment on the Jewish Christians, Justin's total silence respecting the Apostle Paul and his writings, and an expression about the eating of meat offered to idols, which seems like a direct contradiction of the Apostle, have been taken as proofs that Justin favoured the Ebionitish doctrines. We acknowledge that the statements from which this conclusion is drawn, have a foundation in truth. It

from Gentile Christians. Whether they could be saved, he considers a doubtful point. (*Dial. c. Tr. c. 47*, p. 143, [p. 266, C. 1])

¹ *Dial. c. Tr. c. 47*, p. 143, (p. 266, B.) τὸ ἀεὶ οὐκ ἔστιν ἡμεῖς γινώσκοντες.

² *Sulpic. Sever. hist. sacr.* 2, 31, (p. 245, ed. Lips. 1709,) tum (under Hadrian) pœne omnes Christum deum sub legis observatione credebant.

is correct, that the Apostle Paul was peculiarly obnoxious to the stricter Jewish Christians; they called him in plain terms an apostate;¹ and some members of that party even forged a biography of the Apostle, in which his zeal against the law was imputed to a marriage with the daughter of the High-priest being broken off.² It is moreover correct, that in Justin's writings no mention occurs of the Apostle, nor are any of his Epistles quoted, though Justin was certainly not unacquainted with his writings, and in the Dialogue with Trypho treats of a subject which would naturally lead him to notice them. Lastly, it cannot be denied that Justin expresses himself respecting the participation by Christians of meat offered to idols differently from Paul in 1 Cor. x. 25. While Paul in that passage considers the eating of such food as is in itself not culpable, but advises the Corinthians to abstain from it, lest the consciences of the more scrupulous members of the church should be offended,—Justin, on the contrary, treats such participation with unqualified abhorrence, and even stigmatises those who practised it, or allowed it in others, as mere nominal Christians, as disciples and servants of the Spirit of error, while he represents their opponents as adherents of the pure and true doctrine of Jesus.³ But the inference

¹ *Iren. adv. hæres.* 1, 26, p. 105. Apostolum Paulum recusant, apostatam eum legis dicentes.—Origen. in *Jerem. homil.* 18, 12, T. iii. p. 254.—Euseb. *hist. eccles.* 3, 27, T. i. p. 252.—Hieronym. *comment. in Matt.* 12, 2, T. ix. p. 29.—Theodoret. *fabul. hæret.* 2, 1, T. iv. p. 328.

² Epiphani. *adv. hæres.* 30, 16, T. i. p. 140.

³ *Dial. c. Tr. c.* 84, sq. p. 132, (p. 253, A—D.) πᾶσαν αἰτίαν καὶ τιμωρίαν μίχρεις ἰσχύατος θανάτου ὑπεμίνουσι (οἱ χριστιανοὶ) περὶ τοῦ μήτι ἰδωλολατρεῖσθαι μήτι ἰδωλίσθῃτα φαγῆναι καὶ ὁ Τρύφων καὶ μὴν πολλοὺς τῶν τοῦ Ἰησοῦν λιγόντων ὁμολογῶν καὶ λεγομένων Χριστιανῶν συνδάνομαι ἰεθεῖν τὰ ἰδωλίσθῃτα καὶ μηδὲν ἐκ τούτου βλάπτεσθαι λίγιναι. Καγὼ ἀπεικρινάμην καὶ ἐκ τοῦ τοιούτου εἶναι ἄνδρας, ὁμολογοῦντας ἑαυτοὺς εἶναι Χριστιανούς καὶ τὸν σταυρωθέντα Ἰησοῦν ὁμολογῶν καὶ κύριον καὶ χριστὸν καὶ μὴ τὰ ἐκείνου διδάγματα διδάσκοντας, ἀλλὰ τὰ ἀπὸ τῶν τῆς πλάνης σωμαμάτων, ἡμῖς οἱ τῆς ἀληθείης Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ καὶ καθαρῶς διδασκαλίας μαθεῖται πιστότεροι καὶ βιβαιοτέρως γινόμεθα ἐν τῇ ἐλπίδι τοῦ

drawn from these premises is incorrect. First of all, as to the remarkable silence of Justin respecting Paul, this cannot be imputed to prejudice against the Apostle, conceived and nourished in the spirit of the Ebionites, since the existence of such a prejudice is totally without proof, and incapable of being proved. Had Justin cherished such a prejudice, it could be traced to no other source than the Apostle's opposition to the absolute continuance of the Mosaic law, which formed the peculiar ground for the animosity of the Jewish Christians towards Paul; but in this opposition Justin agreed most fully with the Apostle. The real ground of this silence was of a purely formal nature. Paul, as the Acts of the Apostles and his own Epistles show, had brought, in a high degree, the hatred of the Jewish Christians, and still more of the Jews, upon him, by his zeal for the prevalence of Christian universalism, by his unreserved declaration of the merely temporary

κατηγγεγμένη ὑπ' αὐτοῦ Ἔσιν οὖν καὶ ἰγίνοντο πολλοί, οἱ ἄδια καὶ βλάβοςμα λίγιν καὶ πρᾶττειν ἰδίδασιν, ἐν ὀνόματι τοῦ Ἰησοῦ προσελθόντες, καὶ εἰσιν ὑφ' ἡμῶν ἀπὸ τῆς προσωνυμίας τῶν ἀνδρῶν, ἐξ οὗπερ ἐκάστη διδαχὴ καὶ γνώμη ἤρξατο Καὶ εἰσιν αὐτῶν οἱ μὲν τινες καλούμενοι Μαρκανοὶ οἱ δὲ Οὐαλιντιανοὶ, οἱ δὲ Βασιλιδιανοὶ, οἱ δὲ Σατορνιλιανοὶ καὶ ἄλλοι ἄλλῃ ὀνόματι, ἀπὸ τοῦ περηνήτου τῆς γνώμης ἑκαστος ὀνομαζόμενος.—“They (the Christians) endure every kind of torture and punishment, even to death itself; rather than worship idols, or eat meat offered to idols. Then said Trypho; I hear that many of those who say that they acknowledge Jesus, and are called Christians, eat meat that has been offered to idols, and say that they do so without harm. I replied; for this reason, because there are men who profess that they are Christians, and acknowledge Jesus who was crucified as Lord and Christ, and do not teach his commandments, but those that proceed from the Spirit of error,—we, the disciples of the true and pure doctrine of Jesus Christ, are more steadfast and faithful in the hope announced by him. There are and were many who taught both to say and to do impious and blasphemous things, coming forth in the name of Jesus, and they are denounced by us from the names of the individuals, from whom each doctrine and opinion originated. Some of them are called Marcianians, others Valentinians, others Basilidians, others Saturnalians, and others by different names, from the name of the leader of each sect.”

obligation of the Mosaic law, and by the distinguished success of his apostolic labours,¹ which always did visible injury to Judaism. But Justin wished to operate principally on the Jews, by means of his Dialogue with Trypho. Under these circumstances, what was more natural and more prudent, than that he should not take notice of the Apostle throughout the Dialogue, notwithstanding their congeniality of spirit, in order not to endanger his good cause, and, as it were, to stumble at the threshold, by uselessly introducing a hated name? But, in the Apologies, the name of the Apostle had no place, because the personal representation of the Christian cause, as far as it was mentioned, was connected exclusively with the person of Jesus. If we further consider the expression, respecting the eating of meat offered to idols, it is still more difficult to conceive how it can involve a condemnation of the Apostle. On this supposition we must believe that Justin ranked the Apostle among the number of those of whom he says, that they bore indeed the Christian name, but, instead of the commandments of Jesus, taught the doctrine of dæmons: it is seen at a glance that this supposition is totally false. Justin expressly points out the persons he is opposing, namely, the Gnostics. Or if the supposed opposition against Paul is to be sought for in maintaining a stricter opinion than the Apostle's; it is to be recollected, first, that this greater strictness is not so very important, as may be shown from the passage in 1 Cor. x. 25. Paul forbids the participating, in the heathen temples, of meat offered to idols, (1 Cor. viii. 10; x. 14, 20,) by Christians, as absolutely as Justin; in one point only he approves a milder discipline, in allowing the eating of such meat, if bought at the shambles, or placed on the table in private houses, as far as this can be done, without wounding the consciences of weaker brethren, (1 Cor. x. 25.) Again, this strictness is by

¹ Lange enters into a full consideration of these points in his *Beiträge zur ältesten Kirchengeschichte*, Leips. 1838, I. 72, 76.

no means to be placed exclusively to Justin's account; it is only his individual expression of a canon received and maintained by all Christian antiquity; it is found, in substance, in all those church teachers who are the most decidedly attached to Paul. Exactly in the same tone as Justin, Irenæus complains of the Gnostic sects of the Nicolaitans, Basilidians, and Valentinians, that they partook of meat offered to idols without scruple and discernment, and did not believe that they were defiled in so doing.¹ "Abstain," the apostolic constitutions² demanded, "from meat offered to idols, that ye may not be associates of dæmons, for it is slaughtered in honour of dæmons, and in contempt of the one God." It was quite natural that the Fathers should understand and enforce the prohibition of eating meat offered to idols in this unqualified manner. The resolution of the apostolic convention at Jerusalem, (Acts xv. 28,) and the threatening of the Apocalyptic Seer (Rev. ii. 14, 20,) could not fail to impress them strongly.³ But their dæmonology converted this prohibition, under its strictest form, into a prime article of discipline. They regarded dæmons as peculiarly the receivers of all heathen offerings, and the flesh as food consecrated to these beings. Hence, to eat such food was, in their opinion, under all circumstances, to hold fellowship with dæmons, every meal of this kind was an act and vehicle of idolatry.⁴ How could they, the declared

¹ Iren. *adv. hæres.* 1, 1, p. 30—1, 23, p. 102—1, 27, p. 105.—1, 32, p. 107.—Agrippa Castor in Euseb. *hist. ec.* 4, 7, T. I. p. 304.

² *Constitut. Apostol.* 7, 21, T. I. p. 368.

³ Origen refers to the resolution of the apostolic convention, (c. *Cels.* 8, 29, T. I. p. 763, and Tertullian to the passage in the Revelation, (*de præscr. hæret.* c. 33, T. II. p. 33.)

⁴ Compare Justin *Apol.* 1, 58, p. 78, (p. 92, B.) with 2, 5, p. 92, (p. 44, B.)—Minuc. Fel. *Otav.* c. 38, p. 141.—Tertull. *de spectac.* c. 13, T. IV. p. 106, sq.—Origen, c. *Cels.* 8, 24, T. I. p. 760, 8, 30, sq. p. 763. Also Paetz *de vi quam religio Christ. per tria priora sæcula ad hominum animos, mores ac vitam habuit*, p. 51.

enemies of the subtlest idolatry, allow themselves, or others, to partake of what was not only connected with this idolatry, but actually involved it. They were compelled to convert the relative interdict of idols' meat by Paul into an absolute one, since they did not view the idols of the heathen cultus in so purely a negative light as did the Apostle.¹ This rigorous interpretation of the apostolic prohibition, as held by Justin and the later Fathers, was, therefore, at the farthest remove from a designed or Ebionitish opposition to the Apostle; it was only a natural consequence of the patristic dæmonology.

Equally without foundation as this alleged difference from the Apostle, is the last point which is adduced to prove the Jewish Christian leaning of Justin, namely, the agreement in doctrine between this Father and the Ebionites. For this agreement is in part not real, and in part of that kind, that if it actually is to be considered as a criterion of approximation to Ebionitism, the ancient church must have abounded in Ebionites or half Ebionites. In this latter case, it may be confidently maintained, that the ancient church never laid aside the Jewish-Christian costume. Coincidences like those in Justin, although not exactly in the same direction, may be pointed out without much trouble, in all the church teachers. We may mention, first of all, that side of the asserted doc-

¹ Several learned men, as Dähne, *Entwicklung des Paulinischen Lehrbegriffs*, Halle, 1835, (p. 97,) and Olshausen (*Biblischer Comment.* III. 1, 586, 613,) from 1 Cor. viii. 5, 10, 20, have attributed to the Apostle the Patristic opinion of the identity of the heathen idols and dæmons, and hence maintained that he, like the fathers, regarded the heathen feasts as the medium of holding fellowship with dæmons; but Neander (*Geschichte der Pflanzung und Leitung der Christlichen Kirche durch die Apostle*, 2 Aufl. II. 645.) History of the Planting and Training of the Christian Church by the Apostles. Translated from the the Third Edition of the original. Edinburgh, 1842. (Biblical Cabinet, Vols. XXXV. XXXVI.) vol. I. p. 283, 284; vol. II. p. 188—190,) has, in our opinion, completely refuted this view.

trinal agreement, which has not even an outward appearance of it. This relates to the manner in which Justin refers to the Old Testament. This use of Scripture, it is said, must be Ebionitish. Nothing less so! The method in which Justin makes use of the Sacred books, has no trace of Ebionitism.

What characterises the use which Justin makes of the Old Testament, is the excessive valuation of the prophecies,—the anxiety to attach a Messianic reference to every letter,—and the arbitrary manner in which this propensity is indulged, by means of allegorical interpretation; where can we find evidence that the Ebionites treated and interpreted the Old Testament in the same manner? Of the Gnostic Jewish Christians, of whom Epiphanius gives a full account, and whose doctrinal views are laid down in the well-known Clementine Homilies,¹ the exact opposite is the fact. They not only regarded the Old Testament with no peculiar reverence, but misused it in the strangest manner; they not only attached no importance to the letter, but considered the whole composition of the Old Testament as corrupt. The prophetic books they rejected altogether, and despised the prophets as erroneous teachers, who sought indeed after the truth but never found it, and who spoke from their own suggestions, and not from divine illumination.² By some among them, David and Solomon, Elijah and Elisha, Isaiah and Jeremiah, Ezekiel and Daniel, are insulted and accursed.³ The Mosaic

¹ Clem. *Homil.* 3, 53, T. 1. p. 646. Yet there are some references to prophetic passages, see *Homil.* 16, 7, p. 725, 18, 15, 17, sq. p. 741. sq.

² *Method. conviv. decem. virgin. orat.* 8. (in Combefis. *biblioth. græc. patr. auctarium noviss.* Par. 1672, II. p. 113, D.) 'Εβιοναῖοι, ἐξ ὧν κινήσις τοῖς προφήταις λαλεῖται φιλονεικῶνται.—Epiphanius *adv. hæres.* 30, 18, T. I. p. 142. τῶν προφητῶν λογιστοὶ οὐσίαις ἴσαι προφήταις, καὶ ἢ ἀληθείας.

³ Epiphanius *adv. hæres.* 30, 18, p. 142, ἀναθιματίζουσιν καὶ χλευάζουσιν Δαβὶδ τε καὶ τὸν Σολομῶνα, ὁμοίως δὲ τὸς περὶ 'Ησαΐαν καὶ 'Ιερμίου καὶ Δανιὴλ καὶ 'Ιεζεκιήλ· 'Ηλίαν τε καὶ 'Ελισσαίον ἐδιδούσιν.—30, 15, p. 139, πάντες τῶν προφητῶν, ὅς ᾤτοι βδελύσσονται.

books they describe as a mixture of truth and error.¹ Moses (so they tell us) entrusted to seventy wise men the eternal and pure law, according to God's will, received by oral tradition from Adam, the first prophet, in order that it might again be handed down, in its original purity, by the medium of oral tradition. But soon after Moses' death, the law, contrary to God's will, and under the influence of Satan, was committed to writing, and disfigured by all sorts of false and impious additions. These have multiplied, since it has happened that the Pentateuch has been several times destroyed and again compiled. God allowed these falsifications as a trial of men's minds, and to see who would listen to the blasphemous paragraphs scattered through the Scripture, and who could turn from them with abhorrence.² The true may be easily separated from the false. All that implies unworthy (anthropopathical) conceptions of God, whatever contradicts the pure idea of creation, whatever dishonours the righteous men who were the organs of the original unadulterated revelation³—is false. It is false when Adam, who was fashioned by God's own hand, is represented as a transgressor, and Noah, the only righteous man of his times, as a drunkard; it is false, when Abraham, who, on account of his chastity, was to be the father of many children, is said to have had three wives, and Jacob, who was the progenitor of the twelve tribes, and prophesied of Christ's advent, is said to have had four wives, and two of them sisters; it is false, when Moses, who has unveiled the divine law to all ages, who, on account of his upright conduct, was declared to be a faithful steward, is represented as a murderer, and as the pupil of an idolatrous priest.⁴ Lastly, it is false, when the Scripture speaks

¹ Epiphanius. *adv. hæres.* 30, 18, p. 142, οὗτοι δὲ ληστέες τὴν συντάκτικον Μωϋσέως ἔλκον, ἀλλὰ τινὰ ῥήματα ἀποβαλλοῦσιν.

² Clem. *homil.* 2, 38, T. i. p. 631. 2, 47, 51, p. 633. 3, 47, 50, sqq. p. 645, sq. 8, 10, p. 676.

³ *Homil.* 3, 42, p. 643. 3, 48, sq. p. 645.

⁴ *Homil.* 2; 52, p. 634.

of several gods,—when it is said,—that God dwelt in a tabernacle,—that he conceals himself in thick darkness, or the tempest, or the whirlwind,—that he is pleased with lamps and lights,—that he comes with the sound of trumpets, and a shout, with arrows and darts,—that he loves war,—that he creates evil,—that he produces blindness and deafness,—that he hardens the heart, when it is said, that he requires sacrifices, incense, and libations,—that he is weak and unrighteous, repents, lies, deceives, &c.¹

The Jewish Christians who were not Gnostics, the Ebionites in the strictest sense of the word, who alone were known to the church Fathers, except Epiphanius, certainly regarded the Old Testament with greater reverence than their Gnostic brethren; we might, indeed, attribute to them the idolatrous veneration of the sacred books, which many Jews cherished, on account of the scrupulous anxiety with which they adhered to the usages of their forefathers; but no writer informs us that they understood and interpreted the sacred volume in the same manner as Justin. In the words of Irenæus (*adv. hæres.* 1, 26, p. 105,) *quæ sunt prophetica, curiosius exponere nituntur*; the assertion that the Ebionites believed that the whole of Christianity was signified and typified in the prophetic writings of the Old Testament, and that they attempted to extract it by means of allegorical interpretations,—cannot be contained,² since Irenæus, by this expression, evidently means to convey a reproach; and it cannot be supposed that he, a most zealous advocate and cultivator of the allegorical and typical method of interpretation, should have been so inconsiderate as to condemn his own mode of understanding the Old Testament.³ It is also worth while to

¹ *Homil.* 2, 42, sqq. p. 632, 3, 43, sqq. p. 644, 18, 19, p. 724.

² This is done by Credner (*Beitrage zur Einleitung*, I. 278, Anm. 2.) Compare also Massuet, *dissert. in Iren.* 1, 7, 131, T. II. p. 54.

³ What Irenæus intended to say by these, remains an enig-

observe, that the Clementine Homilies and Recognitions, whose friends were only one branch of the same stock with the narrow-hearted Jews, who confined themselves to the latter, are decidedly against the allegorical interpretation. The Recognitions lay down the following canon, with an undisguised reference to the Old Testament Scriptures:—"multas, ut video, ingeniosi homines ex his quæ legunt verisimilitudines capiunt; et ideo diligenter observandum est, ut lex dei cum legitur non secundum proprii ingenii intelligentiam legatur. Sunt enim multa verba in scripturis divinis, quæ possunt trahi ad eum sensum, quem sibi

ma. The words, in their detached state, are perfectly unintelligible, and at least no meaning can be given to them which rises higher than a probability. We shall content ourselves, in addition to what we have said above, with mentioning some other attempts at interpretation, without deciding on their value. Gieseler (*über die Nasaræer und Ebioniten*, in Stäudlin's und Tzschirner's *Archiv. für. alte und neue Kirchengeschichte*, iv. 2, 291,) with whom Lange, (*Beiträge zur ältesten Kirchengeschichte*, I. 21,) and Hilgen, (*Kritische Darstellung der Häresen*, I. 1, 111,) agree in the main,—is of opinion that Irenæus, in these words alluded to the millenarian expectation of the Ebionites, which was raised and cherished by the prophetic books of the Old Testament, and so far blamed them as they claimed the first place in the millenarian reign to the prejudice of catholic Christians. Neander has given a two-fold explanation. In his work, "*genetische Entwicklung der vornehmsten gnostischen Systeme*," p. 391, he would understand the account of Irenæus of a too subtile enquiry respecting the notions of the true prophets, according to the idea of the Clementines; but more recently, (*Allgemeine Geschichte der Christ. Religion und Kirche*, I. 2, 407,) he has rightly, as we think, recalled this meaning, and thus expresses himself; "We cannot say more than that Irenæus would not feel satisfaction in the exposition of the Prophets among the Ebionites, according to the rabbinical Jewish method, which was at variance with the common Christian method, and hence he took occasion to blame over curious investigations." Notwithstanding this change in his opinion, the former view has been preferred by Schneckenburger, (*über einen häufig übersehenen Punkt in der Lehre der Ebioniten von der person Christi; Tübinger Zeitschrift für Theologie*, 1830, I. 120,) and by Hoffman, (*das Leben Jesu kritisch bearbeitet von Strauss, geprüft*. Stutt. 1836. 212, Anm. 2)

unusquisque sponte præsumsit, quod fieri non oportet. Non enim sensum quem extrinsecus attuleris, alienum et extraneum debes quærere, quem ex scripturarum auctoritate confirmes, sed ex ipsis scripturis sensum capere veritatis.—"I have observed these ingenious persons are apt to catch at resemblances in what they read; it ought, therefore, to be carefully observed, when the law of God is read, that it be not read according to the understanding of the individual mind. For there are many words in the sacred Scriptures which may be made to mean what suits the previous opinions of different persons, which ought not to be done. For you ought not to seek a foreign and extraneous sense drawn from without, and then attempt to confirm it by the authority of Scripture, but aim at obtaining the real truth from the Scriptures themselves."—Hence it is evident that there is no sort of agreement between the use which the Ebionites made of the Old Testament and the manner in which Justin treated it. A real and more than accidental agreement is found in other points of doctrine, which is presumed to shew Justin's dependence on the Ebionitish mode of thinking in the doctrines of dæmons, baptism and the millennium; but this agreement is far from establishing the supposed dependence. What it proves is only this, that Justin and the Ebionites partially breathed the same mental atmosphere;—that both had received the same elements of mental training, from a common third source. In the developement of the doctrines referred to, we shall set this in a clear light. For the present, we shall dismiss these preliminary enquiries, and enter on the consideration of particular doctrines.

CHAPTER I.

THE DOCTRINE OF GOD.

It was not within the province of the ancient Church to furnish a regular and finished delineation of Chris-

tian doctrine. Its office lay within the immediate sphere of practical life ;—it meddled not with the necessities of the schools. Its age was one of conflict ; of conflict for the palladium of its clearest hopes, during which but little time could be devoted to theoretic investigations. The construction of a whole presupposes the formation and adjustment of the parts ; the Church could not meditate and compose a system of faith, till the individual articles of faith had been conceived and prepared for insertion in their organic connection. What the ancient Church accomplished for the scientific formation and exhibition of the Christian faith, related only to particular points ; and the choice of these points depended on the impulse which the Church received from without. According to the variety of enemies with which the Christian doctrine had to contend, one or the other portion of it was sooner or later elaborated. The idea of God experienced at once the most searching and yet the most limited treatment, in proportion as it was conceived or not in its specifically Christian form. The doctrine of the Logos formed the original stock from which a Christian theology grew up, but the divine nature in itself was treated of only in a subordinate and detached manner. It is doing the Fathers in general, no injustice to assert that their idea of God (in himself) universally remained a pure object of immediate faith. What they contributed for its speculative establishment, was but little. Even the attempt which they made to set in a clear light the infinity of God in contrast with the Grecian doctrine of a plastick power—the unity of God in contrast with heathen polytheism and Gnostic dualism—the righteousness of God in contrast with the Gnostic overstrained notions of the divine goodness—was nothing more than an attempt. Hence, their idea of God (if we except those of the Alexandrian school) by no means wears in general the character of pure spirituality ; their God is far from being exalted above all the conditions of finiteness. However much they showed themselves

captivated and overpowered by the majesty of the divine Being, however general the rapture they feel at the idea, and though the ascription of an unchangeable elevation to the Deity, is the key-note to which all their discourses respecting him are fitted, yet they had not attained to free their idea of God from all limitations of space and time. Involuntarily they attempted to bring the Ineffable, the Inconceivable, within the bounds of a circumscribed and circumscribing representation of the understanding; the idea in itself essentially spiritual, acquired, in passing through their minds a tincture of anthropomorphism or anthropopathism.

Justin considered the idea of God as the natural inheritance which man brings into the world with him at his birth; the notion of a God is, according to him, an innate representation belonging to human nature of an ineffable Being¹ This origin of the idea of God allows him to dispense with every speculative deduction of it,—belief in the Deity is in his view an unalienable treasure, which remains to man even under the perplexing influences of dæmoniacal powers, bad laws, and corrupt morals.² Yet this universality and permanence of possession, he attributes only to the knowledge of the reality of the First Cause, of the being of a God; the possibility of a more intimate knowledge, the attaining to a spiritual view of the Divine, he confines to those who have the spirit of

¹ *Apol.* 2, 6, p. 92, (p. 44, E.) τὸ θεὸς προσπαγέρισμα οὐκ ἐπομέστιν, ἀλλὰ πρῶτα διειρηγῆται ἱερῶτος τῇ φύσει τῶν ἀνθρώπων ζῆτα —“The appellation God is not a name, but the representation of an inexplicable thing implanted in the nature of men.” —Tertullian (*Apol.* c. 17, T. v. p. 37,) Clem. (*protrept.* 6, 68, T. i. p. 58, sq. Strom. 5. 14, 134, T. iii. p. 98,) and Arnobius (*adv. gent.* 1, 32, T. i. p. 22,) also consider the idea of God as innate. The last mentioned writer distinctly asks,—*quisquamne est hominum, qui non cum istius principis notione diem primæ natiuitatis intraverit? cui non sit ingentum, non affixum, imo ipsi pæne in genitalibus matris non impressum, non insitum, esse regem ac dominum, cunctorum quæcunque sunt moderatorem?*

² *Dial. c. Tr.* c. 93, p. 190, (p. 329, D.)

God.¹ Besides the knowledge of the reality of God, Justin considers an acquaintance with the unity of the divine Being, as the second donative which man received at his creation from the Creator. But this gift, he adds with grief, has been almost entirely lost by its receivers. Satanic craft and dæmoniacal worthlessness, succeeded early in suppressing or obscuring this knowledge in the human heart, by the illusory notion of the existence of many gods—the fallen wearers of the divine image knelt before dead idols, and became the miserable sport of God-opposing spirits; and still the belief in one God marks the boundary of true religion, and is the starting-point in the true knowledge of God. Jesus first gave renewed predominance to this belief, which had been taught and required in the most decided manner by means of the Old Testament, and which had been drawn from that source by individual sages of idolatrous heathenism.² Justin places the peculiar being of God in the intellect; he calls him “the Truth, the Father of the Universe, who is the absolute intellect.”³ He removes him so far above the sphere of the common objects of knowledge, that he gives him the constant epithet of “*the Ineffable*.”⁴

¹ *Dial. c. Tr. c. 4*, p. 107, (p. 222, E.) *νοῦν αὐτὰς (ψυχὰς) δύνανθαι, ἵτι ἴσσι θεός*; . . . *καὶ γὰρ συντίθεται*.—*c. 4*, p. 105, (p. 221, C.) *τὸν θεὸν ἀνδρώπε νοῦς ἐφισταί ποτε, μὴ ἀγίῳ πνεύματι παροσμυμένος*;

² *Coh. ad Græc. c. 36*, p. 33, (p. 34, D.) *δυνατὸν μανθάνειν ὁμῶς ἡα καὶ μένον ἵνα θεόν, ὃ πρῶτόν ἴσται τῆς ἀληθείας στοιβίας γνώρισμα*.—*c. 21*, p. 21, (p. 19, C.)—*Dial. c. Tr. c. 126*, p. 219, (p. 355, C.) The other passages in proof of this sentiment, have been in part already quoted, and others will be adduced in treating of Justin's doctrine respecting men and dæmons. Strauss in his *die Christliche Glaubenslehre*, I. 404, gives a brief review of the attempts made by other apologists to prove the divine unity.

³ *De resurr. c. 1*, p. 588, C. *ἴσται ἀλλάθαι ὁ θεός, ὁ πατὴρ τῶν ὅλων, ἵς ἴσται νοῦς τίλειος*.—*c. 8*, p. 593, C. *οὐκ ἔφρων ὁ τῶν ὅλων τίφους νοῦς*. The phrase *ὁ τῶν ὅλων νοῦς* is indeed Philonic, but not used by Justin in a Philonic sense.—See Grossman *quæst. Philon.* (Lips. 1829,) I. p. 15.

⁴ *Apol. 2*, 10, p. 95, (p. 49, A.) *ὁ ἀήματος πατὴρ*—*2*, 12, p.

Yet this unutterableness, thus affirmed of the Deity, has by no means the foundation and significance which is attributed to it in the Platonic philosophy, and in its offshoot, the Jewish Alexandrianism. For when Plato had wound up the perfection of his original cause of all things to such a height, that he had not contented himself with removing all finite sensible limitations, and conceiving of it as pure being, pure goodness, and intelligence;¹ but went so far, as to declare these distinctions of being, goodness, and intelligence, (which otherwise he regarded as the purest and highest,)—as utterly insufficient images of the absolute perfection of God—and even subtilized² the idea of God into a pure idea, which could not possess a real substantiality (*einer wirklichen Wesenheit*); when likewise Philo, in believing adherence to these maxims of his teacher, would assert nothing of God but pure being, represents him as absolutely simple, without substance or qualities,³—and (by a ridiculous climax) still purer than unity, less composite than the uncompounded;⁴—and, when both Plato,

96, (p. 50, C.)—2, 13, p. 97, (p. 51, C.)—*Dial. c. Tr. c. 126, p. 219, (p. 355, C.)*

¹ *Protag.* c. 84, T. ii. p. 188.—*Phileb.* c. 16, T. iii. p. 172. *de republ.* 1, 2, T. V. p. 76, sq. 1, 6, p. 241, 1, 7, p. 250.—*Tim.* T. vii. p. 17, 26.—*Phaedr.* T. viii. p. 29. Compare Tennemann's *Geschichte der Philosophie*, (Lpz. 1799,) II. 382, and Ackermann's *das Christliche im Plato und in der Platonischen Philosophie*, 39.

² *Phileb.* c. 11, T. iii. p. 160.—*de republ.* 1, 6, T. v. p. 242, καὶ τοῖς γινωσκόμενοις τοῖνυ μὴ μόνον τὸ γινώσκασθαι φάναι ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ παρῆναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ εἶναι τι καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν ὅπ' ἑαυτοῖς προσῆναι, οὐκ οὐσίας ὄντας τῷ ἀγαθῷ, ἀλλ' εἶναι ἰστέονα τῆς οὐσίας προσβάς καὶ δυναμίς ὑπερέχοντες

³ *Quod deus immut.* c. 11, T. II. p. 77, sq. οἱ μὲν ψυχῆς ἰταίρου . . . οὐδὲ μὴ τῶν γινόμετων ἰδίᾳ παραβάλλουσι τὸ εἶν' ἀλλ' ἐκβιβάζαντες αὐτὸ πάσης ποιότητος—ἢ γὰρ τῶν εἰς τὴν μακαριότητα αὐτοῦ καὶ τὴν ἀρετὴν ἰδωμένων ἦν, τὸ ψιλλὴν ὄντω χαρακτῆρος τὴν ὁρατὴν καταλαμβάνουσιν—τὴν κατὰ τὸ εἶναι μόνον φαντασίαν ἰνδιζαντο, μὴ μορφώσαντες αὐτό.

⁴ *De præn. et poen.* c. 6, T. V. p. 226, *de vii. contempl.* c. 1, p. 305.

as well as Philo, regarded this elevation of the Deity, carried to the absolute negation of substance and quality, as the most indubitable reason of his absolute unconceivableness and incomprehensibility, and, therefore, of his unutterableness¹—Justin could not adopt this proof of the incomprehensibility, and of the consequent unutterableness of the Supreme Being, because the premises on which it is built were not such as he owned. He is, indeed, on more than one occasion, zealous against the human representations which the heathen superstition, and a carnal Judaism had formed of God;² and, whenever he speaks of the Deity, he always asserts his Being with a marked emphasis;³ but he never sublimates the admitted transcendental elevation and spirituality of the divine existence into the evanescent height of the negation of substance. Substantiality may rather be said to be a clearly expressed constituent of his idea of God.⁴

¹ On Plato, see Ritter's *Geschichte der Philosophie*, (Hamb. 1830,) II. 288; and on Philo, compare Dahne's *Geschichtliche Darstellung der jüdisch-Alexandr. Religionsphilosophie*, I. 133.

² *Apol.* 1, 9, p. 48, (p. 57, C.)—*Dial. c. Tr.* c. 114, p. 207, (p. 341, E.)—c. 127, p. 220, (p. 306, D. 357, A.)

³ *Coh. ad Gr.* c. 26, (p. 24, D.) *ὁ θεὸς ὁ ὢν* *Σίός*—c. 17, p. 20, (p. 17, D.)—c. 20, p. 21, (p. 19, B.)—*Dial. c. Tr.* c. 55, p. 150, (p. 274, B.) *ὁ θεὸς ὁ ὢν* *Σίός*—*Apol.* 1, 13, p. 51, (p. 60, E.) *ὁ θεὸς ὁ ὢν* *Σίός*.

⁴ *Dial. c. Tr.* c. 128, p. 222, (p. 358, C.) *ὃ καὶ ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας, ὡς ἀπεμερίζετο τῆς τοῦ πατρὸς οὐσίας*, &c.—“Not by division, as if separated from the substance of the Father,” &c.—An opinion has prevailed to the present time, that Justin taught the perfect super-substantiality of God in the sense, and on the authority of Plato: this traditionary judgment has even found acceptance and approval with such writers as Starck, (*freimüthige Betrachtungen über das Christenthum*, 2 Aufl. Berl. 1782, s. 155.) Beck, (*Comment. Hist. decret. relig. Christ.* Lips. 1801, p. 201, sq.) Bertholdt (*Handbuch d. Dogmengeschichte*, II. 64.) Baumgarten-Crusius, (*Lehrbuch der Christ. Dogmengeschichte*, II. 926.) Englehardt (*Dogmengesch. Neust. a. d. Aisch.* 1839, I. 203.) and Hagenbach (*Lehrbuch der Dogmengesch.* I. 107.) With similar unanimity another passage, in the Dialogue with Trypho, is adduced as a proof of the as-

Indeed, sometimes he insists so strongly on this point, and not unfrequently presents it in so gross a form, that he subjects pure spirit to the shackles of a refined anthropomorphism (*er dem absoluten Geiste sogar die Zwangsjacke eines feinen Anthropomorphismus anlegt*)¹ and encloses the Illimitable in a definite place. He whom no eye hath seen or can see, has, nevertheless, a form; he who is enclosed by no space, not even by the whole universe, has yet his place which he never leaves;² he dwells above the visible hea-

serted adherence of Justin to Plato. *Dial. c. Tr. c. 4*, p. 105, (p. 221, C. D.) *ῥησὶ Πλάτων, αὐτὸ τοιοῦτον εἶναι τὸ τοῦ τοῦ ὁμοῦ καὶ πρὸς τοῦτον ἡμῖν διδόνθαι, ὡς δύνανθαι καθορᾶν αὐτὸ ἐκείνο τὸ ἐν εἰλικρινεῖ αὐτῷ ἐκείνῳ, ὃ τῶν ἰσχυρῶν ἀπάντων ἰσχυρὸν αἰτεῖον, οὐ χροῦμα ἔχον, οὐ σχῆμα οὐ μέγεθος, οὐδὲ οὐδὲν ὃν ὀφθαλμοῖς βλέπειν, ἀλλὰ τι ἐν τοῦτ' αὐτῷ, φημι, ὃν ἰσχύειν πάσης οὐσίας, οὔτε ῥητὸν οὔτε ἀγορευτόν, ἀλλὰ μόνον καλὸν καὶ ἀγαθόν.*—“Plato affirms, that such is the eye of the mind, and that it is given us for this purpose, that we may behold with it distinctly that very Being who is the cause of all things that are conceived by the mind,—who has no colour, nor form, nor magnitude, nor any quality which the eye beholds,—but is something, I say, beyond all substance, indescribable, ineffable, but alone beautiful and good.”—We can hardly conceive how this mistake was possible. Justin certainly lays down, in the passage above quoted, the Platonic axiom of the super-substantiality of God, but not Justin the Christian, but Justin the heathen. Hahn. (*de platonismo theolog. vet. eccles. patr.* p. 14,) has perceived this, though he has not attended to it.

¹ *Apol. 1*, 9, p. 48, (p. 57, E.) *ἄρρητον δόξαν καὶ μεγεθὲν ἔχον.*—*Dial. c. Tr. c. 127*, p. 221, (p. 357, B.)

² *Dial. c. Tr. c. 127*, p. 221, (p. 357, A.) *ὁ ἀρρητος πατήρ καὶ κύριος τῶν πάντων οὔτι ποιεῖ ὅτι καθεῖσθαι οὔτι ἀνίσταται, ἀλλ' ἐν τῇ αὐτοῦ χώρῃ, ὅπου πατρί, μὲν . . . οὔτε κινούμενος ὁ τὸς τε ἀχώρητος καὶ τῇ κόσμῳ ὅλῳ.*—“The unutterable Father and Lord of all, neither comes to any place, nor sleeps, nor rises up, but remains in the same place, wherever that may be . . . he is not moved, and is uncontained by place and by the whole world.”—Probably the crude representation of limitation to a definite place, to which Justin seems to subject the divine existence, in this and the following passages, was only employed for impression. Origen himself, whose idea of God was confessedly in a tolerable degree spiritual, (*de princip. 1*, 1, T. I. p. 49, sq.—1, 6, 4, p. 71, 2, 4, 3, p. 86. *Comment in Joan.* 13, 21, sqq. T. IV. p. 230, sqq.) could not entirely free himself from the fetters of locality, c. *Cels.* 4, 5,

vens,¹ he resides in heaven.² When, therefore, Justin calls God *the Unutterable*, it is never to be so understood, as if, according to his notion of the supreme cause of all things, nothing, besides his existence, could be affirmed, on account of his supposed absolute simplicity and destitution of qualities (*Eigenschaftlosigkeit*), but that negative epithet only serves as a pregnant expression of the inconceivable distance between the divine majesty and the weakness of the creature, and is intended only to give a more vivid impression of the impossibility of comprehending the infinite fulness of the Divine existence in a narrow description, or of representing it in any words or images. The other negative epithet which Justin applies to the Deity, that of *Namelessness*,³ also serves to set forth the surpassing glory of God. On a threefold ground, Justin considers the naming of God inadmissible and impos-

T. I. p. 505, καὶ ὁ Θεὸς τῶν ὅλων τῇ αὐτοῦ δυνάμει συγκαταβαθὴν τῇ Ἰησοῦ εἰς τὸν τῶν ἀνθρώπων βίον . . . οὐκ ἔξωδρος γίνεσθαι οὐδὲ καταλείπει τὴν αὐτοῦ ἰδαν· ὅς τινα μὲν τόπον αὐτὸν αὐτοῦ εἶναι, ἴτιον δὲ πλήρη οὐ πρότερον αὐτὸν ἔχοντα. Ἐπιδομαὶ δὲ δυνάμει καὶ θιότητι Θεοῦ, δι' οὗ βούλεται καὶ ἐν ᾧ ὡρίσκει χώραν ὅρα ἀμείβοντες τόπον οὐδ' ἐκλείποντες χώραν αὐτοῦ κινήν καὶ ἄλλην πληροῦντες.—“Although the God of the universe, by his own power, descends with Jesus into human life,—yet he does not alter his position, nor leave his own abode, so that one place should be empty of him and another full in which before he was not. But the power and divinity of God go forth by whomsoever he will, and where he finds a region for them without changing his own place, or leaving his own region empty and filling another.”

¹ *Dial. c. Tr. c. 60, p. 157, (p. 283, B.)* οὐ τὸν ποιητὴν τὸν ὅλων καὶ πατέρα, καταλείποντα τὰ ὅπλα οὐρανὸν ἅπαντα ἐν ἐλίγῃ γῆς μορῇ περιάσαι, πῶς ὁρίσθαι, καὶ μικρὸν οὖν ἔχον, τολμήσει εἰσαῖν.—“No one, however limited his capacity, will venture to say that the Maker and Father of the universe, left all the region above the heaven, and appeared in a small corner of the earth.”—c. 56, p. 150, (p. 275, A.) τῷ ἐν ταῖς ὁμιθυραῖσι διὰ μίσητος.—c. 60, p. 157, (p. 284, A.) τῇ ὅπλῃ κίρμον Θεῷ, ὅτι ἐν ἄλλῃ οὐκ ἔστι.

² *Dial. c. Tr. c. 127, p. 221, (p. 357, C.)*—c. 129, p. 122, (p. 358, D.)

³ *Apol. 1, 63, p. 81, (p. 95, C.)* τὸν ἀνομήμενον Θεόν.

sible. First, because giving a name has no other end than to make the objects which exist in multiplicity and variety, knowable and distinguishable; but God being one and unique, has no like with whom he may be confounded.¹ Secondly, because the imposition of a name supposes the priority of the namer to the named; but God, as the Unbegotten, is preceded by no being more ancient.² Thirdly, because no adequate expression can be found for the immensity of the Divine existence.³ All these reasons, as may be easily perceived, spring from the same stock: they all presuppose that unbounded exuberance of the Divine nature, which rejects and spurns every finite measure. Justin, therefore, watched with anxiety for the acknowledgment of this namelessness of God. On one occasion he utters an anathema on whoever should refuse to grant it.⁴ "No one can give a name to the unutterable God: if any one should dare to say that there is such a thing, he must be in a state of hopeless insanity." Yet he by no means forgets the limits of human nature: he does not require verbal communication to go into a sphere from which it is necessarily banished. He himself applies, innumerable times, one name or another to the Supreme Being, and is perfectly ready to grant this liberty to others. His inter-

¹ *Coh. ad Gr.* c. 21, p. 21, (p. 19, B.) οὐδὲν ὄνομα ἐπὶ Θεῷ κυριολογῆσθαι δυνατὸν· τὰ γὰρ ὀνόματα εἰς δόλῳσιν καὶ διάγνωσιν τῶν υποκειμένων καὶται πραγμάτων, πολλῶν καὶ διαφόρων ὄντων· Θεῷ δὲ οὗτοι εἰσιδεῖς ὄνομα περιῦπτερχιν, οὗτοι αὐτοὶ ἑαυτὸν ὀνομάζουσιν φάσθαι δύνανται, οἷς καὶ μόνος ὑπάραχων.—The same conclusion is adopted by Minuc. Fel. Octavius, (c. 18, p. 58,) Cyprian, (*de Idol. Vanit.* c. 9, T. II. p. 14,) and Lactant. (*Institut. Divin.* 1, 6, 1, 11.) Compare Petav. *Theolog. Dogmat. de deo deique propriet.* 8, 6. Venet. 1757. I. p. 319, seq.

² *Apol.* 2, 6, p. 92, (p. 44, D.) ὄνομα τῷ πάντων πατρὶ Θεῷ, ἀγνωστὸν ὄντι, οὐκ ἔστιν. "Ὁ γὰρ εἰς καὶ ὀνόματι προσεταγορεύεται, περιβύτιον ἔχει τὸν θίμινον τὸ ὄνομα.

³ *Apol.* 1, 61, p. 80, (p. 94, D.) ὄνομα τῷ ἀρρήτῳ Θεῷ οὐδεὶς ἔχει ἐπαιῖν.

⁴ *Apol.* 1, 61, p. 80, (p. 94, D.) ὄνομα τῷ ἀρρήτῳ Θεῷ οὐδεὶς ἔχει ἐπαιῖν· εἰ δὲ τις τοιμήσειεν εἶναι λίγον, μήμητι τὴν αὐτοῦ μαρτίαν.

dict only applies to the erroneous fancy that a name could ever be more than a prop for human weakness, that it could possibly have an essential relation to the Divine nature, or be a receptacle of sufficient amplitude for the fulness of God. Against the use of such designations as "Father, and God, and Creator, and Lord, and Ruler," he has not the slightest objection, provided that they are not considered as real names, but as limited abstractions of the reflective understanding.¹ But if the namelessness of God rest upon a pure Christian view of the Divine existence, if it be in its true sense a perfectly necessary assumption of the Christian consciousness, then the strange opinion is at once set aside, which would see in this doctrine a Platonic piece of patchwork on a Christian garment.² The Platonic philosophy certainly spoke of a nameless God; but besides that, the Christian doctrine was not under the necessity of borrowing its existence from this philosophy, the internal possibility was wanting for connecting the Christian sentiment with the Platonic dictum. The Platonic namelessness of God goes hand in hand with its correlative notion, the unutterableness of God; both one and the other, upon the not merely inconceivable, but self-annihilating notion of the simplicity of God. Hence, as Justin had not adopted Plato's notion of such a simplicity of the Divine existence, he could not call God nameless, in the Platonic sense.³ We do not, indeed, maintain that the patristic doctrine of the namelessness of God

¹ *Apol.* 2, 6, p. 92, (p. 44, D.) τὸ πατὴρ καὶ θεὸς καὶ κτίστης καὶ κυβερνῆς καὶ διαπότης οὐκ ὀνόματά ἐστιν, ἀλλ' ἐκ τῶν ὑπολοίπων καὶ τῶν ἔργων προσέρχεται. Compare *Theophil. ad Autol.* 1, 3, p. 339, sq. (p. 71, A. B.) and *Clem. Strom.* 5, 12, 83, T. III. p. 59.

² Such is the view taken by Hahn (*de Platonismo Theol. vet. Eccles. Patr.* p. 11, sq.) and Semler, (*Geschichte der Christ. Glaubenslehre*, II. 44.)

³ This, indeed, is not avowed in plain terms in Justin, but it is tolerably evident, *Apol.* 2, 6, sq. p. 92, (p. 44, C. D.) ὀνόματι ἰσχυροῦ, διὰ τοῦτο ἰσχυροῦ αὐτοῦ τῶν ἀγγέλων καὶ τῶν τέκνων ἵδμεν, προσηγέρμενοι. Ὀνομα δὲ τῷ πάντων πατρὶ θεῷ, ἀγινώτῃ ὄντι, οὐκ ἔστι.

had been formed altogether and purely from itself, without any outward attraction. We readily allow, that on one side the multiplicity of names in the Grecian Pantheon was a manifest inducement to dwell so emphatically on the namelessness of God. On another side, we concede to the Jewish-Alexandrianism a more immediate and direct influence in fixing this idea: to it belonged the biblical argument, which was given to the latter. In the passage of Exodus, in reply to the inquiry of Moses, what was his name, and by what name he was to make him known to the Israelites (Exod. iii. 14), God declares, אֶהְיֶה אֲשֶׁר אֶהְיֶה וַיֹּאמֶר כֹּה תֹאמַר, the LXX.

(it is admitted,) have wilfully departed from the Hebrew text; ἐγώ εἰμι ὁ ὢν καὶ εἶπεν οὕτως ἐπεί τις τοῖς υἱοῖς Ἰσραὴλ· ὁ ὢν ἀπέσταλκέ με πρὸς ὑμᾶς. This reading was the Biblical prop by which the Fathers and Justin, first of all, supported their position, that to God, in a peculiar sense, no name belonged. Thus Justin says, "Plato having heard, in Egypt, that God had said to Moses, when he was about to send him to the Hebrews, I am the Being. (ὁ ὢν,)—understood that God had not told him his peculiar name, for no name can be properly attributed to God."¹ This application of Exod. iii. 14, betrays an evident derivation from the Jewish Alexandrianism; for in that school this use of it was first found; it has all the characteristic marks of it, and the translation ὁ ὢν is itself a product of the spirit of that school.² To consider the agreement between Justin and the Jewish-Alexan-

¹ *Coh. ad Gr.* c. 20, sq. p. 21, (p. 19, B.) ἀκηκως (Πλάτων) ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ τὸν Θεὸν τῷ Μωσῇ εἰρηκέναι· ἐγώ εἰμι ὁ ὢν ὁ πηνικα πρὸς τοὺς Ἑβραίους αὐτὸν ἀποστέλλειν ἐμελλεν ἔγνω ὅτι οὐ κύριον ὄνομα ἑαυτοῦ ὁ Θεὸς πρὸς αὐτὸν ἔφη· οὐδὲν γὰρ ὄνομα ἐπὶ Θεοῦ κυριολογεῖσθαι δυνατόν.

² See Daehne's *Geschichtl. Darstellung der Judisch-Alexandr. Religionsphilosophie*, II. 27.

drian theosophists in the use of the Mosaic passage, as an accidental agreement, is unsatisfactory, since Justin agrees verbally, in part, with Philo. But, notwithstanding this close connection, the dependance of the former on the latter is really a matter of indifference. The manner in which they made use of the Biblical passage for their own special object, is perfectly distinct. While Philo employed the words *ἐγώ εἰμι ὁ ὢν* to establish his theosophic paradox, that God could have no name applied to himself, because he only *is*, without being something;¹ Justin is so far from following him in this, that he rather sees in the words *ὁ ὢν*, merely an emphatic expression of the true and eternal reality of the one God, in contrast to the vain illusory existence of the heathen gods.²

¹ *De Mutat. Nomin.* c. 2, T. III. p. 159. *ἦν οὖν ἀκόλουθον τὸ μὴδ' ὄνομα κύριον ἐπιφημισθῆναι δύνασθαι· τῷ ὄντι πρὸς ἀλήθειαν. Οὐχ ὁρᾷς ὅτι φιλοπευστοῦντι πρὸς ἀλήθειαν τῷ προφήτῃ, τί τοῖς περὶ ὀνόματος αὐτοῦ ζητοῦσιν ἀποκριτέον, φησὶν ὅτι, ἐγώ εἰμι ὁ ὢν, ἴσον τῷ εἶναι πέφυκα, οὐ λέγεσθαι, —*De Vit. Mos.* I, 14, T. IV. p. 130, *ἐὰν οὖν φησί, πυνθάνωνται, τί τὸ ὄνομα τοῦ πέψαντος, μὴδ' αὐτὸς εἰπεῖν ἔχω, ἀρ' οὐ δόξω διαπατᾶν; Ὁ δέ, τὸ μὲν πρῶτον λέγει, φησὶν, αὐτοῖς· ἐγώ εἰμι ὁ ὢν ἵνα μαθόντες διαφορὰν ὄντος τε καὶ μὴ ὄντος προσαναδιδαχῶσιν, ὥς οὐδὲν ὄνομα ἐπ' ἐμοῦ τὸ παράπαν κυριολογεῖται, ὃ μόνῳ πρόσσεσι τὸ εἶναι.*—"It was therefore agreeable to analogy, that no proper name could be applied to the Being who in truth (pre-eminently) *is*. Do you not see that he says to the prophet anxiously inquiring for the truth, what reply he must give to those who asked concerning his name, 'I am, ὁ ὢν,' which is equivalent to saying, 'according to my nature I am to be, not to be called.'—If then, he says, they ask what is the name of him that sent thee, and I cannot tell them, shall I seem a downright deceiver? But he says, first tell them I am ὁ ὢν, that learning the difference of *being* and of *not being*, they may be fully instructed that no name can with any propriety be applied to me, whose sole prerogative it is to be."*

² *Coh. ad Gr.* c. 21, p. 21, (p. 19, c. E.) *οὐδὲ ὀνόματος τινὸς ὁ θεὸς ἀποστέλλων πρὸς τοὺς Ἑβραίους τὸν Μωσῆα μέμνηται, ἀλλὰ διὰ τινος μετοχῆς ἵνα καὶ μόνον θεὸν αὐτὸν εἶναι μυστικῶς διδάσκει· ἐγώ γάρ, φησὶν, εἰμι ὁ ὢν· ἀντιδιαστέλλων αὐτὸν δηλονότι ὁ ὢν τοῖς μὴ οὖσιν. . . . Διὰ τοῦτω πρὸς τὸν Μωσῆα ἔφη, ἐγώ εἰμι ὁ ὢν, ἵνα διὰ τῆς μετοχῆς ὄντος τοῦ θεοῦ ὄντος καὶ μὴ ὄντων διαφορὰν διδάξῃ.*—"Neither did God, when he sent to the Hebrews by Moses, make mentio

In order to make the divine Being in some measure at least conceivable, (who in his absolute unity and totality, is completely inaccessible to our apprehension,) we assign to him a number of peculiar distinctions. At the same time, it is by no means implied, that these distinctions are so divided and exist in actual separation from another, as we separate them in order to gain an approximate knowledge of God. The divine Being (we acknowledge) remains an absolute and perfectly undivided unity. That division serves only as a vehicle and aid for our knowledge of God, and is at the same time a practical confession, that we cannot apprehend God as he is in himself, but only in his relation to the world, and conversely, in the relation of the world to him. Following this law of the universal limitation of the human faculties, Justin assigns to God attributes partly of a negative and partly of a positive nature, without attempting either a complete or initial solution of this problem. He mentions the divine attributes generally in a passing manner, and in contrast with the common lowering to the standard of humanity, to which the poetic and plastic mythology of the Greeks subjected their national divinities. Especially his zeal was fired at the folly of polytheism in reference to the generation of the gods, with which he contrasted the negative attribute of the divine existence, that it is without beginning and without end. "God alone," he says "is unbegotten and imperishable, and for this very reason he is God."¹

of any name ; but by a participle he mystically teaches that he is the one and only God ; for I, said he, am ὁ ὢν, clearly contrasting himself, *the Being*, ὁ ὢν, with the *no-beings* (τοῖς μὴ οὖσιν). —On this account he said to Moses, I am ὁ ὢν, that by the participle *being* he might teach the difference between the God who is, and the gods who are not."—c. 25, p. 25, (p. 23, E. 24, A.)

¹ *Dial. c. Tr. c. 5*, p. 108, (p. 223, D.) *μόνος ἀγέννητος καὶ ἀφθαρτός ὁ θεὸς καὶ διὰ τοῦτου θεός ἐστιν*. The epithet *ἀγέννητος* is in Justin almost a constant appellation of the Divine Being, *Apol. 1*, 14, p. 51, (p. 61, B.)—*1*, 49, p. 72, (p. 85, B.)—*2*, 12, p. 96, (p. 50, C.)—*2*, 13, p. 97, (p. 51, C.)—*Dial. c. Tr. c. 126*, p. 219, (p. 355, C.) With the same

and—"he alone is the *ever-being* who is unproduced."¹ The attribute of unchangeableness, connected on one side at least with eternity, Justin assigns to God in a twofold sense, as excluding every possibility of change in his essence,² and all excitability from passion.³ The attribute of the divine knowledge, omniscience, he describes generally thus:⁴ "The unutterable Father and Lord of all things, beholds all things, sharp-sighted and quick of hearing, not with eyes nor with ears, but with indescribable power; he knows all, none of us can remain concealed from him." He brings forward only two particular instances of this omniscience, namely, the foreseeing of future events,⁵ and the all-seeing of present events, with a knowledge of the thoughts.⁶ Still more hastily he touches on the prerogative of the divine will, omnipotence, holiness and righteousness. Omnipotence he defines according to the moral conception of it, as the ability

emphasis and concern the other church-teachers speak of the unbegotten God.—Thus Iren. *adv. Hæres.* 4, 75, p. 285, τέλειος ὁ ἀγέννητος· οὗτος δὲ ἐστὶ θεός.—Theophil. *ad Autol.* 1, 4, p. 340, (p. 71, C.).—Minuc. *Fel. Octav.* c. 23, p. 84.—Tertull. *adv. Marc.* 1, 3, T. i. p. 5, sq. 5, 1, p. 313.—Clem. *Protrep.* 5, 65, T. i. p. 56.—Clem. *Homil.* 10, 10, T. i. p. 687, sq. ὡς τοῦ ἀγεννήτου ἰδίου τὸ θεὸς εἶναι, οὕτως πᾶν ὁτιοῦν γενόμενον θεὸς τῷ ὄντι οὐκ ἔστιν.

¹ *Coh. ad Gr.* c. 22, p. 23, (p. 20, E.).—c. 25, p. 25, (p. 24, A.).—*De Resurrect.* c. 8, p. 593, C.

² *Apol.* 1, 13, p. 51, (p. 61, A.): τὸν ἀτρεπτον καὶ αἰεὶ ὄντα θεόν.

³ *Apol.* 1, 25, p. 58, (p. 69, B.) θεῷ τῷ ἀπαθεῖ. Justin only conceives as possible a moral alteration in God in his judicial relation to the world; God's conduct towards men alters as far as their moral conduct gives occasion.—*Coh. ad Gr.* c. 25, p. 24, sq. (p. 23, B.)

⁴ *Dial. c. Tr.* c. 127, p. 220, (p. 357, A.).

⁵ *Dial. c. Tr.* c. 16, p. 117, (p. 234, B.) προγνώσεως τῶν γίνεσθαι μελλόντων ἣν καὶ ἐστὶν ὁ θεός.—c. 23, p. 122, (p. 241, A.).—*Apol.* 1, 44, p. 70, (p. 82, A.)

⁶ *Apol.* 1, 12, p. 49, (p. 59, A.).—1, 12, p. 50, (p. 59, C.) 1, 15, p. 52, (p. 62, B.) οὐ τῶν ἔργων φανερῶν μόνον τῷ θεῷ ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ἐνθυμημάτων.—2, 12, p. 96, (p. 50, C.).—2, 12, p. 97, (p. 51, A.)

of God to do all that he wills to do, and, on this account, generally calls him the All-powerful (*ὁ παντοκράτωρ*,) *Dial. c. Tr. c. 16, c. 117, (p. 234, B.)*—*c. 83, p. 181, (p. 310, A.)*—*c. 96, p. 193, (p. 324, A.)*¹ Holiness he represents as absolute separation from sin, and righteousness he most frequently mentions under its judicial modification.² Lastly, the happiness of God appears in him, considered as immanent, only under the single aspect of the absence of want,³—as communicative, in his revelation as love;—and again, in this revelation, chiefly under the form of compassion.⁴

These expressions of Justin, respecting the divine nature and attributes, are only an exposition of the general sentiments of the Church, as they were formed on the foundation of holy writ, and in opposition to the heathen theology. The idea of God is never, with him, an object of distant speculation; he propa-

¹ *Dial. c. Tr. c. 84, p. 181, (p. 310, D.) πάντα δύνασθαι τὸν θεόν, ὅσα βούλεται.*

² *Apol. 1, 6, p. 47, (p. 56, B.) τοῦ ἀληθεστάτου καὶ πατρὸς δικαιοσύνης καὶ σωφροσύνης καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀρετῶν ἀνεπιμίκτου τε κακίας θεοῦ.*—1, 10, p. 48, (p. 58, B.); τὰ προσόντα αὐτῷ ἀγαθὰ. . . . σωφροσύνη καὶ δικαιοσύνη καὶ φιλάνθρωπία καὶ ὅσα οἰκεῖα θεῷ ἐστι.—1, 44, p. 70, (p. 82, B.)—*Dial. c. Tr. c. 16, p. 117, (p. 234, B.)*—*c. 23, p. 122, (p. 241, A.)*—*c. 96, p. 193, (p. 323, D. 324, A.)*

³ *Dial. c. Tr. c. 23, p. 122, (p. 241, A.) ἀνευδέης.*—*Apol. 1, 13, p. 50, (p. 60, C.) ἀνευδέης αἱμάτων καὶ σπονδῶν καὶ δομαμάτων, ὡς ἐδιδάχθημεν*—1, 10, p. 48, (p. 58, A.) οὐ δέεσθαι τῆς παρὰ ἀνθρώπων ὑλικῆς προσφοράς προειληφάμεν τὸν θεόν, αὐτὸν παρέχοντα πάντα ὁρῶντες.

⁴ *De Resurrect. c. 8, p. 593, E. ἀγαθός ἐστι καὶ σώζεσθαι πάντας θέλει.*—*Dial. c. Tr. c. 107, p. 201, (p. 334, C.) ἐλεήμων ὁ θεὸς καὶ φιλάνθρωπός ἐστιν ἐπὶ πάντας τοὺς μετατιθεμένους ἀπὸ τῆς κακίας.*—*c. 23, p. 122, (p. 241, A.)*—*c. 47, p. 143, (p. 266, D. 267, A.)*—*c. 96, p. 193, (p. 324, A.) τὸν παντοκράτορα θεὸν χρηστὸν καὶ οἰκτιρμονα ὁρῶμεν.*—*c. 108, p. 202, (p. 335, D.) τοῦ εὐσπλάγγχον καὶ πολυελέου πατρὸς τῶν ὄλων θεοῦ.* According to Athenagoras (*legat. pro Christ. c. 24, p. 302,*) [p. 27, B.] goodness is as essential to God as colour to bodies: according to Clement, (*Strom. 1, 17, 86, T. II. p. 60,*) as warmth to fire, and brightness to light.

gates the doctrine of the Church in the style of his age, crudely as it came into his hands. The cause of this passivity lies in the individual peculiarity, as well as the historical position of Justin. For himself, he found perfect satisfaction in the views of the Divine Being, which were commonly held in the Church: the opposition against the general polytheism, required only a simple negation of what was unworthy of God, and an unvarnished exposition of the belief of the Church; heathen philosophy had hitherto left Christian theology (in the most restricted sense of the word) essentially untouched. How should Justin feel himself called upon to be anxious about this scientific construction of this theology?¹ It was different with respect to the idea of God, in its Trinitarian mode of conception. The believing confidence with which the most ancient Christian communities revered Jesus as the Son of God,—the glowing devotion with which they sung hymns to him as the incarnate God,—were soon interrupted and agitated by the coarse mockery of the heathen, who regarded the worship of a crucified man as madness, as well as by the furious opposition of the Jews, who denounced the divine honours paid to the Nazarene, as an open idolatrous apostacy from the One God. At an early period, the unavoidable task was imposed on Christians to vindicate scientifically, if their faith was not to be looked as an arbitrary deification, and their worship as a common idolatrous service. Both imputations were alike intolerable. And thus their first noted apologist, Justin, attempted to furnish the necessary justification. As far as this attempt referred immediately to the objections of adversaries, we have already given an account of it; we shall proceed to explain its peculiar and full organism.

¹ How far Justin might feel himself called upon by the Gnostics to furnish a scientific vindication of the Christian doctrine respecting the Divine Being must remain undecided, since the writings of the apologists against the heretics have not been preserved.

CHAPTER II.

THE DOCTRINE OF THE LOGOS.

JESUS is the Christ, and as such, in an eminent (metaphysical) exclusive sense, Son of God: this position is the standing, we might say, the single theme of the apostolic preaching,—the Shibboleth of true biblical Christianity,—the central point of the Christian faith. The first member of this most important position involves no peculiar difficulty;—the second is the Sphinx, whose enigma, until this hour, has put to shame the understanding of the wisest. For the wants of the Christian communities, as such, it has ever been sufficient to admit into their consciousness the divine nature of the Redeemer, as a simple fact belonging to the Christian faith. But the more speculative members of the Church were from the first equally impelled, if not by a purely scientific, yet by an apologetic motive, to impart, if possible, a scientific clearness to that article of faith. This clearness, alas! remains the philosopher's stone, which can never be found. The attempts of the most ancient church-teachers to define scientifically the divinity of Jesus in itself, and especially in harmony with monotheism, have frequently been denominated crude: they are so, especially in their form; but, let the truth be spoken, later attempts have not succeeded much better! The ancient Church attached its demonstration to the idea of *the Divine Logos*. They found the first germ of this idea already existing in the canonical books of the Old Testament,—in a farther state of development in the Old Testament Apocrypha,—in a certain sense fully unfolded, yet mixed up with allegory, in the Jewish religious philosophers of the Alexandrian school,—in a Christian, sounder, purer substantiality, by the Apostles,—and chiefly in John, given historically. The fundamental character of the Old Testament idea

of God, is the principle of unity as limited by morality. Those persons are in the right who deny that this unity within the Old Testament sphere was already expanded into the Christian Trinity; but, on the other hand, it is wrong to extend this denial so far, as to make the Jehovah of the Old Testament a philosophical, solitary monad. Throughout the whole Old Testament history of the development of religion, there is undeniably the obscure intimation, more or less apparent, that the revelation and agency of God in the world has, in a considerable degree, mediated through a second divine subject reflecting in himself his Being and Life.¹ It may still be reckoned a formal limitation of the Old Testament point of view, if, in the Old Testament, *the Word* appears as the bearer of all God's revelation and agency in this world. But the numerous poetic personifications of this Divine Word, as they are presented in the older books of the Old Testament, contain unquestionably "a dogmatic germ,—they are, as it were, præformations of the later hypostasizing of the Divine Word."² The objectivity of the divine organ of revelation, (the conception of which among the Jews, in its most finished stage, is the *δύναμις θεός* of Philo,) becomes more marked in the representation, wavering as it were between a mere affirmation of qualities and a hypostatical existence, which, in the later books of the Old Testament, is given to the divine attribute of Wisdom, the Hebrew sum and substance of ethical perfection. Even Job (xxviii. 20, 23) speaks of the divine Wisdom, (although, in truth, he views it purely as a quality,) as far as he describes it, as a cosmical and ethical principle,—as a being existing out of (*ausser*) God. In a more elevated, though not with a more real,

¹ On this subject see an excellent exposition by Nitzsch, (on the essential Tri-unity of God, in the *Theol. Studien und Kritiken*, 1841, H. 2, 5, 310,) with which, nevertheless, we do not agree in all points.

² Lücke's words in his *Commentar. über das Evangelium der Johannes*. 3 Aufl. (Bonn, 1840,) I. 257.

personal, self-subsistence, Wisdom appears in the Proverbs of Solomon (viii. 1, and especially 22) Here, Wisdom not merely places herself in the way and at the doors, in order to invite men;—she not merely announces herself as the original source of all knowledge and virtue,—as the exclusive organ of divine Providence,—but she calls herself likewise the first creation, the beginning of the works of God; she declares that, from the beginning, before the origin of the mountains and hills, and was with God at the creation of the world as the chief architect, and stood before him as the daily object of his joy and delight. The divine Wisdom has, as we have said, in this delineation, not a strictly substantial reality, but poetic personification has here reached the highest degree of its elastic expansibility. Still the moveable fleeting outline of the anticipating Fancy, must be brought to the fixed defined form of a metaphysical concrete. Yet this metaphysical creation does not present itself on canonical ground. It belongs first to the Apocryphal development of the Old Testament spirit; and even here it is not fully exhibited. The Proverbs of the Palestinian Jesus Sirach, which were collected in the original about two hundred years before Christ, stand essentially on the same boundary-line as those of Solomon,—their wisdom bears the same impress of an ominous personification; it is, in truth, in some parts a slavish copy of that of Solomon.¹ According to the representation of the Son of Sirach, was created before time, in the beginning, by God, or rather proceeded from the mouth of the Most High, (Ecclesiasticus i. 1; xxiv.

¹ The "Wisdom" of the Son of Sirach is viewed as a consolidated hypostasized being by Keil, (*opusc. academ.* p. 506, sqq.) Rauch, (*über d. λόγος des Evangelisten Johannes*,) in Zimmerman's and Heydenreich's *Monats-schrift f. Predigerwissenschaften*, vi. 3, 207, 267, and, as it seems, by Strauss, (*die christ. Glaubenslehre*, I. 412.) But Dahne, (*geschichte. Darstellung der Jüdisch-alexand. relig.* II. 130,) and Lücke, (*Commentar.* I. 262,) have justly opposed this view. Gfrörer, (*Philo, u. die Alexand. Theosophie*, II. 52,) takes a middle course.

3,) and remained the constant associate of God; at the creation she veiled the earth as a mist;—her throne rests upon cloudy pillars;—she dwells in heaven, but, at the same time, is everywhere and rules all things;—she walks in the depth of the sea, she has propriety over the whole earth, among all nations; but her chosen and constant abode is in Israel;—she has poured forth the richest fulness over Jerusalem;—she serves in the holy tent before God;—the written Mosaic law is her complete revealed code, as it were the body in which she has obtained a national historical consistency. A peculiarity of this description of Wisdom is the distinctness with which the general enlightening and attractive energy of the divine *σοφία* is transferred with the most pregnant objectivity within the limits of the theocratic nation. The form of the divine Logos is dimly seen through this representation, who, according to the latter theology, gave evidence of his hypostatic existence by numerous appearances among the Jewish people. The Son of Sirach, with ominous timidity, approaches the long prepared step of giving a substantial objectivity to the divine organ of revelation; indeed, this step is first taken in the apocryphal Wisdom of Solomon. In this collection of proverbs, the divine wisdom bears the undeniable character of substantial distinctness. The unknown author of this collection not merely extols Wisdom with an exuberance of language, as a never failing treasure, (vii. 14; viii. 18,) the source of all knowledge both in physical (vii. 16; viii. 8,) and moral (ix. 3,) respects; as the original source of all virtues, (viii. 7; ix. 3, 18,) and skill in the arts, (vii. 16,) of all joy and all happiness, (viii. 10, 16); in short, as the incomparable assemblage of all true good, (viii. 7—11; viii. 3); he not merely elevates her to be the all-ruling occupant of the divine throne, (ix. 4, 10,) and allows her to have been present at the creation of the world as a witness, (ix. 9,) or rather as peculiarly and solely an active former of all things, (vii. 12, 22; viii. 5); calls her the reflection of the eternal light, the spotless

mirror of the divine operations, the transcript of the divine goodness, (vii. 26); but, touching more closely her peculiar nature, he distinctly describes her as a breath of the power of God, as a pure efflux of the glory of the Almighty, (vii. 25); as a spirit intelligent, holy, innate, multipartite, subtile, mobile, even more so than motion itself, penetrating, spotless, clear, resplendent as the sun, keen, unconfined, steadfast, happy, almighty, all-seing, all-renovating, penetrating all things, especially intelligent pure refined spirits by virtue of her purity, dwelling with most delight in holy souls, making them friends of God and holy prophets, (vii. 22; viii. 1.) Wisdom, in this representation has evidently ceased to be a mere attribute of God; objectively conceived, she has gained a distinct existence out of God; she appears as a refined etherial substance existing by emanation. Yet she is neither morally nor essentially really separate from God; she is the faithful and unchangeable expression and reflection of the divine fulness; she is, though penetrating all things, still with God. In her relation to the world, she is the connecting medium of the created with the uncreated; all well-being and life, all improvement and happiness which is imparted by God to the world, is mediated by her. The Book of Wisdom with peculiar distinctness, (x. 1, 15,) exhibits the individual operation of the divine *σοφία* among the Israelitish nation. She it is who protected and guided, redeemed and blessed the patriarchs Adam and Noah, Abraham and Lot, Jacob and Joseph; she it is who redeemed the people of Israel from bondage, and performed signs and wonders by Moses, before Pharaoh: she went before the people, in a wonderful manner, through the wilderness, as a cloud by day and a flame by night. She divided the waves of the Red Sea, and led the chosen people through it.

After this fixation of the idea of the divine intervening cause, one thing only is wanting, in order to give it essential completeness, which it was possible to attain on the Old Testament ground, namely, that instead of

a general, though highly spiritualized ethereal nature, a personal being should be presented. In the Book of Wisdom this is not done. The divine intermediate being of that work sometimes, indeed, approximates to the idea of a person, but then again vanishes under the representation of a spiritual all-pervading substance. Philo, (or, generally speaking, that mode of philosophising of which he stands forth as the chief representative and champion,) was the first who gave to the divine organ of revelation the distinct character of a hypostasis. His Logology is the immediate prelude of the idea of the Christian Logos. In his representation he moulded together the essential elements, which had been obtained by the preceding unfolding of the Old Testament spirit, towards forming the idea of a self-conscious organ of mediation between God and the world, and succeeded in giving, or at least strove to give, a philosophical basis to this idea by the application of Platonism. He set out from the Platonic dualistic principle of an absolute, unchangeable, simple God, destitute of attributes, to whom nothing belongs but existence, (hence frequently called $\delta \delta\upsilon\tau\omega\varsigma \delta\upsilon\tau\omega\varsigma$, $\tau\acute{o} \pi\rho\acute{o}\varsigma \alpha\lambda\eta\theta\epsilon\iota\alpha\upsilon \delta\upsilon\tau\omega\varsigma$), and an equally eternal Matter, which, with ambiguous phraseology, he sometimes describes as the pure negation of true being, as the mere antithesis, unendowed with qualities of actually formed substances,—sometimes, and with preference, as the chaotic, irregular, lawless mingling of the four elements. Both God and matter he regarded as in direct (and yet again allayed) opposition. God is as the pure active principle, originator and governor of all existing things;¹ the world, as it actually appears, as phænomenal, is not in its material substratum, but yet in its formal impress, a work of God ; for adaptation and intelligence

¹ *Leg. alleg.* 1, 2, T. I. p. 61, $\delta\sigma\pi\alpha\varsigma \tau\acute{o}\nu \tau\acute{o} \kappa\alpha\iota\iota\upsilon\upsilon \pi\upsilon\rho\acute{o}\varsigma \kappa\alpha\iota \chi\acute{\iota}\nu\omicron\varsigma \tau\acute{o} \psi\acute{\upsilon}\chi\eta\iota\upsilon$, $\epsilon\upsilon\tau\omega \kappa\alpha\iota \theta\iota\omicron\upsilon \tau\acute{o} \pi\omicron\iota\omicron\iota\upsilon$.—3, 3, p. 128. $\iota\iota\acute{o}\iota\varsigma \delta\iota\omicron\iota\omicron\varsigma \kappa\iota\tau\iota\upsilon \tau\acute{o}\nu \delta\epsilon\omega\tau\eta\varsigma$.—*de cherub.* c. 26, p. 219, $\phi\acute{\upsilon}\sigma\eta \delta\epsilon\mu\epsilon\tau\eta\tau\eta\iota \tau\acute{o} \tau\omega\iota \epsilon\lambda\lambda\alpha\iota \kappa\iota\tau\iota\upsilon$, c. 35, p. 288.

have not their basis in matter itself. The formation and conservation of the world is the act of God operating with matter. But how can this operation take place? How could God become the author of the present form of the world? How can he uphold and govern the world? Not by himself, for it contradicts the divine simplicity and majesty to come into immediate connection with any sensible and material object; by his own powers God arranges and upholds the world.¹ As he resolved on the formation of the world from the impulse of his goodness, he projected, somewhat in the same way as a human artist proceeds before he constructs a work of art, a pattern or archetype of the things which were to be created. This archetype (*ἀρχέτυπον παράδειγμα*, *ἀρχέτυπος ἰδέα*, or simply *ἀρχέτυπον*, *παράδειγμα*) contains in infinite variety and gradations, the types (in Platonic language *ἰδέαι*) of all individual objects which are to have form and existence, and this assemblage of types, patterns, or ideas, constitutes the typical or ideal world (*κόσμος νοητός*, *ὁ ἐκ τῶν ἰδεῶν συνεστῶς κόσμος*), of which the sensible world is only a copy.² The ideal world originally presented itself as the simple and most ancient product of the divine mind, and therefore involved in its very essence,³ being in its nature like God, incorporeal, spiritual, invisible, incapable of being known or defined,⁴ when it proceeded from

¹ *De victim. offer.* c. 13, T. IV. p. 355. *ἡ ἐκείνης (ἀμερξίας) πάντ' ἰγίνηται ὁ θιός οὐκ ἰφαστόμινος αὐτός οὐ γὰρ ἦν θίμις ατρίων καὶ σιφερμίνης υλῆς ψαυειν τὸν ἰδμονα καὶ μακαριον ἀλλὰ ταις ασωματοις δυναμειν, ὡν ἰτυμον ἰομα καὶ ἰδέαι, κατιχηρησασο πρὸς τὸ γινει ἱκαστον την αμερξίαν λαβειν μερξην.*—Euseb. *præp. evang.* 7, 13, p. 323, A.

² *De mund. opif.* c. 4, sqq. T. I. p. 7, sqq. c. 10, p. 12.—*leg. alleg.* 1, 9, p. 65.—*de confus. ling.* c. 34, T. II. p. 285.—*vit. Mos.* 3, 13, T. IV. p. 211.

³ *De mund. opif.* c. 6, p. 9.—*de profug.* c. 14, T. III. p. 125.

⁴ *De vit. Mos.* 1, 28, T. IV. p. 147, *ἡ ἀειδής καὶ ἀόρατος καὶ ἀσώματος τῶν ὄντων παραδειγματικὴ εὐσία*—*de monarch.* 1, 6, p. 242, sq.—*de sacrif. Abel et Cain.* c. 15, T. 1. p. 244. *ἀπείρητος*.

God in all the multiplicity of its images. In this, their outward objectivity (which, according to their origin, may be conceived of as an expansion of the divine existence,¹ or as a beaming forth of the divine effulgence,² or as an overflowing of the fountain of the divine life,³)—the divine ideas or powers became the creative or conservative energies of the world—inasmuch as they reduce the unarranged formless matter to its definite forms; they stand marshalled like satellites round the heavenly king, and follow in his train, to execute what was below his dignity;⁴ or as deputies, as eyes and ears of the Supreme, they see and hear all things, and as messengers they descend from heaven and return thither, to protect and to rescue created things,—to communicate to his children the commands of their Father, and to their Father the wants of his children:⁵ as an all-comprehending band they are spread through heaven and earth, through air and water.⁶

According to their nature as originally forms of thought, and afterwards emanating self-subsistent energies, and according to the analogy of the human λόγος ἐνδιάθετος, the unexpressed (internally arranged) thought, and the λόγος προφορικός, the spoken and as it were substantialized word, they are called in the double

¹ *Quod deti pol. insid.* c. 24, T. I. p. 292, τίμινται σὺδὲν τοῦ θείου κατ' ἀπάρετην ἀλλὰ μόνον ἐκτείνονται.—*de mut. nomin.* c. 4, T. III. p. 163.

² *De profug.* c. 24, T. III. p. 138, ὁ θεὸς . . . λαμπροτάτῃ φωτί, ἑαυτῷ, τὰ ὅλα ἀναλάζει.—*de somn.* 1, 13, p. 230.—1, 18, p. 238. τὸ ἴσον φέγγος ὁ θεὸς ἀντιβεβαλῆ.—*de proem. et pœn.* c. 6, T. V. p. 226.

³ *De profug.* c. 36, T. III. p. 152.—*de somn.* 2, 37, p. 312, sq.

⁴ *De sacrif. Abel.* c. 15, T. I. p. 244.—*de confus. ling.* c. 34, T. II. p. 285.—*de migrat. Abrah.* c. 31, p. 330.—*de Abrah.* c. 24, T. IV. p. 29.—*de monarch.* 1, 6, p. 292.—*fragm. in Exod.* 24, 13, T. VI. p. 245.

⁵ *De somn.* 1, 22, T. III. p. 244.

⁶ *De confus. ling.* c. 27, T. II. p. 277.—*de migrat. Abrah.* c. 32, p. 332.

sense of the Greek λόγος (*Reason and Word*) pre-eminently *Logi*.¹ Notwithstanding their infinite multiplicity, they have their unity² both as it concerns their immanence in God, and their spreading through the world in the collective idea of the divine Logos, who on that account is called the all-productive Logos, (ὁ γενικώτατος λογος)³ the idea of ideas (ἰδέα τῶν ιδέων);⁴ the place (ὁ τόπος);⁵ the mother-city (ἡ μητρόπολις);⁶ the father;⁷ the charioteer (ὁ ἡνίοχος);⁸ and leader (ὁ ἡγεμὼν, ὑφηγητής)⁹ of the powers or Logi.

As Philo concentrated in the idea of the Logos, the complex assemblage, the *pleroma*, as it were, of the divine spiritual world,¹⁰ (*Pleroma der göttlichen Geisterwelt*) he naturally transferred to it in an eminent sense,

¹ *Leg. allegor.* 2, 7, T. i. p. 98.—*de vit. Mos.* 3, 13, T. iv. p. 211.—*de Judic.* c. 3, T. v. p. 128. The twofold meaning of the Greek word λογος, by virtue of which it is available for designating the immanence, as well as the personal subsistence of the divine instrumental cause, comprehending indeed both conceptions in one utterance, was the circumstance, next to the Old Testament style of speaking, by which Philo felt himself induced to depart from the phraseology of his immediate predecessors, Solomon, Jesus the Son of Sirach, and the Pseudo-Solomon, and to call the divine instrumental cause in the formation of the world, not by the name commonly employed by them—Wisdom—but by that of the Logos. He sometimes uses the term σοφία, and occasionally substitutes it for λογος, but only when speaking loosely. Wisdom, according to Philo, is properly one of the powers of the Logos, namely, the intellectual capability residing in the latter, to sketch the plan of the world. See Grossmann *quæst. Philon.* ii. p. 67, and Dahne, *geschichte. Darstellung*, I. 210, 220, II. 162.

² *De mund. opif.* c. 9, T. i. p. 12, τὴν αὐτὴν ἐν αὐτῷ κόσμῳ μένουσιν, μοναδικῇ ἰχνοῦσι φέρειν.—*quod deus immut.* c. 18, T. ii. p. 83.

³ *Leg. allegor.* 3, 61, T. i. p. 174.

⁴ *De mund. opif.* c. 6, T. i. p. 9.—*de migrat. Abrah.* c. 18, T. ii. p. 315.

⁵ *De mund. opif.* c. 6, T. i. p. 8.—*de somn.* 1, 11, T. iii. p. 227.

⁶ *De profug.* c. 18, T. iii. p. 130.

⁷ *De somn.* 2, 28, T. iii. p. 302.

⁸ *De profug.* c. 19, T. iii. p. 131.

⁹ *De somn.* 1, 41, T. iii. p. 265.

¹⁰ *De confus. ling.* c. 20, T. ii. p. 269, c. 28, p. 279—*Quis*

all the properties and functions which he had attributed to the Logi, either separately or collectively considered. Thus he represents the Logos as the likeness (ἡ εἰκών); the glory (ἡ δόξα); or (according to the emanative system) the shadow (ἡ σκιά) of God; the first born or eldest son of the Eternal; not indeed God in the highest sense of the term, but a God (not ὁ Θεός but simply Θεός); the nature which stands on the confines between God and man, less than God, more exalted than man; not unbegotten like the former, and yet not begotten like the latter. Every revelation of the invisible, unsearchable God in the world, every active relation of the absolutely incomprehensible to the creature, is through the instrumentality of the Logos. He is the interpreter and the revealed name,⁸ the instrument (ὄργανον, ἐργαλεῖον)⁹ and the servant

rer. divin. hæc. c. 48, T. iii. p. 50.—*de profug.* c. 19, p. 131.—*de somn.* 1, 41, p. 264.—*de monarch.* 2, 5, T. iv. p. 205.

¹ *De somn.* 1, 40, T. iii. p. 263.—*de monarch.* 1, 6, T. iv. p. 292.—*fragm. in Exod.* 24, 13, T. vi. p. 244, sq.

² *Leg. alleg.* 3, 31, T. i. p. 152.

³ *De agricult.* c. 12, T. ii. p. 116, ὁ πρωτόγονος υἱός.—*de conf. ling.* c. 28, p. 279, ὁ πρωτόγονος αὐτοῦ λόγος.

⁴ *De confus. ling.* c. 14, p. 262, πρῆσβυτάτος υἱὸν ὁ τῶν ὄντων ἀνιτῆλι πατὴρ, ὃν ἐτίρωθι πρωτόγονον ἀνόματι—*quod Deus immut.* c. 6, p. 73.

⁵ *De Somn.* 1, 39, T. iii. p. 262, sq. ὁ μὲν ἀληθεία Θεὸς εἰς ἑσ-
τιν' οἱ δ' ἐν καταχρήσει λεγόμενοι πλείους Διο καὶ ὁ ἱερὸς λόγος
(Gen. xxxi 13,) ἐν τῷ παρόντι τὸν μὲν ἀληθεία διὰ τοῦ ἄρθρου μιμή-
νυκτι, ἐπ' αὐτῷ ἰσχύει ὁ Θεός· τὸν δ' ἐν καταχρήσει χωρὶς ἄρθρου, φέ-
ρων ὁ ἐφ' ὧς εἰς ἐν τόπων, οὐ τῷ Θεῷ, ἀλλ' αὐτὸ μόνον, Θεῷ. Κα-
λεῖ δὲ Θεὸν τὸν πρῆσβυτάτον αὐτοῦ υἱὸν λόγον.

⁶ Euseb. *præp. evang.* 7, 13, p. 323, A. τὸν διούτερον Θεόν εἰς
ἑστὶν ἰκέμεν λόγος.—*Phil. leg. alleg.* 2, 21, T. i. p. 113. See other
passages in Grossmann's *Quæst. Philon.* ii. p. 46.

⁷ *Quis rer. div. hæc.* c. 42, T. iii. p. 46, οὗτοι ἀγίνητος ὡς ὁ
Θεός ἂν οὐτε γινητός ὡς ἡμεῖς, ἀλλὰ μίσις τῶν ἄκρων, ἀμφοτέρως
ὁμηρώων.—*de somn.* 2, 28, p. 303, μιθιέρως τις Θεοῦ φύσις, τοῦ μὲν
ἐλάττω. ἀνδρώπυ δὲ πρῶστων.

⁸ *Leg. alleg.* 3, 73, T. i. p. 184.—*de confus. ling.* c. 28, T.
ii. p. 279.

⁹ *Leg. alleg.* 3, 31, T. i. p. 152.—*de cherub.* c. 35, p. 228.
de migrat. Abrah. c. 1, T. ii. p. 293.

(ὕπερ ἑστῆς)¹ of the Most High. By him God made the world. He is the divider (ὁ τομεύς) who separates the unarranged original matter, and places it in order for the divine formations:² he is the archetypal seal (ἡ ἀρχέτυπος σφραγίς) which impresses the crude material, and imparts quality to that which is destitute of it, and form to the formless.³ The consecration and vivification of the world, are equally dependent on his agency. The Logos is the rudder by which God steers the great vessel of the world; the foundation on which the universe rests firm and secure; the indissoluble bond which embraces and holds together all parts of the creation; the eternal law, the soul of the world, which penetrates, vivifies and sanctifies all material and physical existence.⁴ His agency spreads its ramifications through the human world. As a holy, spotless, perfect High Priest (ἀρχιερεύς), he fills the office of Mediator between God and men.⁵ As suppliant (ἱκέτης) and advocate (παράκλητος), he intercedes for the sinful, weak race of man before God, and procures the forgiveness of sin. As ambassador (πρεσβευτής) of the heavenly King, he descends hither, to help and to redeem, and imparts eternal gifts of grace.⁶ He is the depository and originator of all

¹ *Quod deus immut.* c. 12, T. ii. p. 78.—*de mutat. nomin.* c. 13, T. iii. p. 174.

² *Quis rer. divin. hær.* c. 26, sqq. T. iii. p. 30, sqq. c. 48, p. 51.

³ *de mund. opif.* c. 6, T. i. p. 9.—*de profug.* c. 2, T. iii. p. 112.—*de monarch.* 1, 6, T. iv. p. 293.

⁴ *De cherub.* c. 11, T. i. p. 207.—*de plantat.* No. c. 2, T. ii. p. 146.—*de migrat. Abrah.* c. 1, p. 293.—*quis rer. divin. hær.* c. 38, T. iii. p. 42, c. 44, p. 48.—*de profug.* c. 20, p. 133.—*de somn.* 2, 1, p. 269.

⁵ *De Profug.* c. 21, T. iii. p. 134.—*De Somn.* 2, 27, p. 301.

⁶ *Quis rer. divin. hær.* c. 42, T. iii. p. 45. τῷ δ' ἀρχαγγέλῳ καὶ πρεσβυτάτῳ λόγῳ δωρεὰν ἐξαίρετον ἔδωκεν ὁ πᾶσι θεοῦ πατὴρ ἵνα μετόπισθε εἰς τὸ γινόμενον διακρίνῃ τοῦ πεισισμένου. Ὁ δ' αὐτοὺς ἰκίτης μὴν εἰς τὴν θνητὴν κηραίνοντες αἰὲν πρὸς τὸ ἀφθαρτον, πρεσβυτῆς δὲ τοῦ ἁγίου πρὸς τὸ ὑπῆκουον.—*De Somn.* 1, 23, p. 245, sq.—*De vit. Mos.* 3, 14, T. iv. p. 212, sq. ἀναγκάσει

wisdom, the source and guardian of all virtue;¹ as spiritual manna, he is the food of susceptible souls.² As the representative of the Most High, he often appeared to the chosen Israelitish people; as the Prince of Angels, as Archangel (ἀρχάγγελος), he destroyed Sodom and Gomorrah; he appeared to Jacob (Gen. xxviii. 11; xxxii. 28); he spake to Moses out of the burning bush; he went before Israel in the cloudy pillar, and led them through the wilderness.³

It is evident, from these statements, that Philo could no longer regard the Logos under the earlier notion of a personification, or in the indistinct, intangible form of an etherial substance universally diffused, but as endowed with a personal existence and life, as a real subject distinguished from God. For when he calls the Logos, the Image, the oldest and first born Son of God, when he draws a parallel between him and the Jewish high-priest, and with an archangel, the application of these epithets, especially the peculiar manner in which they are not unfrequently employed, makes it almost an impossibility to rest satisfied with the mere supposition of a poetical personifying chrySTALLISATION (if we may so express it) of the divine attributes and agency. But this supposition becomes absolutely impossible, by the place which the Logos assumes as a cosmical principle. For when Philo inserts the Logos, as a middle power between God and man, in order that the formation of the world, and the consequent office of providential

ἦν τὸν ἱερωμῖον τῷ τοῦ κόσμου πατρὶ παρακλήτῳ χρῆσθαι τιλαε-
τάτῳ τὴν ἀρετὴν υἱῷ, πρὸς τι ἀμνηστίας ἀμνηστημάτων καὶ χειρηγίας
ἀφθονοτάτων ἀγαθῶν

¹ *De Posterit. Cain.* c. 37, T. ii. p. 34. ποτίζει ἀρετάς, ἀρχὴ καὶ πηγὴ καλῶν πράξεων.—*Quod Deus Immut.* c. 28, p. 93.—*De Profug.* c. 18, T. iii. p. 130; πηγὴ σοφίας.—c. 25, p. 138; ἀφ' οὗ πᾶσαι παιδείαι καὶ σοφαὶ μύθοι δίδνται.

² *I.eg. Alleg.* 3, 59, sqq. T. i. p. 172, sqq.—*De Profug.* c. 25, T. iii. p. 138, sq.

³ *Quis rer. divin. hær.* c. 42, T. iii. p. 45.—*De Somn.* 1, 40, sq. p. 263, sqq.—*De Abrah.* c. 22, sqq. T. iv. p. 26, sqq.—*Vit. Mos.* 1, 12, p. 128, 1, 29, p. 149.

conservation may not be referred immediately to the Supreme God, (since he considers that as irreconcilable with his absolute and happy perfection) when, in accordance with this assumption, he often contrasts the Logos with the Most High God, sometimes as such, sometimes under the peculiar title of the second power;—when, with anxious endeavour, he repeats the assumption that this or the other providential act (for example, the appearance of a divine person) proceeded from the Most High God, and meets it with the suggestion, that in all these cases the divine Logos was the peculiar and exclusive agent;¹ this distinction evidently can only mean that Philo recognised in the Logos an individuality hypostatically separate from the being of God. Philo must have involved himself in the grossest contradiction if, after he had placed God and the world in exclusive opposition, he had then essentially identified the Logos, the appointed Mediator between both, with the substance of God. Philo, indeed, does not constantly keep in view the strict personality of his Logos; sometimes he apparently merges his personal subsistence in mere qualities, but this is only where he carelessly gives the reins to his fancy, and does not properly distinguish between the λόγος ἰδιόθετος and the λόγος προφορικός. Where he understands himself, he unquestionably represents the Logos as a person.²

The doctrine of the Logos, such as we have described it, especially in the form it was held by Philo, served as a starting-point and direction to the specu-

¹ See the passages relating to this point in Dahne, *Geschichte Darstellung*, i. 240.

² In this result the numerous representations of Philo's doctrine of the Logos which have appeared in modern times, almost all agree. Compare Keil, *Opus. acad.* p. 512, sqq. Ballenstedt's *Philo und Johannes*, (Braunsch. 1802) 23, 32. Grossman's *quest. Philon.* ii. 45, 68. Gfrörer's *Philo und die Alexand. Theosophie*, i. 243, 282. Ritter's *Geschichte der Philosophie*, iv. 446, 450. Dahne's *geschicht. Darstellung*. i. 238. Lücke's *Kommentar. über d. Evang. des Johannes*, i. 279, and Strauss' *die Christ. Glaubenslehre*, i. 415.

lative enquiries of the most ancient fathers relative to the person of Christ. We except, however, the so called apostolic fathers. Every such application of the idea of the Logos was foreign to their minds. Their purely apostolic, practical turn of mind made them satisfied with being faithful organs and guardians of the piety of the Christian Church, without troubling themselves about the speculative elaboration of doctrinal propositions. They were distinguished by a childlike and unwavering faith, glowing with love; of intellectual training they knew and exhibited little. They simply expressed their conviction of the divine nature and dignity of Jesus, and were very far from seeking or giving a reason for it by means of human science. The divinity of the Redeemer, in a pregnant sense of the word, was to them a matter of faith of immediate certainty. Clement of Rome calls Jesus simply the author of our salvation, the High Priest of our sacrifice, the advocate of our weakness, he gives him briefly, although emphatically, the title *ὁ κύριος*, describes him as the image and sceptre of the divine effulgence, and places him as high above the angels as the name of Son exceeds in dignity that of angel (messenger).¹ Barnabas goes somewhat farther. He speaks of Jesus as the Son of God, (a title which he uses with an evident regard to its metaphysical meaning),² the upholder and end of all things;³ the Creator, Governor, and sole Judge of the world; the intelligent subject to whom God said before the beginning of the world "Let us make man," Gen. i. 26.⁴ He sees in

¹ *Epist. ad Corinth. prin. c. 36, T. i. p. 167.* *ὁς ὡς ἀπαύγασμα τῆς μεγαλωσύνης αὐτοῦ τοσούτῳ μιᾶν ἰστὶν ἀγγέλων, ὅση διαφωρότερον ὄνομα κακληρονόμηται.*—(Compare Ps. ii. 7, with civ. 4,) c. 16, p. 154.

² *Epist. c. 12, T. i. p. 41.*

³ *Epist. c. 12, p. 40, ἔχεις καὶ ἐν τούτῳ τὴν δόξαν τοῦ Ἰησοῦ, ὅτι ἐν αὐτῷ πάντα καὶ υἱὸς αὐτόν.*

⁴ *Epist. c. 5, p. 60.* *Orbis terrarum dominus, cui dixit die (Deus) ante constitutionem sæculi; faciamus hominem.*—c. 7, p. 20. From the latter passage Francke (*die Lehren der Apos-*

him the principle and object of Old Testament prophecy,¹ and, in the spirit of the Old Testament mode of contemplation, invests him with such splendour that he avers that mortal eyes cannot behold him without danger. "Had he not come in the flesh (he says)² how could we men have beheld him and lived? since, if men attempt to gaze at the sun, which is only the work of his hands, and will one day cease to exist, they are not able to meet its rays directly." Nearly in the same manner Hermas expresses himself on the divinity of Jesus. He generally calls him the Son of God, and marks this name as great and incomprehensible; he speaks of him as more ancient than all creatures, and testifies that he was with the Father as a counsellor at the creation of the world; he considers him as the continual basis of all existence.³ Of all the apostolic fathers Ignatius presents the divinity of Christ in the strongest and most glowing terms; not that his representation of it is doctrinally more elaborate and finished than that of the other apostolic fathers; it bears rather the same stamp of an indefinite crudeness;⁴ but his whole discourse of the Redeemer is highly impassioned; the conviction that the crucified Jesus was the incarnate God, is the one immovea-

tolischen Väter: Zeitschrift f. d. gesamte lutherische Theologie u. Kirche herausg. von Rudelbach u. Guericke, i. 2, 80,) with over-subtle acuteness, extracts the Lutheran doctrine of the *communicatio idiomatum*.

¹ *Epist. c. 5, p. 61.*

² *Epist. c. 5, p. 16.*

³ *Past. 3, 9, 12, T. i, p. 115: filius dei omni creatura antiquior est, ita ut in consilio patri suo adfuerit ad condendam creaturam.—3, 9, 14, p. 116, nomen filii dei magnum et immensum est et totus ab eo sustentatur orbis.* Lange vainly endeavours to explain away from the first passage the doctrine, unacceptable to himself, of the hypostatic pre-existence of the Son.

⁴ We here refer only to the shorter recension of the Ignatian Epistles; the longer, which has no claim to genuineness, speaks of Christ in very precise and creed-like expressions, and even introduces the Trinity in its representations, sometimes with a truly pedantic formality in the spirit of later schemes of that doctrine. See Rothe's *Die Anfänge der christl. Kirche*, i. 744.

able anchor of his faith, the living fountain of his highest hopes and joys. He calls the Redeemer simply, but very often and with a strong emphasis—God —;¹ he sees in him the Son of God who was with the Father *πρὸ αἰώνων*, as his eternal Logos, and proceeded from him according to the will and power of the eternally active God.²

The Apostolic fathers, notwithstanding their overflowing love to the Redeemer, and their decided conviction of the divine nature and life of the Lord, agreeably to the apostolicity of their disposition and office, contented themselves with aphoristic, simple, and undeveloped assertions of this their conviction; while, on the contrary, in the Apologists who immediately succeeded them, the question of the Divinity of Jesus is treated with an undeniably doctrinal spirit and interest, and in all of them the Old Testament doctrine of the Logos, as interpreted by Philo, as undeniably forms the scientific frame-work of the Christian dogma. Not that the fathers had approved and adopted the essential principles of Philo's system; this they could not do without denying their Christian principles; not that they had mixed the Gnosis of Philo with the substance of their biblical belief; they had only poured the contents of the Scriptures into a Philonian vessel; they viewed the Biblical passages through a Philonian medium. The matter of their idea of the Logos is essentially Scriptural; but its construction betrays a Philonian ground-plan. Thus it is with Justin. On him as on other fathers alluded to, the twofold office devolved, owing to the opposition both from Gentiles and Jews—to prove the possibility

¹ *Epist. ad Ephes.* c. 7, T. ii. p. 13.—c. 18, sq. p. 16.—*ad Roman.* c. 3, p. 27.—*ad Smyrn.* c. 1, p. 34.

² *Epist. ad Magnes.* c. 6, p. 18. 'Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ ὃς πρὸ αἰώνων παρὰ πατρί ἦν καὶ ἐν τέλει ἰσότης —c. 8, p. 19. οὗτος θεὸς ἰσὺς ἐστὶν ὁ φανερώσας ἑαυτὸν διὰ 'Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ τοῦ υἱοῦ αὐτοῦ, ὃς ἐστιν αὐτοῦ λόγος αἰδώς, ἐκ ἀπὸς σιγῆς προειλθών.—*ad Smyrn.* c. 1, p. 34, δοξάζω 'Ἰησοῦν Χριστὸν τὸν θεόν . . . υἱὸν θεοῦ κατὰ δόγμα καὶ δύναμιν θεοῦ.

and reality of the existence of a second divine [person] (*eines zweiten Göttlichen*) with the original Divine [person] (*neben dem Urgöttlichen*) and then the consistency of this duality of the divine Being, with the Christian principle of the unity of the Divine. Both offices were discharged by Justin and the other fathers, by connecting their views with the doctrine of the Logos as historically formed among the Jewish people, and applied by John to the person of Jesus.

In the first place, to make the possibility and truth of the personal divinity of Jesus conceivable, Justin adopted the philosophical division of the Logos into immanent and transitive. He considers the divine (*das Göttliche*) in Jesus as originally a pure property, and subsequently a hypostasised power of Reason (*Vernunftkraft*) of God; accordingly he ascribes eternity to the Logos as a property, but not as a person, (*eigenschaftliche, aber keine persönliche Ewigkeit*.) As long as the Logos rested in God, it was essentially identically with his substance, or rather stood in the relation of a part to the whole: by coming forth from the divine essence, it first attained a personal self-subsistence. Justin entertained the opinion which is so briefly expressed by Tertullian:¹ *fuit tempus cum filius non fuit*, and supposed that the creation of the world was the epoch, when the Logos came forth from God. Both the immanence of the Logos as a property, and its coming forth as a hypostasis, as well as the eternal ante-mundane existence of the Logos, are clearly expressed in the two following passages:²

¹ *Adv. Hermag.* c. 3, T. ii. p. 61.

² *Apol.* 2, 6, p. 92, (p. 44, D.) 'Ο δὲ υἱὸς ἐκεί·ν· οὐ μόνος λεγόμενος πατρὶος υἱός, ὁ λόγος πρὸ τῶν ποιημάτων καὶ συνῶν καὶ γενώμα-
τος· ὅτι τὴν ἀρχὴν δι' αὐτοῦ πάντα ἐκτίσας καὶ ἐκόντησι, Χριστὸς . . .
. . . λίγισται—*Dial.* c. Tr. c. 62, p. 159, (p. 285, D.) τὸ
τῷ ὄντι ἐπὶ τοῦ πατρὸς προβληθὲν γέννημα πρὸ πάντων τῶν ποιημάτων
συνῶν τῷ πατρὶ καὶ τῷ τῷ ὁ πατὴρ προσομιλῶν, (Gen. i. 26; iii. 22.)
In these two passages the words and ideas *συνῶν* and *γενῶμα* form a contrast, though verbally rather concealed, yet not to be mistaken. On this contrast rests the truth of

"The Son of God, who alone in a proper sense is called Son, the Logos who was with him and begotten before his works, since by him in the beginning he created and arranged all things, is called Christ;" and,

the representation given in the text. The *συνίηαι* is by the clause *πρὸ πάντων τῶν ποιημάτων* placed beyond all time; the *γενῆσθαι*, on the contrary, although it has a share in this clause, is, by the additional indication of time, *ἵνα τὴν ἀρχὴν αὐτῷ πρὸς τὴν ἐκτίσιν*, placed so nearly contemporary with the creation of the world, that it approaches time itself. *Γενῆσθαι* is the regular analogical speculative modus, under which Justin represents the becoming of the individuality or personality of the divine Logos, (see *Dial. c. Tr. c. 129*, p. 222, [p. 359, A. B.] *γεννηθῆναι ὑπὸ τοῦ πατρὸς οὗτο εὐὶ γέννημα πρὸ πάντων ἀπλῶς τῶν πτισμάτων ὁ λόγος* (Prov. viii. 25) *ἰδέλναι, καὶ εὐὶ γεννώμενον εὐὶ γεννῶντος ἀριθμῶ ἔχον ἵνα, πᾶς ὁσίων ἡμολογήσῃ.*—"This progeny was begotten by the Father (the Scripture declares), before all created beings (Prov. viii. 25), and every one will allow that what is begotten is numerically different from him who begets." The *συνίηαι* is therefore, by virtue of the contrast, to be regarded as unpersonal, and applied only to a property. In general, those who, from a false doctrinal motive, were anxious to prove Justin orthodox, in the sense of the Nicene *ἡμετέρας*, have made use of the first of these two passages, in order to extract from it the eternal personality of the Son; but this meaning can be obtained only by the most forced misconstruction of the passage. The artifices, which have been applied on different sides, in order to cloak the conscious arbitrariness of the interpretation with an appearance of right, fall in pieces at the first touch. Koch, (*Justin. Mart. c. Tryph. Jud. Dialogus*, p. 172, sq. 216, sq.) and after him Mühler, (*Patrologie*, I. 238,) would understand *γεννώμενος*, of the eternal generation of the Logos, inasmuch as the generation of the Logos is said to be "before the world," which is only another expression for the idea of eternity. "Justin puts the generation back beyond the beginning of the creation, therefore beyond the beginning of time; thus it naturally falls into eternity." In this artificial explanation, it is overlooked that the words *συνίηαι* and *γεννώμενος*, form the contrast already mentioned,—that the ideas of "before the world," and eternity, by no means perfectly coincide, but not unfrequently are circumstanced to one another as relative and absolute,—and that the free choice of the particle of time *ἵνα*, which makes the creation of the world and the generation of the Logos, appear as almost instantaneous acts, on account of this very freedom, excludes the fixed, absolute eternity of that generation. Nor does it particularly recommend the proposed interpretation,

"but the offspring really produced by the Father was with the Father before all his works, and with him the Father conversed." Genesis i. 26; iii. 22. Since the Logos was the first substance which pro-

that it makes it unnecessary to consider the words *γενόμενος*, as a Hysteron Proteron. Still more naïve is the method in which Möhler attempts (in his work, *Athanasius der Grosse und die Kirche seiner Zeit*. Mainz. 1827. I. 39,) to give a Nicene meaning to the passage in the Apology. He distinguishes between internal belief and the actual representation, and accordingly suggests that Justin, in that passage, allowed to the Logos merely a generation before the creation of the world; but, nevertheless, maintains that he really believed in an eternal personality of the Logos. That ante-mundane generation is placed merely to the account of the incomplete, self-contradictory representation, which does not express the real sentiments of the author. The Apologist wished to treat the eternal generation of the Logos, though he has not really taught it according to the letter. An admirable expedient, certainly, for finding everything in a writer which we want to find; but it will not be thought honourable by every body to interpolate after this fashion. More plausible, but not in essential points more successful, were the attempts which Nifanius (*Justinus Philos. Christ. et Mart. exhibitus veritatis. Evangel. Vestis et Confessor*. Tref. 1688, p. 116,) and Bull (*Defens. Fidei Nicænen. 3, 2, 1. Opp. ed. Grabe, p. 187,*) made to bring the language of the Apology into harmony with the Nicene theology. They separate the parenthesis *ὅτι τὸν ἀρχὴν . . . ἐκείνου* syntactically from *γενόμενος*, and place it in connection as a causal clause (translating *ὅτι* by *quoniam*), with the principal subject *Χριστός . . . ἀγίταται*. This mode of rendering, not to notice that it still requires the Hysteron Proteron before mentioned—is impossible, because *ὅτι* is not a causal, but temporal particle; and that if the words *ὅτι τὸν ἀρχὴν . . . ἐκείνου* are to be taken as the reason why Christ is called the Son of God, they will form an inadmissible tautology, with the following parenthesis, *καθὼς τὸ . . . ποιεῖται τὸ πρῶτον* *ὅτι αὐτὸν τὸν θέν, which really contains the alleged reason. Equally unjustifiable is the distinction by which Prudent. Maranus (Opera Just. p. 92, not. h. p. 158, not. b. p. 159, not. a. d. p. 218, not. d. p. 222, not. a. b.)—which, with some slight modification, is adopted by Vogelsang, (fides Nicæna de filio dei sanct. patrum atque doctorum, qui tribus primis sæculis continua successione in ecclesia floruerunt, traditione confirmata. Colon. 1829, p. 38, sqq. 43, 45, sq. 108,)—attempts to remove the unacceptable limitation of the eternity of the Logos, from the passage in the Apology. He distinguishes between an eternal real, and an ante-mundane temporal metaphorical*

ceeded from God, Justin not unfrequently calls it the first-begotten of God,¹ or the first-born of all creatures.² The act of coming forth, he designates, in reference to the Father, by the term *προβάλλειν*,³ most frequently by *γεννᾶν*;⁴ and, in reference to the Logos, by *προβάλλεσθαι*, *γεννᾶσθαι*, and also by *προερχεσθαι*;⁵ the Logos himself considered as thus

generation of the Logos. The former, the eternal impersonation of the Logos in God, or rather the effect of it, the eternal personal existence in and with God, he supposes is indicated in the expression *συνόν*, and the latter, the simple, actual coming forth of the eternal personality of the Logos from God, for the purpose of creating the world, he finds in the words *γεννώμενος*, *ὅτε ἦν ἀρχὴν ἰκίμενος*. This distinction between an eternal and an ante-mundane temporal, a real and a figurative generation, is purely imaginary. Justin knows only *one* generation of the Logos, which he considers as having taken place immediately before the creation of the world; by this generation, he understands, as we have already seen, and shall see again in the sequel, exclusively the personal individualisation of the Logos, hitherto conceived of as a property in God; of a generation merely titular he makes no mention. Maranus takes great pains to confirm the reality of the supposed twofold generation, by single expressions of Justin; but to what sort of proofs he is obliged to have recourse, may be seen plainly enough from the fact, that at last he is driven in despair to the expedient of taking the very same expression, which at one time he has used to prove the temporal figurative generation, to prove, at another time, the eternal generation.

¹ *Apol.* i, 58, p. 78, (p. 92, B.) *πρωτόγονος* τοῦ Θεοῦ, i, 46, p. 71, (p. 83, C.) *πρωτότακος* τοῦ Θεοῦ, — i, 63, p. 81, (p. 96, C.)

² *Dial. c. Tr.* c. 84, p. 181, (p. 310, B.) — *Dial. c. Tr.* c. 85, p. 182, (p. 311, B.) — c. 138, p. 229, (p. 367, D.)

³ *Dial. c. Tr.* c. 62, p. 159, (p. 285, D.) — c. 76, p. 173, (p. 301, B.)

⁴ *Apol.* i, 23, p. 57, (p. 68, C.) — 2, 6, p. 92, (p. 44, D.) — *Dial. c. Tr.* c. 129, p. 222, (p. 359, B.)

⁵ *Dial. c. Tr.* c. 100, p. 195, (p. 327, B.) The word *προερχομαι*, which Dähne (*geschichte. Darstellung, u. s. w.* i. 268,) reckons among the technical terms by which Justin is wont to designate the coming forth of the Logos from God, occurs indeed in the writings of the Martyr, but only once, and that in a connection where it bears a different meaning. Among the Catholics, Tatian first used the word, (*Orat. Gr.* c. 5, p. 247, [p. 145, A.]) in the sense falsely attributed to Justin.

coming forth from God, he generally terms *γέννημα*,¹ and once *ἐργασία*.² These expressions sufficiently indicate by what analogy Justin endeavoured to present, in a similar form, the coming forth of the Logos from God, which he ascribes to the power and will of God, as its ultimate cause.³ But since this analogy is open to misapprehension, as far as the physical act includes separation or loss, on the part of the generating subject, Justin calls to the aid of this, two other analogies, that of light and that of human speech, in order to guard against the gross notion that God, by the generation of his Son, had suffered any division or diminution of his substance. "God," he says, "begot before all creatures⁴ from

¹ *Dial. c. Tr. c. 62*, p. 159, (p. 285, D.)—*c. 129*, p. 222, (p. 359, B.)

² *Dial. c. Tr. c. 114*, p. 207. (p. 341, D.) It is also worthy of remark, that Justin allows Trypho's assertion that God had created Christ (*τοῦ θεοῦ ἡ καὶ αὐτὸν τοῦτον ποιήσαντος*), to pass without animadversion.—*c. Tr. c. 64*, p. 161, (p. 287, C.) Similar language is used by Tatian, (*Orat. c. Gr. c. 5*, p. 247, [p. 145, A.] *ἔργον πρωτότερον τῷ πατρί*).

³ *Dial. c. Tr. c. 100*, p. 195. (p. 327, B) *πρὸ πάντων ποιήματος, ἀπὸ τοῦ πατρὸς δυνάμει αὐτοῦ καὶ βουλῇ προελθόντα*. The hypostasizing of the Logos is also considered as a free act of the divine will, by Tatian (see the passage quoted above,) Theophilus of Antioch (*ad Autol.* 2, 22, p. 365. [p. 100, B.]), Tertullian (*adv. Prax. c. 6*, T. II. p. 153,) and Origen (*de princip.* 1, 2, 6, T. I. p. 55. Justinian *epistol. ad Men. in Mansi. collect. concil.* T. IX. p. 525).

⁴ *Dial. c. Tr. c. 61*, p. 157, sq. (p. 284, A—C.) *ἀρχὴν πρὸ πάντων τῶν κτισμάτων ὁ θεὸς γέννησας δυνάμει τινα ἐξ αὐτοῦ λογικῇ . . . ἰσοῦ καὶ ἰθ' ἡμῶν γινόμενον ὁρῶμεν. Λόγον γὰρ τινα προβάλλοντες, λόγον γινώσκον, οὐ πατ' ἀποτομήν. ὡς ἱλατταθῆναι τὸν ἐν ἡμῖν λόγον, προβαλλόμενον· καὶ ἰσοῦν ἰπὶ πυρὸς ὁρῶμεν ἄλλο γινόμενον, οὐκ ἱλατταίνον ἱπνίου, ἐξ οὗ ἡ ἀναψις γίνεται, ἀλλὰ τῷ αὐτοῦ μίοντος, καὶ τὸ ἐξ αὐτοῦ ἀναφθῖν καὶ αὐτὸ ὁ φάσμαται, οὐκ ἱλαττώσαν ἱπνίου, ἐξ οὗ ἀνήφθῃ. This analogy of fire, of which Philo had always availed himself (*de gigant.* c. 8, T. II. p. 55,) for illustrating the transference of thought from one individual to another, and the analogy of human speech, are also employed by Tatian, (*Orat. c. Gr. c. 5*, p. 248, (p. 145, B. C.) Tertullian, *adv. Prax. c. 8*, T. II. p. 157, sq. *Apol. c. 21*, T. V. p. 43, sq.,) and Lac-*

himself as a principle of being, a rational power, which is called by the Holy Spirit sometimes the effulgence of the Lord; sometimes Son; or Wisdom; or Messenger; or God; or Lord; or Logos; sometimes also the Supreme Commander, in the manner we see performed by ourselves. For, when we utter a rational word, we beget reason, without dividing ourselves, without diminishing our own thinking power. Or we may illustrate it by fire. When a fire is kindled on anything, that which kindles the substance experiences no diminution, but remains the same, and still appears the same and equally existing as that which is kindled." In a later passage he repeats the same sentiment:¹ "I have said that the power (the Logos) has been begotten by the Father, by his power and will, but not in consequence of a separation, as if the substance of the Father were divided; like all other things which are divided and separated, and cease to be what they were before the separation; and, for the sake of illustration, I instance fire, which, when it has

tantius (institut. divin. 4, 29,) evidently borrowed in part from Justin. On the other hand, Irenæus (*adv. hæres. 2, 16, sqq. p. 130, sqq.*) rejects altogether the use of such analogies, as equally useless and unbecoming, primarily in opposition to the Gnostics, but unconsciously, at least unintentionally, to the Catholics also.

¹ *Dial. c. Tr. c. 128, p. 221, sq. (p. 358, c. D.)* εἰσὼν, τὴν δυνάμιν ταύτην γιγνέσθαι ἀπὸ τοῦ πατρὸς, δυνάμει καὶ βουλῇ αὐτοῦ, ἀλλ' οὐ κατ' ἀποτομήν ὡς ἀπομεριζομένη; τῆς τοῦ πατρὸς οὐσίας, ὅποια τὰ ἄλλα πάντα μεριζομένα καὶ τιμνόμενα οὐ τὰ αὐτὰ ἴσται ἃ καὶ περὶ τμηθῆναι καὶ παρατείγματος χάριν παρελήφην τὰ ὡς ἀπὸ πυρὸς ἀναπτόμενα πυρὰ, ἃ ἴσται ἱερῶν, οὐδὲν ἱλαττουμένου ἱερέως, ἱεὺς οὐ ἀναφθῆναι πολλὰ δύναται, ἀλλὰ ταύτου μόνουτος. Tertullian expresses a caution essentially the same; *adv. Prax. c. 8, T. II. p. 157, sq. Apol. c. 21, T. V. p. 43, sq.* It is interesting to notice how Tatian, notwithstanding his general dependence on Justin, and his agreement in meaning with the doctrine of the Logos, as taught by his master, endeavours, on this point, to frame a terminology of his own; *Orat. c. Gr. c. 5, p. 247, sq. (p. 145, B.)* γίγναι κατὰ μερισμόν, οὐ κατ' ἀποτομήν· τὸ γὰρ ἀποτμηθῆναι τοῦ πρώτου κηχάρεται, τὸ δὲ μερισθῆναι οἰκονομίας τὴν αἵρεσιν προσλαβὼν οὐκ ἡδὴ τὸν ἔσθιν εἴληπται πωήκειν. Compare Daniel's *Tatianus der Apologet. p. 57.*

lighted another fire, the two are different without the former being lessened, by which many may be lighted, while itself remains the same." From the instant when the Logos came forth from God, Justin considers him as bearing the relation of a son, and since no other being has proceeded, in the same immediate manner from God, Justin calls him in a pre-eminent, a unique, and exclusive sense, the Son of God,¹ or briefly, the Only-begotten.²

To the filial relation of the Logos, he joins the name and character of God. Innumerable times he attributes to him the name and dignity of a God. He not only says,³ "that before the creation of the world he was God;" and,⁴ "he is called God, and is and will be God;" but he quotes a number of Old Testament passages, (Gen. xviii. 1; xxxii. 30. Exod. vi. 2. Numb. xi. 23. Deut. xxxi. 2,) in which, according to his opinion, Christ is expressly called God.⁵ But he evidently makes the possession of the name and character of God to be dependent on the filial relation, when he says,⁶ "He is God, as Son of the

Divinit

¹ *Apol.* 1, 23, p. 57, (p. 68, C.) Ἰησοῦς Χριστὸς μόνος ἰδίως υἱὸς τοῦ Θεοῦ γινώσκεται, λόγος αὐτοῦ ὑπαρχὼν καὶ πρωτότοκος καὶ δύναμις — 2, 6, p. 92, (p. 44, D.) ὁ υἱὸς ἑαυτοῦ ὁ μόνος λεγόμενος κυρίως υἱός.

² *Dial. c. Tr. c.* 105, p. 200, (p. 332, C.) μονογενὴς ἦν τοῦ πατρὸς τῶν ὄλων οὗτος, ἰδίως ἐξ αὐτοῦ λόγος καὶ δύναμις γινώσκ-
μενος.

³ *Dial. c. Tr. c.* 56, p. 152, (p. 276, C.) τὸν καὶ πρὸ ποιήσεως κόσμου ὄντα Θεόν.

⁴ *Dial. c. Tr. c.* 58, p. 156, (p. 281, D.) Θεός καλεῖται καὶ Θεός ἐστι καὶ ἴσται; c. 127, p. 221, (p. 357, D.); *Apol.* 1, 63, p. 81, (p. 96, C.) Sometimes, indeed, Justin calls Christ ὁ Θεός, with the article emphatically prefixed: thus, c. *Tr. c.* 56, p. 151, (p. 276, C.); c. 75, p. 172, (p. 300, D.); c. 113, p. 206, (p. 340, C.) It is, therefore, incorrect to maintain, as Milow has done, (*über Jesus und dessen Person und Amt. u. s. w.* in Henke's *Magazin. f. Religions-philosophie, u. s. w.* III. 1, s. 113.) that the ancient church-teachers never called Jesus simply ὁ Θεός. It seems an act of critical violence when Lange, (*ausführl. Geschichte der dogmen.* I. 149,) would strike out the article in the last of the passages above quoted.

⁵ *Dial. c. Tr. c.* 126, p. 219, sq. (p. 355, D. 356.)

⁶ *Dial. c. Tr. c.* 126, p. 219, (p. 355, C.)

only and unbegotten and unutterable God;" and¹ "he is God because he is the first born child of all creatures.

Justin, as we have already stated, considers the hypostatical existence of the Logos as beginning with his coming forth from the being of the Father. When, even down to our own times, it has been debated, when in different quarters the assertion has been made, that Justin held the Logos to be as little after as before his beaming forth (*Ausstrahlung*,) from God for the purpose of creating the world, any thing more than a divine power,—we may hesitate² which to wonder at most,—the perplexity which such an assertion involves; or the confidence with which it has been frequently risked. The two supports on which it is generally based are quite rotten and insufficient. The word *δύναμις*, which Justin sometimes applies to the Logos,³ denotes in ecclesiastical language, a person as well as a power. Thus, to mention only two examples, Satan⁴ and the good Angels⁵ by Justin, and the Angels⁶ by Athenagoras, are called *δύναμις*. But the doctrine that Christ, as Logos, long before his incarnation, had been active among men, and, in later times, had been communicated to all, will not be more difficult to unravel by the presupposed personality of

¹ *Dial. c. Tr. c.* 125, p. 218, (p. 354, C.) *Οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ Θεοῦ, ὁ ἀρχὴν πάντων τῶν ὄντων ἐκείνου ἐκείνου.*

² Thus by Ziegler (*theologische Abhandlungen*, I. 92.) Wundemann, (*Geschichte der Christ. Glaubenslehren vom Zeitalt. des Athanasius bis auf Gregor d. Grossen*, I. 256.) Augusti, (*Lehrbuch d. Christl. Dogmengeschichte*, 4. Aufl. 287.) Ammon, (*die Fortbildung des Christenthums zur Weltreligion*. II. 107, 115, 162, 167.) and others.

³ *Apol.* 1, 32, p. 63, (p. 74, B.) *Dial. c. Tr. c.* 61, p. 158, (p. 234, C.); c. 105, p. 200, (p. 332, C.)

⁴ *Dial. c. Tr. c.* 125, p. 218, (p. 354, D.) *ὁ διάβολος τῆς σαρκὸς ἡ δύναμις ἐκείνη ἡ καὶ ὅφρις πεκλημένη καὶ σατανᾶς.*

⁵ *Dial. c. Tr. c.* 85, p. 182, (p. 311, C.)

⁶ *Legat. p. Christ. c.* 24, p. 302, (p. 27. A.) Compare other passages in Suicer. *thesaur. eccles.* I. p. 969, and Baumgarten-Crusius, *Lehrbuch d. Christ. Dogmengeschichte*, II. 1041.

the Logos, than when the Scriptures teach of God, whose substantiality no one would be willing to question, that he fills, enlightens, inspires, and guides the hearts of men. But what makes this assertion perfectly inconceivable is not only that Justin positively deduces the personal subsistence of the Logos according to his generation from the Father, from the idea of generation, and, with the most earnest concern, labours to base it on the ground of the Old Testament expressions, (Gen. i. 26; iii. 22; xix. 24,) and the narratives of the Theophanies, but, more particularly, that he combats and rejects, in a direct reply, the favourite supposition of a merely dynamic existence of the Logos after his generation. He says,¹ "Some maintain that the power which came forth from the Father of all, and appeared to Moses, Abraham, and Jacob,

¹ *Dial. c. Tr. c.* 128, p. 221, (p. 358, A.—C.) *γινώσκω καὶ τινὰς προλίσγειν ταῦτα βουλευμένους καὶ φάσκων . . . ἄτμητον καὶ ἀχώριστον τῷ πατρὶς ταύτης τὴν δύναμιν ὑπάρχειν, ὅτιαι τρέπον τὸ τῷ ἡλίῳ φῶς ἐν τῇ γῆς εἶναι ἄτμητον καὶ ἀχώριστον ὅπως τῷ ἡλίῳ ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ καὶ ὅταν δύσῃ συναποφίρεται τὸ φῶς ἐν αὐτῷ ἐκ τῆς, ὅταν βούληται λίγαι δύναμιν αὐτῷ προσηδᾶν παῖς καὶ ὅταν βύληται, πάλιν ἀναστίλλει εἰς αὐτόν. Κατὰ τούτων τὸν τρόπον καὶ τοὺς ἀγγέλους ποῖν αὐτὸν διδάσκουσιν Ἄλλ' ὅτι μὴ ὅς ἐστιν ἀγγέλοι, καὶ ἀεὶ μίνοντες καὶ μὴ ἀναλυόμενοι εἰς ἐκείνῳ ἐξ ὕπαιρι γιγνώσκουσιν. ἀποδίδεσθαι καὶ ὅτι δύναμις αὕτη, ἣν καὶ θεὸς καλεῖται προφητικὸς λόγος . . . καὶ ἀγγελὸν ὅχ' ὡς τὸ τῷ ἡλίῳ φῶς ἐνέμασι μῖνον ἐριθμῶνται, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐριθμῶ ἱερὸν τι ἐστί, καὶ ἐν τοῖς προσημνίαις διὰ βραχίων τὸν λόγον ἐξήτασα, ἐπὶ αὐτῇ τὴν δύναμιν ταύτην γιγνέσθαι ἀπὸ τοῦ πατρὸς. The idea of the Logos, which is disapproved in this passage, as a merely temporal influx of the divine power, without a hypostatical existence, is essentially the same as that afterwards held by the sects called Monarchians and Patripassians; a proof that the modalistic identifying of the divinity of Christ with the hypostasis of the Father, had gained acceptance in the church long before it obtained its historical representatives in Praxeas, Sabellius, and others. Yet even the image of the rays of the sun, which is mentioned by Justin, was again used by Sabellius. Epiphanius, *adv. hæres.* 62, 1, T. I. p. 513. How Meier (*Lehrbuch der Dogmengeschichte*, 71,) with a distinct reference to the passage quoted from Justin, could write, "Yet Justin did not venture to reject this (monarchian, modalistic) view of the relation of the Father, Son, and Spirit, as erroneous," it is difficult to explain.*

was, on its appearance before men, inasmuch as through it the will of the Father was made known to men,—called *Messenger*; and because it came forth with an aspect of unspeakable glory, it was called *Light*; and because it appeared according to the will of the Father in human form, it was called *Man*; and because it conveyed information from the Father to men, it was called *Speech* or *Discourse*. They maintain further, that this power was not divided and separated from the Father, as little as the rays of the sun are divided or separated from the sun in the heavens when they reach the earth; but as the light withdraws at sun-set, so likewise the Father, whenever he pleases, causes his power to issue forth from himself, and, whenever he pleases, to draw it back again into himself. In the same manner, they say, he created the angels. But that there are real angels, who are permanently such, and do not return to the state from which they came forth, I have already shewn; and I have also briefly demonstrated that the power which is called the *Prophetic Word* and *Messenger* of God, is esteemed not merely nominal, but something numerically distinct. For this purpose I have explained that that power was begotten of the Father."

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If Justin had brought to view, along with the relation of the immanent and transitive Logos, and the analogy of human generation,—the metaphysical possibility of the impersonation of a second divine subject from the essential fulness of the godhead, and had pointed out the real presence of this subject principally in his creative acts, and in events recorded in the Old Testament, he would have completed the first part of the Trinitarian-christology. But there still remains a task of greater difficulty, to bring the existence of this second divine personality into intelligent harmony with the principle and requirements of Monotheism. The way in which Justin attempted to effect this harmony was partly the general one already mentioned, by maintaining the *moral* unity of the two

divine persons, the Father and the Son,¹ and partly the special one, which Philo's influence recommended to his adoption, that of placing the Son in the strictest subordination to the Father. This relation of subordination is expressed by Justin distinctly, and under various aspects.² He briefly indicates it when, as on several occasions, he assigns to the Logos the second place after God. Thus, when he says,³ "we shall exhibit Jesus Christ, in whom we acknowledge the son of the true God, and to whom we assign the second place, and with reason honour the prophetic Spirit in the third rank,—and,"⁴ "we adore and love after God, the Logos that is from the unbegotten and unutterable God,"—and,⁵ "the first power and Son after the Father of all, and Lord God, is the Logos,"—and,⁶ "the Logos, than whom we know no ruler more royal, and more just, after God who begat him." The sense in which Justin believed that the Logos was subordinate to the Father, is twofold—that of complete dependence, and of a quantitative inequality of being.

Justin considers the Logos as dependent on God, in respect of his existence, his rank, and his power, his

¹ Compare *Dial. c. Tr. c.* 101, p. 196, (p. 328, A.) οὐ τῇ αὐτοῦ βουλῇ ἢ ἰσχυρὶ πράττειν τι καυχώμενος.

² This has been already acknowledged by Starck (*Versuch einer Geschichte des Arianismus*. Berlin, 1783, I. 82, 84.) Oelrichs de vera et certa eorum, qui medio secundo atque ineunte tertio sæculo floruerunt, patrum de ratione sive relatione filii veri verbi cum patre sententia (Gotting. 1787,) p. 21, sq. Martini, *Versuch einer pragmat. Geschichte des Dogma von der Gottheit Christi*, (Rostock, 1800,) I. 49.

³ *Apol.* 1, 13, p. 51, (p. 60, E.) Ἰησοῦν χριστὸν . . . τὸν σταυρωθέντα καὶ Ποντίου Πιλάτου . . . υἱὸν αὐτοῦ τοῦ ὄντος Θεοῦ μαθόντες καὶ ἐν δυστίρῃ χάριτι ἔχοντες, πνεύματι τε προφητικῶν ἐν τρίτῃ τάξει ὅτι μετὰ λόγου τιμῶμεν, ἀποδιῶμεν.

⁴ *Apol.* 2, 13, p. 97, (p. 51, C.) τὸν ἀπὸ ἀγίνητου καὶ ἀρρήτου Θεοῦ λόγον μετὰ τὸν Θεὸν προσκυνούμεν καὶ ἀγαπῶμεν.

⁵ *Apol.* 1, 32, p. 63, (p. 74, B.) ἡ πρώτη δύναμις μετὰ τὸν πατέρα πάντων καὶ διαπόνη Θεὸν καὶ υἱὸς ὁ λόγος ἰστίς.

⁶ *Apol.* 1, 12, p. 50, (p. 59, E.) ὁ λόγος οὐ βασιλικώτατος καὶ δικαιοτάτος ἄρχωντα μετὰ τὸν γενήσαντα Θεὸν οὐδὲνα οἶδαμεν ὄντα.

worship, and his agency. All that the Logos has, is a gift of the Father.¹ He is God, because it was the will of the Father;² he is powerful, yea, Lord of the heavenly hosts, because God has made him so;³ he receives divine honours because God has ordained it.⁴ In all things he stands below the Creator of the world;⁵ to him he is subordinate, not merely as Father, but also as Lord;⁶ he is the instrument of a higher will. Justin expressly terms the Logos a servant of the Creator⁷ of the universe, not so much in relation to the creation, and universal enlightening of the world, as in reference to the Old Testament Theophanies, in which he appeared in God's stead, to teach and to act, to bless and to punish.⁸

¹ *Dial. c. Tr. c. 86, p. 184, (p. 313, C.)* αὐτὸς ἀπὸ τοῦ πατρὸς ἔλαβι τὸ βασιλεὺς καὶ χριστὸς καὶ ἱερεὺς καὶ ἄγγελος (εἶναι) καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα τοιαῦτα ἔχει ἢ ἔσχει.

² *Dial. c. Tr. c. 127, p. 221, (p. 357, B.)* ἐκείνου τὸν κατὰ βουλὴν τὴν ἐκείνου (πατρὸς) καὶ θιόν ὄντα υἱὸν αὐτοῦ. C. 129, p. 222, (p. 358, D.); τὸν ἐν τοῖς οὐρανοῖς ὑπάρχοντα· ὅς καὶ τοῦ ἐπὶ γῆς κυρίου κύριος ἐστίν (Gen. xix. 24,) ὡς πατήρ καὶ θεὸς αἵτις τε αὐτῷ τοῦ εἶναι καὶ δυνατῷ καὶ κυρίῳ καὶ θείῳ.

³ *Dial. c. Tr. c. 85, p. 181, (p. 311, A.)* ὅς ἐστι κύριος τῶν δυνάμεων διὰ τὸ θίλημα τοῦ δόντος αὐτῷ πατρὸς.

⁴ *Dial. c. Tr. c. 93, p. 190, (p. 321, A.)* ὁ . . . ἀγαπῶν τὸν θιόν . . . οὐδὲνα ἄλλοι τιμήσει θιόν, καὶ ἄγγελοι ἐκείνου ἀντιμίσση θιού βουλευμένου, τὸν ἀγαπῶμενον ὑπ' αὐτοῦ τοῦ κυρίου καὶ θεοῦ.

⁵ *Dial. c. Tr., c. 56, p. 151, (p. 275, C.)* ἐστὶ καὶ λέγεται θεὸς καὶ κύριος ἵτινες ὑπὸ τὸν ποιητὴν τῶν ὅλων, ὅς καὶ ἄγγελος καλεῖται. The reading ὑπὲρ τὸν ποιητὴν, which is found in the edition of Thirlby and Maranus, owes its existence merely to an arbitrary alteration by Robert Stephens, who was not satisfied with ὑπὸ. All the manuscripts read ὑπὸ.

⁶ *Dial. c. Tr. c. 126, p. 219, (p. 356, B.);* ὑπὸ τῷ πατρὶ καὶ κυρίῳ τιταγμένοι. C. 127, p. 221, (p. 357, B.) τὸν πατέρα καὶ ἄρρητον κύριον τῶν πάντων ἀπλῶς καὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ χριστοῦ.

⁷ *Dial. c. Tr. c. 57, p. 154, (p. 279, D.);* ὑπερήτης ὢν τοῦ ποιητοῦ τῶν ὅλων θεοῦ. Compare Koch's remarks (pushed rather too far) on the meaning of the term ὑπερήτης. (*Just. Mart. c. Tryph. Jud. dialogue, p. 115.*)

⁸ *Dial. c. Tr. c. 60, p. 157, (p. 283, A. B.);* οὐχ ὁ ποιητὴς τῶν ὅλων ἵσται θεὸς ὁ τῷ Μωσὶ ἐπών, αὐτὸν εἶναι θεόν 'Αβραὰμ καὶ θεόν 'Ισαακ καὶ θεόν 'Ιακώβ, ἀλλ' ὁ ἀποδευχθεὶς ὑμῖν ὡφθαί τῷ 'Αβραὰμ καὶ τῷ 'Ιακώβ, τῇ τοῦ ποιητοῦ τῶν ὅλων θελήσει ὑπερητής καὶ ἐν τῇ κρίσει τῶν Σοδόμων τῇ θουλή αὐτοῦ ὁμοίως ὑπερητήσας. c. 125, sqq. p. 218, sq. 221, (p. 354, C. 356, B. 357, B.)

The quantitative inequality of being, between the Father and the Son, of which Tertullian professes his belief, in the harsh terms, *pater tota substantia est, filius vero derivatio totius et portio*,¹ is expressed by Justin not so clearly and unequivocally, yet intelligibly enough, when he says² "God begot from himself, before all creatures, a certain rational power (δυναμὴν τινὰ λογικὴν), and when he calls the Logos a σπέρμα παρὰ τοῦ Θεοῦ³—a designation, for the correct explanation of which he gives the key, when, in another passage, he makes the distinction:⁴ ἑτερόν ἐστι σπέρμα τινὸς καὶ μίμημα κατὰ δύναμιν ὁ δὲ καὶ ἕτερον αὐτό, οὐ κατὰ χάριν τὴν ἀπ' ἑκείνου ἢ μετουσίᾳ καὶ μίμησις γίνεται. When, moreover, he considers the personal appearance of the Supreme God on earth as impossible and absurd, because such an appearance would be inconsistent with the unchangeableness and infinitude of God: he betrays, on the other hand, not the slightest scruple to make the Logos the subject of the Old Testament Theophanies: when he gives, as an additional proof of the asserted impossibility, that men were utterly incapable of enduring⁵ the consuming splendour of the appearance of the Creator, yet he considers the appearance of the Son, a few instances excepted, as easy to be borne: when, lastly, he disputes the admissibility of giving a proper name to the supreme God, among other reasons, because no name can be sufficiently comprehensive to express the infinite glory of the Divine Being; of the Logos, on the contrary, he says: "He can be addressed by names of all kinds, because he serves the paternal will, and is begotten by the will of the

¹ Tertull. *adv. Prax.* c. 9, T. II. p. 159. Compare *Apol.* c. 21, T. V. p. 44.

² *Dial. c. Tr.* c. 61, p. 157, (p. 284, A.) See Oelrichs *de vera et certa eorum*, &c. p. 19, 52, 77.

³ *Apol.* I, 32, p. 63, (p. 74, B.) Grabe's conjecture is incorrect, who would read *πνεῦμα* instead of *σπέρμα*. See his edition of the larger *Apology*, p. 66.

⁴ *Apol.* 2, 13, p. 98, (p. 51, D.)

⁵ *Dial. c. Tr.* c. 60, p. 157, (p. 283, B.)—c. 127, p. 220, (p. 356, D. 357, A. B.)

Father."¹ Who can satisfactorily explain these counter-statements, without adopting the concession that Justin distinguished the being of the Son quantitatively from the being of the Father?²

¹ *Apol.* 1, 61, p. 80, (p. 94, D.)—2, 6, p. 92, (p. 44, E.)—*Dial. c. Tr.* c. 61, p. 158, (p. 284, B.) ἵχτι πάντα προσνομάζινθαι, ἵνα τι τοῦ ὑπεριπὺν τῇ πατρικῇ βουλήματι καὶ ἵνα τοῦ ἀπὸ τοῦ πατρὸς διλήγου γιγινῇθαι.

² How little the distinctions given in the text (at least the first two) will admit of being brought into harmony with the Nicene doctrine of the absolute equality of the Father and the Son, is shown most clearly by the unsuccessful attempts which have been made to force that harmony. The authors of these attempts have, in general, been driven to the doubtful expedient of insensibly shifting the real ground of the point in debate, and avoiding the metaphysical reasons, on account of which Justin believed he was forced to deny the ability of the supreme God, to appear personally on the earth, to assume that they had only to answer the question in general, why Justin denied the ability of appearing to the Father, and granted it to the Son. For merely to this question an answer is given, when Nifanius (*Justin-Philos. christ. et mart. exhibitus. verit. evang. testio.* p. 206,) states, in the words of Calovius, that the ancient church-teachers attributed to the Son, and not, in an equal degree, to the Father, the receptivity of a body, the sensuous medium of appearing; or, when Natalis Alexander (*hist. eccles. V. N. Ti. sæc. 2, dissert. 6, Par. 1730, T. III. p. 386,*) replies, that Justin had simply made the canon of Scripture for himself, in which visibility is never asserted of the Father, but only of the Son; or, lastly, when Bull, (*defens. fid. Nicæn.* 4, 3, 4, sq. *Opp. ed. Græb.* p. 268, sqq. 4, 3, 12, p. 274, sq.), and in part Prud. Maranus (*Opp. Justin.* p. 220,) assert that Justin conceived and represented the Old Testament appearance of God, as parts of the general economy of salvation, the realising of which, agreeably to the trinitarian reciprocity of the Father and the Son, (according to which the Father begets, and the Son is begotten, the Father is the head and the Son is in a state of dependence; the Father sends, and the Son is sent,) he regarded as properly not the concern of the unbegotten, absolutely independent Father, but is the office of the ministering Son. What Maranus remarks, besides, is still further from the mark. But when Bull, as a positive corroboration of his hypothetical solution, refers to a passage in the Exhortation to the Greeks (*Coh. ad Græc.* c. 21, p. 22, [p. 20, C.] as to an express testimony that Justin did not consider the divine appearance of the Logos as locally confined,—to a pas-

Justin tacitly concluded what Tertullian openly avowed, when he admitted "jam ergo alius erit qui videbatur, quia non potest idem invisibilis definiri qui videbatur et consequens erit, ut invisibilem patrem intelligamus pro plenitudine majestatis, visibilem vero filium agnoscamus pro modulo derivationis; sicut nec solem nobis contemplari licet, quantum ad ipsum substantiæ summam, quæ est in cœlis, radium autem ejus toleramus oculis pro temperatura portionis, quæ in terram inde porrigitur." (*adv. Prax.* c. 14, T. ii. p. 170.) Compare c. 16, p. 178.) From the representation that has been given in the preceding pages of Justin's doctrine of the Logos, it is, first of all, evident that the theory of this Father, when compared with the later Trinitarian systems of the Church, has a distinct, though incomplete independency;—that Justin belonged to neither of the two parties into which the Christian world, which acknowledges a specific and concrete divinity in the person of Jesus, has been di-

sage of the Epistle to Diognetus (c. 7, p. 237, [p. 498, C.] as to a proof that he considered the Son, equally with the Father, exalted above being perceived by the senses—and, lastly, to a passage in the Shorter Apology (2, 10, p. 95, [p. 48, E.] λόγος ὁ καὶ ἱεὺς ὁ καὶ πατὴρ ὁν) as evidence that he ascribed an unlimited essential omnipresence to the Son as well as to the Father—he overlooked, with respect to the first passage, that the sense he attributes to it is supposititious, that the passage treats altogether, not of the Logos but of God; in relation to the second passage, he made use of a writing, as a source of acquaintance with Justin's theology, which does not belong to him; and, in the third passage, he has confounded a (moral) efficient with an essential omnipresence. Möhler (*Athenasius der Grosse*, i. 37,) lastly, avails himself of the expedient before alluded to; for, while he admits that Justin uses phraseology different from the Nicene, that, in a precipitate imitation of Philo, and that he subordinated to the Father the Logos, as the subject of the Old Testament theophanies, he consoles himself with believing that this mode of speaking was not the real corresponding expression of his internal conviction. In heart he was perfectly devoted to the later catholic doctrine of the Son of God, only "he perplexed himself in his demonstrations, so that he brought forward the exact opposite of what he wished strictly to demonstrate."

vided since the time of Arius, and of the Nicene Council, on the question, what relation this divinity bears to the original divinity; that those persons are equally wrong who believe that they can find in Justin the Nicene or the Arian scheme.¹ In a certain sense, indeed, he may be called a forerunner of both creeds, for his doctrine of the Logos has various points of contact with them.

His representation of the generation of the Logos from the being of God, and his illustration of this doctrine by the image of fire, has a relation to the decrees of the Nicene Council. His designation of the Logos as an *ἐργασία* of God, and his assertion that the Logos received a personal existence only a short time before the creation, and that, by the will of God, lends support to Arianism. But withal, an essential difference exists between his doctrine of the Logos and the Nicene and Arian Creeds. The Nicene, Athanasian orthodoxy "maintains a generation of the Son from all eternity, and Justin knew no other than what took place shortly before the creation; according to the former, the generation of the Son is founded in an internal necessity of the divine nature, according to Justin, it is the consequence and effect of a free divine resolve;² lastly, according to Athanasian orthodoxy, the Son is perfectly equal with the Father, has not only \neq specifically, but also numerically one

¹ Justin's doctrine of Christ has been described as Arianism by Sand (*nucleus hist. eccles. exhibitus in historia Arianorum*. ed. 2. Colon. 1676, p. 77, and *Appendix ad nucleum. hist. eccles.* Colon. 1678, p. 97, 135,) by Petau (*Theol. dogmat. de trinit.* 1, 3, T. ii. p. 20, and *notæ in Epiphani.* T. ii. p. 285,) by Semler (*Geschichte der christl. Glaubenslehre*, ii. 44, Anm. 53,) and by Löffler (*kurze Darstellung der Entstehungsart der Dreieinigkeit*, in an Appendix to Souverain's *Versuch über d. Platonismus der Kirchenväter*, 439.)

² Nifanus indeed asserts, (Justin *exhibit. vent. evang. testis* p. 2141), boldly, Justinus filium *ἀπὸ τοῦ πατρὸς διλήσει γενέσθαι* dixit, non autem voluntatem liberi ac intermissibilis decreti intelligit sed voluntatem naturalem, — but with what right?

and the same being."¹ Justin, on the contrary, distinguishes the Son numerically from the Father, makes him entirely dependent on the latter, and considers him only as a part of his substance.² Justin's convictions stand in irreconcilable opposition to the Arian faith, inasmuch as the latter attributes eternity in no sense to the Son, whose generation or emanation it rejects, as contradictory to the incorporeity and indivisibility of God, and holds him to be nothing more than a creature, (though a perfect one) of God, (κτίσμα καὶ πλῆγμα, ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων ὑπόστασις).³

From the account we have given of Justin's doctrine of the Logos, another point is also clear, that Justin on the whole was justified in describing his doctrine as a scriptural tradition of the Church,⁴ and partially in tracing even its speculative form back to the Old Testament. For in its main substance it is undoubtedly the doctrine of the New Testament,⁵ the

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¹ Martini's words, (*Versuch einer pragmat. Geschichte des dogma von der Gottheit Christi*, 1. 52.

² If we are to believe Bull, (*defens. fid. Nicæn.* 2, 4, 1, sqq. *Opp. ed. Grab.* p. 65, sqq. 4, 2, 2, p. 259.) Prudent. Maranus (*Opera Just.* p. 158, not. d. 220, not a.) Lumper (*de vita, scriptis atque doctrina sanct. patrum*, T. II. p. 141.) Vogel-sang (*fides Nicæna de filio Dei*, p. 29, sqq.) and others,—Justin's writings abound with passages in which the true divinity of Christ is taught most decidedly in the sense of the Nicene *immuta*. But of what kind are these. Expressions in which Christ either simply, or with reference to his generation from the being of the Father, is called God, and is declared to be worthy of divine worship; comparisons, such as that of fire and of human speech, by which the coming forth of the Logos from the Father is sensibly represented: applications of Old Testament passages to him, such as Exod. iii. 6, 14, *ὁ γὰρ ἔφη ὁ θεός, θεός Ἄβραμ, &c.* Passages of this sort torn from their natural connection, and especially from their connection with Justin's christology as a whole, and in this isolated state wrested to the utmost, may appear at times to say what they are wished to say; but have passages thus treated the qualification of witnesses?

³ See Mohler's *Athanasius de Grosse*, I. 217.

⁴ *Apol.* 1, 46, p. 71, (p. 83, C.)—τὸν Χριστὸν πεποιθέντα τοῦ θεοῦ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀρχαίου θέναι.

⁵ Not indeed of the Old Testament, as Justin in an equally

faith of the Church immediately succeeding the Apostles. Justin ascribes to Jesus as the incarnate Logos, ante-mundane existence, and ante-mundane divine glory: (John i. 1; vi. 62; viii. 58; xvii. 5. Coloss. i. 17.) he calls him the First-born of the creation, (Coloss. i. 15.); the only begotten of the Father, (John i. 14.); he contemplates him as the reflection of the divine being, as the image of the invisible God, (John xiv. 9. 2 Cor. iv. 4. Philip. ii. 6. Coloss. i. 15; ii. 9. Heb. i. 3.); he deduces the creation of all creatures from him, (John i. 3. 1 Cor. viii. 6. Coloss. i. 16. Heb. i. 2). He represents him as the supporter of all existences; as the abiding efflux of light and life, (John i. 4. Heb. i. 3.); in short, he acknowledges his right to the name and dignity of God, (John i. 1; xx. 28. Rom. ix. 5. 1 Tim. iii. 16. Titus ii. 13.); he presents, as the quotations show, only the doctrine of the Bible, and this doctrine is by no means to be looked upon as a refinement of Gnostic Judaism. That the same doctrine was essentially the confession of the Church in the age next to the Apostolic, the testimony of the Proconsul Pliny alone is sufficient to prove, which is contained in his well-known answer to the Emperor Trajan; Epist. x. 97: "adfirmabant (Christiani) hanc fuisse summam vel culpæ suæ vel erroris, quod essent soliti stato die ante lucem convenire carmenque Christo quasi deo dicere secum invicem."¹ With respect to the Apostolic Fathers, it is to be noticed that, in Barnabas and Hermes, the same dramatic interpretation of Gen. i. 26, is to be found as that given by Justin. When Justin, moreover, referring to Prov. viii. 22, says;² "I will

unhesitating manner supposes. Compare, besides the passage already noticed, *Coh. ad. Gr.* c. 15, p. 19. (p. 16, C.) τὸν τοῦ Θεοῦ λόγον, δι' οὗ ἐκράνθη καὶ γῆ καὶ πᾶσα ἑστίν, ὡς διδάσκειται ἡμᾶς αἱ Θείαι τῶν ἁγίων ἀνδρῶν προφητεῖαι.

¹ Compare this with the assertion of Arteman, an ancient enemy of the Church; Euseb. *hist. Eccles.* v. 28, T. ii. p. 135. Παλμοὶ καὶ ἄλλοι ἀδελφῶν ἀπ' ἀρχῆς ὑπὸ σιγῶν γραφεῖσιν, τὸν λόγον τοῦ Θεοῦ τὸν Χριστὸν ὑμνοῦσι διαλογώμενοι.

² *Dial. c. Tr.* c. 61, p. 157, sq. (p. 284, A. C.) μαρτύρεται καὶ

give you, my friends, another testimony from Scripture that God has begotten from himself, as a principle of being before all creatures, a certain rational power. . . . The word of Wisdom will bear me witness, even that God who was begotten by the Father of all, who is reason, and wisdom, and power, and the brightness of him who begat him, and by Solomon, says these things ;” or when he says ; “ the Scriptures have made known by Solomon,¹ that that production which Solomon calls Wisdom, was begotten by God as a principle of creation before all creatures ;”—it not only cannot be doubted that Justin really borrowed this expression from this Old Testament passage, by which he endeavoured to make intelligible the ante-mundane impersonation of the divine Logos, but it must also be acknowledged that the passage in question forms at least the dawn of the light which he sought for in it. But if, on the one hand, it is clear that the substance of Justin’s idea of the Logos rests on a purely Scriptural and Christian foundation, on the other *Philo* hand, it is not less clear that the Alexandrian and Philonic theosophy had a considerable share in the special scientific formation of this idea. The influence of this philosophy shows itself not merely in the two leading points already mentioned, that Justin illustrates the eternal being of the Logos in God, and his ante-mundane coming forth from God, by the difference between the λόγος ἐνδιάθετος and the λόγος προφορικός, —and meets the objection of a rigid Deism by the complete subordination of the Son to the Father; it appears, also, in his illustrating the emanation of the Logos by the parallel of fire,—in the incautious (as it regards Monotheism,) representation of the Logos as a

ἄλλο ὑμῖν, ὦ φίλοι, ἀπὸ τῶν γραφῶν δώσειν ὅτι ἀρχὴν πρὸ πάντων τῶν κτισμάτων ὁ θεὸς γινέσθαι δυνάμει τινα ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ λογιστήν. . . .
Μαρτυρήσω μοι ὁ λόγος τῆς σοφίας, αὐτὸς ὃν εὖτος ὁ θεὸς ἀπὸ τοῦ πατρὸς τῶν ἑλων γιννηθεὶς καὶ λόγος καὶ σοφία καὶ δύναμις καὶ δόξα τοῦ γινησάντος ὑπάρχων καὶ διὰ Σολομῶντος φήσαντος [φῆσας] ταῦτα.

¹ *Dial. c. Tr. c. 62, p. 159, (p. 285, D.)*

Θεός ἱερεὺς, in the decided application to him of all the Old Testament theophanies, in designating him a divine ἀγγελος or ὑπηρέτης, and in several other particulars. That Justin had always a clear perception of this dependence on Jewish-Alexandrianism is not probable; but even if this were the case, he might easily satisfy his doctrinal scruples by the theological dictum with which John opens his Gospel; ἐν ἀρχῇ ἦν ὁ λόγος; this appeared as a sanction of the prevailing idea of the Logos, which would naturally seem so far free from any decidedly unchristian element.

But while we grant to the Alexandrian Philonic *theosophy* an essential share in the formation of Justin's doctrine of the Logos, we equally refuse it to the Platonic philosophy. In a two-fold sense there has been a disposition to charge this doctrine with Platonism. On the one hand, it has been maintained that Justin borrowed his idea of the Logos immediately from the Platonic philosophy, as its peculiar and original source, and transferred it to the Christian soil; while, on the other hand, some persons placed an intermediate party between Justin and Plato, and thus regarded the Platonism of that idea as only taken at second-hand. The first view has been presented under three modifications. Some, as Starck¹ and Bretschneider,² have considered the whole patristic doctrine of the Logos, both in contents and form, as a Christian offset of the Platonic philosophy; others, as Onymus,³ have rather regarded the form only as Platonic; others, in the last place, as Hahn,⁴ have set to Plato's account whatever would not agree with the Nicene theology. The second view contains two varie-

¹ *Versuch einer Geschichte des Arianismus*, I. 57, 66, 112. *Freimüthige Betrachtungen über das Christenthum*. s. 159.

² *Probabilia de evangel. et epist. Joan. apost. indole et origine*, p. 84, 191.

³ *Justini phil. et mart. de præcipuis relig. christ. dogmatis sententiam*, p. 17, 20.

⁴ *De Platonismo theol. veterum eccles. doctorum* corruptore, p. 24, sq. 26, sqq.

ties, according to the medium by which the Platonic philosophy is supposed to have passed into the Christian theology. Some, as Gruner,¹ and Priestley,² consider Philo's system,—others, as Oelrichs,³ Martini⁴ and Ackermann⁵ consider the new Platonic philosophy in its first rudiments as the nearest immediate source of Justin's doctrine of the Logos, recognise therefore in this doctrine only a Philonic or new Platonic Platonism. All these attempts to detect Platonic elements in Justin's doctrine are deficient in solidity. With respect to the opinion of those who consider the patristic doctrine of the Logos to be an immediate result of Platonic speculation, it is readily conceded that Plato speaks of a λόγος or νοῦς of God (expressions which he employs as equivalent ;)⁶ that he calls this, the creative and governing principle of the world ;⁷ that in a mythological and figurative mode of expression he asserts, that since wisdom and intelligence must be the principles that regulate the universe, and a soul must be the necessary substratum of wisdom and intelligence, so also in the nature of Zeus a kingly soul and a kingly reason must be presupposed.⁸ Even the idea of a Son

¹ *Institut. theolog. dogmat. libri tres.* p. 91, 113.

² *History of the corruptions of Christianity* (*Geschichte der Verälschungen des Christenthums. Aus. d. Engl.*) (Berlin. 1786, I. 11, 12.)

³ *De vera et certa eorum, qui medio sec. atque ineunte test. sæc. flor. patrum de rat. fil. c. patre sententia.* p. 69, sq.

⁴ *Versuch einer pragmat. Geschichte des dogma von der Gottheit Christi.* I. 111, 115.

⁵ *Das Christliche un Plato und in der Platonischen philosophie.* s. 297.

⁶ *Tim. T. vii.* p. 27, ἡ ἐν λόγῳ καὶ διανοίᾳ διῶ . . . ἥλιος καὶ σελήνη . . . γίγνται.

⁷ *Epinom. T. vi.* p. 495, κέσμεν. δι' ἰσχυρὸς λόγος ὁ πάντων θεότατος ἱερατὴν.—*Tim. T. vii.* p. 29 — p. 41, τὰ διὰ τοῦ διδμημυργημένα.—*Phileb. c. 16, T. iii.* p. 172, ἐὰν τῷ παντὶ νοῦς ἀρχῇ.

⁸ *Phileb. c. 16, p. 172, αἰτία οὐ φάσκη, νομοδότης τε καὶ ἐνταύτω ἡκανοτός τε καὶ ἄρας καὶ μήνας, σοφία καὶ νοῦς λεγομένη δικαιοτατ' ἔν . . . Σοφία μὴν καὶ νοῦς ἄντι ψυχῆς ἐκ ἧν πότῃ γενεῖσθαι . . . Οὐκ οὖν ἐν μὲν τῇ τοῦ Διὸς ἐκείῃ φύσει βασιλικὴν μὲν ψυχὴν, βασιλικὴν δὲ τοῦ ἐγγίγνισθαι, διὰ τὴν τῆς αἰτίας δύναμιν.*

of God was not unknown to the philosopher. He speaks of an offspring of the good;¹ he mentions a happy and perfect God begotten of the Supreme God, whom he calls the *only begotten*.² But notwithstanding this apparent and at first sight striking resemblance, Justin's doctrine of the Logos does not stand even most remotely in real and genetic dependance on the Platonic principles; as to the resemblance which relates to the Platonic notion of a Son of God, it is purely verbal. For when Plato speaks of an offspring of the good, he means nothing more by it, than the abstract ideas of knowledge and truth; when he makes mention of a begotten, only begotten, happy, and perfect God, he means only the universe as far as this is a visible transcript of the divine original ideas, a reflection of divine intelligence and perfection.³ But the most essential ingredient is wanting to the Platonic Logos, which is peculiar to the Christian idea, that of personality; it has indeed an actual, but not a hypostatical reality; it is a property: and though distinguished from the being of God, it is a purely immanent idea; it is the principle of intelligence in God.⁴

¹ *De republ.* lib. vi. T. v. p. 240, τὸν τῷ ἀγαθῷ ἱκχονος, ὃν τὰ γὰρ ἰσχύουσιν ἀνάλογον ἑαυτῷ.

² *Tim.* T. vii. p. 19, 22, διὰ πάντα δὲ ταῦτα ἰδοίμενα διὸν αὐτὸν τὸν ἰσχύοντα — p. 106, διατὰ καὶ ἀθάνατα ζῶν λαβὼν καὶ ἐμπληρωθὲς ὃς ὁ κόσμος, οὗτω ζῶν ἑαυτὸν, τὰ ἑαυτὰ περιέχον, ἀκὼν τῷ νοητῷ θεῷ, αἰσθητός, μέγιστος καὶ ἄριστος κάλλιστός τε καὶ τελιώτατος γίγνεται. ὃς ἑαυτὸς ὃς μονογενὴς ὢν.

³ Oelrichs *doctrina Platonis de deo a Christianis et recentioribus Platonis varie explicata et corrupta* (Marb. 1788.) p. 12, and Baur *das christliche des Platonismus*, 61, 67, 76.

⁴ This is demonstrated by the profound investigations of Prudent. Maranus (*prolegomena*, 2, 1, p. x. sqq.) Oelrichs (*doctrina Platon.* p. 8, sq. 11, sq.) Tennemann (*über d. göttlichen Verstand aus der platonischen Philosophie* in Paulus *Memorabilien.* I. 34.) Tiedemann (*Geist der spekulativen Philosophie*, II. 118, and others, and may be called the prevalent conviction of the times. Compare Buhle *Geschichte der Philosophie*, II. 172. Martini *Versuch einer pragmat. Geschichte*, I. 112. Tzschirner, *Fall des Heidenthums*, I. 579. Ackermann *das Christliche in Plato*. 44, 297. Baur *das Christliche der Platonismus*.

Plato drops not the slightest hint that this Logos ever came forth from the being of God; there is not the most distant intimation that it ever existed out of God, or began to be self-subsistent. The Christian idea of the Logos cannot be taken for a mere copy, or if it be preferred, a continuation of the Platonic, since Plato had not the slightest presentiment of what is the most important point in the Christian theology. Should it be replied, that though Plato had no conception of a divine Logos or Nous hypostatically distinct from the being of God, as some of the later new Platonic expositors have falsely imagined, yet Justin might have adopted the supposition of the new Platonists, inasmuch as he attributes to the philosopher the knowledge of the Christian Trinity; it is indeed correct that Justin seeks and finds the Christian Trinity in Plato, but it is to be observed, that he never adduces the Platonic Logos as a member of this Trinity. As a proof of Plato's acquaintance with the Christian doctrine of the Trinity, he employs the well-known mysterious expression of the second spurious Epistle to Dionysius: *περὶ τὸν πάντων βασιλέα πάντ' ἐστί δεύτερον δὲ περὶ τὰ δεύτερα καὶ τρίτον περὶ τὰ τρίτα*, and the dogma of the Son of God especially, he gathers from a passage of the *Timæus*, where the formation of the soul of the world is the topic under discussion, and the figure of the X is given to it,¹—passages these, in which not a syllable is uttered about the divine Logos, and from which it may be very easily seen Justin did not borrow his conviction of the Trinity, but rather imposed such a meaning upon them; that he did not find, but brought the doctrine there. Indeed, Justin is so very far from recognising in the Scripture doctrine of the Trinity an indigenous production of the heathen soil, that he not only deduces Plato's acquaintance with it from a use of Old Testament passages, but can offer no other ex-

¹ *Apol.* I. 60, p. 78, sq. (p. 92, E. 93, A. B.) *Plat. Timæus*, T. VII. p. 24.

planation of the accordances with the doctrine of the Logos which he found in the pseudo-Orphic verses, than that Orpheus took them from the Old Testament.¹

either
re-
sult
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Nor is Justin's doctrine of the Logos more an indirect than a direct offset of the Platonic theology. As to the religious philosophy of the Alexandrian Jews, a certain dependence of Justin's upon it, in the doctrine of the Logos, is very evident; and the affinity of Philo to Plato, in the same doctrine, is equally incontestable. But exactly where Philo goes hand in hand with Plato, Justin keeps at a distance. The influence of Platonic speculations on the Philonic developement of the doctrine of the Logos is shewn most decidedly in this respect, that Philo supposes the divine Logos, in his immanent state, to be identical with the divine ideas,—that he considers it as the aggregate of all the original eternal types which God designed for the purpose of creating the universe, and of which, visible things according to their intelligent forms, are only the most nearly approximating copies; and of this Platonic consummation of the Philonic doctrine of the Logos, Justin knows nothing.² Where he really adopts Philo's sentiments, it is when they rest exclusively on oriental modes of conception, or are supported by the authority of the Old Testament. If, moreover, the new Platonic philosophy be adduced as the medium through which the Christian theology received a Platonic colouring in the first developement of the doctrine of the Logos, we may affirm still more decidedly, that this is to embrace a cloud instead of Juno. Of the existence and form of the new Platonism before the end of the second century, we know next to nothing: the opinions held respecting it have been only vague suppositions, destitute of historical soundness. But if we descend to a later period, and take the system as

¹ *Coh. ad Græc.* c. 15, p. 19, (p. 16, B. C.)

² Except Origen, who, on this point, decidedly Platonises: *Comment. in Joan.* 1, 22, T. IV. p. 21. See Retberg's *Doctrina Origenis de λογῷ Divino ex Disciplina Neo-platonica Illustrata*, p. 41, 45.

it was elaborated by Plotinus, the assumed relation between the Christian and new Platonic Logos, or the doctrine of the Trinity in general, will appear to be exactly inverted, and the latter must be explained by the former, not the former by the latter. The new Platonic Trinity is an oriental graft on a Platonic stock, and this oriental graft is in part decidedly Christian.¹ The eclectic character of the new Platonism forced its disciples to seek for grains of truth even in Christianity. That they were never unfaithful to this principle of their philosophy, even in reference to Christianity, appears in later times, partly from the reverence with which the person of Christ, and especially the Prologue of the Gospel of John, was treated in their schools; and partly from the obligations which even Porphyry, that bitter opponent of Christianity, was under to the Christian mode of thinking.² That the Christian doctrine, specifically in the point of the three principles, had been originally one of the formative elements of new Platonism, was evident to the Syrian Platonist Numenius, who forms, as it were, the partition between the general eclecticism of the earlier Græco-Roman philosophy and the more restricted and distinct Eclecticism of the new Platonic school, who approached very near the new Platonic mode of thinking, and by the new Platonists themselves was regarded as one of the supporters of their doctrine. This Numenius—the oldest Platonist, who distinctly asserts two divine first causes of things—who associated with the first or supreme God, who in himself, and absolutely, is good and intelligent, a second God, of whom the former is the origin and father, who is only good and intelligent by participation of the first God, in fact, a mere copy and imita-

¹ See the proofs in Ritter's *Geschichte der Philosophie*, IV. 582, 589.

² See Ullman's *Parallelen aus der Schriften des Porphyrius zu neutestamentlichen Stellen: theol. Studien und Kritiken*, 1832, H. 2, S. 236.

tion.¹ Numenius constructed this doctrine, though on undeniably Platonic ground, yet in decided deviation from Christianity. This derivation is most apparent from the manner in which Numenius endeavoured to render intelligible the coming forth of the second God from the first, which he conceives to have been by emanation. He has recourse, therefore, to the same analogies which the Fathers used for a similar purpose, and, like them, with the intention of showing that the coming forth of the second cause from the first by no means involved a change of being in the latter. He adduces, as comparison, the kindling of one light by another, and the impartation of knowledge by a teacher to his pupils. "One lamp," he says,² "is kindled by another, and receives light from it, without depriving the first of its light. A science which one person imparts, and another receives, remains with the giver, and yet is equally possessed by the receiver." Who does not recognize, in this parallel, the language of the Christian Fathers? The representation of Numenius may be taken with less hesitation for a copy and echo of the Christian, since, on other occasions, he showed a strong partiality for the Christian literature and doctrine. His high estimation of Moses is well known; he calls Plato the Attic Moses.³ He often refers, in his writings, to the narratives of the Old Testament, and applied them to his own purpose by the aid of allegorical interpretation; he even employs the Evangelical history allegorically, though without mentioning the name of Jesus.⁴

¹ Euseb. *præpar. evangel.* 11, 18, p. 537, sqq. 11, 22, p. 543, sq.

² Euseb. *præpar. evangel.* 11, 18, p. 538, οἷον ἂν ἴδῃς ἑξαφθίντα ἄφ' ἑνὸς λύχνου λύχνον φῶς ἔχοντα, ὃ μὴ τὸν πρῶτον ἀφίλιπε, ἀλλὰ τῆς ἐν αὐτῷ ὕλης πρὸς τὸ ἰκτείνου πῦρ ἑξαφθίστης. Τοιοῦτον τὸ χερμῆμά ἐστι τὸ τῆς ἐκείνης, ἢ δοθεῖσα καὶ ληφθεῖσα, παραμένει μὲν τῷ διδωκότι, σύνεσι δὲ τῷ λαβόντι ἡ αὐτή.

³ Clem. *Strom.* 1, 22, 150, T. II. p. 101, τί γὰρ ἐστὶ Πλάτων ἢ Μαῦσῆς ἀπεικίζων.

⁴ Origen, c. *Cels.* 4, 51, T. I. p. 543, ἵνα δ' ἴδῃ καὶ Νουμήνιον τὸν Πυθαγόρειον, ἄνδρα πολλῶν κρείττεον δηγησάμενον Πλάτωνα.

Thus, we consider our position thoroughly established, that Justin's doctrine of the Logos was in no sense produced or modified by Platonism. It was of pure biblical origin and consistency, but certainly of a Philonic shape.

CHAPTER III.

THE DOCTRINE OF THE HOLY SPIRIT.

The doctrine of the Holy Spirit belongs, unquestionably, to the most obscure and difficult section in the history of ancient Dogmatics. This obscurity and difficulty are owing not merely to the brevity and detached manner with which the church-teachers generally express themselves respecting the Pneuma, but, principally, to the indistinctness and want of colouring with which their representations are overspread. When treating of this subject, they seem embarrassed and perplexed. They felt themselves obliged, by the biblical writings, and especially by the baptismal formula, to place the Spirit as a third object of devotion, next to the Supreme God and the Son; but, in truth, they knew not how to bring this object into a living connection with their existing theology; they were kept in constant vacillation on the question, what position ought to be assigned to the Spirit in his relations to the Father and Son,—to the world,—and especially to the work of redemption. The Scriptures gave no precise explanations on the nature and origin of the Spirit; while to a fundamental speculative investigation and solution of this problem, which might

. . . , πολλαχῶ τῶν συγγραμμάτων αὐτῷ ἐκτίθιμιν τὰ
Μαυρίαις καὶ τῶν πρεσβυτέρων, καὶ οὐκ ἀπειθάντες αὐτὰ τρεπολογῶντα
. Ἐν δὲ τῇ τρίτῃ περὶ τὰς αὐτῶν ἐκτίθεται καὶ περὶ τοῦ
Ἰησοῦ ἱερῆς τινός, τὸ ὄνομα αὐτοῦ οὐ λίγων, καὶ τρεπολογεῖ αὐτὴν
. Ἀποδιχόμεθα αὐτὴν, μᾶλλον Κίλσεν καὶ ἄλλων
Ἑλλήνων, βουλῆθιντα φιλομαθῶς καὶ τὰ ἡμίτερον ἱερίσιν καὶ
κηθόντα ὡς περὶ τρεπολογεῖ μιν καὶ οὐ μωρῶν συγγραμμάτων.

promise a satisfactory result, the Fathers did not feel themselves urged, owing to the want of outward excitement. The part of mediation between the invisible, incomprehensible, unutterable God and the world, was already assigned to the Son; for the agency of the Spirit, who in no case could be conceived as being in a state of absolute inaction, scope could only be afforded by infringing on the idea of the Logos as the all-comprehensive organ of revelation. Thus something indistinct and vacillating naturally and unavoidably pervades the representations of the Fathers respecting the Spirit. It is often a difficult task to bring their expressions into connection and harmony, either with themselves, or still more with their Christology. From this indistinctness and perplexity one point only is free, namely, the PERSONALITY of the Holy Spirit; here all the church-teachers are unanimous; they regard the Spirit as a self-subsistent personal being, a subject distinct from the Father and the Son. We except, on this point, the Apostolic Fathers, not because we believe that they made opposite representations: only in Hermas¹ there is an appearance of confounding the Son and the Spirit. But their language respecting the Spirit is, on this point, so detached and indistinct, that no dogmatical result can be drawn from it with certainty. Justin stands at the head of those church-teachers who distinctly adjudge to the Spirit a personal self-subsistent being and life. This distinctness might seem to authorise us to treat the question of personality with brevity; yet we are compelled against our wishes to enter into copious details, since on this ground, in spite of its clearness, the Anti-trinitarian bias of prejudiced historians of dogmatics, a most mischievous confusion has been raised. What Souverain² boldly asserted to the men of his age, that the most ancient church-teachers, and among them Justin, made no real distinction between the Logos and the Holy

¹ *Pastor.* 13, 5, 2, 5, sq. T. I. p. 104, sq.

² *Versuch ueber den Platonismus der Kirchenväter.* s. 329.

Spirit, has been, in modern times, wholly or partially received in many quarters as an article of faith, so that at last even impartial persons have subscribed to it. This opinion, particularly in reference to Justin, has not only been embraced by such critics as Semler,¹ Zeigler,² Lange,³ Schmidt,⁴ and Ammon,⁵ but even Nitzsch⁶ and Augusti⁷ have assented to it. But powerful remonstrances have been raised against this gross misrepresentation of the real convictions of the ancient church; investigators such as Keil,⁸ Münscher,⁹ Munter,¹⁰ Möhler,¹¹ and Baumgarten-Crusius,¹² independently and yet unanimously, have ascertained and proved that Justin, and the church after him, attributed to the Holy Spirit a constant, personal distinction from the Logos; yet so inveterate an error has still found some advocates: two of the latest inquirers in the department of ancient dogmatics, Georgii¹³ and Hasselbach,¹⁴ have so far at

¹ *Historische Sammlungen ueber die Beweisstellen in der Dogmatik. Zweites Stück.* (Halle, 1768,) S. 62, 65.

² *Theologische Abhandlungen*, I. S. 90.

³ *Dissertatio, in qua Justinus Mart. Apologia prima . . . sub examen vocatur*, II. p. 16, sqq. and, *Ausführliche Geschichte der Dogmen*, I. S. 107, 110, 116.

⁴ *Christologische Fragmente in Schmidt's Bibliothek für Kritik und Exegese des N. T.* I. 3, S. 361.

⁵ *Die Fortbildung des Christenthums zur Weltreligion* (2 Aufl.), II. S. 107, 116, 249.

⁶ *Theologische Studien*, I. 119, Anm. 2.

⁷ *Lehrbuch der christlichen Dogmengeschichte*, 293.

⁸ "Ob die ältesten christlichen Lehrer einem Unterschied zwischen dem Sohne und heiligen Geiste gekannt und welche Vorstellung sie sich davon gemacht haben," in *Flatt's Magazin für christliche Dogmatik und moral*, iv. S. 39.

⁹ *Handbuch der christ. Dogmengeschichte*, I. 401.

¹⁰ *Handbuch der ältesten christl. Dogmengeschichte*, I. 475.

¹¹ *Athanasius der Grosse und der Kirche seiner Zeit*, I. 40.

¹² *Lehrbuch der christ. Dogmengeschichte*, II. 1050.

¹³ *Dogmengeschichtliche, Untersuchung über die Lehre vom heiligen Geiste bei Justin d. M. in den Studien der evangel. Geistlichkeit Württembergs*, x. 2, S. 102, 107, 116, 118.

¹⁴ *Noch ein Wort über die Stelle in Justinus des Märts. Apologie*, I. 56, *theol. Stud. und Kritiken*, 1839.

least, fallen into this error, as to maintain that Justin, in his doctrine of the Spirit, wavered between two conflicting views, and that, in different passages of his writings, he had affirmed the personal identity as well as the distinction of the Logos and the Spirit. In undertaking therefore a fresh discussion of the subject, we have first of all to inquire into the grounds on which the assertion rests, that Justin constantly or occasionally confounded and identified the Logos and the Pneuma. These grounds are principally two; one, a passage in the Apology, where it is said (Apol. i. 33, p. 64, (p. 75, B.) τὸ πνεῦμα καὶ τὴν δύναμιν τὴν παρὰ τοῦ Θεοῦ οὐδὲν ἄλλο νοῆσαι θέμις· ἢ τὸν λόγον ὃς καὶ πρωτότοκος τῷ Θεῷ ἐστι.—“Therefore it is not lawful to consider the spirit and the power which is from God, as any other than the Logos, who is the first-born of God,”—from which it is inferred that Justin attributes no individual agency to the Spirit, inasmuch as he attributes the inspiration of the prophets, elsewhere the peculiar function of the Spirit, to the Logos equally with the Pneuma. Both points, more closely considered, give only an apparent support to the opinion under examination.

To begin with that expression in the Apology, to which, in general, such great weight is attached: Lange,¹ for example, says, “this passage is decisive, and I do not see how any one, after so plain a declaration, can still say that Justin does not consider the λόγος and the πνεῦμα as one subject.” This expression can only prove the personal identity of the Logos and the Spirit, when viewed out of the connection in which it is placed. Taken in its connection, it gives quite another sense. Justin is speaking, in the passage where it occurs, of the birth of Jesus, and labours to convince the heathen that this event was not, in the ordinary course of things, as a consequence of sexual intercourse, but owing to an immediate divine power

¹ Ausführl. *Geschichte der Dogmen*. I. 107. Compare also Souverain, p. 331, and Georgii, p. 116.

exerted on the Virgin Mary. According to a use of the term, adopted by other ecclesiastical writers, he calls the principle of the miraculous conception the Logos.¹ In order to give his assertion the stronger impress of credibility, he refers to the prophecy in Isaiah vii. 14, and connects with it the narrative in Luke i. 31, 35. The former proves that Jesus was to be born of a virgin, and the latter, that her conception was effected by the Logos. But, in the evangelical history, the causal principle of Mary's conception is called πνεῦμα ἅγιον and δύναμις ὑψίστου. This verbal discrepancy might appear to cast an uncertainty on the conclusion drawn from the former passage. In order to meet this difficulty, Justin adds the remark under consideration,—“By the Pneuma and power of God we are to understand nothing else than the Logos.” This remark, therefore, is very far from maintaining the identity of the Logos and the Pneuma in general, and in a dogmatical sense; it is rather purely exegetical; it amounts to no more than saying, “by the Pneuma mentioned in Luke i. 35, we are to understand the Logos.”² This identity Justin could maintain, inasmuch as he considered the Logos, according to his nature, to be a Pneuma, and the Logos is not unfrequently so termed by church-teachers, who unquestionably attributed personal self-subsistence to the Holy Spirit. Tertullian here furnishes an admirable commentary, not merely he frequently applies the term Pneuma to the Logos or Son of God,³ but

¹ See the VIth Chapter, Article 1, where the necessary proofs are given.

² Thus Onymus, correctly in essential points, explains the passage, (*dissert. exponens Justin. phil. et mart. de præcip. vel. christ. dogmat. sentent.* p. 25,) and Keil in *Flatt's Magazin* IV. 40. Baumgarten-Crusius differently in his *Lehrbuch der Christ. Dogm.* II. 1053.

³ Compare *adv. Marc.* 3, 16, T. I. p. 133, spiritus Creatoris qui est Christus.—3, 6, p. 111.—*adv. Hermag.* c. 18, T. II. p. 77.—*Apol.* c. 21, T. V. p. 43, nos etiam sermoni atque rationi itemque virtuti, per quæ omnia molitum deum ediximus propriam substantiam spiritum inscribimus. See *Bull defens. fid. Nican.* 1, 2, 5.—*Opera, ed Grabe,* p. 19.

principally because he interprets the passage in Luke i. 35, exactly in the same way as Justin : (*adv. Prax.* c. 26, T. II. p. 198,) *dicens* (the Angel, Luke i. 35,) "spiritus dei" etsi spiritum dei, tamen non directo deum nominem portionem totius intelligi voluit, quæ cessura erat in filii nomen, hic spiritus dei, idem erat Sermo. Sic enim Johanne dicente; "sermo caro factus est," spiritum quoque intelligimus in mentione sermonis; ita et hic sermonem quoque agnoscimus in nomine spiritus. Nam et spiritus substantia est sermonis et sermo operatio spiritus, et duo unum sunt.

In reference to the second point, which has been alleged to prove the personal confounding of the Logos and the Pneuma by Justin, namely, that he has attributed the inspiration of the prophets equally to the Logos and the Pneuma; it may, for the present, be left altogether undecided whether Justin is really chargeable with this confusion respecting the author of inspiration. The consequence drawn from these (whether true or false) premises, is at once set aside by the remark, that a confounding of agencies is not a confounding of persons. Tertullian confessedly distinguishes the Holy Spirit, in explicit terms, from the person of the Son, and yet he attributes the inspiration of the prophets equally to both.¹ This ambi-

¹ It would be useless to accumulate the passages in which Tertullian speaks of the Holy Spirit as a distinct divine personality. The fact is known and acknowledged on all hands. Only some passages may be pointed out, in which the African father ascribes the inspiration of the prophets sometimes to the Logos, sometimes to the Spirit. He speaks of the prophets as inspired by the Logos, *adv. Marc.* 3, 6, T. I. p. 111, 4, 13, p. 194,—*de præscript. hæret.* c. 13, T. II. p. 13,—*de resurrex. carn.* c. 22, T. III. p. 196; and, on the other hand, as inspired by the Spirit; *adv. Hermag.* c. 22, T. II. p. 83,—*adv. Prax.* c. 11, p. 164. In other church-teachers a similar vacillation may be found. For example, in Irenæus, *adv. hæres.* 1, 2, p. 48, 3, 11, p. 187, compared with 4, 37, p. 254, 257. In one passage he says, 2, 47, p. 156: *Scripturæ perfectæ sunt, quippe a verbo dei et spiritu ejus dictæ.* Compare also, Clem. *strom.* 5, 13, 85, T. III. p. 61, with 5, 14, 120, p. 82, and 6, 15, 126, p. 176.

guity, wherever it occurs, serves only to prove that the representations, respecting the Holy Spirit, were not yet dogmatically fixed.

Having thus adduced reasons for believing that the notion that Justin identified the Logos and the Spirit, rests upon no solid foundation, we shall now bring together the proofs by which the direct contrary will be established. They are numerous. In almost every part of Justin's writings we meet with attestations that the Martyr clearly distinguishes the Pneuma from the Logos, and regarded the former as a self-subsistent, personal being.

Of this kind are, first of all, the two passages in which Justin, to defend the Christians from the charge of atheism, names the objects of Christian veneration and worship; *Apol.* 1, 6, p. 47, (p. 56, C.) ἐκείνόν τε (Θεόν) καὶ τὸν παρ' αὐτοῦ υἱὸν ἐλθόντα καὶ τὸν τῶν ἄλλων ἐπομένων καὶ ἐξομωιουμένων ἀγαθῶν ἀγγέλων στρατὸν πνεῦμά τε τὸ προφητικὸν σεβόμεθα καὶ προσκυνούμεν,¹ and *Apol.* 1, 13, p. 51, (p. 60, D. E.) ἄδειοι μὲν οὖν ὥς οὐκ ἐσμέν, τὸν δημιουργὸν τοῦδε τοῦ παντὸς σεβόμενοι, τίς σωφρονῶν οὐχ ὁμολογήσει; Τὸν διδάσκαλόν τε τούτων γενόμενον ἡμῶν καὶ εἰς τοῦτο γεννηθέντα Ἰησοῦν Χριστόν, υἱὸν αὐτοῦ τοῦ ὄντως Θεοῦ μαθόντες καὶ ἐν δευτέρᾳ χώρᾳ ἔχοντες, πνεῦμά τε προφητικὸν ἐν τρίτῃ τάξει ὅτι μετὰ λόγου τιμῶμεν, ἀποδείξομεν.²

In both these passages the Pneuma stands, grammatically considered, in the same immediate relation of dependence on the governing verbs of adoration, as the other accusatives, and this verbal co-ordination, (allowing that Justin had not expressed himself ab-

¹ "But him and his Son, who came and taught us these things, and the host of all the good angels who follow and resemble him, and the prophetic Spirit, we reverence and adore."

² "That we are not atheists, but worship the Maker of the universe, what person of sound mind will not allow? Our teacher on these subjects, and who was born for the purpose, Jesus Christ, (whom we have learned, is the Son of the true God, and hold in the second place,)—and the prophetic Spirit in the third rank, we have shown that with reason we honour."

surdly) makes it necessary to regard the Pneuma as well as God, the Creator and the Son, as a special self-subsistent object of adoration. In the first passage the host of angels is placed between the Son and the Spirit; this would have been impossible if both the latter names had been only two different designations of one and the same personality. For what purpose could this twofold designation be used in such a connection, and with so forced and unnatural a concession. But, in the second passage, the Spirit is distinguished both by number and rank (*δευτέρα χώρα, πρώτη τάξις*) from the Son; how could this phraseology be rescued from the imputation of gross absurdity, if the Son and the Spirit were, in Justin's opinion identical? Both passages have for their object, as we have said, to clear the Christians from the charge of impiety; if Justin, in such a connection, in express opposition against the gods of heathenism, which were considered as personal beings, according to his expressly avowed intention, wished to shew that if the Christians did not worship the Grecian gods, which were in their opinion dæmons, yet still they had *their own* objects of worship,—if Justin, I say, in such a connection, had brought names together, which in part could not mean what the heathen would expect them to mean, which, instead of designating real beings, amounted to no more than pure tautology,—could we call this anything but disingenuous ambiguity? Verbally, and in fact, the two above-mentioned Trinitarian passages undeniably bear witness to the personal distinction between the Son and the Spirit.¹ This distinction lies

¹ If any one wishes to be convinced to what forced and harsh interpretations those persons must have recourse, who wish to bring the Trinitarian statements we have investigated into harmony with their assertion, that Justin knew nothing of the personal subsistence of the Holy Spirit, let him consult Lange's *Ausführliche Geschichte der Dogmen*. I. 110, 115. The reviewer of this work in Schmidt's *Bibliothek für Kritik und Exegese des N. T.* I. 3, S. 503, consults very much his own convenience, by cutting the knots which he cannot untie. He supposes that in all those passages where Justin assigns to the

at the basis of a third Trinitarian passage, which stands nearly related to the preceding, and speaks of Plato's acquaintance with the Christian Trinity. *Apol.* 1, 60, p. 79, (p. 93, B.) *δευτέρῳ μιν χῶρῳ*

Pneuma the third place, a later hand have inserted what a later age might seem to miss, in order to find this celebrated Father perfectly orthodox. It is extraordinary that a more frequent appeal has not been made to these passages of the Dialogue with Trypho, in which Justin speaks of the worship of the Father and the Son, without mentioning the Holy Spirit, in order to prove Justin's unacquaintedness with the personal existence and distinct divinity of the Holy Spirit. In the first, it is said, in reference to Isaiah xlii. 8, (*Dial. c. Tr. c. 65*, p. 163, (p. 290, B.)) : *νισήκατε, ὦ φίλοι, ὅτι ὁ Θεὸς λίγος δώσειν ταύτῃ δι' εἰς Φῶς ἰδῶν κατίσῃσι, δόξαν καὶ οὐκ ἄλλῃ τινὶ ἄλλ' οὐχ. ὡς Ἰφθ Τρύφων, ὡς ἑαυτῷ κατίχοντος τῷ Θεῷ τὴν δόξαν.*—"Do ye understand, my friends, that God declares he will give glory to him whom he has appointed for a light to the Gentiles, and to no other; but not, as Trypho said, as if God withheld glory from himself?" In another passage, Justin expresses himself thus (*c. Tr. c. 93*, p. 190, (p. 321, A.)) :—*ὁ ἐξ ὅλης τῆς καρδίας καὶ ἐξ ὅλης τῆς ἰσχύος ἀγαπῶν τὸν Θεόν. πλήρης Θεοσιβῆς γνώμης ὑπάρχων οὐδένα ἄλλον τιμῆσει Θεόν καὶ ἀγγέλων ἱκῆσιν ἂν τιμήσῃ Θεῷ βουλομένου, τὸν ἀγαπῶμεν ὅτ' αὐτοῦ τοῦ κυρίου καὶ Θεοῦ.*—"He who loves God with all his heart and all his strength, and is filled with a devout disposition, will honour no other God; yet he will honour that angel who is loved by the Lord and God himself."—Lastly, in a third passage, he puts this question to Trypho and his companions, (*c. 68*, p. 165, (p. 293, B.)) :—*μήτι ἄλλοι τινὰ προσκυνεῖται καὶ κύριον καὶ Θεόν λεγόμενον ἐν ταῖς γραφαῖς νοεῖτε εἶναι, πλὴν τοῦ ταῦτο ποιήσαντος τὸ πᾶν καὶ τοῦ Χριστοῦ.*—"Do you think that there is any other being mentioned in the Scriptures to be adored, both Lord and God, excepting him who made this universe and the Christ, who, by so many Scriptures, I have demonstrated was made man?"—Is unacquaintedness with these passages, or a feeling that they will not answer their purpose, the reason why the advocates of that identity have allowed them to lie unemployed? Which ever it be, at all events this keeping such passages out of sight is a fortunate tact. Justin's silence respecting the Spirit is, for the most part, purely accidental. He passes over this subject, because the Jewish opposition had raised doubts only against the divinity and worship of Christ, and only required answers to these doubts. But as far as that silence is intentional, it does not, at least, amount to a denial. This intentional silence proceeds from an apprehension

τῷ παρὰ Θεοῦ λόγῳ, ὃν κεχιάσθαι ἐν τῷ παντὶ ἔφη δίδωσι, (πλάτῳ) τὴν δὲ τρίτην τῷ λεχθέντι ἐπιφέρεισθαι τῷ ὕδατι πνεύματι (Gen. i. 2,) εἰπὼν· τὰ δὲ τρίτα περὶ τὸν τρίτον.—“For the second place he gives to the Logos of God who (he said) was impressed upon the universe,—but the third to the Spirit, who is said to have been borne over the waters, saying, but the third about the third.”¹ Here also the Spirit is distinguished from the Logos, not merely numerically, but likewise according to his dignity; and in both cases a recognition of a distinct personality of the Spirit is necessarily presupposed. The same recognition is farther necessary in all those passages in which there is still more direct mention of the divine Triad.² Thus, when referring to the rite of baptism, he says:—“In the name of God the Father of all, and Lord of our Saviour Jesus Christ, and of the Holy Spirit, they (the persons to be baptized) are bathed in water” (*empfange [die Tauf-] das Wasserbad*)—and “In the name of Jesus Christ, who was crucified under Pontius Pilate, and in

lest he should aggravate the aversion of Trypho, (who already had taken such decided offence at the Christian doctrine of the Son of God, that he called it blasphemous,) by an untimely introduction of the doctrine of the Spirit, which lay quite beyond the circle of Jewish speculation. Justin very intelligibly indicates this in the answer which he represents his opponent as making to the question proposed to him; πῶς τῷτο δυνάμιθα εἶναι ἡμολογῆσαι, ὁσέτι· εἰ καὶ ἄλλος τίς ἐστι πλὴν τοῦ πατρὸς μόνου, τῇ σαυτοῦτην ζήτησιν ἰσχυροσάμιθα;

¹ Τὰ δὲ τρίτα περὶ τὸν τρίτον. *Est Pseudo-Platon. epist. II. p. 312, E.* (vol. xi. p. 69,) locus difficillimus, qui quomodo recte explicandus sit, inter se discrepant. Certe a Patribus perperam ad christianam doctrinam transfertur. Cum Platone habent τρίτον περὶ τὰ τρίτα; sed Marano observante Proclus *Theolog. Platon. ii. c. 11*, eodem modo legit ac S. Martyr. quod argumento est non defuisse codices, in quibus hæc legendi ratio occurreret. v. *Justini Opera. recensuit, &c. J. C. T. Otto. Jenæ 1842, T. i. p. 256.*—[*Tr.*]

² *Apol. i. 61, p. 79, (p. 94, A.)* Ἐπ' ὀνόματος γὰρ τοῦ πατρὸς τῶν ὁλῶν καὶ υἱοῦ τοῦ σωτῆρος ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ καὶ πνεύματος ἁγίου τὸ ἐν τῷ ὕδατι ἵσται λυτρὸν ποιῶνται. Compare Tertull. *adv. Prax. c. 26, T. ii. p. 199*, novissime mandans (Christus discipulis) ut tingerent in patrem et filium et spiritum

the name of the Holy Spirit, who by the prophets foretold all the things relating to Jesus, he who is illuminated is baptized."¹ In describing the rite of the Supper, Justin says, "Thus bread and a cup of water and wine, is brought to the president of the brethren, who having received them, offers up praise and glory to the Father of all, through the name of the Son and of the Holy Spirit"²—and—"For all that we taste we bless the maker of all, through his Son Jesus Christ and through the Holy Spirit."³—All these passages presuppose the personal distinction of the Spirit from the Son.

With equal, if not with greater evidence, the subjective personal being of the Holy Spirit is shown from the multitude of passages in which Old Testament citations are made use of, and the Pneuma in his own peculiar character as the principle of prophecy fills the office of speaker, giving information respecting the Father and the Son. We shall quote only three of these passages, one from the larger Apology, and two from the Dialogue. The passage from the Apology is as follows; (Apol. 1, 40, p. 67, (p. 78, E. 79, A.) *πρὸς τοῦτοις καὶ λόγων ἐτέρων . . . καλῶς ἔχον καὶ οἰκείως ἐπιμνησθῆναι λελογίσμεθα, ἐξ ὧν μαθεῖν ὑμῖν πάρεστι, πῶς προτρέπεται ζῆν τοὺς ἀνδρώπους τὸ προφητικὸν πνεῦμα καὶ πῶς μηνύει . . . ὅτι αὐτὸν (Χριστὸν) υἱὸν καλεῖτ' ὁ θεὸς καὶ ὑποτάσσειν αὐτῷ πάντας ἐχθρούς ἐπηγγέλται.*—"And in addition, there are other words . . . we have thought excellent and suitable to be

sanctum, non in unum. Nam nec semel, sed ter, ad singula nomina in personas singulas tinguimur.

¹ *Apol. 1, 61, p. 80, p. 9, D. E.* Καὶ ἰσ' ὁνόματος δι' Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ τῷ ταρωθίντῳ ἐπὶ Ποντίῳ Πιλάτῳ καὶ ἰσ' ὁνόματος πνύματος ἁγίου, ὃ διὰ τῶν προφητῶν προεικήρυξε τὰ κατὰ τὸν Ἰησοῦν πάντα, ὃ φωτισζόμενος λάτεται.

² Ἐπειτα προσφέρεται τῷ προεσῳτῇ τῶν ἀδελφῶν ἄρτος καὶ ποτήριον ὕδατος καὶ πρῶματος, καὶ ὅτος λαβὼν αἶνον καὶ δέξαν τῇ πατρὶ τῶν ὅλων διὰ τοῦ ὁνόματος τοῦ υἱοῦ καὶ τοῦ πνύματος τοῦ ἁγίου ἀνατίμκει.

³ Ἐπὶ πάντις οἷς προσφερόμεθα ὑλογῶμεν τὸν ποιητὴν τῶν πάντων διὰ τοῦ υἱοῦ αὐτοῦ Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ καὶ διὰ πνύματος τοῦ ἁγίου.

mentioned. from which you may learn, how the prophetic spirit exhorts men to live, and how it declares that God calls him (Christ) *Son*, and promises to put all his enemies under him." In the Dialogue, Justin makes the following demand on Trypho and his companions, c. Tr. c. 56, p. 152, (p. 277, C.); *εἰ καὶ ἄλλον τινὰ θεολογεῖν καὶ κυριολογεῖν τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον φατὶ ὑμεῖς παρὰ τὸν πατέρα τὸν ὅλων καὶ τὸν Χριστὸν αὐτοῦ, ἀποκρίνασθε μοι*;—"Tell me, whether you assert that the Holy Spirit calls any other being God and Lord, besides the Father of all and his Christ?"—In reference to the incarnation of Jesus, he remarks; (c. Tr. c. 84, p. 181, (p. 310, B.) *διὰ παρθενικῆς μήτρας τὸν πρωτότοκον τῶν πάντων ποιημάτων σαρκοποιηθέντα ἀληθῶς παιδίον γενέσθαι, προλαβὼν αὐτὸ διὰ τοῦ προφητικοῦ πνεύματος, κατὰ ἄλλον καὶ ἄλλον τρόπον . . . προεκήρυξεν (ὁ Θεός).*—"God foretold that the first-born of all his works would be truly a child, being made flesh in the Virgin's womb, anticipating it by the prophetic Spirit in various ways."—Passages of this kind peremptorily exclude the non-personality and identity of the Spirit with the Logos. Speaking is attributed to the Spirit. What can be more clearly decisive of his personal existence?¹ The Spirit too, is introduced as speaking respecting the Son; how then can the Son and the Spirit be one subject? *Scripturæ omnes* (says Tertullian in his work against Praxeas, c. 11, T. ii. p. 163.) *et demonstrationem et distinctionem trinitatis ostendunt, a quibus et præscriptio nostra deducitur, non posse unum atque eundem videri, qui loquitur et de quo loquitur et ad quem loquitur.*

Three passages still remain, each of which exhibit the self-subsistence and personality of the Spirit with such irresistible force of evidence, that one of them has compelled Lange² to recognise this truth in the Dialogue with Trypho, the author of which he dis-

¹ No one can refer this speaking to a poetical personification, since it relates to dry forms of quotation.

² *Ausführliche Geschichte der Dogmen*, i. 172.

tinguishes (as is well known) from the author of the Apologies. The first stands in the longer Apology. Here Justin, in his zealous opposition to the Jewish opinion that the subject of the Old Testament theophanies was the Creator himself, makes the following exegetical remark, (*Apol.* 1, 63, p. 81, [p. 95, C.]) τὸ προφητικὸν πνεῦμα διὰ Ἡσαίου. . . . ἐλέγχων αὐτοὺς (Ἰουδαίους). . . . , εἶπεν ἔγνω βοῦς τὸν κτησάμενον (*Is.* i. 3.) καὶ Ἰησοῦς δὲ ὁ Χριστός ὅτι οὐκ ἔγνωσαν Ἰουδαῖοι, τί πατήρ καὶ τί υἱός, ὁμοίως ἐλέγχων αὐτούς, καὶ αὐτὸς εἶπεν οὐδεὶς ἔγνω τὸν πατέρα (*Matt.* xi. 27.) "The prophetic spirit, reproving the Jews by Isaiah, said, the ox knoweth its owner, and Jesus the Christ, because the Jews knew not what the Father was, and what the Son, in the same manner reproving them, also himself said, No man knoweth the Father."—In this remark two distinct subjects are evidently introduced as speaking, the Prophetic Spirit, and Jesus Christ; and that this distinction is not a mere empty play with titles, but denotes a real duality of persons, is rendered incontrovertible by the emphatic phrase καὶ αὐτός. The second passage has already been under consideration in our discussion respecting the Logos, and is, with some omissions, as follows; (*Dial. c. Tr.* c. 61, p. 157, [p. 284, A. B.]) ἀρχὴν πρὸ πάντων τῶν κτισμάτων ὁ Θεὸς γεγέννηκε δυνάμιν τινα ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ λογικὴν, ἥτις καὶ δόξα κυρίου ὑπὸ τοῦ πνεύματος τοῦ ἁγίου καλεῖται, ποτὶ δὲ υἱός, ποτὶ δὲ σοφία . . . ποτὶ δὲ ἀρχιστράτηγον ἑαυτὸν λέγει, ἐν ἀνδρώπῳ μορφῇ φανέντα τῷ τοῦ Ναυῆ Ἰησοῦ.—"God begat from himself, before all creatures, a beginning, a certain rational power, which, by the Holy Spirit, is called the glory of the Lord, but sometimes Son, sometimes Wisdom, . . . but sometimes he calls himself Captain of the Host, when he appeared in the form of a man to Joshua the son of Naue."—All comment is here superfluous; the self-personality of the Spirit is rendered quite palpable by the distinctive clauses ἥτις . . . ὑπὸ τ. πνεύματος τ. ἁ. καλεῖται and ἑαυτὸν λέγει. The third passage is expressed in the most positive terms; (*Dial. c. Tr.* c. 36, p. 134, [p.

255, B. C.) ἐπειδὴ οἱ ἐν οὐρανῷ ἄρχοντες ἰώρων ἀειδῆ καὶ ἄσιμον τὸ εἶδος καὶ ἄδοξον ἔχοντα αὐτόν, οὐ γνωρίζοντες αὐτόν, ἐπυνθάνοντο, τίς ἐστὶν οὗτος ὁ βασιλεὺς τῆς δόξης; καὶ ἀποκρίνεται αὐτοῖς τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον ἢ ἀπὸ προσώπου τοῦ πατρὸς ἢ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἰδίου, κύριος τῶν δυνάμεων αὐτὸς οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ βασιλεὺς τῆς δόξης. This passage depicts in a fanciful exposition of the 24th Psalm, the triumphant entrance of the risen and glorified Christ into heaven. To the inquiry of the Angels, who, unable to recognise the person of the suffering Redeemer in the splendour of his glorification, are doubtful respecting the name and character of the illustrious stranger, the Holy Spirit is represented as giving a reply. In the phraseology which introduces this reply, personality is directly ascribed to him. He has an ἴδιον πρόσωπον distinguished from the πρόσωπον of the Father, as well as from that of the κύριος τῶν δυνάμεων.

After testimonies so unimpeachable, facts so decisive, we think the question, whether Justin made an ontological distinction between the Logos and the Holy Spirit, and ascribed to the latter a personal existence, may be considered as settled in the affirmative. We tread upon more slippery ground when we proceed to enquire what representation Justin has given of the genesis and nature of the Spirit, what view he took of the relation of the Spirit to the Father and the Son, and what special sphere of operation he assigned to him. At all events, we must expect that our data will be in some measure uncertain.

And, in the first place, with respect to the question, what were Justin's opinions on the nature and origin of the Spirit, we may obtain a negative more easily than a positive result. We are able to show that Justin regarded the Spirit neither as an angel, nor, in general, as a created being, but we are not equally competent to point out distinctly what other representation he held respecting Him. We here enter on disputed ground. Principally through¹ Neander's influence, the opinion

¹ *Allgemeine Geschichte der christlichen Religion und Kirche.*
i. 3, s. 693.

entertained by the English theologian Samuel Clark,¹ has become, for a time, almost dominant, that Justin held the Holy Spirit to be a mere, though the principal created being in the spiritual world, and thus placed him in the class of angels, though at their head. This opinion has been approved and received by Bretschneider,² Baumgarten-Crusius,³ Dettinger,⁴ Otto,⁵ and Ritter.⁶ And yet no representation is so much opposite as this to the Biblical point of view and general feelings of the ancient church,—none more unfounded. Neander appeals, for the justification of his views, to two passages in Justin; one in the Dialogue, c. Tr. c. 116, p. 209, (p. 344, A.) where it is said: *ὡς (Χριστιανοῖς) ὁ διάβολος ἐφίστηκεν αἰὲ ἀντικείμενος καὶ πρὸς αὐτὸν ἔλκειν πάντας βουλούμενος, καὶ ὁ ἀγγέλους τοῦ Θεοῦ, τουτέστιν ἡ δύναμις τοῦ Θεοῦ ἡ πεμφθεῖσα ἡμῖν διὰ Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ ἐπιτιμᾷ αὐτῷ καὶ ἀφίσταται ἀφ' ἡμῶν.* Whom (i. e. the Christians,) the devil threatens with constant opposition, and seeks to draw them all to himself; and the Angel of God, that is the power of God sent to us by Jesus Christ, rebukes him, and he withdraws from us;” and the second, a passage in the Apology which we have already noticed,—(Apol. I, 6, p. 47, (p. 56, C.) *ἐκέλευον τε καὶ τὸν παρ' αὐτοῦ υἱὸν ἐλθόντα . . . καὶ τὸν τῶν ἄλλων ἐπομένων καὶ ἐξομοιου-*

¹ In the second of his treatises against Bull, published in 1695, *Brevis responsio ad Bulli defensionem fidei Nicænæ*, p. 105.

² *Handbuch der Dogmatik*, (4 Aufl.) I. 634.

³ *Lehrbuch der Christ. Dogmengeschichte*. II. 1054. “The most prevalent opinion in the ancient church was, probably, that this Spirit was regarded as the highest in the spiritual world, probably, therefore, as the highest angel.”—To this point belongs the noted passage in Justin. *Ap. l. 6.*— . . . “the Holy Spirit stands next to the angels, as the principal (*κατ' ἐξοχήν*) of them. Tryph. 128, elsewhere *αγγελος Θεοῦ* interchanges with *δύναμις πεμφθεῖσα*, therefore with the Holy Spirit.”

⁴ *Beiträge zu einer Theologie des Korans, in der Tübinger Zeitschrift f. Theologie*. 1837, II. 87.

⁵ *De Justin Mart. scriptis et doctrina*. (Jen. 1841, p. 138.)

⁶ *Geschichte der Philosophie*. (Hamb. 1841,) V. 303.

μένον ἀγαθῶν ἀγγέλων στρατὸν πνεῦμα τε τὸ προφητικὸν σεβόμεθα καὶ προσκυνούμεν. "But him, and the Son who came from him, . . . and the host of the other good angels following and imitating him, and the prophetic Spirit we reverence and worship." Neander believes that, in the first passage, the Holy Spirit is indicated by the phrase, "*the power of God*," which Jesus Christ sends to believers in their conflict against Satan, and the latter passage he translates the clause τῶν ἄλλων as referring to what is subsequently said of the prophetic Spirit, "We reverence the Son of God, and, indeed, the host of other angels imitating him, but especially the Holy Spirit." Neither of these two passages has the meaning which this learned enquirer assigns to them, as already has been attempted to be pointed out by Möhler;¹ and after Neander² had endeavoured to confirm his views by a vindication in reply to Möhler, has been again shown by Georgii³ and Haselbach.⁴ In the passage of the Apology, all the supposed evidence rests on the reference of the words τῶν ἄλλων to the prophetic Spirit; but this reference is, for lingual reasons, quite untenable. The collective supplementary notion "*other*," in a logically correct form of expression, generally relates to something preceding, not to something following. If the clause τῶν ἄλλων referred to the prophetic Spirit, the passage must have been thus expressed to suit Neander's translation;—καὶ τὸν τῶν τε ἄλλων ἐπομένων καὶ ἐξομοιουμένων ἀγαθῶν ἀγγέλων στρατὸν καὶ πνεῦμα τὸ προφητικὸν σεβόμεθα. But since this arrangement has not been chosen, it is doing violence to the language to justify the assumption of the Holy Spirit into the

¹ Ueber Justin Apologie. I. c. 6. Tübinger theolog. Quartal-schrift. 1833. I. 50, 58.

² Theologische Studien und Kritiken. 1833. III. 772.

³ Studien der evangelischen Geistlichkeit Wurtemberg's. X. 2, 71, 85.

⁴ Theologischen Studien u. Kritiken. 1839. II. 376. In the following discussion, we partly make use of what has been said by these writers, and partly pursue our own method.

class of angels from this passage. Nor is the passage in the Dialogue more favourable. Admitting, for the present, that in this passage the Holy Spirit is the chief subject of discourse, and is denominated by Justin, from his own free choice, ὁ ἄγγελος τοῦ Θεοῦ, yet we are by no means justified in taking the expression dogmatically. Justin uses the word ἄγγελος in a double sense, ontologically and etymologically: he denotes by it the order of angelic beings; but he also applies the word to all individuals, whom God employs to realize his purposes. In the latter sense he not merely calls the prophets ἄγγελοι,¹ but also very frequently terms the Logos ἄγγελος; partly as serving the Creator of the world generally,² and partly, because under the Old Testament dispensation, and after his incarnation, he made known to men the divine purposes and councils.³ Therefore if Justin applied the name ἄγγελος to the Holy Spirit, it could not reasonably be understood to indicate more than the relation of service in which the Spirit, like the Logos, stands to God; the Spirit is thereby a messenger, but not an angel of God. But the epithet ὁ ἄγγελος τοῦ Θεοῦ in the passage of the Dialogue is not one of Justin's free choice; it is a phrase taken from the Old Testament passage which the Apologist is

¹ *Dial. c. Tr. c. 75, p. 172, (p. 300, D.)*; ἄγγελοι καὶ ἀπόστολοι τοῦ Θεοῦ λέγονται οἱ ἀγγέλλειν τὰ παρ' αὐτοῦ ἀποστέλλόμενοι προφηταί.

² *Dial. c. Tr. c. 127, p. 221, (p. 357, B.)*; υἱὸν αὐτοῦ καὶ ἄγγελον ἐκ τοῦ ὑπηρετεῖν τῇ γνώμῃ αὐτοῦ.

³ *Apol. I. 63, p. 81, (p. 95, D.)*; ὁ λόγος τοῦ Θεοῦ . . . καὶ ἄγγελος καλεῖται καὶ ἀπόστολος. Αὐτὸς γὰρ ἀπαγγέλλει, ὅσα δεῖ γνωσθῆναι, καὶ ἀποστέλλεται μνησύν, ὅσα ἀγγέλλεται. *Dial. c. Tr. c. 56, p. 151, (p. 275, C.)*; c. 60, p. 157, (p. 283, C.) ; ἄγγελοι τοῦ τῶν ὅλων ποιητοῦ Θεοῦ καλεῖται καὶ νοῦται εἶναι, ἐκ τοῦ διαγγέλλειν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις τὰ παρὰ τοῦ πατρὸς καὶ ποιητοῦ τῶν πάντων. C. 76, p. 173, (p. 301, C.) ; Ἡσαΐας μεγάλῃς βουλῇς ἄγγελον αὐτὸν εἰπὼν, οὐχὶ τούτων, ὥσπερ ἰδίδασκιν ἰλθάν, διδάσκαλον αὐτὸν γιγινῆσθαι προεικήρυσεν ; ἃ γὰρ μεγάλη ἐβουλεύετο ὁ πατὴρ εἶς τι πάντας τοὺς ἐναρίστους γινόμεινους αὐτῷ καὶ γινησκομένους ἀνθρώπους καὶ τοὺς ἀποστάτας τῆς βουλῆς αὐτοῦ ἁμείως ἀνθρώπους ἢ ἀγγέλους, οὗτος μόνος ἀπαρκαλύπτως ἰδίδασκιν.

explaining, and in this connection cannot be considered either as a name or as a predicate of an actual real personality. In that part of the Dialogue where it occurs, Justin is engaged with the exposition of the prophecy Zechar. iii. 1, and explains it in the usual way as typical of Jesus and Christians.¹ After premising the remark—in order to guard against the supposition that the prophecy could be understood literally or historically—that the prophet Zechariah saw the High-priest Joshua, and the other subjects of whom the prophet speaks not really, but merely in ecstatic vision;² he places by the side of each object of this prophetic vision the antitypes in which he sees the fulfilment of the prophecy. The High-priest Joshua appears to him as the representative of the crucified High-priest Jesus; the soiled garment worn by that Joshua, signified to him the impurities and sins of Christians before their purification by the grace of Christ; the Satan standing at Joshua's right hand represented the Devil, who is incessantly hostile to Christians, and strives to seduce them; the Angel of God, who stands behind Joshua, is a symbol of the power of God, which Jesus bestows on his followers in their conflict with Satan; lastly, the flaming brand, which is, with difficulty, snatched out of the fire, typifies the Christians, as far as they are purified from their former sins, and are delivered from the fiery trial and persecution to which they are exposed from Satan and his emissaries. From his precautionary remark, and from this contrast of the prophetic image and its historical realization, it is very evident that Justin, in the words *ὁ ἄγγελος τοῦ Θεοῦ, τουτέστιν ἡ δύναμις τοῦ Θεοῦ ἡ πεμφθεῖσα ἡμῖν δια Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ*,—employed the word *ἄγγελος* neither of his own free choice, nor literally to make a distinct concrete personality. The words

¹ *Dial. c. Tr. c. 115, p. 208, (p. 342, C.)*; *Ζαχαρία ἐν παραβολῇ διηκνύντι τὸ μυστήριον τοῦ Χριστοῦ καὶ ἀποκινημένως κηρύσσονται πιστεύσαι ὀφείλονται.*

² *Dial. c. Tr. c. 115, p. 208, (p. 343, A.)*

ἄγγελος τοῦ Θεοῦ were given him by the Old Testament passage, which he wished to explain; in doing this, he took these words from the prophecy, and attached them to his exposition by means of *τουτίστι*; ¹ the ἄγγελος τοῦ Θεοῦ is the prophetic type; the δύναμις τοῦ Θεοῦ is the historical fulfilment of the type. The expression of Justin's under consideration, viewed in the connection of the passage, means in substance, this: the prediction of the prophet Zechariah, when it mentions an angel who withstands Satan, points to the power of God, which Jesus grants on his people in their conflict with Satan,—or inversely; the power of God, which Christians receive through Jesus, in their conflict with Satan, is, in the vision of Zechariah, allegorically represented as an angel. Consequently, the δύναμις τοῦ Θεοῦ of the Dialogue is explained by Justin, neither appellatively nor ontologically as an Angel. Hitherto we have not controverted the assertion of our opponent, that by the δύναμις τοῦ Θεοῦ, the Holy Spirit is to be understood; and have only attempted to show, that even on this supposition we are not warranted in numbering the Spirit among the Angels. But we must now go a step farther, and deny that the expression in the Dialogue can denote the Holy Spirit. It may not be of much weight in favour of this negative, that the Holy Spirit is in no other passage of Justin called a power of God; nor do we urge as an objection, that Justin was not acquainted with the narrative of the sending of the Holy Spirit on the day of Pentecost, and the promise of the Spirit contained in John's Gospel, since the

¹ *Τουτίστι* is used by Justin innumerable times as a connective between biblical passages and their interpretation. Thus in *Dial. c. Tr. c.* 30, p. 127, (p. 247, B.) ἀπὸ τῶν ἀλλοτριῶν, (Pa. xix. 13.) *τουτίστι* ἀπὸ τῶν ποτηρίων καὶ πλάνων πινυμάτων.—c. 49, p. 145, (p. 268, B.) τῆς φοβεῖας καὶ μεγάλης ἡμέρας (Malachi iv. 5,) *τουτίστι* τῆς διουτέρας παρούσης αὐτοῦ (Χριστοῦ)—c. 74, p. 171, (p. 300, A.) ; τὸ σωτήριον τοῦτο μυστήριον. (1s. xcvi. 2,) *τουτίστι* τὸ πᾶθος τοῦ Χριστοῦ.—c. 91, p. 188, (p. 318, D.) *παρατίθω* Σίντις, (Deut. xxiii. 17.) *τουτίστι* κατακυριότης.

first part of this objection is decidedly groundless, for in a passage of the longer *Apology* there is an indisputable reference to the Pentecostal effusion, *Apol.* 1, 50, p. 73, (p. 86, B.) But there is weight in the expression which Justin uses, in the same passage, where he explains the Angel of Zechariah as denoting the divine power communicated through Jesus to believing Christians; ὡς περ ἀπὸ πυρὸς ἐξεσπασμένοι ἐσμεν, ἀπὸ μὲν τῶν ἁμαρτιῶν τῶν προτέρων καθαριζόμενοι, ἀπὸ δὲ τῆς θλίψεως καὶ τῆς πυρώσεως, ἣν πυροῦσιν ἡμεῖς ὁ τε διάβολος καὶ οἱ αὐτοῦ ὑπηρέται πάντες, ἐξ ὧν καὶ πάλιν ἀποσπᾷ ἡμεῖς Ἰησοῦς ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ Θεοῦ.—“We are, as it were, snatched out of the fire, being purified from our former sins, and from the tribulation and the fiery trial with which the Devil and all his servants assay us, from which Jesus the Son of God again rescues us.”—

In this language, Justin plainly identifies the divine power which is vouchsafed to believers in their struggle against evil, with the person of Jesus, and accordingly, unless we suppose that Justin, within a few lines, could involve himself in such a confusion of ideas, a supposition totally groundless,—the δύναμις τοῦ Θεοῦ cannot be understood of the Holy Spirit, but only of Jesus himself, or rather of the spiritual, moral, divine power, which is imparted by God through the mediation of Christ to Christians for the conquest of evil. Indeed Justin nowhere represents the Holy Spirit as the principle of moral life, he never assigns to him the guardianship of Christians in their conflict with the wicked; but he says of Jesus, that he continually dwells in believers by his power;¹ and elsewhere makes an assertion, which is completely parallel with the language already quoted; c. Tr. c. 30, p. 128, (p. 247, C.) τὸν Θεὸν ἀεὶ διὰ Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ συντηροῦναι παρακαλοῦμεν, ἵνα μετὰ τὸ ἐπιστρέψαι πρὸς Θεὸν δι' αὐτοῦ ἄμωμοι ᾤμεν.—“We always beseech God that

¹ *Apol.* 1, 32, p. 63, (p. 74, B.) ἰν αἷς (Χριστιανοῖς) οἰκᾷ τὸ παρὰ Θεοῦ σπινθηρμα, ὃ λόγος.—*Dial.* c. Tr. c. 54, p. 149, (p. 273, D.) ἰν οἷς ἀεὶ δύναμις παύεται.

we may be preserved through Jesus Christ; that after turning to God, we may be spotless through him."—Thus the two passages on which the opinion has been founded, that Justin held the Holy Spirit to be only an Angel, though the most exalted, are proved to be utterly inadequate to support such a notion. But it is not enough that this opinion is destitute of satisfactory exegetical support; the representation which the Martyr gives of the nature of angels, subverts it, as Georgii has already remarked,¹ by dogmatical necessity. Justin subjected angels to a twofold limitation, bordering almost on human infirmity. He not merely represented them as naturally peccable, and confined their intelligence within very narrow bounds,² but also imputed to them the

¹ *Studien der evangelischen Geistlichkeit Württemberg's* X. 2, 78.

² Justin infers this narrowness of intelligence from Psalm xxiv. 7. *Dial. c. Tr. c. 36*, p. 134, (p. 255, B. C.) Möhler (*Tübinger theol. Quartalschr.* 1833, I. 52,) makes use of the passage in the Dialogue, to prove that Justin set the Holy Spirit above the collective angelic order, the highest finite spirits; "above the angelic order I say, not merely above angels, with the exception of himself." However little anything in the shape of argument can be found against the object of this proof, however certainly Justin had exalted the Spirit above the sphere of finite natures, yet is the passage in the Dialogue unsuited to furnish weapons for this truth. When Möhler argues, that in it the Holy Spirit is brought forward as instructing the chiefs of Heaven (τὰς ἐν ἑρηνῷ ἄρχοντας) therefore not angels simply, but their leaders; when he adds, "what no one knew but God, is here communicated to the whole order of angels by the Spirit;" he has overlooked that the expression οἱ ἐν ἑρηνῷ ἄρχοντες (as it appears with the greatest clearness from the parallel passage in *Dial. c. Tr. c. 85*, p. 182, (p. 311, C.) ἄγγελοι καὶ δυνάμεις, οἷς ὁ λόγος ὁ τοῦ προφητείας τοῦ διὰ Δαβὶδ [κλινοῦ] ἰσχυροῦ τοῦ πύλας, ἵνα εἰσέλθῃ οὗτος ὁ ἐκ νεκρῶν ἀναστὰς κύριος τῶν δυνάμεων,—“Angels and powers whom the word of prophecy by David commands to lift up the gates, that this Lord of powers risen from the dead may enter,”—denotes not the chief of the angels, but the angels simply as the powers of heaven; he has, besides, not observed that the expression, even if it were used to designate the highest angels,

want of physical enjoyments. Could Justin rank the Holy Spirit with natures so limited, although at their head, and at the same time, insert him as a member of the divine Triad? Impossible! In regarding the Spirit as a member of the divine Tri-personality, as he does, it is at the same time implied, that he could reckon him among the angels.

But perhaps he places the Spirit among created beings generally? This question is in part identical with the preceding, and so far is already answered; as far as it is distinct, it is somewhat more generalized, but, like the former, must be met by a negative. As it was opposed to the ancient Christian views in general, to regard the Holy Spirit as created, to whatever elevation the idea of a created being may be carried—among the church-teachers before Origen, not one can be found who taught that the Spirit was a created being—so Justin opposed this error in the most decided manner by the Canon which he lays down on the occasion of making the remark, that God had created angels and men free, and therefore could and would justly punish them for all the evil which proceeded from them; *Apol. ii. 7, p. 93, (p. 45, E.)* γυνητοῦ παντὸς ἧδε ἡ φύσις, κακίας καὶ ἀρετῆς δεξιὸν εἶναι.—“Of all created beings it is the nature to be receptive of vice and virtue.”—This Canon makes liability to sin an essential property of *all* creatures; if Justin then had placed the Holy Spirit in the category of created beings, he must also have assumed the possibility of his sinning,—an assumption which amounts to sheer blasphemy.

But if Justin gives no support to the representation of the genesis of the Spirit as a created being, how has he conceived that genesis? Unquestionably as an emanation or generation from the divine essence.

could not without something more be identified with the idea of a class; and that though the Holy Spirit were represented as teacher of the chief, or the collective angelic order, he nevertheless might be reckoned as belonging to the class of angels.

This opinion cannot be proved, indeed, unless the common appellation of the Spirit as πνεῦμα τοῦ Θεοῦ¹ be admitted as a species of proof. For even the passage of the larger Apology, in which a concealed allusion to the generation of the Spirit may appear to be, inasmuch as the Logos is called πρῶτον γέννημα τοῦ Θεοῦ,² is not available, since Justin does not always connect with γέννημα the strict idea of generation, but applies it to the original divine creation of the lower animals.³ Yet the analogy of faith in the whole ancient Church, the manner in which Justin represents the impersonation of the Word, renders the supposition highly probable that Justin would have conceived the origin of the Spirit, had the question been fully brought before his mind, as an emanation or generation from God. But it remains quite undecided, whether he considered this procession as immediately from God, or mediately through the Logos.

With more confidence than his genesis and nature, the position is ascertainable which Justin assigns to the Holy Spirit, in his relation to the Father and the Son; it is that of subordination, and of dependance on both. That subordination is indicated by the third place, which the Spirit, as often as he is mentioned in connection with the Father and the Son, regularly occupies; but it is also very evident, from the direct assertion which is found in two of the trinitarian passages already quoted,⁴ that the Spirit occupied the third rank, and was honoured by Christians in the third degree. In reference to the asserted dependance, it is deserving of notice, that Justin represents the Spirit before the incarnation as exclusively at the disposal of the Father, but after that event of the Logos.

¹ *Apol.* 1, 60, p. 79, (p. 93, B.)—1, 64, p. 82, (p. 97, A.)—*Dial. c. Tr.* c. 49, p. 145, (p. 268, C.)—c. 88, p. 185, (p. 315, B.)

² *Apol.* 1, 21, p. 56, (p. 66, E.)

³ *Dial. c. Tr.* c. 84, p. 181, (p. 310, B.) πάντα ζῶα λίγῃ θεῷ ἐκείνῳ ἐγενήθη.

⁴ *Apol.* 1, 13, p. 51, (p. 60, E.)—1, 60, p. 79, (p. 93, B.)

The Old Testament prophets received the various powers of the Spirit from God;¹ God bestowed the Spirit on the prophets,² on Elias and John;³ he made use of the Spirit as the principle of inspiration for the prophets.⁴ But after the Logos had commenced his incarnate existence and operation, the Spirit and the power of the Spirit were at his command. The powers of the Spirit bestowed on the prophets were concentrated in his person, and he it is who again brings them into action when he transfers them to believers.⁵

¹ *Dial. c. Tr. c. 87, p. 185, (p. 314, D.)*—οἱ παρ' ὑμῖν προφηταὶ ἑκάστος μίαν τινὰ ἢ καὶ διυτίραν δύναμιν παρὰ τοῦ Θεοῦ λαμβάνοντες, ταῦτα ἰσχύουσιν καὶ ἱλάσθαι, ἃ καὶ ἡμῖς ἀπὸ τῶν γραφῶν ἰμάσθωμεν.

² *Coh. ad Græc. c. 10, p. 15, (p. 11, C. D.)*—c. 32, p. 30, (p. 30, D.)

³ *Dial. c. Tr. c. 49, p. 146, (p. 269, B.)*

⁴ *Apol. 1, 33, p. 64, (p. 74, E.)*—ἃ ἡ ἀπιστία . . . , ταῦτα ὁ Θεὸς προμύνηται διὰ τοῦ προφητικοῦ πνεύματος μίλλειν γίνεσθαι.—1, 44, p. 70, (p. 82, B.)—*Dial. c. Tr. c. 84, p. 181, (p. 310, B.)*

⁵ *Dial. c. Tr. c. 87, p. 185, (p. 314, C. 315, A.)*—ταύτας τὰς κατηριθμημένας τοῦ πνεύματος δυνάμεις, οὐχ ὡς ἰδιοῦς αὐτοῦ τοῦ ὄντος, φησὶν ὁ λόγος, (Is. xi. 2.), ἐπιηλυθῆναι ἐκ' αὐτὸν (Χριστόν) ἀλλ' ὡς ἐκ' ἐκείνου ἀνάπαυσιν μελλουσῶν ποιῆσθαι, ταυτίσθαι ἐκ' αὐτοῦ πύξας ποιῆσθαι, τοῦ μηκέτι ἐν τῷ γίνῃ ὑμῶν κατὰ τὸ παλαιὸν Ἰσος προφήτας γινῆσθαι Ἀναπαύσατο οὖν, ταυτίσθαι ἑαυτὸν, ἰλθόντος ἐκείνου, μὴ δὲ τῆς οἰκονομίας ταύτης τῆς ἐν ἀνθρώποις αὐτῷ γινομένης χρόνις παύσασθαι ἰδίᾳ αὐτὰ ἀφ' ὑμῶν καὶ ἐν τούτῳ ἀνάπαυσιν λαβόντα πάλιν, ὡς ἐκπροφῆταις γινῆσθαι δόματα, ἃ ἀπὸ τῆς χάριτος τῆς δυνάμεις τοῦ πνεύματος ἐκείνου τοῖς ἐκ' αὐτοῦ πιστεύουσιν δίδωσιν, ὡς ἄξιον ἑαυτοῦ ἰσίσταται. c. 39, p. 136, (p. 258, A. B.)—"These powers of the Spirit which have been enumerated, the Scripture saith, came upon him, (Christ,) not because he was in need of them, but that they might rest on him; that is, find a limit in him, so that prophets, according to the ancient custom, should no longer be in your race. The Spirit rested, that is, ceased, when he came, on the establishment of whose dispensation it behoved these gifts should cease among you; and resting in him, there will be a renewal of gifts, (as has been prophesied,) which he will grant to those who believe on him from the grace of the power of his Spirit, as he deems each individual worthy."—Georgii, (*Studien der evang. Geistlichkeit Württemberg's X. 2, s. 168,*) has misunderstood the passage quoted above, in supposing that it

The peculiar sphere of the Holy Spirit's operations is the illumination and inspiration of the prophets, considered partly as interpreters in general of the divine will, and specially as heralds of the Messianic times. The Spirit is not only the principle of the Old Testament prophecies,—but he reveals to the prophets divine and heavenly things,¹—he teaches them the true knowledge of God,²—the history of creation,³—the reality of moral freedom;⁴—he exhorts men, through them, to moral purity,⁵—and punishes obdurate hearts.⁶ Justin occasionally alludes to other operations of the Spirit. He ascribes to him the anointing and installation of the Jewish kings;⁷ the Apostles, on the day of Pentecost, were filled with power from

implies a complete merging of the Holy Spirit in the personality of the Logos. "The Spirit," he says, "appears here as evanescent, as if it had a self-subsistence, until the appearing of Jesus, but then passed over to Jesus, and, from that time, subsisted partly as the internal being of Christ, and partly manifested in the form of *λόματα*." But in that passage there is no intimation of an absorption of the personality of the Spirit by Jesus. Justin maintains nothing more than that Christ concentrated in himself those powers of the Holy Spirit, which, before his incarnation, had been bestowed on the prophets, and allowed them to shine forth from himself for different purposes. Individual powers of the Spirit are not the Spirit himself. His personal being was in no degree renounced or impaired by the communication of his powers to the Old Testament prophets; and as little could his personality sustain an injury when Christ received into himself these powers that had, long before, emanated from the Spirit

¹ *Coh. ad Gr.* c. 8, p. 13, (p. 9, B.)

² *Coh. ad Gr.* c. 35, p. 32, (p. 32, E.)

³ *Apol.* 1, 59, p. 78, (p. 92, C.)

⁴ *Apol.* 1, 44, p. 69, (p. 81, B.)

⁵ *Apol.* 1, 40, p. 67, (p. 78, E.)

⁶ *Apol.* 1, 63, p. 81, (p. 95, C.)—*Dial. c. Tr.* c. 37, p. 134, (p. 255, D.)

⁷ *Dial. c. Tr.* c. 52, p. 148, (p. 272, B.) *τὸ ἐν ταῖς προφήταις πνεῦμα καὶ τοὺς βασιλεῖς ὑμῖν ἔχει καὶ καθεῖσθαι.* In a subsequent passage the same function appears to be ascribed to Christ; *c. Tr.* c. 86, p. 184, (p. 313, B.) *οἱ βασιλεῖς πάντες καὶ οἱ χεῖροι ἀπὸ αὐτοῦ (Χριστοῦ) μετίσχουσιν καὶ βασιλεῖς καλεῖσθαι καὶ χεῖροι.*

on high;¹ and he calls Christians those who are baptised with the Holy Spirit.² Of a continued operation of the Spirit on Christians he has nothing to say: he also regards the heathen world as hermetically closed against it. Even the illumination of the prophets he does not ascribe to the Spirit without some deductions. The Logos likewise exercised, in his office as teacher (before the incarnation) of the collective human race, and especially as the subject of the divine appearances to the prophets, an enlightening influence. Only the inspiration of the latter in a more restricted sense, namely, the aid afforded in the conception of the Old Testament Scriptures, is ascribed exclusively to the Holy Spirit. Justin decidedly expresses himself, on this point, in the Exhortation to the Greeks, and the Dialogue with Trypho;³ while, on the contrary, not a single passage can be produced from these treatises in which the Logos is mentioned as the principle of inspiration to the prophets.⁴ And, where quotations are introduced, the Logos never appears as the inspirer, but either God, or, most frequently, the Holy Spirit. When, as it often happens,⁵ the quotation is prefaced with the formula *ὁ λόγος φησίν*, *λόγος* means Scripture, or expression, as is shewn by the interchange of the plural for the singular, as, for example, *οἱ λόγοι κηρύσσουσιν*.⁶ Similarly in the formula,

¹ *Apol.* 1, 50, p. 73, (p. 86, B.)

² *Dial. c. Tr.* c. 29, p. 127, (p. 246, C.)

³ *Coh. ad Gr.* c. 8, p. 13, (p. 9, B.)—c. 10, p. 15, (p. 11, C. D.)—c. 35, p. 32, (p. 32, E.)—*Dial. c. Tr.* c. 7, p. 109, (p. 224, D.)—c. 77, p. 174, (p. 303, A.)—c. 114, p. 207, (p. 341, B. C.)

⁴ When Georgii (p. 111,) appeals to the words, *Dial. c. Tr.* c. 128, p. 221, (p. 358, B.) *καὶ λόγοι καλῶσιν, ἰσχυρὰ καὶ τὰς παρὰ τῷ πατρὶς ἑμὴς φέροι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις*, two things are to be recollected, that these are not Justin's own words, and that they do not relate to inspiration, in the strict sense, but to the theophanies.

⁵ *Dial. c. Tr.* c. 49, p. 145, (p. 268, A.)—c. 54, p. 149, (p. 272, B.)—c. 60, p. 157, (p. 283, D.)—c. 77, p. 174, (p. 303, A.)—c. 93, p. 190, (p. 321, B.) &c.

⁶ *Dial. c. Tr.* c. 63, p. 160, (p. 287, B.)

ὁ προφητικὸς λόγος σημαίνει¹ the word λόγος is not to be taken personally, but means, *the prophetic Scripture or expression*. This is proved by the parallel expression ὁ λόγος τῆς προφητείας λέγει;² but especially by that passage of the Dialogue where the formula ὁ λόγος ὁ τῆς προφητείας τῆς διὰ Δαβὶδ [κελεύει] alternates with the other, ὁ λόγος τοῦ Δαβὶδ ἀπέδειξεν.³ Lastly, such modes of expression as ἐξηγούμενος διὰ Μωσέως ὁ λόγος τοῦ Θεοῦ τὰ περὶ Ἰακώβ οὕτως φησιν,⁴ are not to be taken as evidence that, in the Dialogue, the Logos is represented as the author of prophetic utterance; for, elsewhere, in similar connections, the phrase ὁ λόγος τοῦ Θεοῦ is interchanged with ἡ γραφή, as, ἡ γραφή ἐξηγουμένη ἡμῖν . . . , οὕτως ἔρη;⁵ and the unwonted use of the preposition διὰ finds, in some degree, an analogy in the expression, προεβόδη, τοῦ προφήτου εἰπόντος διὰ τοῦ προφητικῷ πνεύματος.⁶ In the larger Apology, indeed, Justin appears to waver in determining the principle of prophetic inspiration. Sometimes he describes the prophets as dependent on the Holy Spirit,⁷ at other times on the Logos.⁸ But this ambiguity is merely apparent. His true and firm doctrine is, that the prophets spoke and wrote exclusively under the inspiration of the Holy Spirit.

¹ *Dial. c. Tr. c. 56*, p. 151, (p. 275, D.)—c. 129, p. 222, (p. 358, D.)

² *Dial. c. Tr. c. 30*, p. 127, (p. 247, B.)

³ *Dial. c. Tr. c. 85*, p. 182, (p. 311, C.)

⁴ *Dial. c. Tr. c. 58*, p. 155, (p. 280, C.)—c. 62, p. 158, (p. 285, A.)—c. 87, p. 184, (p. 314, A.)

⁵ *Dial. c. Tr. c. 135*, p. 227, (p. 365, A.)

⁶ *Apol. 1*, 40, p. 67, (p. 78, C.)

⁷ *Apol. 1*, 31, p. 62, (p. 72, B.)—Θεοῦ προφηταί, δι' ὧν τὸ πνεῦμα προσηκούει τὰ γινώσκονται μύλλοντα.—1, 61, p. 80. (p. 94, E.)—πνεύματος ἁγίου, ὃ διὰ τῶν προφητῶν προσηκούει τὰ κατὰ τὸν Ἰησοῦν πάντα.

⁸ *Apol. 1*, 33, p. 64, (p. 75, D.)—ἔτι οὐδενὶ ἄλλῳ διαφθοροῦνται οἱ προφητιούντες εἰ μὴ λόγῳ Θεοῦ, καὶ ὑμῖς φήσιν.—1, 36, p. 65, (p. 76, D.)—ἔτι τὰς λίξεις τῶν προφητῶν λιγομέναις ὡς ἀπὸ προσώπου ἀκούηται, μὴ ἀπ' αὐτῶν τῶν ἱμνισμῶν λίγισθαι νομίστηι, ἀλλ' ἀπὸ τοῦ κινούντος αὐτοὺς Θεοῦ λόγου.—2, 10, p. 95, (p. 49, A.)

He quotes single prophetic expressions, and deduces them never from the Logos, but without exception from the Spirit; and even, in the very place where, in laying down an exegetical canon, he makes the remark, that the divine Logos excited the prophets, he places, nevertheless, the name of the Holy Spirit at the head of the prophetic citations which he adduces to illustrate that canon. That apparent confounding of the Logos and the Spirit only occurs where Justin expresses himself in general respecting the principles of the prophetic inspiration; and, on these occasions, he makes an effort to accommodate the representation of Christian truth to heathen modes of thinking. The Holy Spirit was, both in name and idea, foreign to the heathen; and, in order to render the topics in which the mention of the Spirit occurs, more accessible to the heathen understanding, Justin sometimes interchanges the Spirit with the Logos. That this accommodation of phraseology really exists, that it is not a hasty supposition, may be inferred from various traces of it elsewhere; it may be gathered from the circumstantial designation with which Justin introduces the Holy Spirit in the Exhortation to the Greeks;¹ it is also a proof of it, that, in the Apology, whenever the Spirit is referred to, he almost always bears the title "*prophetic*," so significant to the heathen; while, in the Dialogue with Trypho, the epithet "*holy*" is by far the most usual.²

¹ *Coh. ad Gr. c. 8, p. 13, (p. 9, A.) ἡ ἀνωθεν ἐπὶ τοὺς ἁγίους ἄνδρας καταλθούσα δαριά.*—c. 10, p. 15, (p. 11, C.) ἡ ἀνωθεν ἐπὶ τοὺς ἁγίους ἄνδρας θεία καὶ προφητικὴ κατιούσα δαριά.—c. 32, p. 30, (p. 30, D.) ἡ ἀνωθεν παρὰ τοῦ καταύσου ἐπὶ τοὺς ἁγίους ἄνδρας δαριά, ἢ πνεῦμα ἅγιον ἐνομάζουσιν οἱ ἱεροὶ προφῆται.

² The expression πνεῦμα προφητικόν occurs in the Apology two and twenty times; in the Dialogue only five times. Inversely the phrase πνεῦμα ἅγιον is in the Dialogue twenty-eight times; in the Apology only four times (twice in quoting the baptismal formula, and twice in mentioning the person of the Trinity.) The title πνεῦμα τοῦ is applied twice to the Spirit in the Apology (1, 60, p. 79, [p. 93, B.] 1, 64, p. 82, [p. 97, A.]; and twice in the Dialogue, (c. 49, p. 145, [p.

In reference to the kind and manner of the indwelling of the Holy Spirit in the prophets, Justin observes, that each individual prophet permanently possessed one or the other power of the Spirit as a personal distinction; as for example, Solomon, the spirit of wisdom; Daniel, the spirit of insight and of counsel; Moses, the spirit of strength and of piety; Elias, the spirit of fear; and Isaiah, the spirit of knowledge;¹ but the fulness of the Spirit, bestowed on one prophet, might be transferred during his lifetime, as well as after his death, to another prophet, and was actually so transferred, as from Moses to Joshua, from Elias to John the Baptist, and, accordingly, that all the prophets were not filled with the Spirit in an equal measure, though they all partook of the spirit of truth and holiness.²

268, C.]; c. 88, p. 185, [p. 315, B.]); the name *Θεῖον πνεῦμα* occurs once in the Apology, (1, 32, p. 63, [p. 74, A.]; and twice in the Dialogue, (c. 7, p. 109, [p. 224, D.] c. 9, p. 210, [p. 226, D.]) The double predicate *τὸ ἅγιον προφητικὸν πνεῦμα* occurs in *Apol.* 1, 44, p. 69, (p. 81, B.) 1, 53, p. 74, (p. 88, D.) and in *Dial.* c. Tr. c. 32, p. 129, (p. 249, E.) c. 56, p. 151, (p. 275, C.) To the Dialogue exclusively belongs the phrase *τὸ τοῦ Θεοῦ προφητικὸν πνεῦμα*, (c. 49, p. 145, [p. 269, A.]; and the Apology alone contains the triple designation *τὸ Θεῖον ἅγιον προφητικὸν πνεῦμα*, (1, 32, p. 63, [p. 73, C.]

¹ *Dial.* c. Tr. c. 87, p. 185, (p. 314, D.) σοφίας πνεῦμα Σολομῶν ἰσχύι, συνίστως δὲ καὶ βουλῆς Δαυὶδ, ἰσχύος δὲ καὶ εὐσεβείας Μωϋσῆς, καὶ Ἡλίας φόβου καὶ γνώσεως Ἡσαΐας· καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι αὐτῶν, ἢ μίαν ἱκανότητα ἢ ἑκάστην ἀλλαντὶνὰ μὲν ἄλλαν δυνάμειν ἔχον· οἷον καὶ Ἰερειμίας καὶ οἱ δάδαικα καὶ Δαβὶδ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι ἀπλῶς, ἵνα γινώσκωσι παρ' ὑμῶν προφητῶν

² *Dial.* c. Tr. c. 49, p. 145. sq. (p. 269, A. B.) τὸ ἐν Ἡλίῳ τοῦ Θ εὐ γινόμενον προφητικὸν πνεῦμα καὶ ἐν Ἰωάννῃ γέγονε . . . Ὡς οὖν ἴσιν ὅντος τότε ἐν ἀνδράσιν τοῦ Μωϋσῆος, μετεβήκεν ἐπὶ τὸν Ἰησοῦν ὁ Θεὸς ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐν Μωϋσῇ πνεύματος, οὕτως καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ Ἡλίου ἐπὶ τὸν Ἰωάννην ἰδ.Θεῖν, ὁ Θεὸς δυνατὸς ἢ ποιῆσαι ἵνα ὡς πρὶν ὁ Χριστὸς ἐν τῇ πρώτῃ παρουσίᾳ ἄδοξος ἐφάνη, οὕτως καὶ τοῦ πνεύματος τῷ ἐν Ἡλίᾳ πάντως κατεβήκεν, ὡς τοῦ Χριστοῦ, ἄδοξος ἢ πρώτη παρουσία τοῦ Χρ.

CHAPTER IV.

THE DOCTRINE OF THE CREATION.

ARTICLE I.

THE CREATION IN GENERAL.

The universe, in its *becoming* and its *being* (*in ihrem Werden und Sein*), the starting point of an awakened philosophy, has, from the beginning, formed one of the principal rocks on which adventurous reason, left to itself, has foundered. Even after Grecian speculation had advanced beyond the crude views of the earliest cosmogonists, it attained, even in its most flourishing state, no farther than to consider the universe as a fortuitous concourse of atoms, or pantheistically to deify collective nature, or to conceive of the creation of the universe dualistically, merely as a formation out of the pre-existing matter. Hence it not unfrequently involved itself in the fearful consequence of fatalism, and could only consider existing evil as a necessity of nature. When the church-teachers laboured to introduce, into the belief of their age, the biblical doctrine of the creation, which first and alone afforded the required solution of the cosmical enigma, they did this generally in express opposition against the errors of the heathen cosmology. In combating the notion of the eternity of matter, and the fortuitous formation of the universe, they introduced the development of Christian truth, that the universe, both in matter and form, was the temporal product of a free creation, divine intelligence, and omnipotence. When they contradicted the heathen fatalism, and the assumed necessity of evil, they also laid down the Christian doctrine of a superintending but not compulsive divine providence; they shewed that the evil

in the world was only accidental, partly the produce of the corrupting influence of dæmons,—partly of the moral fall of man,—partly of the increasing infirmities of the world. But their cosmological attempts did not stop here. Since the Christian Gnostics, for the solution of their problem πῶς το κακόν; applied themselves principally to the question respecting the origin of the universe, which they deduced, on the principles of emanation and dualism, from a finite being called Demiurgos, either subordinate or hostile to the Supreme God;—the church-teachers found themselves compelled to set, in the most impressive light, the doctrine that the Supreme God himself created the universe out of nothing by his own Son.

Justin, in laying down his doctrine of creation, (not polemically but, for the most part, antithetically) proceeded, in full agreement with the church doctrine of the Scriptural truth, that the universe, both in material and form, was the work of the absolute creative Deity. He considered the unbegotten God as peculiarly the first cause of the universe, (and, on this account, calls him frequently the Creator of the universe,¹ sometimes Creator and Maker of all things,²—sometimes Lord and Father of all,³—sometimes Father and maker of all things,⁴ though, in further unison

¹ *Apol.* 2, 5, p. 92, (p. 44, A.) ὁ θεὸς τὸν πάντα κόσμον ποιήσας.—*Dial. c. Tr.* c. 55, p. 150, (p. 274, B.)

² *Dial. c. Tr.* c. 16, p. 117, (p. 234, B.); ὁ ποιητὴς τῶν ὅλων θεός.—*Apol.* 1, 13, p. 50, (p. 60, C.) δημιουργὸς τοῦδε τοῦ παντός. Lastly, Justin uses the two expressions, ποιητής and δημιουργός, as perfectly synonymous. The distinction which is made between them in *Coh. ad Gr.* c. 22, p. 23, (p. 21, C.) is Platonic, and one which Justin by no means adopted; ὁ μὲν ποιητὴς αὐτὸς ἰστέον ὑποσυνδύμενος ἐν τῇ ἰαυτῇ δυνάμει καὶ ἰξουσίᾳ ποιῶν τὸ ποιοῦμενον· ὁ δὲ δημιουργὸς ἐν τῇ τῆς δημιουργίας δυνάμει ἐν τῇ ὕλῃ αἰληφώς, κατασκευάζει.

³ *Apol.* 1, 61, p. 80, (p. 94, D.); τῷ πατρὶ τῶν ὅλων καὶ διέπνυεν θεῷ.—*Dial. c. Tr.* c. 108, p. 202, (p. 335, D.)—*de resurrect.* c. 1, p. 588, C.

⁴ *Apol.* 1, 8, p. 47, (p. 57, A.) θεῷ τῷ πάντων πατρὶ καὶ δημιουργῷ—1, 63, p. 81, (p. 96, B.)

with the Scripture doctrine, and in conformity to the important distinction between the revealed and revealing God, he regards the Logos¹ as the immediate creative principle, as the real architect of the universe, and in this capacity, (on the ground of Prov. viii. 22,) calls him ἀρχή.² Since with slavish adherence to the LXX. (Gen. i. 2,) and with anthropopathic limitation of the Creator, he divides the drama of the creation into two completely separate acts—the production of the dark crude unformed material—and the formation of this chaotic mass in the existing universe—a separation, the second part of which he makes peculiarly prominent, as when he says:³—“that ye may learn that Plato borrowed from our teachers his doctrine of the formation of the world by God out of shapeless matter, hear the exact words which Moses wrote, he by whom the Spirit, indicating how and from what God in the beginning formed the universe, thus spake; “In the beginning God made the heaven and the earth, and the earth was invisible and unarranged, and darkness

¹ *Coh. ad Gr.* c. 15, p. 19, (p. 16, B.) τὸν τῷ Θεῷ λόγον δι’ οὗ ἡρανὸς καὶ γῆ καὶ πᾶσα ἐγένετο κτίσις.—*Apol.* 1, 64, p. 82, (p. 97, B.) ἰννοῦντα τὸν Θεὸν διὰ λόγου τὸν κόσμον ποιῆσαι ἔγνωσαν.—1, 59, p. 78, (p. 92, D.)—2, 6, p. 92, (p. 44, E.)

² *Dial. c. Tr.* c. 61, p. 157, (p. 284, A.) c. 62, p. 159, (p. 285, D.) The later Fathers, (and perhaps Philo before them, *de confus. ling.* c. 28, T. ii. p. 279,) referred the ἐν ἀρχῇ of the Mosaic account of the creation (Gen. i. 1, to the formative Logos. Thus Theophil. (*ad Autol.* 2, 10, p. 355, [p. 89, A.] εἶτι ἐν τῇ λέγει αὐτῷ ὁ Θεὸς ποιῶναι τὸν ἡρανὸν καὶ τὴν γῆν καὶ τὰ ἐν αὐτοῖς, ἔφη· ἐν ἀρχῇ ποιῶναι, &c.—2, 13, p. 358, [p. 92, B.]; λίγων· ἐν ἀρχῇ ποιῶναι ὁ Θεὸς τὸν ἡρανὸν συνίσσει διὰ τῆς ἀρχῆς. Thus Clement (*Strom.* 6, 7, 58, T. iii. p. 132,) and Methodius (*in Phot. biblioth. cod.* 235, T. ii. p. 304,) Jerome’s statement is not correct; (*quæst. in Gen.* T. iii. p. 132.) In principio fecit deus cælum et terram. Plerique existimant, sicut in altercatione quoque Jasonis et Papisci scriptum est, et Tertullianus in libro contra Praxeam disputat nec non Hilarius in expositione cujusdam psalmi affirmat, in hebræo haberi; in filio fecit deus cælum et terram. See Grabe’s *Specilegium Patrum*, T. ii. p. 132, and Routh’s *Reliquiæ sacræ*. T. i. p. 94, sq.

³ *Apol.* 1, 59, p. 78, (p. 92, C. D.)

was over the abyss; and the Spirit of God moved over the waters, and God said let there be light! and it was so.”—“Hence Plato, and those who agree with him, and we ourselves, have learned that the whole universe was made by the word of God, out of the existing materials described by Moses”—and,¹ “we have been taught that God, in the beginning, being good, formed all things out of shapeless matter, for the sake of man;” and² “Sunday is the first day, on which God having turned the darkness and matter, made the world.”—since Justin, as we have said, distinguished between the creation of the universe and the fashioning of its form, and often dwelt, with peculiar emphasis, on the latter, keeping the former out of sight, he has laid himself open to the suspicion of having agreed with Plato in admitting a mere formation, not creation, of the universe, on the supposition of the eternal pre-existence of matter.³ But he is cleared from this suspicion as soon as it is considered, first, that he had an apologetic motive for bringing forward the mere structure of the universe from matter already existing, (though not eternal,) and for waving the consideration of the creation of this matter,—(as it enabled him to mark a coincidence between the Mosaic and Platonic cosmogony, in order to make the dependence of the latter on the former credible); and, secondly, that he expressly combated the heathen axiom of the eternity of matter. This axiom he opposed on two grounds; the one taken from the changeableness, or more generally the contingency of cosmi- cal substances and circumstances, as that which ne-

¹ *Apol.* 1, 10, p. 48, (p. 58, B.) πάντα τὴν ἀρχὴν ἀγαθὸν ὄντα δημιουργῆσαι αὐτὸν ἐξ ἀμόρφου ὕλης δι’ ἀνθρώπου διδιδάγμαθα.

² *Apol.* 1. 67, p. 84, (p. 99, A.) πρώτη ἡμεῖς, ἐν ᾗ ὁ Θεός, τὸ σκότος καὶ τὴν ὕλην εἰσέφερε, κόσμον ἐποίησε.

³ This suspicion has been expressed by Onymus, (*Justin. de præcip. rel. Christ. dogmat. sentent.* p. 39.) Cölln. (in *Mun- scher's Lehrbuch. d. Christ. Dogm.* I. 143. Strauss. (*die Christl. Glaubenslehre*, I. 626.) Ritter, (*Geschichte der Philosophie*, v. 301,) and others.

cessarily led to an extraneous cause of these substances and circumstances,¹ having the ground of its being in itself; the other derived from the absolute self-subsistence of uncreated matter, which, as such, would be quite inaccessible to any external artificer.² There are also several places in which Justin, while he carefully distinguishes the two acts of the creation, and the formation of the universe, expressly assigns the former, as well as the latter, to God.³ The ground of the creation was well placed, by Justin, in the divine goodness, and its end objectively considered, in the impartation of divine life to receptive beings, and their admission to the enjoyment of divine happiness;⁴ but, like most of the Fathers,⁵ he is chargeable with a contractedness of view, in limiting this end to mankind. "We have been taught," he says, "that God has not made the world in vain, but on account of the human race."⁶

Inasmuch as the representation of the sensible world

¹ *Dial. c. Tr. c. 5*, p. 107, (p. 223, A.) *τίνα λόγον ἔχει, οἷμα οὕτω τειρόν καὶ ἀντιφωτίζαν ἔχον καὶ σύνθετον καὶ ἀλλοιούμενον καὶ φθίνον καὶ γινόμενον ἰδέσθαι ἡμῖς μὴ ἀπ' ἀρχῆς τοῦ ἐγγυῆσαι γυροῖναι*; Similarly, Theophil. ad Autol. 2, 4, p. 390, (p. 82, C.)

² *Coh. ad Gr. c. 23*, p. 24, (p. 22, A.)

³ *Apol. 1*, 20, p. 55, (p. 66, D.) *ὅτι διὰ τοῦ πάντα πικρομῆσθαι καὶ γιγινῆσθαι*,—2, 6, p. 92, (p. 44, E.) *τὴν ἀρχὴν δι' αὐτοῦ πάντα ἔκτισαι καὶ ἐκδόμηναι*. *Dial. c. Tr. c. 11*, p. 111, (p. 228, A.) *τοῦ ποιῆσαι καὶ διατρέχοντος τοῦ ἐν τῷ πάντι*.

⁴ *Apol. 1*, 10, p. 48, sq. (p. 58, B. C.)

⁵ The most noted church-teachers make mankind the exclusive end and centre of the creation; thus Herm. *Past. 2*, 12, 4, T. I. p. 100. *Epist. ad Diognet. c. 10*, p. 239, (p. 500, D.) Tatian, *Orat. c. Gr. c. 4*, p. 247, p. 144, D. Thophil. ad Autol. 1, 4, p. 340, (p. 72, A.) 2, 10, p. 355, (p. 88, B.) Tertull. *adv. Mar. 1*, 13, T. I. p. 19. Lactant. *institut. divin. 7*, 3; *de ira dei*, c. 13, and others. Origen was the first who extended the design of God in creating the material world to all intelligent natures, (*de princip. 2*, 1, 1, T. I. p. 77,) although elsewhere (*c. Cels. 4*, 74, p. 558,) he gives up that view, and advocates the more usual representation.

⁶ *Apol. 2*, 4, p. 91, (p. 43, D.) Compare 2, 5, p. 92, (p. 44, A.)—*Dial. c. Tr. c. 41*, p. 137, (p. 260, A.)—*de resurrect. c. 7*, (p. 592, D. E.)

in its matter and form is only one side of the idea of creation, with which the other, the physical and rectoral preservation of created beings, is intimately connected, an inquiry respecting Justin's representations of divine Providence naturally follows the account of his cosmological views. But these representations are only to be discerned in their general outline. Justin speaks only seldom, and very sparingly, of Providence. Its reality, indeed, he maintains beyond all doubt; it stands or falls with his faith in the one living and holy God, and with the truth of moral distinctions. "If any one," he says, "disbelieves¹ that God cares for the human race, (that is in a moral respect,) he either denies the being of a God, or, admitting it, he must maintain that he delights in evil, or is like a stone, and that virtue or vice are nonentities, and that good and evil are mere matters of opinion, which is the height of impiety and injustice." He also points out the reality of Providence historically, by one example, that of Old Testament prophecy.² "When we say that future events have been predicted, we do not maintain that this is done by the necessity of fate, but God predicts them by the prophetic Spirit, in order to keep the human race mindful and attentive, by showing that he cares and provides for them. But, as to the mode in which he conceives Providence to operate, he makes only two suggestions; first, that it is universal, embracing the individual and the community, the little and the great; and, secondly, he considers that it is carried on by the assistance of angels. On the former point he alludes indignantly to the opposite doctrine of the Grecian philosophers."³ Most of them do not trouble themselves whether there is one God, or whether there are many Gods; and whether they are watchful over our concerns or not; they would even persuade us that God cares for

¹ *Apol.* 1, 28, p. 61, (p. 71, C.)

² *Apol.* 1, 44, p. 70, (p. 82, B.)

³ *Dial. c. Tr. c.* 1, p. 102, (p. 217, E. 218, A.) *Magna dii curant, parva negligunt.* *Cicer. de nat. deor.* 2, 66.

the whole, that is, for nations and races, but not for me and thee, and individuals;" a view which, with some modifications, found friends and adherents even in the Church.¹

ARTICLE II.

CREATED RATIONAL BEINGS.

I. ANGELS.

The doctrine of Angels forms a favourite, though a very unfixed element of patristic dogmatics. The Fathers, giddy with meditating on the divine infinitude and majesty, were glad to see the divine brought nearer, as it were, to the human, by the middle order of Angels. Incapable of beholding the divine agency in its unmingled purity, they found a desirable doctrine, which made it possible to interpose a medium between themselves and the supreme Being, to represent God under the image of a sovereign who governs his kingdom by deputed authorities. Yearning after strength and consolation, in a life filled with toil and suffering, they felt elevated by the thought, that in the invisible world there was a host of blessed spirits in covenant with them, and that all the powers of heaven witnessed and sympathised in their conflict. They eagerly seized upon the hints which the Scriptures gave respecting Angels, and filled them up with the varied conceptions and images which their own musings suggested.

Resting on the conviction, (which they derived from the sacred volume), that heaven had not only been open in ancient days, but was still open in their

¹ Thus Jerome (*Comment. in Habac.* 1, 14, T. vi. p. 148.) Compare Tenneman's *Geschichte der Philosophie*, vii. 192.

own times,—that the immortal inhabitants of the celestial regions were in constant intercourse with earth and its inhabitants, they gradually formed a distinct angelic economy, and as heathenism placed its inferior deities in the strictest and individual connection with all the objects of nature,—so by degrees, but without wishing to trench upon Christian Monotheism, they brought all sublunary things, the course of nature, and the actions of men, under angelic supervision and guidance. The general conception, that God made use of these beings as assistants in the government of the world, was soon divided into an infinite number of particulars; individual kingdoms and churches, the various acts of the divine Providence, the manifold tendencies and forms of human conditions, necessities and employments, were supposed to have as many individual angels as managers, directors, and overseers;¹ every man, at least every pious man, had one or more guardian angels;² and at last, the whole of nature, rational and irrational, animate and inanimate, the heavenly bodies, the elements, the winds, rivers, and storms, trees and fruits, each was placed under the care of its angel. The Clementine Recognitions and Augustin, assert without the least reservation, that every visible object in the universe has an angel to guard and watch over it. But on the origin and nature, the arrangement and ranks of angels, the views of the Fathers differ widely from one another. What Origen says in his summary representation of the doctrine of the Church, may be applied to this particular doctrine both before and since his time. “*Est etiam illud in ecclesiastica prædicatione, esse angelos dei quosdam et virtutes bonas, qui ei ministrant ad salu-*

¹ Thus there were angels of sickness, of war, of births, and even of abortions; angels for introducing the soul into the body; and for conducting the soul on leaving the body; angels of prayer and instruction, &c.

² See Schmidt's *Historia dogmatis de angelis tutelariis* in Illgen's *Denkschrift* (Leipz. 1817,) where the sentiments of the Jews and heathens are also noticed.

tem hominum consummandam ; sed quando isti creati sint vel quales aut quomodo sint, non satis in manifesto designatur."¹

In Justin we find only occasional references to angels, but they are sufficient to make us acquainted with his views, and are not without importance. He considers angels, whose real existence was accredited by biblical passages,² such as Ps. cxlviii. 1, as personal beings, as subjects of enduring permanence. He strongly expresses this conviction in opposition to a heretical opinion introduced into the Church, which allowed angels to be nothing more than ideal personifications of divine powers, as instantaneous evanescent beamings of the divine essence. "That there are angels,"³ he says "and that they remain permanently, and that they are not resolved into the substance out of which they are made, has been proved." The collective ancient church,⁴ in reference to the question respecting the nature of angels, has decidedly ascribed corporeity to them, and the majority of the church-teachers, as, for example, Tatian,⁵ Origen,⁶ Methodius,⁷ and Theog-

¹ *De princip. proœm.* c. 10, T. i. p. 49.

² *Dial. c. Tr.* c. 79, p. 17^b, (p. 305, C.)—c. 85, p. 182, sq. (p. 312, A.)

³ *Dial. c. Tr.* c. 128, p. 221. (p. 358, B. C.) ὅτι μὲν οὖν εἶναι ἄγγελοι καὶ ἐκείνοι καὶ μὴ ἀναλύμενοι ἐς τὸν αἶνα, ἐξ ὧν γε γινώσκον, ἀποδιδασκται.—c. 85, p. 182, (p. 311, C.) The view of angels as emanations of God, though possessed of personal existence, has been approved by catholic church-teachers ; thus Lactantius, (*Institut. divin.* 4, 8.) Compare Starck's *freimutheg. Betrachtungen über das Christenthum.* 186, 240, but with caution.

⁴ It has been differently stated by Suicer (*Thesaur. eccles.* T. I. p. 34. Petau (*Theol. dogmat. de angel.* 1, 3, T. III. p. 6.) Ode (*Comment. de angel.* p. 319, sqq.) ; and Klee, (*Lehrbuch der Dogmengeschichte*, Mainz, 1837, 1. 248), that along with corporeity, the pure spirituality of angels found believers and advocates in the ancient church ; this opinion derives apparent, but only apparent, support from the uncertain ambiguity of patristical language.

⁵ *Orat. c. Gr.* c. 15, p. 256, (p. 145, C.)

⁶ *Comment in Matth.* 17, 30, T. III. p. 184.

⁷ See the Fragments in Phot. *biblioth. cod.* 234, T. II. p. 299.

nostus,¹ have regarded this corporeity as a medium between pure spirituality and human corporeity, and, for this reason, in their description of it, they make constant use of the images of fire and air, as the finest elementary substances. Justin may so far be considered as their forerunner in this respect, that he attributes corporeity to angels, but he stands alone, as soon as the quality of this corporeity is taken into account. He makes the substance of angelic bodies far more similar to the material of the human frame than the other Fathers. He ascribes to the angels not merely physical wants in general, since, with Clement and Tertullian, in reference to Psalm lxxviii. 25, he states that the manna in the desert, which the Israelites received as a special gift from God, was the usual and appropriate food of angels;² but he believes, moreover, that the two angels (*οἱ τῷ ὄντι ἄγγελοι*) who, as he proved from Gen. xviii. 1, appeared to Abraham, accompanied by the Logos, really partook of the food set before them by the Patriarch, in the same manner as human beings. In the Dialogue with Trypho, in replying to the sceptical question of his opponent, how it could be imagined that the Logos could appear with the angels and eat, he expresses himself in the following manner; "That they (Gen. xviii. 2, 8,) eat, is written; if it were said that the three had eaten, and not only the two who were real angels, and take food even in heaven, as we know, though not the same which we men make use of, . . . I would admit that the Scriptures, when it speaks of eating, means as

¹ Phot. *biblioth. cod.* 106, T. 1. p. 87.

² *Dial. c. Tr.* c. 57, p. 154, (p. 279, C.) ταῦς δύο μόνους, αἱ τινες ἄγγελοι τῷ ὄντι ἦσαν καὶ ἐν ταῖς οὐρανόις, δὴλὸν ἵσταν ἡμῖν, τρεφόμενοι, καὶ μὴ ὁμοίαν τροφήν, ἥτις οἱ ἀνθρώποι χρῶμεθα, τρέφονται· πρὶ γὰρ τῆς τροφῆς τοῦ μάννα, ἣν ἱεράφησαν οἱ πατέρες ὑμῶν ἐν τῇ ἐρήμῳ ἡ γραφὴ οὕτω λέγει (Ps. lxxviii. 25,) ὅτι ἔσθον ἄγγελοι ἰβάντων. — c. 131, p. 224, (p. 361, A.) οἷς ἔσθον εἰς τροφήν ἰδιῶν ἄγγελων οὐρανίων (according to the excellent emendation of Maranus, instead of the common reading δι' ἄγγελων οὐρανίων) τὸ μάννα ἱβρίζειν.

when we say of fire that it devours every thing: but I should by no means understand it as if they had masticated and eaten food with their teeth and jaws; so that here we need not feel the least hesitation if we are only moderately skilled in tropology."¹ Justin in these words evidently ascribes to the angels a receptivity of common human physical refreshment, and denies it to the Logos. Though he allows a choice between a literal and a figurative interpretation of Gen. xviii. 8, it is not as if for himself he hesitated in the least to which of the two methods he should give the preference. He decides instantly and unconditionally for that, according to which the eating is considered as real, and only the two angels as the persons who partook of the food; and since it is not said in the Scripture that only two of Abraham's guests partook of food, and it might be justly inferred that the Logos, the third of the persons mentioned, was likewise a partaker, he preferred the tropical meaning of eating, in order to avoid the necessity of allowing that the Logos literally partook of food. The figurative interpretation serves him only for a makeshift, in case the literal sense is not found to be sufficient. But Justin, as we have shown, ascribes to the angels a capability of partaking of common human food, so that he must have regarded their corporeity as homogeneous with that of mankind. This conclusion can only be avoided by proving that Justin had the same notion of the appearance of the angels to Abraham as Tertullian,² that he ascribed to angels a capability of changing their nature and a power of putting on human corporeity. But he says not a word that these beings possess such a power, not a word that the Abrahamic angels appeared to the patriarch in human nature. The passage already

¹ *Dial. c. Tr. c.* 57, p. 154, (p. 279, B. C.)

² Tertull. *adv. Marc.* 3, 9, T. i. p. 18, in ista quæstione qui putaveris opponendos esse nobis angelos creatoris, quasi et illi in phantasmate putativæ utique carnis egerint apud Abraham et Loth.

quoted from the Dialogue, represents the angels expressly in their specific peculiarity as angels.

As in a physical so likewise in a psychical respect, Justin placed the angels in a low sphere. The moral goodness they possessed is not essential and unalterable, not inherent to their nature. Like men, they were originally endowed with freedom in a state of moral indifference; they were created susceptible of good and evil;¹ their goodness is virtue. Their intelligence he places still lower. When the glorified Saviour, after the close of his sufferings, returned from earth to heaven, they were unable, after having been accustomed to his form of humiliation, to recognize the Son of God in the splendour of this glorification. The intervention of the Holy Spirit was needed, in order to make this recognition possible.²

But though Justin regarded the angels as so very contracted in their nature, he invested them, in reference to their employment, with the most exalted character. He viewed them as universally destined to be

¹ *Apol.* 2, 7, p. 93, (p. 45, E.) αὐτεξούσιον τὸ τι τῶν ἀγγέλων γίνεσθαι καὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων τὴν ἀρχὴν ἔκτισεν ὁ Θεός;—*Dial. c. Tr. c.* 33, p. 186, (p. 316, A.) βουλόμενος τοὺς ἐν ἰλιυδίῃσιν πραιρίσι καὶ αὐτεξούσιους γινώσκοντας τοὺς τι ἀγγέλους καὶ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους, ὁ Θεὸς πρῶτον ὅσα ἔκαστον ἐνδυνάμωσι δύνασθαι ποιῆν, ἐποίησεν, εἰ μὴν τὰ ἐν ἡμῖν αὐτῷ κείνῳ, καὶ ἀφ' ὧν αὐτοὺς καὶ ἀτιμωρήτους αὐτοὺς τηρήσας ἵαν διὰ πονηριῶσιν, ὡς αὐτῷ δοκί, ἔκαστον κολάζειν—“God from the beginning created the race of angels and of men free-agents—God, according to his design, made men possessing freedom of choice, and capable of self-government, and endowed them with power to do whatever they were able to do; and that if they chose what was pleasing to him he might preserve them imperishable and unpunished; but if they should act wickedly, he would punish each as it might seem meet to him.”—*c.* 102, p. 197, (p. 329, A.)—*c.* 141, p. 231, (p. 370, B.) The church has always attributed moral freedom of choice to angels. See *Ode comment. de angelis.* p. 416, sqq.

² *Dial. c. Tr. c.* 36, p. 134, (p. 255, B. C.) Several of the Fathers explain Ps. xxiv. 7, of the ascension of Christ, and either favour this exposition, that the Angels did not know Jesus before his ascension to heaven, or at least that they did not recognise him in his new unwonted state of glorification.

assistants and instruments of the divine providence. In this capacity he allotted them partly extraordinary commissions, and partly current and regular occupations. The first consisted of those special services and ministrations which they fulfilled in connection with the Old Testament economy. Thus the Angels accompanied the Logos when he revealed himself to the Patriarchs;¹ an Angel smote the Assyrians in their camp before Jerusalem;² an Angel announced to the Virgin Mary the Miraculous conception;³ and removed Joseph's scruples occasioned by that event;⁴ Angels opened the gates of heaven to the Son of God, when he entered into heaven after his Resurrection;⁵ and will form his retinue at his second advent.⁶ But the constant and regular office of Angels is, that they descend from heaven, their usual abode,⁷ to take the oversight of the sublunary world, and especially of men;⁸ not as if they were the proper rulers of the earth and its inhabitants, not as if God, unconcerned about his creation, enjoyed himself without care, reposing in his own heaven in Epicurean indolence and apathy. The Angels are rather steps of the ladder, on which God descends to his own world; they are merely servants who fulfil, within prescribed limits, the commands of the all-ruling King of Heaven.⁹ This anthropopathic

¹ *Dial. c. Tr. c. 56*, p. 150, sqq. (p. 275, sqq.)

² *Dial. c. Tr. c. 83*, p. 180, (p. 309, B.)

³ *Apol. I. 33*, p. 64, (p. 75, A. B.) *Dial. c. Tr. c. 100*, p. 196, (p. 327, C.)

⁴ *Dial. c. Tr. c. 78*, p. 175, (p. 303, C.)

⁵ *Dial. c. Tr. c. 36*, p. 134, (p. 255, B. C.)

⁶ *Apol. I. 52*, p. 73, (p. 87, B.) *Dial. c. Tr. c. 31*, p. 128, (p. 247, E.)

⁷ *Dial. c. Tr. c. 36*, p. 134, (p. 255, B.) οἱ ἐν τοῖς οὐρανοῖς ταχθέντες ὑπὸ τοῦ Θεοῦ ἀρχόντες.—c. 85, p. 183, (p. 312, A.)—*Coh. ad Gr. c. 28*, (p. 28, B.)

⁸ *Apol. 2, 5*, p. 92, (p. 44, A.) ὁ Θεὸς τὸν πάντα κόσμον ποιήσας . . . τὴν μὲν τῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ τῶν ὑπὸ τὸν ἄρανον πρῶτον ἀγγέλοις. οὗς καὶ τότε εἰλεῖ, παρέδωκεν.

⁹ Though by many Fathers, as by Athenagoras (*legat. p. Christ. c. 24*, p. 302, [p. 27, B. C.]) a distinction has been made between an universal and a particular, a general and partial

notion of the participation of Angels in the divine government, which was only sketched rudely and imperfectly by Justin, and obtained a more finished form in the Christian Church, by means of Origen, has frequently been noted as one of the elements which found their way into the Church from Platonism.¹ No one can deny that a delusive resemblance of this opinion may be found in the Platonic philosophy. Not only Plato himself taught that the supreme God, since he was incapable of creating beings without immortality, had committed the formation of mortal natures to the gods who were brought into existence by himself, and that he made use of these subordinate deities for the government of particular parts of the universe, which he could not himself govern;² the New Platonists still more zealously maintained the doctrine, that the supreme God did not govern the world in his own person, but by delegates; that an indefinite number of subordinate deities were appointed to be overseers of particular spheres, states, and provinces, who had the power of conferring benefits or inflicting punishments on mankind.

But though it is impossible not to perceive the great similarity existing between this Platonic and that patristic doctrine, it is, at the same time, not allowable to consider the Platonic notion as the origin of the

providence, and the former assigned to God, the latter to Angels, yet these Fathers by no means asserted that the little and the individual was withdrawn from the personal oversight and care of God. On other occasions they expressly attributed to God care for individuals; as the Father we have last named, c. 18, p. 336, (p. 60, B. C.) Only a few dissented from this belief. It is a great mistake when Rossler (*Lehrbegriff der christl. Kirche* 138, compare also *Bibliothek der Kirchenväter*, I. 136,) and Starck (*freimüthige Betrachtungen über d. Christenthum*, 155, 242,) maintain, that the ancient Church generally committed to God the universal oversight and providence (over nations and races,) but to Angels the guidance of individuals.

¹ Thus Hahn *de platonismo theologiae veterum*, etc. p. 12, sq. Brucker, *histor. crit. philosoph.* T. III. p. 377, and Tzschirner's *Fall des Heidenthums*, I. 581.

² Ritter, *Geschichte der Philosophie*, II. 411.

patristic, and for this reason, that the former, although not invented for the purpose,¹ was at least diligently made use of, to conceal the opposition between the popular belief and this philosophy so remote from it—to produce an apparent reconciliation between the monotheism of speculation, and the polytheism of the multitude; Justin, on the contrary,—to confine ourselves to him,—represents himself as far too zealous and decided a Monotheist to feel the slightest disposition to introduce a doctrine into Christianity of so doubtful a tendency; for though, by substituting Angels for subordinate deities, it would lose somewhat of its heathenish complexion, it would still bear too great an affinity to polytheism.

Neither Plato's influence, nor an approval of some parts of his philosophy, could have induced Justin to admit so dangerous a dogma, as the special administration of the world by Angels, in the manner described, if he had not felt himself compelled, by the authority which alone availed with him, that of the sacred Scriptures. This dogma lay at the foundation of several passages of the Bible, with which Justin was acquainted. In Deut. xxxii. 8, the translation of the LXX. ἰσθησὶν ὄρτια ἱδνῶν κατὰ ἀρεθμὸν ἀγγέλων Θεοῦ,—rests confessedly on the opinion that God had appointed Angels to be presidents and protectors of nations. In Dan. x. 13, 20, mention is made of an Angel of Persia and of Greece. The guardian Angels of children are spoken of in Matthew xviii. 10. That these passages were the special sources and supports of Justin's convictions, is perfectly indubitable. If the Martyr has not referred to them by name, this cannot occasion surprise, since he only alludes to his belief on this point, in a hasty manner.² Should any one, in addition to

¹ Ritter *Begriff und Verlauf der Christ. Philosophie in den theol. Studien und Kritiken*, 1833, II. 265.

² Though Justin has omitted to mention the biblical passages by which he was led to the opinion that the angels are the de-

the Bible, regard the influence of Philo, who makes Angels the agents of the divine Providence,¹—as a co-efficient of Justin's belief, nothing important can be urged against such an opinion.

We now come to the question which, for ages, has occasioned much warm discussion, whether Justin considered due to the Angels, whom he honours with being the agents of Providence, any kind of worship on the part of Men. The theologians of the Catholic Church, among whom, after Bellarmine's example, Petau,² Maranus,³ and Onymus,⁴ especially, have decided this question in the affirmative, agreeably to their own dogma, while those who, like Nourry⁵ and Möhler,⁶ take the negative side, are very few. From the Protestant Church, during that period in which doctrinal and ecclesiastical predilections had a powerful influence on historical studies, an almost unanimous negative has sounded forth, while modern en-

legates of God in the government of the world, yet this has been carefully attended to by the later Fathers; Tertullian, (*adv. Prax.* c. 3, T. II. p. 149); Clemens, (*Strom.* 5, 14, 92, T. III. p. 65); Origen, (*c. Cels.* 5, 29, T. I. p. 598, sq. in *Jos. homil.* 23, 3, T. II. p. 451, in *Luc. homil.* 35, T. III. p. 974; the *Clementine Recognitions*, (2, 42, T. I. p. 513); Eusebius, (*demonst. evang.* 4, 7, p. 156); Theodoret, (*fabul. hæret.* 5, 7, T. IV. p. 403, sqq.) and others. The passages to which they unanimously refer are Deut. xxxii. 8. Dan. vii. 10; x. 13, 20. Matt. xviii. 20.

¹ See Dahne's *Geschichtl. Darstellung der jüdisch-alexand. Religions-philosophie*. I, 259, 313, 385.

² *Theol. dogm. de incarn.* xv. 5, 5, (Ven. 1745,) T. V. p. 277.

³ *Prolegomena*, 2, 4, p. xxi. sq.

⁴ *Dissert. exponens Justin. de præcip. relig. Christ. dogmat. sententiam.* p. 25.

⁵ *Apparat. ad biblioth. maxim.* I. p. 414.

⁶ *Tübinger theol. Quartalsschrift*. 1833, I. 53. In his *Patrologie*, I. 240, published after his death, Möhler expresses an opposite opinion, and owns his conviction that Justin reckons angels among the objects of the Christian Cultus. To which view did he finally adhere? We feel bound to adhere to that which he himself made public.

quirers, especially Semler,¹ Martini,² Neander,³ Tzschirner,⁴ Baumgarten-Crusius,⁵ Schulthess,⁶ Hase,⁷ Georgii,⁸ and Haselbach,⁹ have returned to the earlier affirmative. The office of arbitrator belongs to Philology. For there is only a single passage in Justin's writings on which the dispute hinges, and this in reference to a point of syntax. It is the same passage which has already been quoted in discussing the doctrine of the Holy Spirit; the passage in which Justin names the objects of Christian worship. It is as follows; Apol. I. 6, p. 47, (p. 56, B. C.) ἄθεοι κεκλήμεθα· καὶ ὁμολογοῦμεν τῶν τοιούτων νομιζομένων θεῶν ἄθεοι εἶναι, ἀλλ' οὐχὶ τοῦ ἀληθεστάτου καὶ πατρὸς δικαιοσύνης καὶ σωτηροσύνης καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀρετῶν ἀνεπιμίχτου τε κακίας θεοῦ· ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνόν τε καὶ τὸν παρ' αὐτοῦ υἱὸν ἐλθόντα καὶ διδάξαντα ἡμᾶς ταῦτα καὶ τὸν τῶν ἄλλων ἐπομένων καὶ ἐξομοιουμένων ἀγαθῶν ἀγγέλων στρατὸν πνεῦμά τε τὸ προφητικὸν σεβόμεθα καὶ προσκυνῶμεν, λόγῳ καὶ ἀληθείᾳ τιμῶντες. All turns upon this point; *to what governing word is the objective clause τὸν τ. ἄλλων . . . ἀγγέλων στρατὸν to be referred?* If it be made to depend on the verbs σεβόμεθα καὶ προσκυνῶμεν, the angelic Cultus is most clearly expressed; if it be brought, as has been proposed, into connection with the participle διδάξαντα, nothing, expressly at least, is said of this Cultus.¹⁰ We cannot hesitate

¹ *Geschichte d. christl. Glaubenslehre.* II. 45.

² *Geschichte d. Dogm. von d. Gottheit Christi.* 50.

³ *Allgemeine Geschichte der christl. Rel. u. Kirche.* I. 3, 693, and *Theologische Studien und Kritiken.* 1833, III. 774.

⁴ *Fall des Heidenthums.* I. 615.

⁵ *Lehrbuch der christl. Dogmengeschichte.* II. 1054.

⁶ *Engelwelt Engelgesetz u. Engeldienst.* (Zür. 1833.) 180, 184.

⁷ *Lehrbuch der evang. Dogmatik.* (2 Aufl.) 220.

⁸ *Studien der evang. Geistesl. Württembergs.* X. 2, 76.

⁹ *Theologische Studien, u. Kritiken.* 1839, II. 342.

¹⁰ The critical expedient of changing στρατὸν into στρατηγός by which Gruner (*institut. theol. dogmat.* p. 97.) Döderlein, (*institut. theol. christ.* ed. 6, cur. Junge. p. 418. Keil, (*opusc. acad.* p. 556, sq.) Münscher, (*Handb. d. christl. Dogmengeschichte.*) Münter, (*Handb. d. ältesten. christl. Dog-*

to acknowledge that, to us, the first mode of construction appears to be justified both by the language and the connection. Those who adopt the second mode are divided into two parties. Daillé,¹ adopting the translation of J. Lange, and followed by Forbesius a

mengeschichte, I. 522, II. 1, 7,) and others have thought of relieving this much-tortured passage, and of conveniently ridding it of the worship of angels, is only mentioned out of respect to their authority. The expedient is equally unnecessary and inadmissible. When its advocates allege in its recommendation, that Christ is represented by Justin in a passage of the Dialogue, (c. 61, p. 158, [p. 284, B.] compared with c. 62, p. 159, [p. 286, A.]) of similar expression and meaning as the personage appearing to Joshua v. 14, ἀρχιστράτηγος δυνάμεως κυρίου,—it is first to be asked, whether in the connection of that passage, δυνάμεις κυρίου can be understood to mean *the angels*,—for elsewhere Justin generally calls Christ, when he wishes to represent him as head of the angels, κύριος τῶν δυνάμεων (c. Tr. c. 36, p. 134, [p. 255, B.] c. 85, p. 181, sq. [p. 311, A. C.])—and then, granting the proposed meaning to be correct, the parallel passage called in to assist would prove the exact opposite of what it is alleged to prove. It is brought forward certainly on the supposition, that Justin wrote στρατηγός in the passage of the Apology, only in allusion to Josh. v. 14; yet this leads to a question not easily answered, what occasioned Justin to depart, in this passage, from the custom he elsewhere constantly observes, to use the predicates of Christ, taken from the Old Testament with literal exactness; c. Tr. c. 100, p. 195, [p. 327, B.] c. 126, p. 219, [p. 355, B. C.] and especially c. 34, p. 130, [p. 251, D.] where, among other appellations, that of ἀρχιστράτηγος appears unaltered. And, as the proposed correction στρατηγός is unsupported in itself, so it is completely set aside by two considerations; first, that it cannot be conceived why Justin should have assigned to Christ, in this passage of the Apology, the part of leader of the Angels, since it is totally uncalled for by the connection; and next, the emendation could not be admitted without a farther alteration in the passage. For either, as Schultheß proposes, the conjunction καὶ before τὸν τῶν ἄλλων must be dropped, or, if καὶ be retained, as Hasselbach justly thinks preferable, the article τὸν, before τῶν ἄλλων, must be struck out, and the substantive στρατηγός be changed into the participle στρατηγούμενα.

¹ *Adversus Latinorum de cultus religiosi objecto traditionem disputatio*, (Genev. 1664,) 1, 8, p. 37.

Corse,¹ Nifanius,² Basnage,³ Grabe,⁴ Ittig,⁵ Le Clerc,⁶ Thalemann,⁷ Ziegler,⁸ G. Lange,⁹ and Giesler,¹⁰ considers the clause τὸν τῶν ἄλλων ἀγγέλων as parallel with ἡμῶς, and places them both in the same immediate dependence on διδάξαντα, and thus obtains the meaning that Christ taught, not only men, but the host of good angels. A leading objection against this interpretation is, that it is not conceivable what could induce Justin to bring into a statement, which had for its precise purpose an exact enumeration of the objects of the Christian Cultus, a remark, in such a connection, so totally irrelevant as, that Christ was the instructor of the good angels. The irrelevancy of this remark is not done away, or rendered less glaring, if it be supposed to be occasioned by the preceding mention of the evil angels. In fact, this only tends to increase the difficulty. If Justin mentioned the good angels in contrast to the preceding declaration, that the atheism imputed to Christians might be traced simply to their neglect of the evil angels, the dæmons, in the middle of a paragraph which was intended to refute that charge of atheism, by an enumeration of the beings really worshipped by Christians,—how could this mention of the good angels rationally have any other object, than to establish, as far as they were concerned, the doubted devotion of the Christians? Dissatisfied with the at-

¹ *Instructiones hist.-theol. de doctr. Christiana*, (Genev. 1680,) 1, 3, 6, p. 7, 7, 4, 2, p. 323, sq.

² *Justinus exhibitus ventatis evang. testis et confessor*. p. 70, 127, 182, 248.

³ *Histoire de l'Eglise*, (Rotterd. 1699,) 18, 12, 7, T. II. p. 1104.

⁴ In his edition of the larger Apology, p. 11.

⁵ *Hist. eccles. secundi a Ch. n. sæculi capita selecta*, p. 208.

⁶ *Hist. ecoles. duorum primorum a Ch. n. sæculorum*, p. 616.

⁷ In his edition of the two Apologies, p. 6.

⁸ *Theologisch. Abhandlungen*, I. 95.

⁹ *Ausführl. Geschichte der Dogmen*. I. 124.

¹⁰ *Theologische Studien und Kritiken*, 1838, IV. 1163.

tempt of Daille and his followers, to exclude from the passage in the Apology, the service of angels, which seemed, in fact, their worship, Bull,¹ Nourry,

¹ *Defensio fidei Nicane*, 2, 4, 8; *Opera ed. Grab.* p. 70. "These are his (Justin's words,) . . . him we worship and adore; and his Son (who proceedeth from him, and who hath taught us, or revealed to us the host of good angels, his other followers who are made like unto him) and the prophetic Spirit, reverencing them with reason and truth." From this place Bellarmine endeavours to prove the religious worship of angels, which, if done, will destroy an argument for the divinity of the Son and the Holy Spirit. After a quotation from Scultetus, Bp. Bull adds, "Angels are expressly called *εὐαγγελιστῆς*, ministering Spirits, (thus, in the place just cited, from the Epistle to Diognetus, he calls them *εὐαγγελιστῆς*, and excepts the Son and Holy Spirit out of this order,) and, therefore, not to be adored. But why, you will say, is mention made of it, that we are taught by the Son of God the ministry of angels? and why is that inserted by a parenthesis in the character of the Son? That parenthesis (which I desire the reader would exactly observe,) belongs to what Justin had spoke of immediately before in the same place. Justin had said that Socrates, for asserting that the one true God was only to be worshipped, refusing the heathen idols as demons, *i. e.* evil spirits, and hateful to God, was killed as an atheist and impious, by wicked men, at the instigation of the Devil. Then he adds, that the same thing had happened to Christians After he had said that we, by the Christian faith, were taught to avoid the worship of evil angels, he immediately, and very properly adds, in the said parenthesis, that by the same Christ we are instructed that there are other angels, good ones, and ministering spirits to God together with us, and therefore not to be worshipped; so that the parenthesis must be thus rendered and expounded,—*who hath taught us these things*, namely, what went before about worshipping evil angels, and also that there are good angels ministering to God, and imitating his goodness. The whole is this,—by Christ we are instructed concerning the evil as the good angels; of the evil that they are rebellious against God, and, therefore, rather worthy execration than worship; of the good, that they are ministering spirits obeying God, and imitating his goodness, as far as they can, therefore not so to be worshipped. The place, then, is so far from being serviceable to Bellarmine or the Papists, that it affords an invincible argument against the religious worship of angels, and clearly shows, that, according to the mind of the primitive Christians, such worship was not due to angels, nor to any ministers or servants of God, *i. e.* nor

Ode,¹ Rossler,² and Möhler, had made another experiment, already recommended by Scultetus,³ to obtain the same result. They have considered the objective clause τὸν τῶν ἄλλων ἀγγέλων στρατὸν as a second accusative parallel with ταῦτα, and thus made the good angels not the receivers, but the objects and contents of the instruction imparted by Christ. The ταῦτα they refer to the passage in the Apology, respecting the dæmons before mentioned, namely, that these beings were identical with the gods worshipped by the Greeks, who indeed were in no sense gods, but the real authors of the crimes and excesses ascribed to the gods, and likewise the secret instigators of the persecutions raised against the worshippers of the true God, especially against the Christians; they believe, moreover, that they find in the adjective τῶν ἄλλων, by which the host of good angels is introduced, and in the predicates ἐπομένων and ἑξομοιουμένων, a reference by way of contrast, to these dæmons. As to the nature of the instruction given us by Christ respecting angels, some leave it undetermined; others, as Nourry and Ode, make it consist in this, that Christ has made men acquainted with the existence of good angels, faithful and always dependent on God; or as Bull, in this, that he has signified that the other angels were good, and resembled their Creator in holiness, but still merely servants, and therefore not to be worshipped as divine. Against this interpretation a difficulty always presents itself, which also seems to render the former inadmissible, that it is perfectly inexplicable why the bare statement that Christ had instructed mankind respecting the existence and nature of good angels, should be found in

to any creature, but to him only who created all things, to whom all things are subject, to the most holy Trinity."—*Defence of the Nicene Creed, translated by the Rev. Fr. Holland.* London, 1726. Vol. I. pp. 128—130.

¹ *Comment de Angelis*, 9, 6, 18, p. 969, sq.

² *Bibliothek der Kirchenväter*, I. 106; and *Lehrbegriff der Christl. Kirche*, 107.

³ *Medulla theolog. patrum.* (Amberg. 1598,) I. p. 51.

a sentence which is intended to repel the charge of atheism, and for this purpose specifies by name the objects of Christian worship. This incongruity is increased considerably, if we suppose with Bull, the substance of this instruction to be, that Christ had taught mankind the unlawfulness of worshipping angels. If Justin had really wished to convey such a meaning, the method he took was about as rational as to throw a burning torch into a house on fire, for the purpose of extinguishing the flames. But still more weighty than this objection, are the lingual difficulties which attend that interpretation. If the reference of the pronoun ταῦτα¹ to what had been said of bad angels (and as Möhler adds) and their agency, is too harsh, since it is so remote, and if for the same reason, the contrast to τῶν ἄλλων must be sought for in something nearer than the assertions respecting the bad angels,—to consider the objective clause τὸν τῶν ἄλλων ἀγγέλων στρατόν as parallel with the pronoun ταῦτα, (as Georgii has already pointed out),² is to be guilty of the two-fold violation of lingual propriety and of logic. It offends lingual propriety, to place the accusative of things on an equality of dignity and reference with the accusation of the persons τὸν ἀγγέλων στρατόν; if the juxtaposition of this accusative had been intended by the author, he must have written τὰ τοῦ ἀγγέλων στρατοῦ, or τὰ περὶ τὸν ἀγγέλων στρατόν, instead of τὸν ἀγγέλων στρατόν. But it violates lingual logic to place an individual or personally defined notion, as a more distant objective case in connection with the verb

¹ The ταῦτα most naturally refers to what immediately precedes to what is said respecting God, as Grabe, Ziegler, and Hasselbach have long ago perceived. When Möhler (*Theol. Quartalschrift*. 58,) objects against this reference, that Justin in this case would have written ταῦτον instead of ταῦτα, since the ἐλεῖς θεός is an εἶς, not a ταῦτα, the proper answer is, that the pronoun does not refer directly to the person of God, but rather to his attributes, and therefore ταῦτα is quite in place.

² *Studien der evangelischen Geistlichkeit Württemberg's*, X. 2, S. 72.

διδάσκειν. The accusative of the thing with this and similar verbs, must always be something that is a general conception. To instruct any one respecting an object can never be expressed by *διδάσκειν τινά τινα*, but always by *διδάσκειν τινά τι*. When in Greek (both among prose writers and poets) such phrases occur as *διδάσκειν τινα ἱππία, ποιητήν, αὐλητήν σοφόν, συνετόν, &c.*¹ these are not at variance with the rule laid down; they never mean, to give information respecting the person of a horseman, a poet, a flute-player, a wise or prudent man, &c., but always, to make any one by instruction a horseman, poet, flute-player, a wise or prudent man. The verb *διδάσκειν* here takes the syntactical property of *ποιεῖν* and similar words; its two accusatives are an accusative of the subject and of the predicate, and the latter is merely in form a concrete, but in idea an abstract. For *horseman, poet, &c.* might be substituted without hesitation, *horsemanship, art of poetry, &c.*

Thus it appears, that the two attempts at explaining the passage in the Apology, which depend on connecting the clause *τὸν τῶν ἁγγέλων στρατὸν* with *διδάξαντα*, and according to which nothing is said of the worship of angels—are in point both of logic and grammar unallowable; no choice then remains but to connect the *τὸν τῶν . . . ἁγγέλων στρατὸν* with the verbs *σεβόμεθα* and *προσκυνούμεν*, and to acknowledge accordingly that Justin speaks of a Cultus paid to angels. As this interpretation is already negatively recommended by the inadmissibility of the two others, so the verbal connection is still more strongly and positively in favour of it. The particle *τε*, by means of which the prophetic Spirit is classed with the objects before named of Christian worship, joins them by virtue of its nature (connecting with what immediately goes before,) so closely to the angelic host, that the two, the Spirit and the Angelic host, can only be se-

¹ See a list of examples in Stephan, *Thesaurus græc. ling. ed. Huse et Dindorf*. T. ii. p. 1414.

parated by violence from one another. Four clauses naturally present themselves at first sight, which appear co-ordinate, from being connected in a manner essentially the same. "The first clause is *ἐκεῖνόν τε*, the second is joined to this by *καὶ τὸν*, a third co-ordinate clause is evidently linked to the first two in the same manner by the repetition of *καὶ τὸν*, to which, lastly, a fourth is attached by the last *τε*."¹ The equality of this connection, in which the four clauses stand to another, makes the angels distinctly appear as objects of Christian devotion.

We might here close the investigation, for if the Cultus of angels be really asserted in Justin, all farther doubts which might be raised against it are at once checked; it is impossible to escape from the conclusion. Nevertheless we dare not yet allow ourselves that conclusion; for though there is, in truth, no escape from the express language employed, yet the attempt has been made, and the reasons alleged on its behalf which are somewhat plausible, demand a special examination. It is impossible, (such has been the language of some,) that Justin could inculcate the worship of angels; a practice of which the universal ancient church (for the first three centuries and more) knew nothing!² Justin, in the same passage which is supposed to inculcate their worship, calls the angels worshippers, which excludes them from being themselves objects of worship;³ he places them before the Holy Spirit, an unheard of position, even in case they were introduced, like the latter, as religious objects; lastly, he elsewhere names, where he is pursuing the same apologetical design, merely the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, as the objects of Christian worship, without saying a syllable about the

¹ Georgii. 76.

² Besides Daillé and others, see Keil, *Opusc. acad.* p. 550, and Möhler, 53.

³ Thus Keil, 554.

angels.¹ If we examine this remonstrance more closely, it appears that the first reason rests on a two-fold error; first, in acknowledging the church's analogy of faith as a judicial power, which is only a deliberative one; and, secondly, in asserting an unanimity of belief which in no case has existed. Athénagoras, Origen, and Ambrose decidedly taught, if not the worship of angels, yet a certain service to them, as Hasselbach, (after many preceding writers,) has lately proved.² But Justin does not speak of the *worship* of angels, in the strict sense of the word. It is true he applies the terms προσκυνεῖν and εἰσεσθαι, which he uses to designate the act of Christian worship, equally and without limitation to the angelic host, but still an identity in the quality of the service paid to God and to angels is not affirmed.³ Justin expresses himself inaccurately, in the absence of a particular motive for marking the precise points of difference in the Cultus of God and that of Angels; an inaccuracy which, in an inverted form, he repeats on another occasion, when, for the persons of the Trinity, he requires a mere τιμῶν. As the analogy of the faith of the church, so also the assertion that Justin, in the same passage where it is pretended that he allows religious honour to be paid to the angels, calls these very beings worshippers, rests

¹ Such is the unanimous opinion from Scultetus to Möhler.

² *Theologische Studien und Kritiken*.

³ *Apol.* i, 13, p. 51, (p. 60, E.) When Möhler, p. 53, in opposition to the interpretation which connects the host of angels with the verbs προσκυνεῖν and εἰσεσθαι, urges that the honour that would be then attributed, must amount to worship, because Justin, with an evident allusion to John iv. 24, (a passage which the church has never applied to created beings,) has rendered the verbs still more precise and emphatic, by the clause λόγῳ καὶ ἀληθείᾳ τιμῶντες, he would not easily find any person who would agree with him in reference to such an allusion. The words λόγῳ καὶ ἀληθείᾳ say no more than what Justin had asserted, a few lines before, of Socrates; λόγῳ ἀληθῶς καὶ ἔξιστασιπῶς ταῦτα εἰς φανερὸν ἰσχυρᾶτο φέρειν.

on an error. It proceeds from a false rendering of the verb *ἱερισθαι*, taking it in the sense of *reverencing, worshipping*. But this meaning the word never has in itself nor as used by Justin.¹ In his writings it always means, "to be a follower of any one in faith and practice."² The third objection is, indeed, correct, according to outward matter of fact,—the placing of the angelic host before the Holy Spirit; but this arrangement does not deserve the grave censure which has been passed upon it. The refinement of modern etiquette has overlooked that it is not with a dogmatic purpose, but was the effect of almost accidental association of ideas. Justin had just mentioned the Son, and thought of him not in expression but in reality, under the character of the divine *ἄγγελος*, in which he had so often represented him; this thought led him immediately to the angels, to whom this name was applied in common with the Son, and he joins them innocently by means of the connective *τῶν ἄλλων* with predicates, which evince still farther their relation to the Son of God.³ Lastly, when Justin, in the *Apology*, where he repeatedly defends the Christians against the reproach of atheism, names only the three persons of the Godhead as objects of Christian worship, without taking the

¹ Not in the *Apol.* 1, 8, p. 47, (p. 57, A.) which has been adduced as an instance.

² Compare the following examples. *Col. ad Gr.* c. 32, p. 30, (p. 30, E.); *τῇ τῶν προφητῶν ἱερισθαι διδασκαλίᾳ.*—*Apol.* 1, 2, p. 44, (p. 53, C.) *ἱερισθαι τοῖς ἁδίκους τι πραξασιν ἢ δόγμα τίσασιν*, —1, 8, p. 47, (p. 57, A.) *ἱερισθαι θεῷ*, —1, 26, p. 59, (p. 70, A.) *Μιναῖρος τοῦ ἀντὶ ἱερομένου ἱεροῦ*, —1, 28, p. 60, (p. 71, B.) *τῶν (τῷ Σατανᾷ) ἱερομένου ἀνδρώπων.*—*Dial. c. Tr.* c. 1, p. 102, (p. 218, A.) *ἱερισθαι τοῖς δαξέουσι ταῦτα.*—c. 134, p. 226, (p. 363, D.) *βίλτιον ἔστιν ὑμῶς τῷ θεῷ ἱερισθαι ἢ τοῖς ἀσυνίοις καὶ τυφλοῖς διδασκάλοις.*

³ This reference of *τῶν ἄλλων* is recommended by Scultess and recently by Baur, (*die christliche Lehre von der Dreieinigkeit und Menschwerdung Gottes in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwicklung*. Tübing. 1841, I. 175.) also by Semler, only that he is mistaken in seeking in *ἱερισθαι* for an intimation of succession in rank.

slightest notice of angels, this circumstance might perhaps be of some importance in a writer distinguished for accuracy of thought and language; but it is not so with Justin. When, in the *Apology*, (1, 16, p. 53, [p. 63, D. E.]) he says, *ὡς καὶ τὸν Θεὸν μόνον* (here not the divine tri-personality, but only God the Father is meant,) *δεῖ προσκυνεῖν, οὕτως ἔπεισεν, εἰπων· μεγίστη ἐντολή ἐστι . . . Καὶ προσελθόντος αὐτοῦ τινος καὶ εἰπόντος, διδάσκαλε ἀγαθέ, ἀπεκρίνατο λέγων· οὐδεὶς ἀγαθός, εἰ μὴ μόνος ὁ Θεός, ὁ ποιήσας τὰ πάντα,*—does he exclude the Son and the Holy Spirit from the number of beings to be worshipped, and actually worshipped by Christians?

All objections by which it has been attempted to render suspicious, and to paralyse the grammatical truth of the angelic Cultus, however plausible, have been shown to be ineffective. At all events, the result is firmly established, that Justin represents a certain homage paid to angels (its peculiar nature being left undefined) as a part of the religious service of his times.

II. MAN.

The essential character and aim of Christianity is redemption; but Soteriology (the doctrine of salvation) is grounded on Anthropology (the doctrine of human nature.) Without a knowledge of the nature and the wants of man, the key is wanting for understanding the Christian scheme of salvation; according to the various methods of contemplating human nature, the dogma of redemption also varies its form. Hence, however foreign in themselves, anthropological enquiries may be from the business of dogmatics, yet they cannot be left out in the Christian system. They are, as it were, the bridge which enables us to pass over to the peculiar doctrine of salvation. On this account, we find that even the ancient church-teachers, in spite of their partial aversion from philosophical discussions, occupied themselves with anthropological questions.

The fathers, it is true, owing to their disinclination to the subject, do not enter very deeply into it. The history of their attempts to delineate man in his natural state is, especially when man is contemplated in his original first created state, (but less so when viewed as altered by sin,)—little more than an assemblage of opinions and suppositions hastily and aphoristically sketched. Hence the differences in the opinions expressed are numerous; and unanimity exists only in a few leading points. In reference to the doctrine of the soul, which furnished the most prominent, and almost exclusive object of anthropological investigation to the fathers, the points which came most frequently under discussion were,—how the soul existed and would continue to exist, whether it consisted of one part or of two parts—whether its substance was corporeal or spiritual—whether its immortality was natural or capable of being lost. In the course of these purely philosophical investigations, it frequently happened that questions were started of a biblical and historical character, occasioned by the Mosaic history, respecting the divine image in man; they attempted to determine whether this image was exclusively psychical, or to be also sought for in man's corporeal structure; whether it consisted in the possession of reason and moral freedom, or in the immortality of the individual. Not unfrequently the dominion over nature, and especially over the animal creation, were reckoned to be part of this image.

Justin entered into only some of these anthropological enquiries, and, without having a clear perception of their connection and importance, in relation to the doctrine of redemption, he made a triple division (a Trichotomy) in the nature of man.¹ He includes in his definition, the usual one, according to which man

¹ *De Resurrect.* c. 8, p. 593, D. τί ἐστιν ὁ ἀνθρώπος ἀλλ' ἢ τὸ ἐκ ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος συνιστὸς ζῶον λογικόν;—*Dial.* c. Tr. c. 93, p. 190, (p. 321, B.) Against this definition of man as a rational being, which is repeated by many of the later Fathers, as, for example, Tertullian (*adv. Mar.* 2, 4, T. I. p. 57; *de*

is a rational being, consisting of body and soul ; but, when he speaks with greater exactness, and with perfect independence, he expressly distinguishes three parts in men,—the rational thinking principle, or the spirit ; the animal principle of life, or the soul ; and what in itself would be dead, lifeless matter, or the body. He does this most distinctly in his *Fragment on the Resurrection*. “The resurrection,” he says,¹ “is of the fallen flesh, for the Spirit falls not ; the soul is in the body, which lives not without the soul ; the body, when the soul leaves it, is no more ; for the body is the habitation of the soul, but the soul is the habitation of the spirit. These three, in those who have a sincere hope and an undoubting faith in God, will be saved.” This tripartite view of human nature has been frequently taken, but, as we think incorrectly, as a specimen of Justin’s Platonising mode

earn. Christ. c. 12, T. III. p. 293 ; the Apostolic Constitutions, (7, 38, T. I. p. 378,) and Lactantius (Institut. divin. 2, 1.) Tatian bitterly inveighs ; *Orat. c. Gr. c. 15, p. 256, (p. 154, A.)* ἵσται ἀνθρώπος οὐχ, ὥστε οἱ κεκαίφθαι δογματίζουσιν, ζῶν λογικόν, οὐ καὶ ἰσιστήμης δακτυλόν· δαχθάνεται γὰρ παρ’ αὐτοῦ καὶ τὰ ἄλογα οὐ καὶ ἰσιστήμης διακινά. Μόνος δὲ ἀνθρώπος ἰκάνει καὶ ἡμῶσις τῷ Θεῷ λίγω δὲ ἀνθρώπου, οὐχὶ τὸν ἴμοια τοῖς ζώοις πράττοντα. ἀλλὰ τὸν σῆμν μὲν ἀνθρωπότητος. πρὸς αὐτὸν δὲ τὸν Θεὸν κειρανεύεται.—“For man is not, as some croaking dogmatists say, a rational animal, capable of understanding and knowledge ; for, according to them, the irrational animals will be shown to be capable of understanding and knowledge. But man alone is the image and likeness of God. But I call him a man, not one who performs actions similar to those of animals, but who advances beyond humanity, even to God himself.”

¹ *De Resurrect. c. 10, (p. 595, A.)* ἀνάστασις ἵσται τῷ σωτηρίας σαρκίου, πνεῦμα γὰρ οὐ πίπτει, ψυχὴ ἐν σώματι ἵσται, ἡ ζῇ δὲ ἀψυχὸν· σῶμα ψυχῆς ἀπικλοῦσθαι οὐκ ἵσται· οἷος γὰρ τὸ σῶμα ψυχῆς, πνεύματος δὲ ψυχῆ οἷος· τὰ τρία ταῦτα τοῖς ἰσπιδὰ ἡλικιῇ καὶ πῶσις ἀδιάκριτον ἐν τῇ Θεῷ ἵχουσι σωθῆσθαι. Möhler (*Athanasius der Grosse, I. 61*.) has entirely passed over this passage (was it from purely critical scruples ?) when labouring to produce evidence that Justin acknowledged only one soul, namely, the rational. Whatever he adduces that apparently favours this notion, is easily set aside by the circumstance, that Justin, like all the other Trichotomists, frequently uses the simple term *soul*, when he means specially the rational part.

of thinking,—as a graft of the Platonic philosophy.¹ Plato, it is true, distinguishes between a double soul, a higher and a lower. The first, the divine, immortal, and rational, is, according to him, the seat and organ of rational thinking; the latter, the mortal, irrational, and animal, manifests itself in a twofold direction, partly in sensual animal desire, (τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν,) and partly as high-mettled energy (ὁ θυμός, τὸ θυμοειδές); so that the latter forms a medium between the purely rational and purely sensuous, psychical principle of life. The θυμοειδές, though itself not reason, assists the reason in controlling the sensual desires.² But the same method by which Plato arrived at this distinction of a twofold element, one rational, the other anti-rational, in the psychical life of man; the empirical (or experimental) method lay open also to Justin: his own experience must have assured him, that a twofold psychical principle was active in man, one sensual, which aroused the gratification of desires, and is purely animal, and another rational, which often withholds and hinders that gratification, according to the laws of rational reflection, and by virtue of the peculiar strong tendency of Oriental antiquity to reduce to substantial forms mere modes of operation, he would of himself be disposed to elevate those observed mental powers to real and separate divisions of the soul, without having been determined by Plato's example. Yet thinkers before Plato in the East, as well as in Greece,

¹ Thus Horn (*de sententia eorum patrum, quorum auctoritas ante Augustinum plurimum valuit, de peccato originali*, p. 100.) Tennemann (*Geschichte der Philosophie*, VII. 219) Ullmann (*Theolog. Studien und Kritiken*, 1828, II. 427.) Tzschirner, (*Fall des Heidenthums*, I. 582,) and Englehardt (*Dogmengeschichte*, I. 269.)

² The most important passages, in which Plato exhibits that Dichotomy, or, if it be preferred, Trichotomy of the human soul, are in *Repub.* IV. T. V. p. 148—156, IX. p. 346. *Tim.* T. VII. p. 32, 72, sq. 77. See the details in Tennemann (*System der Platonischen Philosophie*, III. 50, 59, 19*, and *Geschichte der Philosophie*, II. 431—436) and Ritter (*Geschichte der Philosophie*, 2 Aufl. II. 417—420.)

had distinguished between a higher and a lower, a purely spiritual and a purely animal principle of the soul.¹ The LXX (according to an arbitrary translation of Job vii. 15, ἀπαλλάξεις ἀπὸ πνεύματός μου τὴν ψυχὴν μου, ἀπὸ δὲ θανάτου τὰ ὀσᾶ μου,) and Josephus (*Ant. Jud.* 1, 1, 2, T. I. p. 9, ἐπλασεν ὁ Θεὸς τὸν ἀνθρώπον χοῦν ἀπὸ τῆς γῆς λαβῶν, καὶ πνεῦμα ἐνέγκει αὐτῷ καὶ ψυχὴν,) were apprised of a difference between ψυχή and πνεῦμα. But if any persons are determined to deduce Justin's Trichotomy from an exterior source, it is at least not to be sought for in Platonism; it lies rather in the Apostolic wish (*votum*) 1 Thess. v. 23, a passage which, with its (either physical or merely logical) Trilogy, influenced the Fathers to such a degree that not only the Trichotomists among them traced back their threefold division of human nature to it,² but even Tertullian, the declared enemy of that division, hesitated for a moment whether he ought not, on the ground of it, to allow a triplicity in man, (*adv. Marc.* 5, 15, T. I. p. 376.)

Justin deduces the origin of the soul from the creative power of God. This appeared self-evident respecting the animal soul, and was never doubted; but with respect to the rational soul, there seemed much more reason for hesitation, and it was often called in question. Not a few of the church-teachers (apart from the heretics) cherished the notion that the thinking principle in man, instead of being the result of a free creative art, was a part and efflux of the Di-

¹ This is true of the Indians and of Pythagoras; the latter, according to Diogenes Laertius, must have distinguished between *νοῦς*, *φρενίς*, and *θυμὸς*, or, according to the erroneous account of Stobæus, between *λογισμός*, *θυμὸς*, and *αισθησία*. See the passages in Olshausen (*de naturæ humanæ trichotomia N. T. scriptoribus recepta in opusc. theolog. Berol.* 1834, pp. 149, 158,) and Stirn (*anthropologisch exegetische Untersuchungen in d. Tübinger Zeitschrift für Theologie*, 1834, III. 27.)

² Thus, for example, Irenæus (*adv. Hæres.* 5, 6, p. 299, sq.) Origines (*in Exod. homil.* 3, 3, T. II. p. 137, *in Matth.* 13, 2, T. III. p. 570, 14, 3, p. 618. An anonymous writer in Jerome (*ad Hedib. quæst.* 12, T. III. p. 103.)

vine substance ; was Justin altogether free from this notion ? the general opinion almost unanimously¹ answers this question in the negative, and asserts that Justin shared in the belief, that the human rational soul was a part of the Divinity. And yet the opposite is true. What appears in Justin's writings as favouring the substantial relationship of the rational soul to God, vanishes as soon as it is subjected to a closer examination. The assertion in the Fragment on the Resurrection which appears to express that relationship so directly, (de Resurrect. c. 8, p. 594, A. ἡ ψυχὴ ἐστὶν ἀφθάρτος, μέρος οὖσα τοῦ Θεοῦ καὶ ἐμφύσημα,— “The soul is immortal, being a part and an inbreathing of God,”) does not give Justin's personal conviction, but is a thesis of the Gnostics, which the Apologist, with dialectic adroitness, adopts for a while, in order to fight his opponents with their own weapons. When, in the Dialogue, the question is asked, (c. Tr. c. 4, p. 106, [p. 221, D.]) τίς ἡμῶν ἔλεγε, συγγένεια πρὸς τὸν Θεὸν ἐστὶ ; ἢ καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ θεία καὶ ἀθάνατος ἐστὶ καὶ αὐτοῦ ἐκείνου τοῦ βασιλικοῦ νοῦ μέρος ;—“What relationship,” said he, “have we to God ? and is the soul, divine, and immortal, and a part of the royal understanding itself ?”—To this interrogatory, an answer is given in the affirmative ; which is indeed an avowal of Justin's, not, however, of the Christian, but of the yet unconverted Platonic philosopher.² Moreover,

¹ This opinion is defended by Souverain (*Versuch über den Platonismus d. Kirchenväter*, 129.) Starck (*Versuch einer Geschichte des Arianismus*, I. 78.) Münscher, *Handbuch der christ. Dogmengeschichte*, II. 94.) Keil *opusc. academ.* p. 678.) Beck (*comment. histor. decret. relig. christ.* p. 348. Dähne (*de ysaia Clement. Alexand.* p. 90.) Daniel von Cölln (*zu Münscher's Lehrbuch d. christ. Dogmen*. I. 326.) Deltinger (*Tübinger Zeitschrift für Theologie*, 1835, IV. 27, 50.) Hagenbach (*Lehrbuch der Dogmengeschichte*, I. 161.) and Otto (*De Just. Mart. scriptis et doctrina*, p. 150.)

² When Münscher remarks on the above passage, “they are certainly not Justin's own words, but those of an ancient, who yet expresses the author's convictions,” he has totally lost sight of the connection, and of the situation in which that question is proposed. Still more surprising is Keil's mistake. He not only takes an erroneous view of the question, but by a further

the doctrine, that even in the period antecedent to the Christian dispensation, the whole human race participated in the Divine Logos, and especially the expression (Apol. 2, 8, p. 94, [p. 46, C.]) *ἐμφυτον παντὶ γίνεσθαι ἀνθρώπων σπέρμα τοῦ λόγου*, “the seed of the Logos implanted in every race of men,” has not that gross and physical meaning, as if particles had been separated from the substance of the Divine Logos, and had been attached as souls to human bodies; but that communication of the Logos to men is only to be understood of an overflowing of Divine intelligence and life into the souls of men; of a dynamic and temporary connection of the Logos with men. *ἐμφυτον* means here, as it often does, deeply implanted. Clemens of Alexandria had even allowed the same conviction, that the Divine Logos, before his incarnation, had been poured forth on the whole human race,¹ and yet he rejects in the strongest terms the physical sameness of souls with God.² There is indeed, another passage of the Dialogue³ that has been strangely overlooked, which, at first sight, seems more decidedly and incontrovertibly to assert the *ὁμοουσία* of the soul with God; it contains an allusion to Gen. ii. 7.⁴ τὸ πλάσμα ὃ ἐπλασεν ὁ Θεὸς τὸν Ἀδάμ οἶκος ἐγένετο τοῦ ἐμφυσηματος τοῦ πατρὸς τοῦ Θεοῦ. c. Tr. c. 40, p. 137, (p. 259, A.) “The figure of clay which God fashioned—Adam—became a habitation of the inbreathing which was from God.” For the most distinguished ancient psychological Homou-

misunderstanding of Justin's Prologue, foists upon it the fantastic doctrine of the metempsychosis—a mistake at which we may as fairly be surprised, as Keil himself is surprised that no one before him had made this discovery.

¹ *Strom.* 7, 3, 21, T. III. p. 221, ὁ λόγος πάντῃ κεχυμένος, — 6, 7, 58, p. 133.

² *Strom.* 2, 16, 74, T. II. p. 168, sq. ὁ Θεὸς οὐδὲ μίαν ἔχει πρὸς ἡμᾶς φυσικὴν σχέσιν . . . , εἰ μὴ τις μέρος αὐτοῦ καὶ ὁμοουσίους ἡμᾶς τῷ Θεῷ τολμήσει λέγειν.

³ As far as we know, Griener, (*institut. theol. dogmat.* p. 159.) is the only writer who has taken notice of it.

⁴ καὶ ἔπλασεν ὁ Θεὸς τὸν ἀνθρώπον, χεὶν ἀπὸ τῆς γῆς, καὶ ἐνεφύσεν εἰς τὸ πρῶτον αὐτοῦ πνοὴν ζωῆς.

sians ground their conviction of the physical affinity of the human soul to God, precisely on the term *ἐνφύσει* in the Mosaic passage, this is done expressly by Philo¹ and Tertullian.² Yet the evidence drawn from that passage is most deceptive; it is in itself neither for nor against the notion. For if there have been church-teachers who have inferred from Gen. ii. 7, the *ὁμοουσία* of the human soul with God, there also have not been wanting those who have made use of that passage without drawing such a conclusion. We will mention only two. Clemens³

¹ *De Opif. Mund.* c. 46, T. i, p. 44. Φυσίῳ . . . γιγνῆσθαι . . . τὴν ψυχὴν ἀπ' ὁμοίου γινεῖται τὸ παράπαν, ἀλλ' ἐκ τοῦ πατρὸς καὶ ἡγιμῶτος τῶν πάντων. Τὸ γὰρ "ἐνφύσει" ὕδιν ἢ ἵταρον ἢ πνεῦμα θεῶν ἀπὸ τῆς μακαρίας καὶ εὐδαίμονος ἐκείνης φύσεως, ἀποκαίει τὴν ἐνθάδε σταλάμινον ἐκ' ἀφελείας τοῦ γένος ἡμῶν.—"He says that the soul was altogether produced not from anything [which had been itself] begotten, but from the Father and Ruler of all things. For the term "ἐνφύσει" means no other than the divine breath (spirit) from that blessed and happy nature, having preferred to migrate hither for the benefit of our race," c. 51, p. 47.—*quod deus sit immut.* c. 10. T. ii. p. 75.—*de concupiscent.* c. 11, T. v. p. 143, sq. ἐκείνης ὁσίας πνεῦμα θεῶν καὶ μάλιστα κατὰ Μαῦσῃν, ὃς ἐν τῇ κοσμοποιῇ φυσίῳ, ἀνδρώσῃ τῇ πρώτῃ καὶ ἀρχηγίτῃ τοῦ γένος ἡμῶν ἐμφυσῆσαι πνοὴν ζωῆς τὸν θεόν. . . . Τὸ δ' ἐμφυσῶμενον δῆλον ὅς αἰδίρειον ἢ πνεῦμα καὶ ἐκ τῆς αἰδρείου πνεύματος προῖτατον, ὥστε τῆς μακαρίας καὶ εὐδαίμονος φύσεως ἀπαύγασμα.—"Its essence is a divine breath especially according to Moses, who in his account of the creation of the world, says that God breathed the breath of life into the first man, the chief of our race— . . . and what was inbreathed was ethereal breath, or if there be anything better than that, forasmuch as it was a reflection of the blessed and thrice blessed nature."

² *Adv. Marc.* 2, 9, T. i. p. 67, *non per illud jam videri potest anima deliquisse, quod ille cum deo affine est, id est per affinitatem, sed per illud, quod substantiæ accessit, id est per liberum arbitrium.*—2, 5, p. 59.—4, 38, p. 293.—*adv. Prax.* c. 5, T. ii. p. 152.—*de anim.* c. 3, T. iv. p. 186, c. 11, p. 199.

³ *Strom.* 5, 14, 95, T. iii. p. 67, ἐκότης . . . λίγει δ' Μαῦσῃς . . . ψυχὴν τὴν λογικὴν ἀναθεῖναι ἐμφυσῶσθαι ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ ἐκείνης πνοῆς.—*pædag.* 1, 3, 7, T. i. p. 108.—"The passage in which Clement speaks against the substantial affinity of the human soul to God, has been already quoted.

and Theodoret¹ expressly call the soul an inbreathing of God, and yet they dispute its being a part or efflux of the divine essence. Therefore, as Justin's writings, as plainly appears from the foregoing observations, know nothing of an emanation of the soul from God,² it is self-evident that Justin must have regarded it in its origin as a created being. But the Apologist states this creation of the soul in express terms. He does so, when treating of the immortality of the soul.

It is well known that several of the ancient, especially the Greek Fathers, attributed to the soul not an unconditional abiding permanence, but an immortality bestowed as a gift, so that it might be regarded as capable of continued existence, and yet liable to death; they placed the principle of its continuance not in the natural indestructibility of its substance, but in the free unshackled will and grace of God. At their head stands Justin. In common with them, he held that the soul (the animal as well as the rational) continued imperishable, but not simply from its own nature, but solely by the free power and gracious will of God. The reason of this merely conditional permanence he placed, like the other fathers, in the soul's total want of an original life of its own, in its natural and total dependence on the divine source of life, which was external and foreign to itself. That the soul had no self-subsistent original life, he deduced from its incapability of producing and communicating life out of itself; and that it must be thus incapable, necessarily

¹ *Fabul. hæret.* 5, 9, T. iv. p. 414, ὁ Θεόδοτος Μαιῦσις πρότερον ἔφησι τῷ Ἀδὰμ διαπλωσθῆναι τὸ σῶμα εἰς οὗτος ἐμφύσησαι τὸν θῖον τὴν ψυχὴν Ἐκείνο διὰ τὸ ἐμφύσημα ἡ μίερος ἐκ τῆς θείας ὁσίας φανὲν . . . , ἀλλὰ τῆς ψυχῆς τὴν φύσιν διὰ τούτου σημαίνεσθαι λέγομεν, ὅτι παντὶ μὲν ἔστιν ἡ ψυχὴ λογικὸν τε καὶ νοερὸν.

² Hence the charge of symbolizing with Plato falls to the ground which has been made against Justin by Hahn, (*de Platonismo theol. veterum*, p. 7, sq.) Gruner, (*institut. theol. dogmat.* p. 159.) Tzschirner, (*Fall des Heidenthums*, I. 581, 583,) and others, as if he had taught the physical oneness of the human soul with God.

resulted, in his opinion, from its nature as created. He expresses himself in very decided terms on this subject;¹ "The soul cannot be called immortal, for if it were immortal, it plainly must be also unbegotten. . . . Or do you maintain that the world is also unbegotten? . . . But if the world be created, souls must be so too, and possibly may cease to be. . . . Yet I do not maintain that souls ever die, for that would be indeed a gain to the wicked. . . . God alone is unbegotten and unchangeable; every thing after him is created and changeable." A little after he says,² "The soul is either life or it has life; if it were life, it would unquestionably communicate life to others, not merely itself, as motion does not communicate itself, but rather sets another body in motion. That the

¹ *Dial. c. Tr. c. 5*, p. 107, (p. 222, E. 223, A. B. D.) The sketches drawn by Olshausen (*antiquiss. eccles. græc. patrum de immortalitate animæ sententiæ*: Opus. Theol. p. 173, sq.) and after him by his reviewer Ullman, (*Theolog. Studien und Kritiken*, 1828, II. 425,) of the doctrine of the immortality of the Soul, as held by the most ancient Greek Fathers, and Justin among the rest, is essentially correct only in reference to Tatian. As to the others, it is so far very deceptive, that a good part of the representations that are peculiar to the Assyrians alone, are transferred to them.

² *Dial. c. Tr. c. 6*, p. 108, sq. (p. 224, B. C.) Irenæus adopts very nearly the same mode of arguing; *adv. hæres.* 2, 64, p. 169. Sine initio et sine fine, vere et semper idem et eodem modo se habens solus est deus. Quæ autem sunt ab illo omninæ, quæcunque facta sunt et fiunt, initium quidem suum accessunt generationis et per hoc inferiora sunt ab eo, qui ea fecit, quoniam non sunt ingenita, perseverant autem et extenduntur in longitudinem seculorum secundum voluntatem factoris dei; ita ut sic initio fierent, et postea ut sint eis donat Et de animalibus de animabus et de spiritibus et omnino de omnibus his, quæ facta sunt cogitans quis minime peccabit, quando omnia, quæ facta sunt, initium quidem facturæ suæ habeant, perseverant autem, quoadusque ea deus et esse et perseverare voluerit Non enim ex nobis neque ex nostra natura vita est, sed secundum gratiam dei datur Sicut autem corpus animale ipsum quidem non est anima, participatur autem animam quoadusque deus vult, sic et anima ipsa quidem non est recta, participatur autem a deo sibi præstitam vitam.

soul lives, no one can dispute ; if it lives, therefore, it does not live because it is life, but because it receives life. But that which receives something is distinct from that from which it receives. The soul enjoys life, because God wills that it should live ; but it is possible for it no longer to enjoy life, as soon as God wills that it should no longer live.¹ For life does not belong to it as its own property, as it does to God ; but as man does not always exist, nor is the body always connected with the soul ; for, as soon as their connection is dissolved, the soul leaves the body, and the man no longer exists ; so also, when the soul must cease to be, the spirit of life is separated from it, and the soul will be no more, but its parts return whence they were taken.”²

¹ Ζωὴς ψυχὴ μισίχαι, ἰσχυὶ ζῆν αὐτὴν ὁ Θεὸς βούλεται· οὕτως ἔρεα καὶ οὐ μισίχαι τοῦ. ἴταν αὐτὴν μὴ θίλοι ζῆν. By these words, it is not meant that God will ever really deprive the soul of its life ; they are intended forcibly to express the sentiment, that the immortality of the soul is not innate and natural, and to represent its physical liability to death and annihilation. The meaning which Olshausen attaches to these words (p. 180,) is foreign to Justin's habits of thought, and built on Tatian's principles. He considers the death of the soul, which they represent as possible, to be figurative, and sees in it the condition in which the soul, deprived of the divine Spirit, hitherto connected with it, sinks into darkness, and, forgetful of its heavenly origin, leads a mere semblance of life. Of a connection of the divine Spirit with the human soul, as Tatian maintains it, and of the subsequent deprivation of the Spirit, Justin knows nothing ; his (hypothetical) death of the soul is a real physical annihilation.

² Ὅταν δὴ τὴν ψυχὴν μολίσι εἶναι, ἀπίστη καὶ αὐτῆς τὸ ζῶντιον πνεῦμα καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν ἡ ψυχὴ ἔτι, ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτὴ εἶναι ἐλάβθη ἐκεῖσε χωρὶς πάλιν.—“When the soul must exist no longer, *the vital spirit* departs from it, and the soul no longer exists, but departs to the place whence it was taken.” The ζῶντιον πνεῦμα mentioned in this passage, is not the spirit of God, trichotonically considered as the third and noblest component part of the human being, as the principle of the rational divine power of thought in man, but that divine Spirit of life on which Justin believed the real substantial being of the soul to depend. In the whole passage quoted above, the word ψυχὴ denotes not the lower soul in distinction from the rational, but both collectively.

The Scriptures place the peculiar pre-eminence of man above all the creatures on the earth, in his being created after the image of God; and the doctrine of the Church has always aimed at setting forth this pre-eminence in all its extent. Justin treats of this divine image in man more briefly than we might expect, and more indefinitely than we could wish. The only thing which he forcibly urges, is to acknowledge the body, (which, it may be observed in passing, he allows was made out of the earth and other elementary materials,¹) as a mirror of the divine image. He not only throws out the casual remark, that Christ assumed the nature of man, formed after the image and likeness of God,² but in the Fragment on the Resurrection, he introduces the subject with a pointed interrogatory,³ "does not the Scripture say, let us make man after our image, and after our likeness? what man? evidently a material man is intended; for it is said, and God took dust of the ground and made man; it is evident then, that the material man was formed after the image of God." What Justin attributed besides, to the divine image in man, can only be conjectured. Yet we shall at least not be very far from the truth, if we reckon as belonging to it, the three-fold prerogative, with which Justin supposes the first man to have been invested at his creation; namely, *dominion* over the terrestrial creation, *reason*, and *moral freedom*. These three prerogatives are the distinguishing traits in which Justin finds the peculiar dignity and elevation of man. The power of man over nature, he touches upon with brevity, yet he explicitly declares that God, when he had finished

¹ *Coh. ad Gr.* c. 30, p. 30, (p. 29, D.) *ἐν γῆς ἀνθρώπου πλάσσειν*,—*de resurrect.* c. 5, p. 590, E. *Dial. c. Tr.* c. 62, p. 159, (p. 285, C.) *Dial. c. Tr.* c. 62, p. 159, (p. 285, C.)—*τὰ στοιχεῖα, τοῦτί ἐστι τὴν γῆν καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ὁμοίως, ἐξ ὧν ποιεῖται τὸν ἀνθρώπον γενεόντα*.

² *Coh. ad Gr.* c. 38, p. 34, (p. 36, C.)

³ *De Resurrect.* c. 7, p. 592, D.E. See Vol. I. p. 177.

creation, subjected earthly things to man.¹ He dwells more frequently and earnestly on the power of reason possessed by man, limiting it, even in its highest possible expression, as far as he contemplates it, as imparted at creation, and natural to the capability of knowing the Divine Being, and of distinguishing between good and evil. Hence we find him saying: "God originally created the human race endowed with understanding, and with the power of choosing truth and of acting aright, so that all men are without excuse before God; for they have been made rational, and capable of thought;"²—and, "the nature of man possessing the power of distinguishing between good and evil;"³—and, "that souls are capable of knowing the existence of God, and the excellence of righteousness and piety."⁴ I grant, Justin treats very frequently and impressively of moral freedom, sometimes simply testifying its reality, while at other times he labours to point its efficiency. To the plain declaration which he repeats, with slight modifications,⁵ "God made man not as he made other things, such as trees and animals, which can do nothing from free choice, but in the beginning he made angels and men

¹ *Apol.* 2, 5, p. 92, (p. 44, A.) ὁ Θεὸς τὸν πάντα κόσμον ποιήσας καὶ τὰ ἱερίγια ἀνθρώποις ὑποτάξας . . . παρέδωκεν.

² *Apol.* 1, 28, p. 61, (p. 71, B. C.) τὴν ἀρχὴν νοερὴν καὶ δυνάμιν αἰετῶσαι τὰληθῆ καὶ εὖ πράττειν τὸ γίνεσθαι τὸ ἀνθρώπινον σπουδήν, ὥς ἀναπολόγητον εἶναι τοῖς πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις παρὰ τῷ Θεῷ· λογικοὶ γὰρ καὶ διακριτικοὶ γινώσκοντες.

³ *Apol.* 2, 14, p. 98, (p. 52, A.) διὰ τὸ ἐν τῇ φύσει τῇ τῶν ἀνθρώπων εἶναι τὸ γνωστικὸν καλῶ καὶ αἰσχεῖ—*Dial. c. Tr. c.* 93, p. 190, (p. 320, D.)

⁴ *Dial. c. Tr. c.* 4, p. 107, (p. 222, E.) Compare *Apol.* 2, 6, p. 92, (p. 44, E.) To the same subject belongs what is said in *Dial. c. Tr. c.* 141, p. 231, (p. 370, B.) that God created men and angels free for the practice of righteousness, μετὰ λόγῳ τῷ ἰσίσασθαι αὐτοὺς, ὅφ' οὗ γινώσκουσιν καὶ δι' ἑν ἑαυτοῖς, πρῶτον οὐκ ἄνθρωποι.

⁵ *Apol.* 1, 43, p. 69, (p. 81, B.) and 2, 7, p. 93, (p. 45, E.) Other similar declarations may be found in *Dial. c. Tr. c.* 88, p. 186, (p. 316, A.)—c. 102, p. 197, (p. 329, A.)—c. 141, p. 231, (p. 370, B.)

free ;"—he annexes a number of proofs from Scripture and experience, in order to protect the naked declaration against any doubts that might be started, and to stamp so important a doctrine with the seal of the strongest evidence. With this view,¹ he remarks, that God said to the first man, " Behold ! good and evil are set before thy eyes. Choose the good ;" and by Isaiah, God made similar requirements,² " Wash you, make you clean, put away evil from your souls, learn to do good," &c. Making his appeal to experience, he says, " That man, according to his own free choice, can act well or ill,—we prove thus : We see that one and the same man pursues opposite courses. But if he were fated to be good or bad, he could not be susceptible of contraries nor change so often." " The same thing,"³ he adds, " is proved by those men who, in various places, have framed laws and philosophical systems, and enjoined on men to perform certain actions, and to abstain from others. Even the Stoic philosophers, when they treat of morals, maintain the same principles." But not satisfied with having proved the reality of moral freedom, from the evidence of Revelation and experience, he pursues the same object by *a priori* reasoning. He adverts, for this purpose, to the important influence of freedom on morals : he shews, that without it they would be without a root, that the moral order of the world would be deprived of its foundation. " If it be owing to a decree of fate,"⁴ he says, " that one man is good and another bad, neither the former merits praise nor the latter blame ; and again, if men are deprived of the power of avoiding the base and choosing the good, no one can be accountable for his actions." A little

¹ *Apol.* 1, 44, p. 69, (p. 81, B. C.) The above quoted words, which Justin erroneously represents as having been spoken to our first parents, are to be found, with some slight variations, in Deuteron. xxx. 15, 19.

² *Apol.* 1, 43, p. 69, (p. 80, E.)

³ *Apol.* 2, 7, p. 93, (p. 46, A.)

⁴ *Apol.* 1, 43, p. 69, (p. 80, D. E.)

afterwards, he adds,¹ "No one would be deserving of reward or praise, who chose the good not of his own free motion, but being born such; nor could any one, if he were bad, be justly punished, if he were not so voluntarily, and could be nothing but what he was by birth." Justin had a powerful stimulus to present, in a clear and impressive light, the truth of the free determination of man. The most dangerous of all prejudices, a horrid fatalism, which the icy consequence of a false philosophy had framed, and thoughtless minds had eagerly embraced, formed one of the greatest obstacles to the regenerating progress of Christianity, and paralyzed its sanctifying influence, not unfrequently even in minds which had received the Gospel with real inward love. It was necessary to expose this prejudice in all its falsehood and baselessness, to pursue and defeat it in all its turns and windings, that the Gospel might really become the power of God to sanctify and save all those who believed it. The indefatigable zeal with which Justin advocated the truth of moral freedom contributed to this end; the same end was, moreover, promoted by the direct attack on Fatalism, which the Apologist added to his vindication of freedom.² Jus-

¹ *Apol.* 1, 43, p. 69, (p. 81, B.) Compare 2, 7, p. 93, (p. 45, E. 46, A.)

² All the other Apologists unanimously combated Fatalism in its manifold forms: thus for example, Tatian, (*Orat. c. Gr.* c. 8, p. 250, [p. 147, A. B.] c. 9, p. 251, [p. 148, C.] Minucius Felix, (*Octav. c.* 36, p. 133.) Clemens. (*Strom.* 4, 7, 54, T. II. p. 307, sq. compare Theodot. *fragm.* c. 75, sqq. T. IV. p. 28,) the Clementine Homilies and Recognitions, (*homil.* 4, 12, T. I. p. 652, sq. 14, 3, sqq. p. 717, sq. *recognit.* l. 8 and 9, p. 560, sqq.) Eusebius, (*præp. evangel.* I. 6, p. 236, sqq.) This deep-rooted opposition of Fatalism formed also the principal external fuel that kept alive the universal glowing interest with which the Fathers, down to Augustin, handled the doctrine of the freedom of the human will. It would be unnecessary here to accumulate proofs of this fact. The principal expression of the Fathers respecting moral freedom, may be found reported with less or greater fulness in Petau, (*theol. dogm. de opif. sex dieb.* l. 3—5. Venet. 1757,

tin conducted his attack on Fatalism, (chiefly that of the Stoic school), in a twofold manner; partly by depriving it of the supports on which it rested, or appeared to rest; partly by exposing its absurdity and dangerous consequences. The system of Fatalism, he first of all suggests, is unauthorized. For since between the outward condition and the inward deserts of men, a striking disposition often exists, this is not the consequence of the prevalence of a blind cold necessity, but the product of the evil destructive agency of a *dæmoni*acal power,¹ endowed with reason and freedom, but committed in conflict with the divine government; the numerous prophecies, however, which are contained in the sacred books of the Christians, are witnesses to the infallibility and exactitude of the divine omniscience and providence.² The sys-

T. III. p. 209, sqq. *de incarn.* 9, 2, sq. T. IV. p. 371, sqq.) Keil, (*opus. academ.* p. 696, sqq.) and Hahn (Opinions of the Church-teachers on the free co-operation of man for his salvation and divine grace, to the time of Ephraim the Syrian, in Illgen's *zweiter Denkschrift*, S. 51). Lastly, when by several learned men, for example, Scultetus (*medulla theolog. patrum*, I. p. 48.) Horn (*de sententia eorum patrum, quorum auctoritas ante August. plur. valuit de peccato orig.* p. 101), and Otto (*de Justin. Mart. scriptis et doctrina*, p. 163,) this patristic doctrine of the spontaneity of the human will, has been traced to the Platonic philosophy as its source, it appears to have entirely escaped their notice, first, that it does not so closely agree with Plato's doctrine as is commonly supposed; secondly, that the belief in the free self-determination of the soul is an indisputable postulate of the universal, pure, human consciousness, and especially the true life-blood of the scriptural doctrine of salvation. It is superfluous to remark, that Justin himself makes the Old Testament the source of the Platonic doctrine of freedom. *Apol.* 1, 44, p. 70, (p. 81, E.) Πλάτων ἐπὶ τῶν αἰτίᾳ ἱλαρίων, τοῖς ὁμοίαις παρὰ Μωϋσέως τοῦ προφήτου λαβὼν ἴσως—a passage which Horn so misunderstood, that he has maintained, in referring to it, that Justin placed his doctrine of spontaneity under the protection of Plato's *Ægis*.

¹ *Apol.* 2, 7, p. 93, (p. 45, D.)

² *Apol.* 1, 44, p. 70, (p. 82, A.B.); ἡ φημεν πειροφρητιῦνθαι τὰ μίλλοντα γίνεσθαι, αὐτὰ δὲ τοῖς ἡμαρμάνοις ἀνάγκη πράττεισθαι λέγομεν· ἀλλὰ προγινώσκου τῷ Διὶ ὅτις τῶν μιλλούντων ὑπὸ πάντων ἀνθρώπων παραχρῆσθαι καὶ δόγματός ὅτις παρ' αὐτῷ κατ' ἀξίαν τῷ

tem of Fatalism, on the contrary, he proved to be absurd, and highly dangerous. For grant that there is a Fate, then this must stand in opposition to itself, as far as there is amongst men a mixture of good and evil;¹ God must be considered as a being who submits to the course and change, and constantly repeated dissolution of the original matter, and acts throughout the whole, and in its individual parts, in all kinds of wickedness; or the ideas of virtue and vice lose their truth, and all distinction between them becomes a mere shadow,—a sentiment which is the height of impiety and injustice.² The only fate which exists,

πράξιον ἵκαστον ἀμείψισθαι μίλλοντι τῶν ἀνθρώπων, καὶ τὰ παρ' αὐτοῦ κατ' ἐξίαν τῶν πραττομένων ἀπαντήσθαι, διὰ τοῦ προφητικῆς πνεύματος· περιλήγει, εἰς ἰπτάσεις καὶ ἀνάμνησιν ἀεὶ ἄγων τὰ τῶν ἀνθρώπων γίνος. δεικνύς, ὅτι καὶ ὅλων ἰστὶν αὐτῶν καὶ προσνοεῖται αὐτῶν. —“ For when we say that future things have been foretold, we do not mean that they are the result of a fatal necessity; but since God foreknows all actions of men, and it is his decree that each one shall receive, according to the desert of his deeds, and he will make an award upon this principle, he predicts it by the prophetic Spirit, always leading the human race to attention and recollection, showing that they are the object of his care, and that he provides for them.”—1, 43, p. 68, sq. (p. 80, D.)

¹ *Apol.* 1, 43, p. 69. (p. 81, A.) εἰ ἔμαρτο . . . , ἂν οἱ μὴν ἦσαν σπουδαῖοι, οἱ δὲ φαῦλοι, ἰπταὶ τῇ ἐμαρμένην αἰτίαν φαῦλων καὶ ἰαντία ἰαντῆς πρᾶττεσθαι ἀποφανόμεθα —“ If good and bad were fated, . . . there would be neither good nor bad men; for we demonstrate, that if fate were the cause of the bad, it would be doing things contrary to itself.”

² *Apol.* 2, 7, p. 93. (p. 46, A.B.) εἴτε γὰρ καὶ ἐμαρμένην φήσουσι τὰ γινόμενα πρὸς ἀνθρώπων γίνεσθαι, ἢ μηδὲν ἵναι θέν [φύσει] παρὰ τριπώμυνα καὶ ἀλλαιόμενα καὶ ἀταλόμενα εἰς τὰ αὐτὰ ἐκ . . . καὶ αὐτὸν τὸν Διὸς διὰ τε τῶν μερῶν διὰ τε τοῦ ὅλου ἐν πάσῃ κακίᾳ γινόμενον· ἢ μηδὲν ἵναι κακίαν μὴ ἀρετήν, ὅτι καὶ παρὰ πᾶσαι σάφρονται ἵναι καὶ λόγον καὶ νοῦν ἴσται. —“ For if they, (the Stoics,) say that the actions of men are fated, or that God is nothing more than the things which are always turned and changed, and dissolved into the same again, . . . and God himself exists in all evil, both in parts and in the whole—or that vice and virtue are nothing, which is contrary to all sober thinking, and reason, and understanding.”—1, 43, p. 69, (p. 81, A.) ἢ ἱκεῖνο τὸ προσηρμένον δοξῆς ἀλαθὺς ἵνα,

and from which no one can escape, is this, that good men will receive their merited reward, and in like manner the bad their merited punishment.¹

CHAPTER V.

THE DOCTRINE OF THE FALL OF CREATED RATIONAL FREE-AGENTS.

ARTICLE I.

THE FALL OF ANGELS.

The doctrine of evil angels interested the Fathers much more deeply than the doctrine of good angels. Several of them, who have said scarcely a word on the latter class of beings, seem as if they hardly knew where to stop in expatiating on the nature and actions of the former. They regarded the whole order of fallen spirits as engaged in conflict against Christianity; in every emergency and crisis of the church they beheld, in the back ground, a host of insulting and persecuting dæmons; and the heathen world formed in their eyes the very vestibule of Hell. Every seeming disturbance and confusion in the course of nature; every (even the slightest) disorder of physical

οὐδὲν ἔστιν ἀρετὴ οὐδὲ κακία, ἀλλὰ δόξα μόνον ἢ ἀγαθὰ ἢ κακὰ νομίζονται, ἥτις, ὡς δίκνυσιν ὁ ἀληθὴς λόγος, μινίσθη ἀσέβεια καὶ ἀδικία ἴσιν.—“Or that which was before said will appear true, that there is neither virtue nor vice, but they are only good and bad according to opinion, which, as true reason shows, is the height of impiety and injustice.”

¹ *Apol.* 1, 43, p. 69, (p. 81, A.) *ἐμαρμένῃν φαρὸν ἀπαράβατον ταύτην εἶναι, τοῖς τὰ καλὰ ἐκλογισμένοι; τὰ ἄξια ἐπιδόματα, καὶ τοῖς ὁμοίως τὰ ἵκανία τὰ ἄξια ἐπίχειρα.*—“But this we say is an inevitable fate, that there are suitable rewards for those who choose the good, and likewise condign wages for those who choose the contrary.”

life, either among men or the inferior animals ;—sin itself, in all the ramifications of depravity, were so many monuments of the ravages of Satan and his associates. But we cease to wonder that the Fathers could take such gratification in constructing their dæmonology (grotesque and extravagant as it often was in the highest degree) when we recollect how universal, in their times, both among Jews and Gentiles, was the belief in dæmoniacal agency,—what abundant confirmation of its wildest dreams, their unbridled fancy might suppose was given in the Scripture narratives of dæmoniacal possession and Satanic temptations,—and how suitable to their prejudices the host of dæmons might appear, for the substratum of a Theodicee. It never entered their minds¹ that their favourite doctrine of dæmons, with much that was revolting to good taste, contained also many elements absolutely unchristian ; that it gave only a seeming assistance towards forming a Theodicee, inasmuch as it did not accomplish the solution of the complicated enigma, “ *Whence and for what end is evil ?* ” but only carried it back one step. Lastly, it was natural that this dogma, with the rich materials which the fancy of individual teachers supplied for its construction, should divide itself into an infinite number of modifications, although, on the other hand, a point of union was not wanting in which their divided opinions might meet. Thus, for example, the conviction was universal that Satan (like the other evil angels) had been originally good, and had fallen by an abuse of his freedom ; thus the fall of Satan is constantly separated from that of the other angels, and fixed at an earlier date ; and thus the origin of the dæmons (or giants) is unanimously deduced from the sexual union of good angels and the daughters of men.

¹ Tertullian's frank declaration is sufficient on this point, *Apol.* c. 22, T. v. p. 48. Quomodo de angelis quibusdam sua sponte corruptis corruptior gens dæmonum evasent damnata a deo cum generis auctoribus et cum eo quem diximus principe, apud literas sanctas ordine cognoscitur.

Justin also holds these points in common with the church teachers. He considers the fall of the evil angels, whose existence is proved (in his opinion) by Scripture passages, such as Gen. iii. 1. Exod. vii. 22; viii. 7, 18; Is. xxx. 4; Zech. iii. 1; Ps. xcvi. 5; Job i. 6.¹ as an entirely free act, a consequence of the abuse of the freedom of the will bestowed on all rational beings.² He also distinguishes both as to its date and cause, the fall of Satan from that of the other angels. The former he makes contemporaneous with the sin of our first parents, and with Tatian,³ Irenæus,⁴ Tertullian,⁵ and Cyprian,⁶ places its first outbreak in the preconcerted artful seduction of Eve. "Satan," he says, "one of the rulers of heaven, fell, when in the form of the serpent, he seduced Eve."⁷ But if this seduction can evidently be regarded only as an outward manifestation of Satanic wickedness—if the outward act necessarily suppresses an inward root, if Satan must have fallen himself before he could effect the fall of

¹ *Dial. c. Tr. c. 79*, p. 176, sq. (p. 305, D. 306, A. B.)

² *Dial. c. Tr. c. 140*, p. 231, (p. 370, A.) οὐκ αἰτία τοῦ θιού ἐις προγνωσκόμενοι καὶ γινόμενοι ἄδικοι, εἴτε ἄγγελοι εἴτε ἄνθρωποι, γίνονται φαῦλοι, ἀλλὰ τῇ ἑαυτῶν ἱκανῶς αἰτία τοιούτοις εἶναι ὁμοίως ἱκανῶς φαίνεται.—"Those who are foreknown as beings who will become unrighteous, whether angels or men, become bad not owing to a fault on the part of God, but each one by his own fault becomes such as the event shows him to be."

³ *Orat. c. Gr. c. 7*, p. 249, (p. 146, D. 147, A.)

⁴ *Adv. hæres. 3*, 39, p. 222, 4, 78, p. 287.

⁵ *Adv. Marc. 2*, 10, T. i. p. 69, *de patient. c. 5*, T. iv. p. 71.

⁶ *De bono patient. c. 19*, T. ii. p. 251, *de zel. et livor. c. 4*, p. 256. The Koran teaches the same doctrine, see Dettinger's *Beiträge zu einer Theologie des Korans in der Tübinger Zeitsch. f. Theologie*, 1837, IV. 3.

⁷ *Dial. c. Tr. c. 124*, p. 217, (p. 353, D.) διοηται (Ps. lxxxii. 7). . . . ὡς οἱ τῶν ἀρχόντων πίπτει ἡ κατὰ φύσιν . . . τὴν πτώσιν τῷ ἑνὶ τῶν ἀρχόντων, τυγίσκει τῷ κακῶς ἐκείνῳ ὅπως πισύοντες πτώσῃ μεγάλῃ, διὰ τὸ ἀποπειλῆσαι τὴν Εὐάν.—"It is said (Ps. lxxxii. 7), 'ye fall as one of the princes,' that he may declare the fall of one of the princes, that is, of him who is called serpent, who fell with a great fall by the seduction of Eve."

our first parents—the question still remains, what did Justin regard as the peculiar internal principle of the Satanic fall? To this question he gives no direct answer; yet as he imputes to Satan, as one of his objects in seducing man, the suggestion and introduction of Polytheism, it may be confidently assumed that he considered pride, lusting after an apotheosis, as the first and fundamental sin of Satan. The Apologist affixes a later date to the original sin of the other angels, especially of those whom God had employed as assistants in the government of the world,—and traces it, evidently in dependance on Jewish tradition, to voluptuousness. The angels he relates, according to the Jewish explanation of Gen. vi. 1, being unfaithful to their calling, had intercourse with the daughters of men, and begat children, the so-called dæmons.¹

In this passage Justin distinguishes the dæmons in a very marked manner, as far as regards their person-

¹ *Apol.* 2, 5, p. 92, (p. 44, B.) οἱ ἄγγελοι, παραβάντες τὴν ἐν τάξει, γυναικῶν μίξιν ἠτήθησαν καὶ παῖδας ἐτίκτωσαν οἱ ὧν οἱ λεγόμενοι δαίμονες.—The reference which Justin makes to Genesis vi. 1, is only an implied one. A defect of memory accounts for the remark of Baumgarten-Crusius (*Lehrbuch der christl. Dogmengeschichte*, II. 990,) that Trypho imputes to the blasphemous exposition of the Christians, the fanciful explanation of Gen. vi. which had been received by the Fathers from Judaism. Moreover, that Justin reckoned the souls of deceased men among the race of Dæmons as a sort of adopted brotherhood, an opinion favoured by Le Clerc, (*histor. ecoles. duorum primorum a Chr. u. secul.* p. 618.) Semler, (*Geschichte d. christl. Glaubenslehre*, II. 79. Daniel, (*Tatianus der Apologet.* 195,) and Klee, (*Lehrbuch der Dogmengeschichte*, I. 266,) is neither demonstrable from *Apol.* 1, 18, p. 54, (p. 65, B.) οἱ ψυχαὶ ἀπαθανάτων λαμβανόμεναι καὶ βιπτούμεναι ἀνθρώποι, οὗς δαίμονες καλεῖται καὶ μαινομένοις καλεῖται πάντες.—“And the men who are seized and thrown down by the souls of the dead, who are universally called dæmoniacs and mad”—(for Justin in these words does not express his own views, but those of the heathen) nor can it in any way be brought into unison with his representations elsewhere respecting the state of ungodly souls after their separation from the body.”—*Dial. c. Tr. c.* 5, p. 107, (p. 223, B.)

ality, from the fallen angels,—a distinction which he brings forward on other occasions¹—while, on the other hand, he mingles them completely with the latter, in whatever relates to their nature, attributes and agency. The dæmons are the perfect reflection of their fathers the angels.² Satan shares in the properties of both; his nature and agency are one with theirs; with the exception that the seduction of our first parents was his exclusive work, and that he knows nothing of the voluptuous emotions. This identity of the angels, the dæmons and Satan, in reference to their qualities and agency, is by no means accidental; nor is it the mere product of the similarity of essence; between these beings a peculiar social relation exists: Satan is the leader of the angels and dæmons, and they are his host.³ But how this relation of subordination was formed, whether the sinning angels after their fall voluntarily yielded to the superior power of Satan, or whether, as Lactantius assumes,⁴ their fall was owing to Satan's enticement, Justin has not clearly expressed himself.

In relation to the nature of the fallen angels, we cannot but anticipate that Justin would place them on the same low stage of created organization which he assigned to the good angels; we might also expect that, with other teachers of the church, he would

¹ *Apol.* 2, 7, p. 93, (p. 45, B.)—*Dial. c. Tr.* c. 76, p. 173, (p. 302, A.) &c.

² Compare *Apol.* 1, 5, p. 46, (p. 55, D E.) with 2, 5, p. 92, (p. 44, B. C.)

³ *Apol.* 1, 28, p. 60, (p. 71, A. B.) παρ' ἡμῖν ὁ ἀρχηγὸς τῶν κακῶν δαιμόνων ὄφει καλεῖται.—*Dial. c. Tr.* c. 131, p. 223, (p. 360, C.) τῶν δαιμονίων καὶ τῆς στρατιᾶς τοῦ διαβόλου On two occasions he applies the title of Dæmon to Satan; *Coh. ad Gr.* c. 21, p. 22, (p. 19, D.) c. 38, p. 34, (p. 36, C.)

⁴ *Institut. divin.* 2, 14. Origen. *de princip. proem.* c. 6, T. 6, T. i. p. 48, apud plurimos ista habetur opinio, quod angelus fuerit iste diabolus et, apostata effectus, quam plurimos angelorum secum declinare persuaserit, qui et nunc usque angeli ipsius nuncupantur. See, *Ode Comment. de Angelis.* p. 490, sq.

consider them as depressed by their fall to a still lower sphere of material and physical development than what they held before. If the latter be not the fact, the former would be so much the more decided. The corporeity of the fallen angels, (a collective name for Satan, evil angels, and dæmons,) is grossly material and almost of human organization. The heathen idols represented their form;¹ they required and delighted in the greatest sensual pleasures. Their *knowledge* was very limited. Satan, before the incarnation of Jesus, was not aware of his own eternal condemnation, though this was already threatened in the Old Testament, because this threatening was veiled in parabolic language.² The contents of the Old Testament were, for the most part, equally concealed from the dæmons; for example, they knew not how to gather from it the real nature and destiny (the crucifixion) of the Messiah, since both were concealed under symbols. Their *power* had also its narrow creat-

¹ *Apol.* 1, 9, p. 48, (p. 57, C. D.) ἄψυχον καὶ περὰ τούτων, (the statues of the gods) γνώσκουσιν καὶ θεῶ μαρτυροῦν μὴ ἔχοντα . . . ἀλλ' ἰκύνουσιν τῶν φανέντων κακῶν δαίμονες καὶ ἰδώματα καὶ σχήματα ἔχον.

² *Iren. adv. hæres.* 5, 26, p. 324. καλῶς δ' Ἰουστίνος ἴφην, ὅτι, πρὸ μὲν τῆς τοῦ κυρίου παρουσίας ἐπίστασι ἰστέλλεσθαι ἐναντίας βλασφημῆσαι τὸν θεόν, ἅτι μάλιστα ἰδὼς αὐτοῦ τὴν κατέκρυπτον, quoniam et in parabolis et allegoriis a prophetis de eo sic dictum est. "Justin has well remarked that before the coming of the Lord Satan never dared to blaspheme God, inasmuch as he was not yet aware of his condemnation, because it was spoken of by the prophets in parables and allegories." This expression, which is found in none of Justin's extant writings, and must, therefore, belong to one that is lost; probably his Treatise against Marcion, is cited by two later writers, besides Irenæus; by Andrew, Archbishop of Cæsaria in Capadocia, in his *Comment.* in *apocal. Joan.* c. 34. *Serm.* 12, and c. 60. *Serm.* 21, (in opp. Chrysostom. ed. Fref. ad M. 1697, T. II. p. 640, 689), and by Oecumenius in his *Comment.* in 1 Pet. 5. 8. (Par. 1631. T. II. p. 524. But the parabolic passages of the Old Testament, from which Satan was unable to learn his reprobation, are in part named by Oecumenius, and in part indicated by Justin himself, in his Dialogue with Trypho; c. *Tr.* c. 91, p. 189, (p. 319, B.)—c. 112, p. 205, (p. 339, A.)

ed limits. Though they could do much, yet they failed in the main design of their efforts.¹ Their rage, directed against Christianity, was powerless in its assault on the pillars of the church. They tried in vain to prevent Christ from being known and believed on among men;² in vain they forbade the reading of the books of the prophets, of the Sybill and of Hy-staspes;³ in spite of all their arts of seduction an innumerable company of men were converted from the corruption of their lives to the purity of Christian morals.⁴ Christ overcame the dæmons of Damascus, even when a child.⁵ The attempt of Satan to tempt him in the wilderness entirely failed;⁶ before the mere name of Jesus the dæmons trembled;⁷ they

¹ *Apol.* 1, 54, p. 75, sq. (p. 89, B. D. E.)—1, 55, p. 76, (p. 90, B.) The Fathers, it is true, ascribe to the dæmons intelligence in various measures and degrees, and especially a knowledge of future events; but they all agree in regarding this knowledge as uncertain and limited, and never rising to prophetic power, in the strict sense. These sentiments are briefly, but well expressed, by Lactantius and Theodoret. The former thus expresses himself, (*Institut. divin.* 2, 14,) *Sciunt illi quidem futura multa, sed non omnia quippe quibus penitus consilium dei scire non licet, et ideo solent responsa in ambiguo exitus temperare.* The latter speaks of them in still more restrictive terms, (*Comment. in Ezech.* 21, 22, T. II. p. 845,—*προσέχου ἰδόναι, ἵτι τῶν ἰσομίνων ἔδιν αἱ δαίμονες ἰσως, παντα-τόχαζομιναι δὲ τῶν πραγμάτων προλίσσιν ἰσχυροῦσι· καὶ ἵσται μὲν ὅτι καθ' ἑαυτὸν φέρονται, πολλὰς δὲ καὶ διαμαρτάνουσι.* Compare *Herm. pastor.* 2, 10, T. I. p. 97.—*Minuc. Fel. Oct.* c. 27, p. 101, sq. *Tertull. Apol.* c. 22, T. V. p. 49, sq.—*Origen, c. Cels.* 4. 92, T. I. p. 572. 7, 5, p. 697.—*Clem. recognit.* 4, 21, T. I. p. 536 *Cyprian. de idol. venut.* c. 7, T. II. p. 13.

² *Apol.* 1, 57, p. 77, (p. 91, C.) Compare *Dial.* c. *Tr.* 121. p. 214, (p. 360, A.)

³ *Apol.* 1, 44, p. 70, (82, C.)

⁴ *Apol.* 1, 10, p. 49, (p. 58, D.)—1, 14, p. 51, (p. 61, B.) *Dial.* c. *Tr.* c. 83, p. 181, (p. 309, D. 310, A.)

⁵ *Dial.* c. *Tr.* c. 78, p. 176, (p. 304, D.)

⁶ *Dial.* c. *Tr.* c. 103, p. 198, sq. (p. 331, C.)—c. 125, p. 218, (354, D. 355, A.)

⁷ *Dial.* c. *Tr.* c. 30, p. 128, (p. 247, C.)—c. 121, p. 214, (p. 350, B.)

gave way to adjuration in this name.¹ they have power only over those men who live in a state of careless security, neglectful of their salvation.²

In reference to their *moral* nature, Justin considers the fallen angels, (taking the name collectively,) from the instant of their fall, as personal concretes of all that is base or worthless; he believes that all their thoughts and endeavours are turned towards evil; that they are the instigators and promoters of every mischief in the physical and moral world. Destitute of all fear of God,³ they have committed the numberless abominations which the Mythology of the Greeks falsely attributed to the gods, or sons of the gods.⁴ Their hand is at work when men like Socrates are seen in prison, or, on the contrary, Sardanapalus, Epicurus, and others of that sort, living in luxury and splendour.⁵ And as they are themselves depraved and godless, so it is their ceaseless effort to draw men in the same direction.⁶ They have a share in all the crimes committed by men.⁷ War, murder, adultery, excesses of all kinds

¹ *Apol.* 2, 6, p. 93, (p. 45, A.)—2, 8, p. 94, (p. 46, D.)—*Dial. c. Tr.* c. 30, p. 128, (p. 247, C.)—c. 76, p. 173, (p. 302, A.) c. 85, p. 182, (p. 311, B.)—c. 121, p. 214, (p. 350, B.)

² *Apol.* 1, 14, p. 51, (p. 61, B.) *χαίρουνται παντας ἰδὸς οὐκ ἴσθ, ὅπως ὑπὲρ τῆς αὐτῶν σωτηρίας ἀγωνιζομένους.* 1, 58, p. 78, (p. 92, B.)

³ *Dial. c. Tr.* c. 30, p. 128, (p. 247, C.)

⁴ *Apol.* 1, 21, p. 56, (p. 67, D.) 1, 25, p. 59, (p. 69, C.) 2, 5, p. 92, (p. 44, C.) 2, 10, p. 95, (p. 48, D.) *Apol.* 1, 5, p. 46, (p. 55, D.)

⁵ *Apol.* 2, 7, p. 93, (p. 45, D.)

⁶ *Dial. c. Tr.* c. 116, p. 209, (p. 344, A.)—*de resurrect.* c. 1, p. 588, D. *ἰσαὶδὴ πολλὰς ἐναντιομαίνουσι πολὺν ἢ παύεται, πολλὰς δὲ καὶ ποικίλους μισθούς πρὸς ἱσχυρὰν χρῆται, πρὸς μὲν τὰς πιστευούσας, ἵνα τῷ τῆς πίστεως ἀπαγὰγῃ, πρὸς δὲ τὰς ἀπίστους ἵτι ἵνα μὴ πιστεύσωσι ἀναγκάσιον εἶναι μοι δοκῶ, &c.*—"And because the adversary desists not to attack many, but employs many and various schemes to ensnare them, against those who have believed, that he may seduce them from the faith, and against those who are yet unbelievers, that they may not believe, it seems to me necessary," &c.

⁷ *Dial. c. Tr.* c. 94, p. 191, (p. 322, A.) *βήγματα τῷ ὄρει,*

are instigated by them.¹ They are assisted in their evil doings by bad laws, and like-minded men, especially the magicians.² Their designs in general against mankind are to draw them off from the service of their Creator, and to make them vassals to themselves.³ They prosecute this object in a twofold manner, by the spread of infidelity and superstition.⁴ Those men who have a heart and susceptibility for the contemplation of the supersensual they entangle in impious theories, such as have been framed by the heretics Simon, Menander, Marcion, Valentinus, Basilides, and Saturninus, and others; those, on the contrary, who know not how to rise above the objects of sense they seduce into idolatry.⁵ In order to bring men into personal subjection, they set machinery of various

ἅπτερ ἰσὶν αἱ κακαὶ πράξεις ἰδωλολατρείαι καὶ ἄλλαι ἀδικίαι.
 "The bites of the serpent, which are evil deeds, idolatries, and other unjust acts."

¹ *Apol.* 2, 5, p. 92, (p. 44, B.)

² *Apol.* 2, 9, p. 95, (p. 48, A.)

³ *Apol.* 1, 5, p. 46, (p. 56, A.) 1, 26, p. 50, (p. 69, D.)

⁴ *Dial. c. Tr. c.* 78, p. 176, (p. 304, D.) Magic was always looked upon in the ancient church as an invention of dæmons, and magicians as Satan's shield-bearers. See Tertullian, *Apol.* c. 23, T. V. p. 50. Minuc. Fel. Octav. c. 26, p. 99. Origen c. *Cels.* 7, 69, T. I. p. 743. Lactant. *Institut. divin.* 2, 14, 16. Compare Mayer *historia Diaboli* (Ed. 2, Tubing. 1780.) p. 612. How natural was it for Justin to see in the Egyptian conjurors who withstood Moses, the organs of Satan!

⁵ *Apol.* 1, 58, p. 78, (p. 92, B.) ἕκ ἄλλο τι ἀγωνίζονται οἱ λογόμενοι δαίμονες, ἢ ἀπάγειν τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἀπὸ τοῦ ποιήσαντος θεοῦ καὶ τοῦ περικοπόντος αὐτῷ Χριστῷ καὶ τοὺς μὲν τῆς γῆς μὴ ἰσχυρίζεσθαι δυναμίδας τοῖς γῆνιαις καὶ χειροποιήτοις προσήλωσαν καὶ προσελθῶσι· τοὺς δὲ ἐπὶ θιωρίαν θέων ἐρμάντας ὑπεκκρούοντες ἦν μὴ λογισμὸν σώφρονα καὶ κατὰρὸν καὶ ἀπαθῆ βίον ἔχουσιν εἰς ἀσίβειαν ἐμβάλλουσιν.
 "For the beings denominated dæmons use their utmost efforts to lead men away from God their Maker and his first-begotten Christ. Those who cannot rise above the earth they have fastened, and still fasten down, by earthly objects and the works of their own hand; but those who are addicted to speculation on divine things they urge forward into impiety, unless they have a sound judgment, and a life pure and well-regulated."

kinds in motion; visions, magical illusions, and spells, threats and tortures.¹ The work they most zealously laboured at, and also the most mischievous, was the introduction and spread of idolatry. After the first attempt of that kind in Paradise by Satan, it was principally by means of the dæmons and their fathers that idolatry was propagated over the world. By personal apparitions and optical illusions, they terrified the spirits of men, who could not bring to the test of reason appearances and phantasms of that kind, so that not detecting their dæmonical nature, they attributed to them the rank and dignity of gods.² Accordingly, they had statues³ and temples;⁴ they received from their irrational devotees sacrifices and supplications, incenses and libations.⁵ These are the gods whom the heathens honour; the names of the gods are their proper names; for men have named the gods according to their own choice and suggestion.⁶ The reason why the fallen spirits have claimed such divine honours, an assumption for making which they may fairly be set on a level with robbers,⁷ is, next to

¹ *Apol.* 1, 14, p. 51, (p. 61, A.)—ἀγωνίζονται ἔχον ἑμᾶς δούλους καὶ ὀπηδεῖς, καὶ ποτὶ μὲν δι' ὀνείρων ἐπιφανείας, ποτὶ δ' αὖ διὰ μαγικῶν τροφῶν χειροῦνται πάντας, &c.—2, 5, p. 92, (p. 44, B.)—προσέτι λοιπὸν τὸ ἀνθρώπων γένος ἑαυτοῖς ἰδάλυσαν, τὰ μὲν διὰ φόβου καὶ τιμωριῶν ἐπιφάρων, τὰ δὲ διὰ δόξαυς θυμάτων καὶ θυμιαμάτων καὶ σποιδῶν. On Dæmons as the authors of dreams, see Thilo *cod. apocryph. N. T.* I. 525.

² *Apol.* 1, 5, p. 46, (p. 55, D. E.) τὰ παλαιὸν δαίμονες φαῦλοι, ἐπιφανείας ποιησάμενοι . . . φόβητρα ἀνθρώποις ἰδεῖναι, ὡς καταπληγῆναι τοὺς οἱ λόγῳ τὰς γινόμεναις πράξεσι οὐκ ἔκρινον, ἀλλὰ διὰς συνηρασμένοι καὶ μὴ ἐπιστάμενοι, δαίμονας εἶναι φαῦλους, τοιοῦς προσκυνήμαζον καὶ ὀνόματι ἑκαστοῦ προσηγόρευον, ὥτις ἑκαστος αὐτῶ τῶν δαιμόνων ἐτίθειτο.

³ *Apol.* 1, 9, p. 48, (p. 57, C. D.)

⁴ *Apol.* 1, 62, p. 80, (p. 94, E.)

⁵ *Apol.* 1, 12, p. 50, (p. 59, D.)—1, 62, p. 80, (p. 94, E.)

⁶ *Apol.* 1, 5, p. 46, (p. 55, E.)—2, 5, p. 92, (p. 44, C.)

⁷ *Tatian Orat. c. Gr. c.* 18, p. 259, p. 157, (C.) ὁ θουμασιώτατος Ἰουστίνος ἐρῶς ἐξηγήσεν ἰσχυρῶς τοὺς προσκημένους λεηταῖς. We believe that we are not mistaken in supposing that Justin compares the dæmons, in the above mentioned sense, to rob-

their pride, their insatiable desire for offerings fitted to gratify the senses; for they require such engagements, since they are slaves to the goadings of criminal desires.¹

Every thing which molests them in these gratifications, or tends to diminish the honours paid to them; all persons who live in faithful dependence on the true God, according to the prescriptions of the Logos, and avoid evil, they persecute with hatred, imprisonment, and death.² For this reason they were inimical to Socrates, and at last accomplished his death;³ for the same reason, they brought hatred and destruction on the Stoics, and put to death Heraclitus, and not long ago Musonius.⁴ But their revenge fell most heavily on the Christians. After labouring in vain to crush the cause of the Gospel in its birth,—after being mortified by witnessing the fruitlessness of their attempts in caricaturing the life of Christ, and the usages of the Church, by the myths and ceremonies of heathenism,⁵ and in bringing Christ to crucifixion by means of the Jews,⁶ they strove to obtain compensation for their failures by the persecution of the Christians. They awarded the punishment of death to the reading of the prophetic scriptures; they slandered the lives of Christians by insulting and reckless reports, and incessantly hurried them to violent deaths, by the instrumentality of credulous and licentious men, especially of those in judicial stations. They even strove to get departed souls into their power.

bers, though the connection in which the Fragment stands in Justin, does not directly favour it. We support our opinion by the circumstance that Tatian himself, on one occasion, (*Orat. c. Gr. c. 12*, p. 254, [p. 151, D.] calls the *dæmons λησται θιόητες*.

¹ *Apol.* 2, 5, p. 92, (p. 44, B.)—*θυμάτων καὶ θυμωμάτων καὶ σπονδῶν, ὧν ἰδιότης γιγνέσκει μετὰ τὸ πάθειν ἐκ θυμῶν δουλωθῆναι.*

² *Apol.* 2, 8, p. 94, (p. 46, C.)—2, 10, p. 95, p. 48, C.)

³ *Apol.* 1, 5, p. 46, (p. 56, A.)

⁴ *Apol.* 2, 8, p. 94, (p. 46, A. B.)

⁵ *v. Book IV. ch. 3, art. 2.*

⁶ *Apol.* 1, 63, p. 81, (p. 96, A.)

The foregoing representation appears grotesque and strange, as long as we view it in its immediate relation to the fallen angels, the dæmons; but it bears the impress of deep internal truth as soon as it is recognised and contemplated as the fresh lively expression of real circumstances. It reflects the historical dark vision of a world estranged from what is divine, and sunk in superstition and wickedness; it exhibits the infernal striving of darkness against the Gospel. If Justin erred in considering these circumstances as entirely the operation of personal angelic beings, of dæmon-powers, he erred in the spirit of his times, and for the (supposed) glory of God; but his delineation is not entirely the empty sport of a restless fancy; he painted, as we have said, what he saw and experienced in actual life.

Finally, if we cast a glance at the origin of the dogma under consideration, it strikes us at once, that it is composed of various materials. Scriptural and non-scriptural, Jewish and Gentile elements, contribute to its formation. In this dogma, to a degree we find in no other, the Christian soil was overrun with plants of foreign origin. This has never escaped observation; rather, indeed, it has been pushed to an extreme, and that has been considered of foreign growth which might have been plainly seen was indigenous. This remark applies especially to the Platonic¹ and Ebionitish² ingredients which have been sought for in this dogma. Neither Platonism nor

¹ Platonic ingredients have been assumed, especially by Hahn, (*de Platonismo theol. vet. eccles. doct.* p. 13.) Wernsdorff, (*de commercio angelorum cum filiabus hominum ab Judæis et patribus platonisantibus credito.* Viteb. 1742, p. 2, 9, 16,) and Brucker, (*hist. crit. philos.* T. III. p. 377.) The Platonism which Baumgarten-Crusius (*Lehrbuch d. christl. Dogmengeschichte*, II. 990,) finds in the patristic dæmonology is highly refined. "The Platonism which Keil denies in this representation is not direct, but lies in the sentiment, that the dæmons are supposed to have fallen by an inclination to the worldly and earthly."

² Credner's *Beiträge zur Einleitung*, I. 93.

Ebionitism had really a share in its formation. Not Platonism; for the corporeity of Angels and of Dæmons, which has been traced to it, is involved in the idea of beings created and propagated like mankind, and in the scriptural accounts of the appearance of Angels; not to mention that Plato's dæmons possessed ætherial bodies, a distinction which Justin did not claim for his spirits. Moreover, the legend of the angelic human origin of dæmons, when it extended its roots into the heathen world, must rather be regarded as a segment of the heathen mythology, than as borrowed from the Platonic philosophy; (Plato took the greater part of what he says about dæmons in his philosophy from the current legends of his times, in the spirit of mythological fiction), but had its true origin in the scriptural passage, Gen. vi. 2, according to the ancient reading of the LXX. *οἱ ἄγγελοι τοῦ Θεοῦ*, a passage which, with the single exception of Julius Africanus,¹ has been understood by all the Ante-Nicene Fathers of the intercourse of angels² with the daughters of men. Lastly, belief in the personal identity of evil angels and dæmons, with the popular divinities of heathenism, which Justin shared with the whole ancient Church, could not originate in the Platonic philosophy, since Plato's dæmons, which are certainly connected with the popular divinities, are quite different beings from those whose existence was admitted by Christians. The former were ministers of the higher gods, the latter were enemies of the supreme. Moreover, Justin repeatedly and expressly grounds his belief on a biblical

¹ Routh's *Reliquiæ Sacræ*, II. p. 127, sq.

² That Justin was acquainted with the Apocryphal book of Enoch, (which was used by many of the Fathers, and treated by Tertullian as an inspired book,) and made use of it for that legend, as Corrodi, (*krit. Geschichte des Chiliasmus*, II. 73, *Versuch einer Beleuchtung der Gesch. des Jüdischen und Christlichen Bibilcanons*, I. 168,) and Gfrörer (*Geschichte des Urchristenthums*, II. 38,) suppose, is in the highest degree improbable.

passage, Ps. xcvi. 5.¹ And apart from this, the immoralities and enormities which the heathen mythology narrates of the gods, must confirm the belief in the identity of these gods and the dæmons. For with these very immoralities and enormities the Fathers held the fallen angels chargeable. On this point Athenagoras expresses himself in no roundabout terms.²

In his Dæmonology (the word dæmon is here used in a more confined sense, exclusive of Satan) Justin certainly approached nearer to Ebionitism than to Platonism; in many points he perfectly agreed with the former, especially in regarding the dæmons as the offspring of intercourse between angels and women,³—in ascribing to them several wants, such as a longing for sacrifices, libations and incense⁴—and in deducing from this longing, their endeavour to draw men off from God, and make them their own vassals, and as the means for this end, employing threatenings and tortures, and visionary appearances, especially by night;⁵ also in regarding the dæmons as the principal authors of physical and moral evil in the world,⁶ in ascribing to them a particularly glowing hatred against the Christians, and yet being subject to their power.⁷ But this coincidence of views, very far from

¹ *Dial. c. Tr.* c. 83, p. 181, (p. 309, D.) ὁ ἡμίτερος Ἰησους . . . ῥάβδον δυνάμειος εἰς Ἱερουσαλὴμ ἱεραπίσταλι, τὸν λόγον τῆς κλήσεως καὶ τῆς μετανοίας πρὸς τὰ ἱδρῶ ἀπαντα, ὅπου τὰ δαιμόνια ἀπικυρίουν αὐτῶν, ὥς φησι Δαβὶδ, οἱ θιοὶ τῶν ἱδρῶν δαιμόνια.—*c.* 73, p. 170, (p. 298, C.)—*c.* 79, p. 177, (p. 306, B.)—*de resurrectione*. c. 5, p. 590, E.

² *Legat. p. Christ.* c. 26, p. 304, (p. 29, C.)—τὰς μὲν δαίμονας εἶναι τὰς ἱσιβατιούσας τοῖς νόμοις, πίστις ἡ ἐκαστοῦ αὐτῶν ἐνέργεια. Οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἀποστρέφουσιν τὰ αἰδοῖα, οἱ περὶ τὴν Πίαν οἱ δὲ ἡγρότατοι ἢ ἐντίμωσιν, οἱ περὶ τὴν Ἀρτέμιν καὶ ἡ μὲν ἐν Ταύροις φοιτοῦσι τὰς ξίνους.

³ *Clem. homil.* 6, 13, T. I. p. 677.

⁴ *Homil.* 11, 15, p. 695, sq.

⁵ *Homil.* 9, 14, sq. p. 683, 11, 15, p. 696.

⁶ *Homil.* 8, 14, p. 677, 8, 17, p. 678, 9, 8, p. 681, 9, 14, p. 683, 11, 15, p. 696.

⁷ *Homil.* 9, 8, p. 631, 9, 19, 21, p. 684, sq. 11, 16⁸ Γ. 636.

being a one-sided relation of dependance, is merely the natural product of the inevitable influence which the prevailing dæmonology of the times exercised equally on Justin and the Ebionites. As the doctrine of dæmons, after it had formed itself out of the chaos of discordant elements in which it was involved, into a kind of Organism, assumed a fixed, definite form, and concentrated in itself a series of representations, the total of which expressed its peculiar, essential, unalterable substance;—an elementary dæmonology was delivered traditionally to the Fathers, which they had only individually to animate, amplify, or modify. These traditional elements are the points in which Justin and the Ebionites meet; the representations are common to both, which form the original type of the doctrine of the church respecting dæmons.¹ Beyond this their agreement does not extend: their path separates when an individual personal form is given to the traditional elements.

Justin had absolutely nothing of what is peculiar to the Ebionitish dæmonology. He did not adopt the grounds on which the Ebionites explain the (sexual) fall of the angels, namely, the attempted assumption of a human nature by these beings, in the originally praiseworthy attempt to amend and correct by their personal presence the ungrateful and God-forgetting human race.² He knew nothing of the

¹ These representations are given in substance in all the other teachers of the church, who have specifically treated of the doctrine of dæmons. Compare Athenag. *leg. p. Christ.* c. 24, p. 303, (p. 27, D.) c. 26, p. 304, (p. 29, B.) c. 27, p. 305, (p. 30, D.)—Minuc. Fel. Octav. c. 26, sqq. p. 98, sqq.—Tertull. *de habit. muliebr.* c. 2, T. iii. p. 29, sq.—*de spectac.* c. 10, T. iv. p. 104.—*Apol.* c. 22, T. v. p. 48, sqq.—Cyprian, *de idol. vanit.* c. 6, sq. T. ii. p. 12, sq.—Clem. *Strom.* 3, 7, 59, T. ii. p. 245.—Origen *c. Cels.* 3, 29, T. i. p. 466, 3, 37, p. 471, 4, 32, p. 525, 4, 92, p. 572, 8, 36, p. 769, *exhort. ad mart.* c. 45, p. 303, sq.—Lactant. *institut. divin.* 2, 14, sqq. 4, 27, 5, 21.—Cyrill. *adv. Julian.* 1, 4, T. vi. p. 525.—Stephan. Gebar. in Phot. *bibl. cod.* 232, T. ii. p. 289.

² *Homi.* 8, 12, sq. p. 676, sq.

arts by which the Ebionites supposed that the daughters of men constantly captivated and delighted these fallen angels—the presentation to their paramours of metals and precious stones, and the treasures of the earth—the instructing of them in their use—the manufacturing of the treasures, in the melting of metals and the colours of clothes—their devotedness to objects of luxury—their initiation into the mysteries of astronomy, &c.¹ He is very far from giving (like the Ebionites) heavenly manna to the progeny of angels and women, though only from necessity, and of deducing from the bestial savageness and insatiability of these beings not appeased by this heavenly fare, the introduction of (according to the Ebionitish morality) the unlawful and abominable use of animal food.² He is a stranger to the occasion to which the Ebionites attribute Noah's deluge—and to the laws to which they subject the remaining souls of the Giants, after the restoration of the human race;³ he is equally a stranger to the particular method by which they supposed the connection of dæmons with men was accomplished, and especially with their souls.⁴ Lastly, he utters not a word of the possible continued interfusion (*Verschmelzung*) of dæmons with human souls after death, and the intolerable agony resulting from it; and he knows nothing of the mysterious magical power over dæmons, which the Ebionites, according to their ascetic notions, attribute to fasting and abstinence.⁵ Not the shadow of a reason is left for considering Justin's dæmonology to be of an Ebionitish cast. We might far sooner expect to find (if it were at all possible) Ebionitism in the dæmonological representations of other Fathers. More than one of these approaches much nearer the Ebionites on this subject than Justin. Athenagoras may be adduced

¹ *Homil.* 8, 14, p. 677.

² *Homil.* 8, 15, p. 677.

³ *Homil.* 8, 17, sqq. p. 678.

⁴ *Homil.* 9, 9, sq. p. 681, sq. 9, 15, p. 683, 11, 15, p. 696.

⁵ *Homil.* 9, 9, sq. p. 682.

as an instance. He not merely held, like the Ebionites, that the individuals with whom the angels had intercourse were virgins, but agrees with them still further in calling the progeny of this unnatural union Giants, and distinguishing the dæmons as their souls.¹

ARTICLE II.

THE FALL OF MAN.

In no doctrine does the difference of dogmatical views, which even in the first ages of Christianity separated the Greek from the Latin or Western Church, stand forth more prominently than in that of the sin of man, and in the points closely connected with it. This difference was unquestionably brought into direct and irreconcilable opposition by Augustin; but already the sentiments of Tertullian, and his immediate successors in the Western Church, differed, in very important respects, from the convictions of the Greek Fathers, especially those of Alexandria. The former, indeed, by no means denied the freedom of the will to fallen man, and were as little disposed to deny that he had a natural susceptibility for good and moral capability, but yet they already taught a physical propagation of sin from Adam to all his descendants by natural descent, and a proportional participation of individual descendants in the guilt of their progenitor; while the Greek Fathers regarded the sin of the individual as an act of his pure free-will, and reckoned among the consequences of Adam's disobedience little more than physical death, (the Alexandrian Fathers not even this), the domination of Satan and the easier seduction of mankind. When, at a later period, Augustin and Pelagius equally believed that the ancient

¹ *Legat. p. Christ.* c. 24, p. 303, (p. 27, D. 28, A.) c. 25, p. 303, (p. 28. B.)

church-teachers were in agreement with their theories, and appealed to them as authorities, they had both evidently fallen into an egregious error; but the Greek Fathers might, with incomparably greater right, have numbered among their ancestors Pelagius than they could Augustin. These Fathers expressed themselves respecting the condition of man after the fall, very frequently, in a manner that by no means allows us to classify their sentiments under the broad title of the so-called later Semipelagianism, but we cannot help recognizing in them a pure Pelagian tincture. The Fathers, indeed, had not yet become downright Pelagians; they had only spun some of the threads which Pelagius afterwards wove into his system; to this system, as a system, they showed the same disapprobation which was expressed by the later church. And though a bare subterfuge remains to excuse all sentiments of a Pelagian cast, by attributing them to inaccuracy of language, and thus making them orthodox in spite of themselves, yet, on the other hand again, it is true that mere incautious, apologetic, or polemical zeal, has given to many a sentence the strong Pelagian colouring which it wears.

Justin, one of the Pelagianising Greeks, deduces, like all the Fathers, the historical existence of sin from the unfaithfulness of the first man in Paradise, and this unfaithfulness again, from the cunning wickedness of Satan, who, under the form of a serpent, seduced Eve. In various forms we meet with the sentiment, "Disobedience and transgression were introduced by an animal."¹ The unfaithfulness into which our first parents suffered themselves to be seduced by Satan was twofold,—in part disobedience,

¹ *Dial. c. Tr. c.* 112, p. 205, (p. 339, B.) *ὁ καταλιπὼν τὸν Θεόν, ἐπὶ θυρίδι, δι' οὗ ἡ παράβασις καὶ παρακοὴ ἐν ἀρχῇ ἔλαβεν, ἵκειδι ἐν λαὸν ἐλπίζειν.* (Numb. xxi. 8.)—"For not forsaking God, he persuaded the people to hope in that animal by which transgression and disobedience had been introduced."—*c.* 100, p. 195, (p. 327, C.) *ἡ ἀπὸ τοῦ ὄφιος παρακοὴ ἐν ἀρχῇ ἔλαβεν.*—*c.* 103, p. 199, (p. 331, C.)

inasmuch as they ate of the forbidden fruit,¹—in part the belief of falsehood, since they were induced by the delusive address of the serpent, “If ye hearken to me, and transgress God’s command, ye shall be as gods,” to believe in the existence of many gods, and in the possibility of their own deification.² As the immediate consequences of this twofold aberration, the seducer who, from this act, received the names of Satan, Devil, Serpent,³ misanthropic and envious Dæmon,⁴ Foe of Humanity,⁵ and Father of Lies,⁶ suffered expulsion from heaven,⁷ and was pronounced accursed;⁸ while those whom he seduced were ejected

¹ *Dial. c. Tr. c.* 81, p. 179, (p. 308, A.)—c. 94, p. 191, (p. 322, A.)—c. 124, p. 217, (p. 353, D.)

² *Coh. ad Gr. c.* 21, p. 22, (p. 19, D. E.) ὁ Θεὸς ἡπίετο τοὺς πρῶτους ἀνθρώπους τῆς παλαιᾶς τῶν προγόνων μιμημένους ἀπάτης, ἢ ἀπατήσας αὐτοὺς ὁ μισάνθρωπος δαίμων ἡβηλῆθη. φήσας πρὸς αὐτούς· ἰὶ ποιήσιν μοι τὴν τῷ Θεῷ παρελθόν ἐντολήν, ἵνα ὡς Θεοί, Θεοὺς ὀνομάζωιν τοὺς μὴ ὄντας, ἵνα οἱ ἀνθρώποι οἰηθύντις καὶ ἰτίως ὦσι Θεοὺς καὶ ἰαυτοὺς δύνασθαι γινώσθαι Θεοὺς πιστεύουσι. . . Παιδείντις τοῖνοι οἱ ἀνθρώποι τῷ ἡπατηκότι δαίμονι καὶ Θεοῦ παραβῶσαι τελέσαντις, ἐξῆλθον τῷ παραδείσῳ.—“God knew that the first generations of mankind remembered the delusion by which the misanthropic dæmon contrived to delude them, when he said to them, If ye obey me in transgressing the command of God, ye shall be as gods, speaking of gods that were not in existence, that men, supposing that other gods existed, might believe that they themselves could become gods. Therefore men (our first parents) being the dupes of the deceiving dæmon, and daring to disregard God, were expelled from Paradise.”—c. 38, p. 34, (p. 36, C.)—Theophilus of Antioch, (*ad Autol.* 2, 28, p. 368, [p. 104, A. B.]) Cyrill of Alexandria, (*adv. Julian.* 1. 3, T. VI. p. 91, D.) and Epiphanius, (*adv. hæres.* 37, 1, T. I. p. 268,) were led by Gen. iii. 5, according to the LXX., to believe that the first human beings were seduced by Satan into a belief in polytheism.

³ *Coh. ad Gr. c.* 28, p. 28, (p. 28, B.)—*Apol.* 1, 28, p. 60, (p. 71, A.)—*Dial. c. Tr. c.* 103, p. 198, sq. (p. 331, A—C.)

⁴ *Coh. ad Gr. c.* 21, p. 22, (p. 19, D.) ὁ μισάνθρωπος δαίμων—c. 38, p. 34, (p. 36, C.) βάσκανος δαίμων.

⁵ *Coh. ad Gr. c.* 28, (p. 28, B.) ἰχθὺς τῆς ἀνθρωπότητος.

⁶ *Coh. ad Gr. c.* 21, p. 22, (p. 20, B.) ψεύτης πατήρ.

⁷ *Coh. ad Gr. c.* 28, (p. 28, B.)

⁸ *Dial. c. Tr. c.* 79, p. 177, (p. 306, A.)—c. 91, p. 189, (p. 319, B.)—c. 112, p. 205, (p. 339, A.)

from paradise,¹ and made subject to Satan and death.² These consequences of the first sin, and with them sin itself, continue to be the lamentable lot of all men. Every man lies under the power of sin; every man suffers the attacks of Satan; every man tastes the bitterness of death. Justin depicts, in striking colours, the universality of sin. "The whole human race," says he, "stand, according to the law of Moses, under the curse; for every one is declared to be cursed who keepeth not what is written in the book of the law. And no one hath done everything perfectly . . . some have kept the law more or less than others. But if evidently the curse falls on those who are under the law, since they have not entirely kept it; will not all heathens be much more under the curse, who serve idols, and are slaves to unnatural and all other vices?" By death, whose existence and dominion Justin dates from Adam's fall, he understands the col-

¹ *Coh. ad Gr* c. 21, p. 22, (p. 20, A. B.) *ποιεθίντες οἱ ἀνθρώποι . . . ἐξῆλθον τῷ παραδείσῳ τῷ μὲν ἐνέματός τῶν θιῶν μνημονεύοντες, μηδαμίαν δὲ παρὰ θεῶν μὴ εἶναι θεοὺς ἰστέονους διδασκούντες. Οὐ γὰρ δύναιτο ἦν, τοὺς τὴν πρώτην ἐντολὴν μὴ φυλάξαντας, ἢ φυλάξαντες ῥάδιον ἦν. διδάσκουσιν ἵτι, ἀλλὰ τιμωρίας αὐτοῖς ἰσάγειν δικαίαν.* "Ευβληθέντες σείνουν τῷ παραδείσῳ καὶ οἰομύνοι, διὰ τὴν παραποῇν λαβιβληθῆναι μόνον, οὐ μὴν ἰδόντες, διότι καὶ θεοὺς μὴ ὄντας ἰστέονους εἶναι, τὸ τῶν θιῶν ὄνομα καὶ τοῖς μετὰ ταῦτα ἐξ αὐτῶν γινόμενους ἀνθρώποις παρῖδοναι. Αὐτὴ τοίνυν πρώτη περὶ θιῶν ψευδὴς φαντασία, ἀπὸ τῷ ψεύτους πατρὸς ἀρχὴν ἰσχηκυῖα." "Then (the human pair) being persuaded, departed from paradise, remembering the name of gods, but no longer being taught by God that there were no other gods. For it was not just that they who did not keep the first commandment, which was easier to keep, should be taught any longer, but rather that they should receive condign punishment. Being therefore expelled from paradise, and thinking that they were expelled only for disobedience, not knowing that it was also because they believed that there were gods who did not really exist, they gave the name of gods to men who were born of them after these events. This first false imagination concerning gods took its rise from the mendacious father."

² *Dial. c. Tr.* c. 81, p. 179, (p. 308, A.)—c. 100, p. 195, (p. 327, C.) *Εἶσα . . . παραποῇν καὶ θάνατος ἵσταται.*

³ *Dial. c. Tr.* c. 95, p. 192, (p. 322, C. D.)

lective unhappiness with which human life has ever since been troubled and disturbed, including the threatening of eternal condemnation, but especially, likewise, the physical mortality of men; the latter in agreement with the prevalent church-tradition, and according to the Mosaic account of the fall, taken literally. When Bähr,¹ on account of a passage in the Dialogue where it is said that Christ procured freedom from death for those who believe on him,²—thinks that death, the annexed penalty of Adam's sin, may be taken merely in a metaphorical sense, he attributes an exclusiveness to that passage which is very far from belonging to it. Granting that it points merely to spiritual death, it would then exhibit only one side of the death that is impending over mankind, without denying the other. But Christ is by no means called in it a Redeemer from death in an exclusively metaphorical sense; among the blessings of this redemption is also reckoned the freedom of Christians from the dread of temporal death, as well as their exemption from the second death, which, if it were never stated more explicitly, yet always awaits the ungodly in eternity. Moreover, when Bretschneider³ would understand, by the death which Justin represents as the wages of Adamic and of all sin, only the condition in which the soul enters Hades after its separation from its earthly body, a condition which "to him (Justin) is a death, since he calls the opposite of this condition imperishability, immortality;" he has given a meaning to the idea of death which it never has in Justin. Justin never gives the name of death to the intermediate state of the soul after the close of its earthly life. He does not do this in the passage which has been adduced to prove it.⁴ For the happy

¹ *Die Lehre der Kirche vom Tode Jesu in den ersten drei Jahrhunderten* (Sulzb. 1832) s. 50.

² *Dial. c. Tr.* c. 100, p. 196, (p. 327, D.)

³ *Die Grundlage des evangelischen Pietismus* (Leipzig 1833,) s. 301.

⁴ The passage, which will again come under our notice, is in *Dial. c. Tr.* c. 45, p. 141, (p. 264, A.)

imperishability and immortality which is here represented as the inheritance of believers and the righteous after the resurrection, is not contrasted with the intermediate state of departed souls in Hades, but precisely with their bodily mortality. The contempt of death, the production of which is named as one of the objects of the incarnation of Christ, must apply entirely to bodily death, since this alone is universally an object of fear and dread, as the violent and painful termination of all earthly relations, and not to the intermediate state of the soul after death, which Justin at least depicts as by no means unpleasant to pious believers. The passage in question contains also an undeniable reference to Revel. xxi. 4, a circumstance which makes the application of the death mentioned in it to bodily mortality still more urgent.

But Justin, although, as we admit, he referred the origin of all sin to the transgression of the first man—although he was convinced of the perfect universality of evil, and extended its original consequences equally to the collective human race—yet he was very far from supposing a physical genetic connection between Adam's transgression and the sin of his posterity, or allowing that the collective sinful race shared in the personal guilt of their progenitor. Hereditary sin and the imputation of Adam's guilt are ideas foreign to Justin.¹ Men, according to his views, were always born with the same integrity in which their first parents were created; the divine image has remained uninjured. Man still possesses the power of reason which he originally received, and is placed by it in a

¹ Justin does not express this thought quite so broadly as it is given in the text. But it may be inferred immediately from observing that Justin attributes to Adam's descendants, altogether the same pre-eminence and capabilities with which he supposes our first parent to be endowed at his creation. Engelhardt (*Dogmengeschichte*, I. 289,) without reason regards this as a mere confounding of the original condition of man with his state after the fall.

position to choose and to follow what God approves.¹ He has still the full unimpaired knowledge of good and evil. "There is no nation which does not feel that adultery, unchastity, murder, and the like, are debasing; and in case they commit all these crimes, they do not lose the consciousness that in doing so they are acting unrighteously; those persons excepted who, being filled with an impure spirit, and corrupted by education or bad morals and laws, have lost their innate notions (τὰς φυσικὰς ἐννοίας) or rather have stifled them; or perhaps still have them, but under restraint (ἐπεσχημέναις ἔχουσιν.) For it may be observed, that the same people cannot endure what they do to others, and severely reprobate in others faults which they themselves commit.² Man also possesses freedom of moral choice, in the same strength and extent as when it was originally bestowed upon him. Every transgression is the purely free act of the will of the individual. Whoever commits sin, the fault lies not with God, but with himself.³ If God's word predicts that a number of angels and men will be punished, it must be presupposed not that God caused them to be sinners, but that he foresaw that they would continue incorrigible.⁴ If men share in the consequences of Adam's sin, this is on personal grounds, since they are independent, and share in Adam's sin from their own free will. Justin expresses this sentiment very clearly in two passages. In the first he says, "Men earn death for themselves, by assimilat-

¹ *Apol.* 1, 10, p. 49, (p. 58, C.) τὸ μὲν τὴν ἀρχὴν γινώσκειν, ἔχ' ἡμῖν ἐστιν· τὸ δ' ἐξαπογλυφῆναι οἷς φίλοι αὐτῷ αἰετῶντες, δι' αὐτοὺς ἐνδράσασθαι λογικῶν δυνάμεων, πέδαι τε καὶ εἰς πίστιν ἄγει ἡμᾶς.

² *Dial. c. Tr.* c. 93, p. 190, (p. 320, C. D.)

³ *Dial. c. Tr.* c. 141, p. 231, (p. 370, B. C.) δι' ἑαυτοὺς ἡμεῖς οἱ ἀνθρώποι καὶ οἱ ἄγγελοι ἐλογχθῆσόμεθα ποτηρευσάμενοι, ἢ μὴ φθάσαντες μεταδώμεθα.—c. 140, p. 231, (p. 370, A.)

⁴ *Dial. c. Tr.* c. 141, p. 231, (p. 370, C.) ἐπεὶ ὁ λόγος τοῦ Θεοῦ προσηνέει πάντας τινὰς καὶ ἄγγελους καὶ ἀνθρώπους πολεσθῆσθαι μίλλοντας, διότι προγίνωσκον αὐτοὺς ἀμεταβλήτους γεννησόμενους ποτηρευέας, προῖπαι ταῦτα, ἀλλ' ἔχ' ὅτι αὐτοὶ ὁ Θεὸς τοιαύτους ἵσχυσεν.

ing themselves to Adam and Eve."—The other is, "the human race since Adam have been a prey to death and the seduction of the serpent, each individual having acted wickedly by his own fault."¹

¹ *Dial. c. Tr. c. 88*, p. 186, (p. 316, A.)—οὐδὲ τὸ γιννηθῆναι αὐτὸν καὶ σταυρωθῆναι ὡς ἰδιῆς τούτων, ὑπὸ μιν (Χριστῆς) ἀλλ' ὑπὲρ τοῦ γένους τοῦ τῶν ἀνθρώπων, ὃ ἀπὸ τοῦ Ἀδάμ ὑπὸ θάνατον καὶ πλάνην τὴν τοῦ ὄφιος πισπύκει, παρὰ τὴν ἰδίαν αἰτίαν ἐκείνου αὐτῶν πωηρευμένοι. The explanation of the above passage, which we have given in the text, (according to which the participial clause παρὰ τ. ἰδ. αἰτ. ἐκείν. αὐτ. πωηρευομένων, is closely connected with the words immediately preceding, as expressing the cause) is not merely, in point of language, the most natural and obvious, but is also strongly supported by the illustrative sentence which immediately follows: βουλόμενος γὰρ τούτους ἐν ἰλευδίᾳ προαιρέσει καὶ αὐτεξουσίᾳ γινώσκοντας τοὺς τε ἀγγέλους καὶ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ὁ Θεὸς πράττειν ὅσα ἴκασται ἰδου-νάμους δύνασθαι καὶ ἰπείσιν, εἰ μὴ τὰ εὐαγγέλια αὐτῷ αἰετοῦ καὶ ἀφθάρτους καὶ ἀσινωμένους αὐτοὺς τηρῆσαι· ἵνα δὲ πωηρεύονται, ὡς αὐτῷ δοκεῖ ἴκασται κολάζειν.—"For, it being God's will that they should possess freedom of choice, and be self-governing, he endued men and angels with such power of doing things as they actually possess; that if they chose what was well pleasing to him, he might preserve them incorruptible and free from punishment; but if they acted wickedly, he might punish each one as he sees fit."—There can be no well-founded objection to translating the words παρὰ τὴν ἰδίαν αἰτίαν, "by his own fault." Παρὰ, as has been shown by Whitby, (*tractatus de imputatione divina peccati Adam posteris ejus universis in reatum*. Lond. 1711, p. 160.) Prudent. Maranus (*Opera Justinii*, p. 98, 186.) Rosler, (*Bibliothek der Kirchenväter*, I. 167,) and Gaab, (*Abhandlungen zur Dogmengeschichte*, 112,) frequently has this meaning. Besides the two passages adduced by Maranus from Irenæus, we may mention the three following; *Athenag. de resurrect.* c. 16, p. 329, (p. 58, C.)—Irenæus *adv. hæres.* 4, 76, p. 286; παρὰ τὴν αὐτῶν ἀπιστησάν αἰτίαν, ἰλευδίᾳ καὶ αὐτεξουσίᾳ τὴν γνώμην γιγνόμενα.—Clem. *1. 8*, 66, T. I. p. 151. The two other meanings which have been given to the above passages are inadmissible in this. That meaning is evidently to be rejected, because, in direct contradiction with the connection, which takes παρὰ in the sense of "against, contrary to," and builds upon it the doctrine of hereditary sin. The other interpretation is in itself admissible, (neither ungrammatical nor decidedly against the connection) but not to be approved, as being far-fetched and forced, which divides the two clauses, ὃ ἀπὸ τ. Ἀδ ὑπὸ θάν. κ. πλ. τὴν τ. ὄφ. πισπύκει and παρὰ τὴν ἰδ.

But if Justin held sin to be universal, and yet did not deduce this universality from the natural transmittance of moral disease from one to another, to what quarter does he look for the solution of this enigmatical phenomenon? He enumerates several sources from which, as he conjectures, sin arises, both internal and external. One internal source is the sensuality¹ existing in every man, naturally multiform, and susceptible of all evil. He appears to regard this sensuality as an essential ingredient of human nature, (as the specific agent of the lower animal soul,) and, therefore, presupposed to exist in our first parents, and

αὐτ. ἵνα σὺ αὐτ. πειρησιασῇ, and places them in the relation of co-ordinates to one another: the latter clause may be translated by ut interim propriam pro se maligne agentis cujusque culpam taceam, as has been done, for example, by Boss, (*de controversiis, quas Pelagius ejusque reliquiae moverunt*, 2, 1. Opera, Amstel. 1701, T. VI. p. 604.) Nourry (*apparatus ad bibl. maxim.*, I. p. 407.) Starck, (*freimüthige Betrachtungen über das Christenthum*, 256,) and by Horn, (*de sententia patrum . . . de peccato originali*, p. 12.) But when that separation and co-ordination is made merely, as is evidently the case with Nifanius (*Justin. phil. exhibit. verit. evang. test. et conf.* p. 263.) Prudent Marauus (*Proleg.* 2, 6, p. xxv. 186,) and Lumper (*de vita Scriptis*, &c. T. II. p. 169,) with a design to obtain a testimony for the doctrine of hereditary sin, it is labour thrown away. For even the validity of that co-ordination being allowed, the tortured passage does not, after all, contain the distinction sought and required for that object, between the universal sinfulness and guilt of all proceeding from Adam, and the free sins of individuals. Justin, in this passage, refers to Adam only so far as death and the dominion of Satan (by no means sin and guilt) proceeded from him. See Whitby, p. 160, and Onymus, *Just. de præcip. relig. christ. dogmat. sentent.* p. 31, sq.

¹ *Apol.* 1, 10, p. 49, (p. 58, D.) ἅπας οὐκ ἠδυνήθησαν οἱ ἀνθρώποι νόμοι πρᾶξαι, ταῦτα ὁ λόγος θείος ὡς ἐγγάτω, εἰ μὴ οἱ φαῦλοι δαίμονες κατισκιδάσαν πολλὰ ψευδῆ καὶ ἄθια κατηγορήματα σύμμιχρον λαβόντες τὴν ἐν ἑκάστῳ κακίῃ πρὸς πάντα καὶ πανκίλιν φύσιν ἰσχυρίαν.—“For what human laws could not do, these the Word, being divine, would have effected, unless evil dæmons had scattered abroad many false and impious crimes, taken for all, as an ally, the evil in each one, and the various natural desires.” In procreation this sensuality manifests itself under the form of lust, *De Resurrect.* c. 3, p. 589, D. E.

he explains by it their susceptibility for the seductive allurements of the dæmonical serpent; at least no trace can be found in him that he, somewhat like Methodius,¹ supposes it to have originated at the fall, and since that event to have been naturally inherited by the propagation of the species. With this sensuality as the internal source, he connects the supremacy of Satan, existing since the fall, though by no means irresistible, and, next the corrupting influence of bad education and bad morals, as the further external sources of sin. Of the supremacy of Satan we have already given his views. He names education and example expressly in one passage of the larger Apology as the incitements of sin, from which it has been strangely thought possible to prove the reality and power of hereditary sin.² It is as follows: ἐπιδοὺ τὴν πρώτην γένεσιν ἡμῶν ἀγνοοῦντες κατ' ἀνάγκην γεγενήμεθα ἐξ ὑγρᾶς σπορᾶς κατὰ μίξιν τὴν τῶν γονέων πρὸς ἀλλήλους καὶ ἐν ἑδίσει φαύλοις καὶ πονηραῖς ἀναστροφαῖς γεγόναμεν, ὅπως μὴ ἀνάγκης τέκνα μηδὲ ἀγνοίας μένωμεν, ἀλλὰ προαιρέσεως καὶ ἐπιστήμης, ἀφ' ἑσέως τε ἀμαρτιῶν ὑπὲρ ὧν προσημάρτομεν τύχωμεν ἐν τῷ ὕδατι, ἐπονομάζεται τῷ ἐλομένῳ ἀναγεννηθῆναι . . . τὸ

¹ In a fragment in Phot. bibl. cod. 234, T. ii. p. 295, sq.

² Such is the opinion of Bebel (*antiquitates eccles. in tribus prioribus p. n. Chr. seculis evangel. p. 257.*) Nourry (*Appar. ad bibl. max. i. p. 407.*) Prudent. Maran. (*proleg. 2, 6, p. 25.*) Lumper (*de vita script. &c. ii. 168,*) and Thiersch (*Zeitschrift für die gesammte luther. Theologie n. Kirche herausg. v. Rudelbach u. Guericke, 1841, ii. 171.*) Another passage in which, even by such men as Onymus (*Justin. de præo. rel. chr. dogm. sentent. p. 32,*) the church theory of hereditary sin has been found, is in *Dial. c. Tr. c. 100, p. 195, (p. 327, C.)* παρδίνος οὖσα Εὐὰ καὶ ἄφθορος, τὸν λόγον τὸν ἀπὸ τῆ ἱδρίας συλλαβούσα, παρακλήν καὶ θάνατον ἔτιξεν. But this passage speaks exclusively of Eve's sin, and its immediate consequences, without making the slightest reference to her descendants. The word ἔτιξεν is metaphorical. As Justin represented the reception of the seductive language of the serpent, by which Eve fell, under the image of sexual conception, he points out the disobedience against God of which Eve was guilty, and the death connected with it as its effect, as the offspring of this union between Eve and the Tempter.

τοῦ πατρὸς τῶν ὅλων καὶ δεσπότου Θεοῦ ὄνομα. (Apol. 1, 61, p. 80, (p. 94, C.) "Since we are ignorant of our first generation, when brought into being by necessity from the connubial intercourse of our parents, and are brought up in evil habits and wicked intercourse,—that we may not remain children of necessity and ignorance, but of choice and knowledge, and may obtain in water the forgiveness of sins which we before committed,—the name of the Father of all, and Lord God, is named on him who is willing to be regenerated, and repents of his sins." This passage distinguishes, undeniably, a twofold birth,—a birth after the flesh, which results from the union of a child's parents,—and a birth after the Spirit, of which baptism is the instrument, (*durch die Taufe vermittelt wird*). The first birth, in reference to the child born, is a matter of pure necessity; we are born physically, without our knowledge or co-operation: the other birth, on the contrary, depends on our individual, self-conscious freedom; we shall be born of the Spirit, only if we wish it. The birth after the flesh, as it is (in respect of the infant) a necessary and unconscious act, forms the starting-point of a life full of ignorance and moral bondage (*unfreiheit*), full of error and sin. The birth after the Spirit, on the contrary, removes this ignorance and bondage, takes away sin by the power of forgiveness, and leads us to the full possession and use of knowledge and freedom. In what sense, then, is the physical life represented as the starting-point of a life full of ignorance and bondage, as the beginning of an existence defiled by sin? The clause ἐν ἔθελαι φαύλοις γεγόνάμεν supplies the answer. We are, (such is the judgment expressed,) as long as we are destitute of the birth of the Spirit, children of necessity and ignorance, since we are under the influence of bad education, and of corrupt morals.

CHAPTER VI.

THE DOCTRINE OF SALVATION.

This doctrine may be comprised under three heads ; the historical foundation of salvation ; the objective means of its appropriation ; and lastly, the subjective conditions of its appropriation.

ARTICLE I.

THE HISTORICAL FOUNDATION OF SALVATION.

However unsettled the ancient Church might be on various points relating to the doctrine of redemption, on one point it was perfectly clear and unanimous, that it placed salvation in the strictest and absolutely indissoluble connection with the person and merits of Christ. Its Soteriology, as far as related to the foundation of salvation, was completely a Christology. Even when it contemplated the salvation of persons who lived before the Christian dispensation, in no immediate dependance on the Saviour's divine work of redemption, it brought this salvation at least so far in connection with the person of the Lord, that it represented him as the Logos, exercising an illuminating and sanctifying power, both among Jews and Gentiles. But the Christology of the Church naturally divides itself into two departments; the contemplation of redemption as a general abstract fact ; and the contemplation of the person of Christ as the concrete instrument of that redemption. In reference to the latter, the twofold view of the personal being of Christ must claim the closest attention. Against Ebionitism it was necessary to maintain the existence of a special divinity in his person, and against Docetism, the reality of his sensible appearance, the essen-

tial homogeneity of his corporeal structure with that of men in general.¹ The reality of a union of a Divine and a Human in the person of Christ, is maintained by all the Church-teachers, though Irenæus first made the attempt to point out the necessity of this union, and a constant uncertainty respecting the kind of union remained prevalent. The greater number adhered to the representation, which, at a later period, were regarded as Apollinarism, that the Logos had assumed a human body, possessed of mere animal life, but destitute of a rational soul; while only a few included this rational soul in their idea of the full humanity of Christ, with which minority Origen concurred in maintaining that the rational soul was the medium of communication between the Divine and the Human in Christ. The mediatorial merit of the God-man, which, according to Scripture, was extended to all men, but, by Origen, to all rational natures, was placed by the ancient Church principally, though not exclusively, in his death. The efficiency ascribed to this death was conceived of by them more as a redeeming than an atoning power. They had not yet penetrated to the full idea of the atonement, though, in the current conception which was held, with more or less clearness, of the death of Jesus, as a sacrifice, there was at least a foundation laid for this idea. But, since the Church contemplated the death of Jesus, principally in its redeeming character, it referred to their redemption in general, and with preference to the freedom it effected from the supremacy

¹ Clemens and Origen, though opposers of Docetism, nevertheless made some approach to it themselves, since the former supposed that the body of Christ was exalted above the common necessities and sensations of the human frame, and the latter believed that it was endowed with a supernatural power of locomotion. Gieseler, (*Commentatio qua Clementis Alex. et Origenis doctrinæ de corpore Christi exponuntur*, Gott. 1837, p. 8, sqq. 18, sqq.) has not been able to deny this, though he has attempted to defend both the Alexandrian Fathers against the charge of a docetic spiritualization of the body of Christ. See Ritter's *Geschichte der Philosophie*, V. 455.

of Satan, which had existed since the fall. The death of Jesus appeared as a ransom paid to Satan, in order that his unrighteous dominion over men might have an end.

Justin, in his personal wrestling after truth and holiness, had experienced too many and deep disappointments; under a sense of these disappointments he had embraced the Gospel with too ardent a love; in the fellowship of this Gospel he had found too copious a source of invigoration and peace not to re-echo, with all his heart, the apostolic affirmation, "Neither is there salvation in any other, nor is there any other name given among men whereby we can be saved, save Jesus of Nazareth." Acts iv. 12. In fact Justin, like the whole ancient Church, knew of no other redemption than that founded by Christ,—he knew no other way of salvation than through the medium of the God-man, and his Soteriology was, as regards its foundation, no other than a Christology. "Christ," says he, "the first born of all creatures, is also the beginning of a new race, regenerated by him through water and faith, and the wood which has the mystery of the cross."¹ Justin recognized the first foundation of this exclusive salvation in the pre-incarnate agency of the Logos; its absolute development, its objective accomplishment he dated from the beginning of the divine humanity of Christ. On the foundation we need not enlarge, as it has been already fully discussed. We shall here treat of the nature and contents of this work of salvation, as carried on by the incarnate Redeemer.

We begin then with what concerns the person of the Redeemer and his personal relations. "THE WORD BECAME FLESH;" this is the great mysterious fact, which meets us at the threshold of the Church,

¹ *Dial. c. Tr. c. 138, p. 229, (p. 367, C.)* ὁ Χριστός, πρωτόγονος πάσης κτίσεως ὄν, καὶ ἀρχὴ πάλιν ἄλλου γένους γίγναι τοῦ ἀναγεννηθέντος ὑπ' αὐτοῦ δι' ὕδατος καὶ πίσεως καὶ ξύλου τοῦ τὸ μυστήριον τοῦ σταυροῦ ἔχοντος.

and is the peculiar and unfathomable mystery of Christianity; who can tell how Justin strove to master and decypher it? He proceeded first of all to guard it and preserve its purity. By the Ebionites and Gnostics he found this sublime miracle deformed; by the former it was brought down to the common level; by the latter it was subtilized into a phantasm; against both these classes he defended its genuine reality. He met the Ebionitish error of the common physical origin of the Redeemer, with the proof that he was born of a Virgin, who was lineally descended from Abraham and David.¹ To counteract the views of the Gnostics, he asserts the true humanity of the Lord. To the judaizers he demonstrated that Christ must be born of a Virgin, because otherwise his birth could not have been sinless, inasmuch as all procreation is tainted with sin on account of the sensual pleasure connected with it;²—because by this birth limits were set to procreation accompanied with unholy pleasure, and it was shewn that God could continue the human race without the sexual union;³—and because the disobedience of man would thus be rectified by the very means which introduced it, since, as disobedience and death were produced by the conversation which the virgin Eve held with the serpent, so a virgin would believe and

¹ *Dial. c. Tr. c. 54*, p. 150, (p. 274, A) ἐκ ἑνὸς ὁ Χριστὸς ἀνθρώπος ἐκ ἀνθρώπων. κατὰ τὸ ποιῶν τῶν ἀνθρώπων γιννηθείς.—*c. 43*, p. 139, (p. 261, B.) τὸν διὰ τῆς ἀπὸ τοῦ γίνεσθαι τοῦ Ἀβραάμ καὶ φυλῆς Ἰσὼθ καὶ Δαβὶδ παρθείνου γιννηθίντα υἱὸν τοῦ Θεοῦ Χριστόν.—*c. 45*, p. 141, (p. 264, A.)—*c. 100*, p. 195, (p. 327, A.)

² *Dial. c. Tr. c. 23*, p. 123, (p. 241, B.) τὸν κατὰ τὴν βουλὴν τοῦ Θεοῦ δίχα ἁμαρτίας [διὰ] τῆς ἀπὸ γίνεσθαι τοῦ Ἀβραάμ παρθείνου γιννηθίντα υἱὸν Θεοῦ Ἰησοῦ Χριστόν. Compare *de resurrect. c. 3*, p. 589, D. E. The words δίχα ἁμαρτίας relate to the process not to the product of procreation, as Prudent. Maranus (*Prolegomena* 2, 6, p. 26.) Oneymsus (*Justin. de præcip. rel. christ. dogmat. sent.* p. 32.) and Seiler (*über den Versöhnungs tod. Christi*. Erlang. 1782, II. 197,) understood them, so that in this passage there is an allusion to hereditary sin.

³ *De resurrect. c. 3*, p. 589, E. 590, A.

rejoice in the message of the angel that announced her conception of the conqueror of death.¹

Justin places the miraculous conception on a par with the general creation of animated beings by means of a single word, with the formation of Eve from Adam's side, with the conception of Abraham's wife, and the mother of Samuel and of John the Baptist, and lastly, with the Christophanies ; the former as well as the latter, he resolves into an exercise of God's creative power,² not that he was of opinion that God immediately formed the Redeemer's body in the Virgin's womb ; without being misled by Luke i. 35, he remained faithful, on this point, to the Scriptural doctrine, that the Logos was the exclusive divine organ of creation ; he expressed the conviction, which may also be found in the writings of Clemens,³ Tertullian,⁴ and others, that the Logos created his own organs of sense in Mary's womb. Thus he says,⁵ " Christ by himself became capable of feeling like ourselves ;— and again,⁶ " By the power of the Logos, Christ, ac-

¹ *Dial. c. Tr. c. 100, p. 195, (p. 327, C.)* Tertull. *de carn. Chr. c. 17, T. III. p. 301.*—Ante omnia commendanda erit ratio quæ præfuit ut dei filius de virgine nasceretur. . . . In virginem adhuc Evam irrepserat verbum ædificatorium mortis, in virginem æque introducendum erat dei verbum constructorium vitæ, ut, quod per ejusmodi sexum abierat in perditionem, per eundem sexum redigeretur in salutem. Crediderat Eva serpenti, credidit Maria Gabrieli quod illa credendo deliquit, hæc credendo delevit.—Iren. *adv. hæres. 3, 33, p. 219.* Epiphani. *adv. hæres. 78, 18, T. I. p. 1050.*

² *Dial. c. Tr. c. 75, p. 172, (p. 300, D. 301, A.)*—c. 84, p. 181, (p. 310, B. C.)

³ *Strom. 5, 3, 16, T. III. p. 13.* ὁ λόγος δημιουργίας αἰτίας, ἴσχυα καὶ ταῦτον γινώσκει, ὅταν ὁ λόγος εἰσέλθῃ ἡμῖν. ἵνα καὶ θεογονή.

⁴ *Advers. Prax. c. 26, T. II. p. 197, sq. adv. Jud. c. 13, p. 259.*

⁵ *Apol. 2, 10, p. 95, (p. 49, A.)* δι' ἑαυτοῦ ἰδιοποιεῖται γινώσκων.

⁶ *Apol. 1, 46, p. 71, (p. 83, D.)* διὰ δυνάμεως τῷ λόγῳ κατὰ τὴν αὐτῆς πατρὸς ; καὶ διακρίτου θεοῦ βαλὼν διὰ πατρὸς ἑαυτοῦ ἀπειρανόθῃ —1, 32, p. 63, (p. 74, B. D. 75, A. C.)—1, 66, p. 83, (p. 98, A.)—*Dial. c. Tr. c. 54, p. 149, (p. 274, A.)*

according to the will of God the Father, and Lord of all, was brought forth as a man by a Virgin." He also partly explains Christ's appellation of *the Son of Man*, by his being born of a virgin. "Christ," he remarks, "called himself *the Son of Man*, either because he was born of a virgin, who was lineally descended from David, Jacob, Isaac, and Abraham, or because Abraham is the father of all those from whom Mary deduced her lineage, or because Adam was the father of all those who have been named from whom Mary was descended; for the fathers of women are also in a sense the fathers of the children born of their daughters."¹

As to the identity in kind of Christ's corporeal structure with the ordinary human body,—in other words, *the true humanity of the Redeemer*,—Justin did not present the arguments for this fact, the great stumbling-block of the Gnostics, as he did those for the miraculous conception: he satisfied himself with simply affirming it, but his affirmation is decided and impressive. Christ, he declares, was really born as a child,²—he had flesh and blood,³—he grew like other men, and passed through the various stages of life,⁴—he partook of all kinds of food,—he was made capable of suffering, and actually suffered:⁵ in the garden of Gethsemane, in the night when the band of soldiers sought for him in the Mount of Olives, the sweat ran from his face as it were drops of blood, his heart and his bones trembled, in order "that we might see that it was the Father's will that his Son should endure

¹ *Dial. c. Tr. c.* 100, p. 195, (p. 327, A.)

² *Dial. c. Tr. c.* 84, p. 181, (p. 310, B.)

³ *Apol. 1*, 66, p. 83, (p. 98, A.)—*Dial. c. Tr. c.* 48, p. 144, (p. 267, C.) *ἄνθρωπος ὁμοιωθεὶς ἡμῖν, σάρκα ἔχων.*

⁴ *Διζήσαν κατὰ τὸ κοινὸν τῶν ἄλλων ἀπάντων ἀνθρώπων, χρεώμενος τοῖς ἀρμόζουσιν, ἐκαστῇ αἰχμασί τὸ οἰκίον ἀπίνουμεν, περιβόμενος τὰς πάντας τρεφάς.*—*De Resurrect. c.* 3, p. 591, A.

⁵ *Dial. c. Tr. c.* 98, p. 193, (p. 325, A.) *ἀληθῶς γίγοντος ἀνθρώπου, ἀντιληπτῶν παθῶν.*—*c.* 99, p. 194, (p. 326, B.)

such sufferings for our sakes, and that we might not say, that because he was the Son of God, he was insensible to what he met with, and passed through."¹

If then, Justin understood that what was truly divine, and what was truly human, were united in Christ, he could not admit that representation of his person which implied merely the indwelling of a divine power in the Man Jesus, nor that other view which, while holding fast the Divine personality, lost sight of his humanity: nor could it fail to happen that the question must often occur to his thoughts, how the combination of a divine and human nature in Christ could consist with the unity of one person. We could not, indeed, expect him to penetrate deeply into this mysterious subject—for which the internal and external necessity was not very pressing; as little could we expect a solution in a dogmatic form, for so intricate a problem, in an age of which the spirit was not sufficiently dogmatic. Justin could only arrive at the conviction, that the connection of the divine and the human in Christ was such, that the unity of the person remained unimpaired. This unity of person the Apologist knew not how to preserve except by sacrificing the completeness of the human nature. Justin was the forerunner of Apollinaris.² He placed the essence and process of the incarnation in the assumption by the Logos of a human body animated by the animal soul without the human spirit as a rational principle. The person of the God-man was composed according to him, of three principles, considered as divine of the λόγος, and as human of ψυχή and σῶμα. The Divine Logos occupied in Christ the place of the reason in man. Though we would not lay a stress upon the circumstance that Justin, when he speaks of Christ becoming man, generally

¹ *Dial. c. Tr. c.* 103, p. 199, (p. 331. C. D.)

² In consequence of an erroneous view of Justin's Anthropology, Planck denies this fact. (*Observationes quædam in primam doctrinam de naturis Christi historiam insertam in Ruinoel et Ruperti commentat. theolog. V. I.* p. 246.)

describes it as an incarnation,¹ yet that view of it is plainly presented in the shorter *Apology*, where he expressly names only three essential parts of the God-man.²

Of the image of the earthly life of the God-man, as it was historically expressed under the conflict of outward circumstances, according to the councils of the divine wisdom, and by the power of the spirit that operated in it, Justin traces only a general and acci-

¹ The most usual expressions in Justin for the idea of the incarnation are the following; *μεθεῖσθαι*, (*Apol.* 1, 5, p. 47, [p. 56, A.]) *συνεσπικνῆσθαι*, *c. Tr.* c. 70, p. 168, [p. 296, D.] *σῶμα ἔχειν*, *c. Tr.* c. 48, p. 144, [p. 267, C.] *σῶμα φερέν* (*de resurrect.* c. 1, p. 588, C.) *συνεσπικνῆσθαι* (*Apol.* 1, 66, p. 83, [p. 98, A.])—*c. Tr.* c. 45, p. 141, [p. 264, A.—c. 84, p. 181, [p. 310, B.])—*c. 100*, p. 195, [p. 326, D.]—*συνεσπικνῆσθαι ἀνθρώπων γένεσθαι* (*Apol.* 1, 32, p. 63, [p. 74, B.]) Less frequently, the following more indefinite phrases occur; *φανέρωσις* (*Apol.* 1, 32, p. 63, [p. 73, C.])—1, 56, p. 77, [p. 91, A.])—*c. Tr.* c. 49, p. 145, [p. 268, C.] *ἐπιφάνεια* (*Apol.* 1, 14, p. 52, [p. 61, C.])—1, 40, p. 67, [p. 78, C.] *φαίνεσθαι* (*Apol.* 2, 10, p. 95, [p. 48, B.])—*c. Tr.* c. 85, p. 181, [p. 311, A.]) *φανερῶσθαι* (*Apol.* 1, 56, p. 77, [p. 91, A.]) *τὸν ἀνθρώπου ἀναλαμβάνειν*, *Coh. ad Gr.* c. 38, p. 34, [p. 36, C.] *ἀνθρώπου γένεσθαι* (*Apol.* 2, 6, p. 93, [p. 45, A.])—2, 13, p. 97, [p. 51, D.])—*c. Tr.* c. 100, p. 195, [p. 326, D.])—*c. 113*, p. 206, [p. 340, D.])

² *Apol.* 2, 10, p. 95, (p. 48, B.) *μεγαλειότερα πάσης ἀνθρωποῦ διδασκαλίας φαίνεται τὰ ἡμῖν, διὰ τὸ λογικὸν τὸ ἔλν τὸν φανέντα δι' ἡμῶν Χριστὸν γενέσθαι, καὶ σῶμα καὶ λόγον καὶ ψυχὴν.* Compare Petau *theol. dogm. de incarnat.* b. 13, T. IV. p. 219. Munscher, *Handbuch der Christ. Dogmengeschichte*, II. 170. Neander, *antignostikus Geist der Tertullianus*, 403. *Allgem. Geschichte der Christ. Relig. u. Kirche*, I. 3, 708. Olshausen, (*opusc. acad.* p. 174,) is mistaken in considering the substantive *λόγον*, as the designation of the rational human soul; Justin never uses the word *λόγος* in this sense; the human spirit he calls *πνεῦμα*. But Möhler does, indeed, adopt an arbitrary and ungrammatical method, joining together the words *καὶ λόγον καὶ ψυχὴν*, and making them equivalent to *ψυχὴν λογικὴν*. What syntax will allow such a contraction? But what this critic urges against the reference of *λόγον* to the person of the divine Logos, namely, the want of the definite article before it, is indeed correct, but a matter of indifference. That omission is only to favour a conformity with the parallel substantives *σῶμα* and *ψυχὴν*, which are also without the article.

dental outline; yet the most important features are inserted. They are the following. The Redeemer, he states, was, in his outward form, as announced beforehand by Isaiah, (liii. 2,) uncomely and despised,¹ but he possessed and showed, even when an infant, extraordinary power.² This divine power he possessed, though veiled, during his whole life, as clearly appears from the fact that the dæmons, and all the powers of earth, trembled before him.³ Till he attained man's estate, his Messianic destiny was concealed from men;⁴ they supposed him to be the son of Joseph the carpenter, and to be no more than a carpenter himself, because he assisted his foster-father in his trade, and made ploughs and yokes.⁵ About his thirtieth year he entered on his office of teacher, after John the Baptist had prepared the way for him.⁶ At his baptism in Jordan, to which he submitted, not from any personal necessity, but for the sake of men, the descent of the Holy Spirit in the form of a dove, and the voice from heaven, "Thou art my Son, to-day I have begotten thee," solemnly testified to the bystanders that he was the Christ of God.⁷ He practised the observance of the Mosaic law, after entering on his Messianic calling, from obedience to the divine plan of salvation. In all

¹ *Dial. c. Tr. c. 85*, p. 181, (p. 311, A.)—*c. 88*, p. 186, (p. 316, C.)—*c. 100*, p. 195, (p. 326, D.) Thus also, *Clem. post.* 3, 1, 3, T. I. p. 279; *Strom.* 3, 17, 103, T. II. p. 272. *Tertull. de carn. Chr.* c. 9, T. III. p. 288. Origen, *c. Cels.* 6, 75, T. I. p. 689. See Hase, *das Leben Jesu.* (Leipz. 1835,) p. 71, 73.

² *Dial. c. Tr. c. 78*, p. 176, p. 304, D.—*c. 88*, p. 185, (p. 315, C.)

³ *Dial. c. Tr. c. 49*, p. 146, (p. 269, C.)

⁴ *Apol.* 1, 35, p. 65, (p. 75, E.)

⁵ *Dial. c. Tr. c. 88*, p. 186, (p. 316, C.) That Jesus, in his youth, assisted his foster-father in working as a carpenter, is the almost universal opinion of Christian antiquity. See Suicer, *thesaur. eccles.* T. II. p. 1254, and Arens *de evangel. apocryph. in canonicis usu. hist. crit. exegetica*, p. 32.

⁶ *Dial. c. Tr. c. 88*, p. 185, sq. (p. 315, C.—316, D.)

⁷ *Dial. c. Tr. c. 67*, p. 164, (p. 291, D.)

points he submitted himself to the Father with devout affection;¹ he wished to do nothing of his own power, and according to his own will; he referred everything to God.² According to his Father's will he became man;³ he undertook and bore the suffering of death;⁴ he regarded his resurrection as a gift from his Father's hand.⁵ He did not impute his deliverance to himself, nor to his dignity as the Son of God, or found his redemption on his own strength and wisdom; in order to be sinless, as he was the only one among men who remained righteous, undefiled, free from sin and blame,⁶ he made all his hope depend on God.⁷ After death he descended, like all men, into Hades, but without remaining there,⁸ he rose again on the third day, in the same flesh in which he had suffered, and returned, in a glorified existence, into heaven to the right hand of the Father.

The two last named facts, the descent of Christ into Hades, and his reassumption of the crucified flesh, de-

¹ *Dial. c. Tr. c. 101, p. 196, (p. 328, A.)* αὐτὸς σωθήσεται ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτοῦ θεοῦ μνησθῆναι, ἀλλ' οὐ ἐφ' αὐτοῦ βουλῇ ἢ ἰσχύϊ πράττειν οἱ καυχώμενοι· καὶ γὰρ ἰσὶ γῆς τὸ αὐτὸ ἱππεῖ.

² *Dial. c. Tr. c. 98, p. 193, (p. 324, D.)* καὶ τὸν πάντα ψαλμὸν. (Ps. xxii.) ἵστανται ἂν, ὅπως καὶ τὸ πρὸς τὸν πατέρα ὑπεβίβη αὐτοῦ ἀκούσῃ, καὶ ὡς εἰς ἱκεῖνους πάντα ἀναφέρει, ὡς αὐτὸς δι' ἐκείνου καὶ σωθῆναι ἀπὸ τοῦ θανάτου τούτου αἰτῶν.

³ *Apol. 1, 23, p. 57, (p. 68, C.)—1, 46, p. 71, (p. 83, D.)—1, 63, p. 81, sq. (p. 96, A. D.)—2, 6, p. 93, (p. 45, A.)—Dial. c. Tr. c. 23, p. 123, (p. 241, B.)—c. 43, p. 139, (p. 261, B.)*

⁴ *Dial. c. Tr. c. 41, p. 137, (p. 260, A.)—c. 95, p. 192, (p. 322, D.)*

⁵ *Dial. c. Tr. c. 100, p. 195, (p. 326, C.)*

⁶ *Dial. c. Tr. c. 17, p. 117, (p. 231, D.)* ἱκεῖνους τὸν μόνον ἄμωμον καὶ δίκαιον ἄνθρωπον.—c. 35, p. 133, (p. 254, B.) ἄμωμος καὶ ἀνίμωλος κατὰ πάντα Χριστὸν Ἰησοῦν.—c. 110, p. 204, (p. 337, D.) ἐφ' δικαιοσύνη καὶ μόνῃ ἀσπίδι καὶ ἀνταρτήτῃ Χριστοῦ.

⁷ *Dial. c. Tr. c. 102, p. 197, (p. 329, D. 330, A.)*

⁸ *Dial. c. Tr. c. 99, p. 195, (p. 326, C.)* οὐτως ἰσχυρίσθαι (Ps. xxii. 2,) οὐκ εἰς ἑαυτὸν τὴν ἑαυτοῦ, ἀλλὰ τῶν νομιζόντων μὴ εἶναι, αὐτὸν Χριστὸν, ἀλλ' ἡγουμένων θανατώσων αὐτόν, καὶ ὡς κοινὸν ἄνθρωπον ἐν ᾧ οὐκ ἔστι μόνος.

mand more distinct consideration. Justin, as it appears, laid little stress on Christ's descent into Hades, since he mentions it very briefly, but yet this reference is important, partly because Justin is the earliest church teacher in whose writings this doctrine makes its appearance,—all the other works which contain it are of later date,¹—partly because he connects with it the object of reducing the inferiority, in which the generations before the Christian dispensation, who either enjoyed not at all, or only in anticipation, the blessing of redemption, appeared to stand to those who beheld and enjoyed it in its concrete reality. He did not confine himself to behold by that descent into Hades, the penalty of mortality taken away, to which the human race had been subjected, since the entrance of sin,²—a view which, at a later period, was also taken by Irenæus,³ Tertullian,⁴ and Hilary of Poitiers,⁵ but he connected, as they did, with that descent the farther design of a personal immediate communication by Jesus, of the saving truth of the gospel, to the men who existed before the incarnation. He approves of the contents of the spurious apocryphal addition to the prophet Jeremiah; c. Tr. c. 72, p. 170, (p. 298, B.) ἐμνήσθη κύριος ὁ θεὸς ἀπὸ Ἰσραὴλ τῶν νεκρῶν αὐτοῦ τῶν κεκοιμημένων εἰς γῆν χύματος, καὶ κατίβη πρὸς αὐτοὺς εὐαγγελίσασθαι αὐτοῖς τὸ σωτήριον αὐτοῦ. But Justin could not have attributed to this

¹ To this class may be referred *The Apocryphal Sermon of Thaddeus at Edessa*, (Euseb. h. e. i. 13, T. I. p. 87,) the *Epistle of Ignatius to the Trallians*, according to the longer recension, (c. 9, T. II. p. 67,) and the *Testament of the Patriarchs*, (12, 9.) in Galland. *bibil. vet. patr.* T. I. (p. 239, C.) On the first witness see Waage *de atate articuli quo in symbolo apostol. traditur Jesu Christi ad inferos descensus*, (Havn. 1836,) p. 123.

² See Dietelmaier *historia dogmatis de descensu Christi ad inferos*, (Ed. 2. Altorf. 1762,) p. 62.

³ *Adv. Hæres.* 5, 31, p. 331.

⁴ *De anim.* c. 56, T. IV. p. 280.

⁵ Enarrat. in *psalm* 53, p. 213, C. in *psalm*. 138, p. 324, A. Pott, *excurs.* 3, *comment. in Epistol. cathol.* T. II. p. 293, sq.

supplementary preaching of Christ, the design of communicating salvation to departed souls in general; for pious Jews and Heathens, prior to the Christian dispensation, had the assurance of their salvation already in the faithful reception and impression of the divine will and life,¹ communicated to them partly by natural knowledge, and partly by extraordinary divine aid; and for those who died in voluntary self-condemned error and impiety, there was no possibility of salvation left in Hades. Perhaps Justin, by making a difference in degree between the happiness of pious heathens and of believing Christians, attributed to the descent of Christ into Hades a tendency to raise the pious heathens and Jews to a higher degree of happiness than their previous position out of the pale of Christianity had allowed, and to introduce them to the fulness of the Christian salvation! Perhaps he attributed to this descent to Hades the secondary object of redeeming the Old Testament prophets and righteous men, from the power of the dæmons which they encountered at their death!²

With respect to the constitution of the body with

¹ *Dial. c. Tr.* c. 45, p. 141, (p. 263, D. 264, A.) Munscher *Handbuch der christl. Dogmengeschichte*, II. 211.)

² *De Resurrect.* c. 9, p. 594, D. E. *τίνος ἵκεν ἐν τῇ σαρκὶ τῇ παθούσῃ ἀνίστη, εἰ μὴ ἵνα διέξῃ τὴν σαρκίαν ἀνάστασι; καὶ τὸτο βολόμενοι πιστοποιῆσαι, τῶν μαθόντων αὐτοῦ μὴ πισυνόντων, εἰ ἀληθῶς σώματα ἀνίστη, βλιπόντων αὐτῶν καὶ διαζόντων, εἰπὼν αὐτοῖς· οὐκ ἔχοντε πίστιν, φησί· Τίτε ἔτι ἰγὼ εἰμι, καὶ ψηλαφῶ αὐτὸν ἐπί τρεῖς αὐτοῖς καὶ τοὺς τύπους τῶν ἡλίων ἐν ταῖς χερσὶν ἰσιδέκεται. Καὶ παρακαλεῖ αὐτὸν παρανοήσαντες, ὅτι αὐτός ἐστι καὶ ἐν τῇ σώματι παρακάλεσαι αὐτὸν φαγεῖν μετ' αὐτῶν, ἵνα καὶ διὰ τοῦτου βεβαιώσῃ μάθωσιν, ὅτι ἀληθῶς σωματικῶς ἀνίστη, καὶ ἱφραγὶ κηρίον καὶ ἰχθύν. Καὶ οὕτως ἰσιδίξας αὐτοῖς, ὅτι ἀληθῶς σαρκὶς ἀνάστασις ἐστὶ, βεβαιώμενοι ἰσιδίξαι καὶ εὐτο, καθὼς ἔρηκται ἐν οὐρανῷ τὴν παροικίαν ἡμῶν ὑπάγειν, ὅτι ὡς ἀπέθανον καὶ σαρκὶ εἰς οὐρανὸν ἀνελθόν, ἀνελήφθη βλεπόντων αὐτῶν εἰς τὸν οὐρανόν, ὡς ἦν ἐν τῇ σαρκὶ —“ For what purpose did he rise (from the dead) in the flesh in which he suffered, unless to demonstrate the resurrection of the flesh? And wishing to confirm this when his disciples did not believe that he was truly risen in the body, but when they saw him doubted, he said to them, Do ye not yet believe?*

which Christ rose from the dead, and afterwards ascended to heaven, Justin cherished the conviction which was predominant in the Greek Church till the third century, and in the Latin till the fourth, that Christ rose in the same body which had been crucified and buried, in a body perfectly homogeneous in its materials and properties, with the common human frame, and that this passed into a state of glorification, first at his ascension, yet without any essential alteration in its nature.¹

We have hitherto contemplated the incarnation of Christ in its purely personal aspect, and represented the life of the Redeemer in its concrete, personal relations: it now remains to develop the representations which Justin has given of the method and operation of that salvation which the incarnation was designed to effect. These representations include nothing less than the restoration of the human race to the perfection of their original condition, the removal of sin and

Behold it is I; and commanded them to handle him, and shewed them the marks of the nails in his hands. And having observed him on every side, and known that it was himself, and that he was in the body, they invited him to eat with them, that thus they might learn with confidence that he was truly risen in the body; and he ate honeycomb and fish. And thus having shewed them that there was truly a resurrection of the flesh, wishing also to shew (as he had said, that our habitation was in heaven) that it was not impossible for the flesh to return to heaven, he was taken up while they beheld him, into heaven, as he was in the flesh." See Müller *de Resurrectione J. Christi, vita eam excipiente et ascensu in cælum sententia, quæ in Eccles. Christ. ad finem usque sæcul. 6. vigerunt.* (Havn. 1836,) pp. 77, 101.

¹ That the body of Christ, when he ascended to heaven, was a glorified one, appears from the dramatic description which Justin has drawn of that event. *Dial. c. Tr. c. 36*, p. 134, (p. 255, B.) But that the apologist supposed that state of glorification to commence a short time before the ascension, Cyril of Alexandria may serve as a surety, who, as in many other points, so also in the Somatology of the risen Christ, reflects Justin's doctrinal type with essential fidelity, though contrary to the spirit of his times. See Müller *de Resurrect. J. Christi*, pp. 88, 102.

all its consequences, physical death excepted. Justin, it is true, does not state this object as precisely as we have expressed it; but what we have just said is only a brief summary of the manifold consequences which he represents as proceeding from the incarnation of Jesus. In his opinion, Christ became man, in order to be a partaker of our sufferings, and to bring their cure,¹—to make an end of the disobedience which had entered the world through the artifice of the serpent,²—to crush and annihilate the destructive power and supremacy of Satan, and of evil angels and men,³—to overcome death, by dying and rising again,⁴—to lead those who believe in him to a contempt of death, and, finally, to free them wholly from its power.⁵ To what do these separate statements amount when taken together, but to an expression of the conviction that the fallen and unhappy human race would again possess, by Christ, what they had lost—the jewel of untroubled purity and bliss?

As the means by which Christ pursued and attained this object, Justin names two things, the *doctrine* and the *death* of Jesus. He never ascribes a strictly redeeming power to the Lord's personal *example*.

¹ *Apol.* 2, 13, p. 97, (p. 51, D.) δι' ἡμᾶς ἄνθρωπος γίγνεται, ἵσως καὶ τῶν παθῶν τῶν ἡμῶν συμμίτοχος γινόμενος καὶ ἡμῶν ποιήσεται.

² *Dial.* c. *Tr.* c. 100, p. 195, (p. 327, C.)

³ *Apol.* 2, 6, p. 93, (p. 45, A.) ἄνθρωπος γίγνεται . . . ἀποκνηδαίς ὑπὲρ τῶν πισυνόντων ἀνθρώπων καὶ [ἐπὶ] καταλύσει τῶν δαιμόνων—*Dial.* c. *Tr.* c. 100, p. 196, (p. 327, D.) διὰ ταύτης γίγνεται οὗτος, δι' οὗ ὁ θὺς τὸν τι ἔργον καὶ τοὺς ὁμοιωθέντας ἀγγέλους καὶ ἀνθρώπους καταλύει.—c. 94, p. 191, (p. 322, A.)—c. 111, p. 204, (p. 338, B.)

⁴ *Apol.* 1, 63, p. 82, (p. 96, D.) διὰ παρθένου ἄνθρωπος γινόμενος . . . ὑπὲρ σωτηρίας τῶν πισυνόντων αὐτῷ καὶ ἱεροδυναστείας καὶ παθῶν ὑπάρχειν, ἵνα ἀπαθανῶν καὶ ἀναστὰς νικήσῃ τὸν θάνατον.

⁵ *Dial.* c. *Tr.* c. 45, p. 141, (p. 264, A.) διὰ τῆς παρθένου . . . γινουμένης σαρκωποιοῦν ὑπάρχειν, ἵνα διὰ τῆς εὐνομίας ταύτης ὁ ποθητός αἰνός τῆν ἀρχὴν ἔρῃ καὶ οἱ ὁμοιωθέντες αὐτῷ ἀγγέλοις καταλυθῶσι καὶ ὁ θάνατος καταφρονηθῇ.—c. 100, p. 196, (p. 327, D.) δι' οὗ (Χριστῷ) ὁ θὺς . . . ἀπαλλαγὴν τοῦ θανάτου τοῖς μεταγινώσκουσιν ἀπὸ τῶν παύλων καὶ πισυνόντων εἰς αὐτὸν ἐργάζεται.

Justin not merely deduces the renovation and restoration of the human race generally from the doctrine of Jesus,¹ but expresses himself by no means obscurely respecting the manner in which he considers that these effects were accomplished. He traces it in part to the power with which Jesus spoke; in part, to the subject of which he principally discoursed. By the power of his discourse—a discourse glowing and splendid as the rays of the sun which penetrated the very depths of the mind and heart—he everywhere prevailed on the people to turn from their evil ways and repent.² By that, he elsewhere boasts, Christ led and still leads men back to God; so that the long obscured Monotheism is again acknowledged and honoured;³ he taught men to know the true nature and agency of the dæmons whom they had unlawfully set up as objects of adoration;⁴ and by this knowledge he withdrew men from their service.⁵ Wherever the words of Christ are received in faith, the worship of dæmons ceases, and the worship of the true God is established.⁶

Justin attributes the most comprehensive importance, for the work of redemption, to the death of Jesus. Deeply penetrated with the conviction that this death was the mysterious power by which, as by nothing else, the pillars of the church were raised and supported,—by which, as in no other way, the sanctification and salvation of men was carried on and completed—he made it the culminating point of the sal-

¹ *Apol.* 1, 23, p. 57, (p. 58, C.) γινόμενος ἀνθρώπου, ταῦτα ἡμᾶς ἰδὼν, ἰσ' ἀλλαγῇ καὶ ἰσπανουργῇ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου γίνους.

² *Dial. c. Tr. c.* 121, p. 214, (p. 350, A. B.) *Apol.* 1, 10, p. 49, (p. 58, D.)

³ *Coh. ad Gr. c.* 38, p. 34, (p. 86, C.)

⁴ *Apol.* 1, 5, p. 47, (p. 56, A. B.)

⁵ *Dial. c. Tr. c.* 83, p. 181, (p. 309, D. 310, A.) ἰσχυρὸς ὁ λόγος αὐτοῦ πῶς πολλὰ καταλίσσιν δαιμόνια, οἷς ἰδούλευον, καὶ ἐπὶ τὸν παντοκράτορα θεὸν δ' αὐτοῦ πιστεύουσιν.

⁶ *Apol.* 1, 14, p. 51, (p. 61, B.) ἡμῖς, μετὰ τὸ λεγόμενον, ἐπιστάμενοι, ἐκείνους μὲν ἀπέστημεν, θεῷ δὲ μόνῳ τῷ ἀγενήτῳ διὰ τοῦ εἰῶς ἐπέμεθα.

vation effected by Christ. He attributed to it both a redeeming and an atoning power. The first, the redeeming power, takes the most conspicuous part, as external and open to observation. Justin calls the death of Jesus *redeeming*, in as much as it frees from the power and dominion of Satan and his angels. This effect he ascribes to it, sometimes in simple assertions, when he says; "By the Crucified One, the serpent has found its death;"¹ or, when he specifies, as a subject of Christian thanksgiving, that the powers and dominions had been overthrown by the sufferings of Christ;² sometimes he describes this effect in its manifestations. He instances, as a fruit of the sufferings and death of Christ, at one time, that the dæmons trembled before the name of Jesus, and by the power of this name obeyed Christians when commanded by them to depart from the bodies of men;³ at another time, that the heathens forsook their idols, and, believing in Jesus, devoted themselves to the service of

¹ *Dial. c. Tr. c. 91*, p. 189, (p. 319, A.)

² *Dial. c. Tr. c. 41*, p. 137, (p. 260, A.) ἵνα ὑπερκερδαίωται τῇ θείῃ . . . ὑπὲρ τοῦ . . . τῶν ἀρχῶν καὶ τῶν ἑξουσιῶν πάντα λευκίνας τιλθῶναι κατὰ λυσιν διὰ τοῦ παθῆτος γινόμενον κατὰ τὴν βουλὴν αὐτοῦ.

³ *Dial. c. Tr. c. 30*, p. 128, (p. 247, C. D.) τῷ (Χριστῷ) καὶ τὴν τῷ ὀνόματος ἰσχὺν καὶ τὰ δαιμόνια τρέμει, καὶ σήμερον ἔξορκιζόμενα κατὰ τῷ ὀνόματος Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ τοῦ ταυρωδίντος ὑπὸ Ποντίου Πιλάτου . . . ὑποτάσσονται ὡς καὶ ἐν τούτῳ πάντες φανεροὶ εἶναι, ὅτι ὁ παῖς αὐτοῦ Ἰησοῦς ἰδὼν αὐτῶν δυνάμειν, ὅςτι καὶ τὰ δαιμόνια ὑποτάσσονται τῷ ὀνόματι αὐτοῦ καὶ τῇ ἰσχύϊ γινόμενον πᾶσι αὐτοῦ οἰκονομία. Εἰ δὲ τῇ τοῦ πατρὸς αὐτοῦ οἰκονομίᾳ τοσαύτη δύναμις δέκνυται παρακολουθήσασα καὶ παρακολουθούσα, πόση ἢ ἐν τῇ ἰσχύϊ γινόμενη αὐτοῦ παρουσία;—
"And the dæmons tremble at the power of his name; and at this very day, when exorcised in the name of Jesus Christ, who was crucified under Pontius Pilate, they submit; so that, from this fact, it is manifest to all that the Father hath given such power, so that the dæmons are subject to his name, and to the economy of his passion. And if the power which followed, and still follows the economy of his passion, is shewn to be so great, how great will it be at his glorious advent?"—c. 49, p. 146, (p. 269, C.)—*Apol. 2*, 6, p. 93, (p. 45, A. B.)

the true God.¹ But it is to be regretted that he does not inform us in precise terms, by what intermediate idea he realized this efficiency of redemption. When Bähr² supposes that he has found this intermediate idea in the representation of a ransoming of men from the power of Satan, by the death of Jesus as the ransom, he has allowed himself to be misled by a passage in the Dialogue with Trypho,³ in which, though apparently the germ of such a representation seems to be contained, it is not so in reality. Every thing depends, in that passage, on the slender thread of the verb, *κτᾶσθαι*, which does not necessarily express the idea of *ransoming*; and what is most material, in that passage, there is no statement that Christ had freed men from Satan's power by his cross and blood. Unquestionably Ziegler⁴ and Baur⁵ are in the right, who consider Irenæus as the first who propounded the theory of ransom, which the ancient Church received and cherished with so strong a partiality. Next to deliverance from the power of Satan, Justin placed the redeeming power of Jesus in regeneration, by which man is released from practical connection with sin, and is purified from its defilement. The passion, the death—the blood of Christ—

¹ *Dial. c. Tr. c. 91*, p. 188, (p. 318, D.) *κτερίθιντες* (Deut. xxxiii. 17,) *ταύτης κατανοήσεις, οἱ ἐκ πάντων τῶν ἱθιῶν διὰ τοῦτου τοῦ μυστηρίου (ταυρῶ) εἰς τὴν διορίσειαν ἰσάσκσαν ἀπὸ τῶν μαζίων ἐδώλων καὶ δαιμόνων.*—c. 131, p. 223, (p. 360, C.)—c. 134, p. 226, (p. 364, C.)

² *Die Lehre der Kirche vom Tode Jesu.* 49, 51.

³ *Dial. c. Tr. c. 134*, p. 226, (p. 364, C.) *ἰδούλιον ἱακῶβ τῷ Λάβαν ὑπὲρ τῶν βαντῶν καὶ πολυμέρφων θρημμάτων ἰδουλιον καὶ τὴν μίχρη ταυρῶ δουλέων ἡ Χριστὸς ὑπὲρ τῶν ἐκ παντὸς γένους ποιπίλων καὶ πολυεῶν ἀνθρώπων, δι' αἵματος καὶ μυστηρίου τῷ ταυρῷ κτησάμενος αὐτούς.* "Jacob served Laban for the spotted and party-coloured sheep; Christ served a servitude, even to the cross, for men of every race, of various colours and forms, acquiring them by the blood and mystery of the cross."

⁴ *Hist. dogm. de redemptione*, Gotting. 1791, in *Velthusen, Kuinoel et Ruperti comment. theolog.* T. v. p. p. 247

⁵ *Die christliche Lehre von der Versöhnung in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwicklung.* (Tubing. 1838,) p. 30.

expressions which he uses interchangeably, without affixing any real difference to them—purifies believers;¹ frees the soul from every kind of evil,² redeems and purifies men who are sunk deepest in corruption;³ is the water of life, a bath of repentance and of the knowledge of God, designed for the unrighteousness of the people of God, and which alone has power to purify the penitent.⁴ Justin in one passage speaks of Christ's death on the cross as the principle of regeneration;⁵ and the same reference is certainly the basis of the often repeated declaration, that sinful men are healed by Christ's stripes.⁶ Lastly, a third redeeming effect of Christ's death is stated by Justin to be, the preservation of believers from death. This effect (apart from all the other passages already quoted,) is pointed out most clearly in the following parallel;⁷

¹ *Apol.* l. 32, p. 63, (p. 74, A.) δι' αἵματος καθαίρειν τὰς πιστεύοντας αὐτῷ.

² *Dial.* c. Tr. c. 41, p. 137, (p. 260, A.) τοῦ πάθους οὗ Ἰωαννὶν ὑπὲρ τῶν καθαιρουμένων τὰς ψυχὰς ἀπὸ πάσης ποτηρίας ἀνδρώπων Ἰησοῦς Χριστός.

³ *Dial.* c. Tr. c. 86, p. 184, (p. 314, A.) ἡμᾶς βιβαπτιζομένους ταῖς βαρυτάταις ἀμαρτίαις, ἃς ἐπράξαμεν. διὰ τοῦ σταυρωθῆναι ἰπὶ τοῦ ξύλου καὶ δι' ὕδατος ἄγνισαι ὁ Χριστὸς ἡμῶν ἱλυτρώσατο.

⁴ *Dial.* c. Tr. c. 14, p. 114, (p. 231, B. C.) διὰ τοῦ λυτρῆ τῆς μετανοίας καὶ τῆς γνώσεως τοῦ Θεοῦ, ὃ ὑπὲρ τῆς ἀνομίας τῶν λαῶν τοῦ Θεοῦ γέγονεν, ὡς Ἡσαΐας βοᾷ (lii. 10,) ἡμεῖς· πιστεύομεν καὶ γνωρίζομεν, ὅτι τοῦτ' ἐκείνο ὃ προηγόρευε τὸ βάπτισμα, τὸ μόνον καθαρῶσαι τοὺς μετανοήσαντας δυνάμει τοῦτο ἐστὶ τὸ ὕδωρ τῆς ζωῆς.—Hitherto these words have been referred almost universally to baptism, as for example by Starck (*Geschichte der Taufe und Taufgesinnnten*. Leipz. 1789,) by Matthies, (*Baptismatis expositio biblica historica dogmatica*. Berol. 1831, p. 163,) and Nielsen, (*de vi et effectibus, baptismo ab ecclesiæ patribus tributis*. Havn. 1836, l. p. 28.) And yet the connection shews in the clearest manner that they can be understood only of the death of Christ.

⁵ *Dial.* c. Tr. c. 138, p. 229, (p. 367, C.)

⁶ *Dial.* c. Tr. c. 43, p. 139, (p. 261, D.) τούτου ἀποθνήσκειν μίλλοντος, ἵνα τῷ μύλωνι αὐτοῦ ἰαθῶμεν· οἱ ἀμαρτωλοὶ ἀνδρώπων.—c. 17, p. 117, (p. 234, D.)—c. 95, p. 192, (p. 323, A.)

⁷ *Dial.* c. Tr. c. 111, p. 204, (p. 338, C.)

"as the blood of the paschal lamb delivered the Israelites in Egypt, so the blood of Christ will redeem believers from death."

Besides the view of the death of Jesus as an act of redemption, Justin presents another mode of contemplating it, which comes under the idea of atonement; but unfortunately the apologist was not aware of the intimate and reciprocal connection between redemption and atonement, nor is the idea of atonement presented in his writings in its just extent. He only traces its general outlines. These are given when he calls the death of Christ a sacrifice for all sinners who are desirous to amend and live righteously,¹—when he represents Jesus as the passover which was offered up for men,²—as the eternal priest of God (Ps. cx. 4), who blesses those that draw to him in faith,³—when, finally, he traces the forgiveness of sins to the efficacy of his blood.⁴

But if Justin ascribes to the death of Jesus, both a redeeming and atoning power, if he elevates it to an objective transaction, through which forgiveness of sins and a moral life is gained and made possible for Christians, the enquiry becomes important, whether he refers this expiatory power of the death of Christ to the whole life of believers, or confines it entirely to the epoch of their conscious entrance into the Church. Both suppositions have found advocates.⁵ We

¹ *Dial. c. Tr. c. 40*, p. 137, (p. 259, C.) *προσφορά ἥν ὑπὲρ πάντων τῶν μετανοῶν βυλομένων ἀμαρτωλῶν καὶ ἡστυόντων, ἥν κατελίσκει Ἡσαίας* (lviii. 3,) *ἡστυάων*.

² *Dial. c. Tr. c. 111*, p. 204, (p. 338, C.) *ὡς τοῦ πασχαῖς ὁ Χριστός ἐτυθῆς ὑστέρων*.

³ *Dial. c. Tr. c. 33*, p. 130, (p. 251, A.B.)—*c. 42*, p. 138, (p. 260, C.)—*c. 96*, p. 192, (p. 323, C.)—*c. 113*, p. 206, (p. 341, A.)

⁴ *Dial. c. Tr. c. 44*, p. 140, (p. 263, B.)—*c. 54*, p. 149, (p. 273, D.)—*c. 111*, p. 205, (p. 338, D.)

⁵ Bretschneider, (*Die Grundlage des evangel. Pietismus*, 302,) defends the latter, Bahr the former, (*die Lehre der Kirche vom Tode Jesu*, 52.) Augusti (*Lehrbuch der christl. dogmengeschichte* 4. Aufl. s. 362,) also writes, "all the Fathers contemplate the

consider the latter to be the true one. It is, we think, fully maintained in the following passage, *Dial. c. Tr.* c. 111, p. 205, (p. 338, D.) τὸ σύμβολον τοῦ κοκκίνου σπαρτίου (Josh. ii. 18,) οὕτως τὸ σύμβολον τοῦ ἁίματος τοῦ Χριστοῦ ἐδήλου, δι' οὗ οἱ πάλαιπύργοι καὶ ἄδικοι ἐκ πάντων τῶν ἐθνῶν σώζονται ἄφεισιν ἁμαρτιῶν λαβόντες καὶ μηκέτι ἁμαρτάνοντες,—“the sign of the scar-

death of Jesus as a sacrifice presented for the sins of the world, and for ever efficacious.” Bahr appeals in support of his opinion, but without just grounds, to the two following passages of the Dialogue: c. *Tr.* c. 40, p. 136, (p. 259, A.) οὗ τῷ αἵματι κατὰ τὸν λόγον τῆς ἀς αὐτὸν πίστεως χρίονται τοὺς οἴκους αὐτῶν, ταῖς τε αὐτῶν αἰσιν αἱ πιστεύοντες ἀς αὐτόν. — (“The mystery of the paschal lamb was a type of Christ,) with whose blood, proportionally to faith in him, those who believe in him anoint their houses, that is, themselves,”—and c. *Tr.* c. 54, p. 149, (p. 273, D.) τὸ ὑπὸ τῷ πατριάρχῃ Ἰακώβ προσηψήσμενον (Gen. xlix. 11,) τὸ τῷ αἵματι αὐτοῦ (Χριστοῦ) ἀποπλύνει μίλλαν τοὺς πιστεύοντας αὐτῷ ἰδῆλα. Στελὴν γὰρ αὐτοῦ ἐκάλει τὸ ἄγιον πνεῦμα τοὺς δι' αὐτοῦ ἄφεισιν ἁμαρτιῶν λαβόντας.—“What was prophesied by the patriarch Jacob, signified that he would wash in his blood those who believe in him.” In neither of these passages is anything said of the atoning and purifying power of the death of Jesus, continued beyond the epoch of conversion. In the first passage, those are believers who have attained this. These new converts, in the moment when they mark themselves with the blood of Christ, i. e. become partakers of the blessings of this blood, are called believers, since that participation necessarily presupposes faith in the merits of the Redeemer. But the moral purification, which, in the second passage, is mentioned as a consequence of the forgiveness of sins, is not that which continually repeats itself in the life of believers, by virtue of the atoning death of Christ, but that purification which Christianity grants to its professors, with and in their conversion. It is perfectly agreeable to fact, that this purification is placed after the forgiveness of sins, for the latter is the source of the former. But if persons are disposed to take the title of eternal priest, which Justin gives to Christ, as a proof that that has extended the atoning and sanctifying power of the death of Christ over the whole life of believers,—it is to be recollected that Christ receives this title merely because his sin-offering, as far as it is applied to Christians, who have once received the benefit of it, is not rendered inefficacious by their guilt, and has an eternal efficacy for those who have newly entered into the Christian church.

let thread, (Josh. ii. 18,) . . . similarly the sign of the blood of Christ, by which those who before were adulterers and unjust, are saved out of all nations,—receiving the remission of sins, and sinning no longer.” According to this passage, Justin knew only of one single act of forgiveness of sin, as the fruit of the death of Christ, which takes place at the entrance of individuals into vital communion with the Redeemer, and conceives them before their entrance as in a state of ignorance and slavery to sin. After conversion, the Christian sins no more, or if he does, divine grace must again renew his repentance.

We come now to the last point which demands investigation; namely, whether Justin, inasmuch as he considered the death of Christ as sacrificial, and had already the idea of a substitutionary satisfaction, whether he understood the doctrine of atonement in the sense of the later theory of satisfaction. This in itself is from the first very unlikely, since Justin apprehended and pursued the idea of sacrifice generally in a very imperfect manner; yet persons have ventured to assert this,¹ and have connected it with topics which certainly have something attractive. Justin more than once expresses the thought that Christ suffered and died for (*ὑπὲρ* für) men; once he throws out the remark, that the Saviour had taken for all men the curse of all upon himself. Is not this the pure doctrine of satisfaction? So it seems, but it is only so in appearance. In truth Justin was completely unacquainted with substitutionary satisfaction in its first and simplest rudiments.

The preposition *ὑπὲρ*, in those passages in which the sufferings and death of Christ are represented as having taken place *for* men, has not the meaning of “instead of,” but of “for the service of,” or “for the good of.” This appears most distinctly from a number of expressions, of which we will only adduce two. Thus

¹ Among others Seiler (*über den Versöhnungs tod. Christi* I. 509.) Lange (*Ausführliche Geschichte der Dogmen*, I. 164,) and Munter (*Handbuch der ältesten christ. Dogmengeschichte*, I. 318.

Justin speaks,¹ "Christ after being born of a virgin sustained contempt and suffering for the salvation (*ὑπὲρ σωτηρίας*) of those that believe on him." And again,²—"Christ submitted to be born, and to die on the cross, not out of necessity, but (*ὑπὲρ*) for the service of the human race." That, moreover, by the death of Jesus the Divine punitive justice was appeased, Justin as little knew, as that the agony of Jesus in the garden of Gethsemane, which rose even to a bloody sweat, was a special act of expiation, that the anguish of that hour arose from the severity of the Divine wrath, by the pressure of which, on the substitutionary Mediator, men became free from the curse of their sins. In that conflict on the Mount of Olives, he saw merely the design of placing beyond a doubt the true humanity of Christ.³ When in the Dialogue, he employs the remarkable expression, τὸν ἑαυτῷ Χριστὸν ὑπὲρ τῶν ἐκ παντὸς γένους ἀνθρώπων ὁ πατὴρ τῶν ὅλων τὰς πάντων κατάρσας ἀναδέξασθαι ἱβουλῇθει.—"It was the will of the Father of the Universe that his Christ should receive the curses of all, for men of every race,"—he could not intend to say that God cursed his Christ *instead of* men (on the ground of his voluntary agreement) *i. e.* loaded him with all the punishment which men must otherwise have borne for their sins. For he earnestly and repeatedly protests against the charge made by his Jewish opponents which they supported by Deut. xxi. 23, that the curse of the law, or of God, rests on the crucified Redeemer. He describes this curse in relation to the person of Christ as merely *apparent*,⁴ charges the Jews with folly⁵ for regarding Jesus as an

¹ *Apol.* 1, 63, p. 82, (p. 96, D.)

² *Dial. c. Tr. c.* 88, p. 186, (p. 316, A.) Other passages of the same kind are *Apol.* 1, 63, p. 81, (p. 96, A.) *Dial. c. Tr. c.* 74, p. 171, p. 300, A.—c. 134, p. 226, (p. 364, C.)

³ *Dial. c. Tr. c.* 103, p. 199, (p. 331, C. D.)

⁴ *Dial. c. Tr. c.* 90, p. 187, (p. 317, D.) Μωσῆς πρῶτος ἐξέφαντο αὐτοῦ ταύτην τὴν δοκοῦσαν κατάρσιν, δι' ἧν ἰσχυρίσθητο σημῖον.

⁵ *Dial. c. Tr. c.* 63, p. 191, (p. 321, C.)—ἰκύνον μὲν ὡς ἐχθρὸν θεῷ καὶ καταπραμίνον ἀξίον τι ἀποδοκίμασαι ἵσταυρῶνθαι ὅπως τοῦ ἀλλοτρίου ὑμῶν γνάμους ἔργον ἵστί.

enemy of God, and loaded with a curse, and thus reprimands them;¹ "If the Father of all had willed that his Christ should take upon himself the curse of all for the salvation of men of every nation, since he knew that he would rise again after his crucifixion and death; why do ye speak as if he was accursed, who underwent the suffering according to the will of his Father?" He adds, by way of explanation,² "what is written in the law, *Cursed is every one that hangeth on a tree*, confirms our hope, which rests on the crucified Christ, not as if God cursed this crucified One, but in as much as God foretold what you, and those like-minded with yourselves, would do." He afterwards remarks,³ "Our suffering and crucified Christ was not cursed by the law, but manifested that he alone could save those who did not keep at a distance from his faith." Accordingly, when Justin says that Christ took upon himself the curse of all, this can, on no account, be so understood as if Christ bore the punishment of sin for men, and in his own person had made expiation for them; but it can only signify, Christ took upon himself the sins of men which deserved the curse, in order to take them away. But how? this remains undecided. To this question Justin gives no solution; he had none. But as to the matter of fact,—in this he was firmly fixed. The crucifixion of Christ had gained for men forgiveness of the guilt of sin, and freedom from the service of sin. This was his clear decided conviction, which he expressly avows;⁴—"In the law, a curse lies upon

¹ *Dial. c. Tr. c. 95, p. 192, (p. 322, D. 323, A.)*

² *Dial. c. Tr. c. 96, p. 192, (p. 323, C.)* τὸ ἐρεμῖνον ἐν τῷ νόμῳ (Dent. xxi. 23,) ὅτι ἐκτενέστατος πῶς ὁ κριμῶμενος ἐπὶ ξύλῳ, ὅχ ὡς τοῦ Θεοῦ κατακριμῖνου σῶν τοῦ ἱσταυρωμένου ἡμῶν τοιοῦ τὴν ἰδέαν ἐκκριμαμένην ἀπὸ τοῦ σταυρωθέντος Χριστοῦ, ἀλλ' ὡς προέκτεντος τοῦ Θεοῦ, &c.

³ *Dial. c. Tr. c. III, p. 204, (p. 338, B.)* ὁ παθὴς ἡμῶν καὶ σταυρωθὴς Χριστὸς οὐ κατηράθη ὑπὸ τοῦ νόμου ἀλλὰ μόνος σώσεν τοὺς μὴ ἐφισταμένους τῆς πίστεως αὐτοῦ ἰδέσθαι.

⁴ *Dial. c. Tr. c. 94, p. 192, (p. 322, C.)* ἐν τῷ νόμῳ κατὰ τὴν κρίσιν κατὰ τῶν σταυρωμένων ἀνθρώπων οὐκ ἔστι δὲ καὶ κατὰ τὴν κρίσιν τοῦ Θεοῦ κατὰ τὴν κρίσιν, δι' οὗ σώζει πάσης γένεως κατὰ τὴν κρίσιν αὐτοῦ.

crucified men, but the curse does not lie on the Christ of God, through whom he saves all who have done things that deserve the curse."

ARTICLE II.

THE OBJECTIVE MEANS OF APPROPRIATING SALVATION.

At first the Church was united on the question, by what instrumentality individuals obtained a participation in the redemption accomplished by Christ. Baptism and the Lord's Supper were unanimously considered as the two objective vehicles by which the gifts of Christian grace passed into the hearts and lives of Christians.

I. BAPTISM.

The ancient Church regarded the rite of baptism, not merely as a ceremony obvious to the senses, by which the entrance of an individual into the church was marked, and, as it were, accredited,—nor merely as a significant symbol, by which the inward consecration of the spirit, and regeneration of the person so entering was typified, but rather as an efficacious medium by which the blessings of the Gospel, especially the sacrificial death of Jesus, became objectively communicated to believers. Scarcely a single Church-teacher can be named, who has considered the baptismal act as purely disciplinary and symbolical, although it has not unfrequently happened that the name, at least, of a symbol has been applied to the holy rite. By many, the efficacy of baptism has been painted in brilliant colours; an almost magical omnipotence is often attributed to it. Not the soul alone, but the body also, partook of its beneficent agency. For the soul it was the source of the forgiveness of sins, and of intellectual and moral regeneration; while the body received from it the capability of rising again

from the grave. Mental illumination, freedom from the defilement of sin, a restoration to communion with God, incorruptibility of body and soul, eternal well-being and life, are the comprehensive blessings which it was believed to ensure. Contemplated in this light, it is easy to conceive that the ancient Church must have regarded baptism as indispensable for salvation, (only the baptism in blood of martyrdom compensated, in the opinion of the Church, for the want of water-baptism); and thus it is clear that it could make no earnest opposition, for any length of time, to the infant-baptism that was at first disputed. But, while the ancient Church attributed to baptism an objective efficiency, yet it did not forget and neglect to place faith and repentance in relation to it. It was extremely rare that an absolute efficacious power was ascribed to the rite, entirely apart from the subjectivity of the person baptized. If the Fathers were not disposed to acknowledge faith and repentance as essentially co-operating factors of inward sanctification, yet they allowed to both the position of indispensable pre-requisites.

The equivocal honour has lately been conferred on Justin, of having his views of baptism described as more pure and unadulterated than those of the other Fathers.¹ We believe that it is unmerited. Certainly such elevated, we may say, extravagant representations of the effects of baptism, are not to be found in his writings, as for example in the Epistle of Barnabas,²

¹ This has been done by Münscher, (*Handbuch der christ. Dogmengeschichte*, II. 304,) and Starck (*Geschichte der Taufe und Taufgesinnten*, 28.) On the contrary, Gael says, (*Abhandlungen zur Dogmengeschichte*, 79,) "how gross are the expressions of a Justin and an Athenagoras on Baptism!"

² *Epist.* c. 11, T. i. p. 38, καταβαίνουσιν εἰς τὸ ὕδωρ γίνονται ἀμαρτιῶν καὶ λύσιν, καὶ ἀναβαίνουσιν καρποφοροῦντες ἐν τῇ καρδίᾳ, τὸν φόβον καὶ τὴν ἐλπίδα εἰς τὸν Ἰησοῦν ἔχοντες ἐν τῷ πνεύματι.—"We go down into the water full of sins and pollutions, but come up again bringing forth fruit; having in our hearts the fear and hope which is in Jesus by the Spirit."—(Archbishop Wake's translation.)

and in the works of Clement of Alexandria;¹ but his convictions on the subject embraced all the essential points which are comprised in the church-dogma. He sees in baptism the free gift of the divine goodness, first of all, the outward act, in consequence of which the Christian is acknowledged as such, by which he becomes authorised to participate in the celebration of the Holy Supper; baptism he regarded as the initiatory rite of Christianity.² "In the Eucharist no one can participate," he says, "but he who believes that the things taught by us are true, and who has been washed in the bath for the remission of sins and regeneration, and so lives as Christ has commanded."³ But this ecclesiastical purpose of the baptismal act is only the outward side of the sacred rite; its higher, internal significance is the communication of divine grace and divine life to the baptized. This communication, to represent which the terms *illumination*⁴ and *illuminated*,⁵ applied by Justin according to a generally received ecclesiastical phraseology, to baptism

¹ *Paedag.* 1, 6, 26, T. i. p. 122, 1, 6, 28, p. 123, 1, 29, p. 125.

² *Dial. c. Tr. c.* 43, p. 139, (p. 261, C.)

³ *Apol.* 1, 66, p. 83, (p. 97, E. 98, A.)

⁴ *Apol.* 1, 61, p. 80, (p. 94, D.) καλεῖται τοῦτο τὸ λουτρον φωτισμός, ὡς φωτιζόμενοι τὴν διάνοιαν τῶν ταῦτα μανθανόντων.—"This bath is called illumination—since those who learn these things are illuminated in their understandings,"—Hence *Dial. c. Tr. c.* 39, p. 136, (p. 258, A.) φωτιζόμενοι διὰ τοῦ ὀνόματος τοῦ Χριστοῦ—"being illuminated by the name of Christ." Clemens interprets the term *φῶτισμα* differently: he supposes it to be used, because baptism (as by a magical operation) opens the mental eye and enables it to behold the Divine. *Paedag.* 1, 6, 26, T. i. p. 122.

⁵ If what Augusti states be correct, (*Handbuch d. christ. Archäologie*, I. 148,) that by the Fathers in general, the Christians already baptized are generally called *φωτιζόμενοι*, and only sometimes as by exception *φωτισθέντες*, while, on the contrary, the catechumens, or persons about to be baptized, are commonly called *φωτισθέντες*;—Justin's phraseology must be reckoned an exception. He terms the catechumens *φωτιζόμενοι* and the baptized *φωτισθέντες*, *Apol.* 1, 61, p. 80, (p. 94, E.); 1, 65, p. 82, (p. 97, C.)

and the baptized, by no means served, since these appellations merely related to the preceding catechetical instruction—this communication, of divine grace and divine life which takes place in baptism, embraces the two points of the forgiveness of sin and regeneration;¹ whoever receives baptism receives remission of his guilt and moral renovation. This renovation Justin makes mention of under a variety of images, and without limitation. By baptism man receives spiritual circumcision² and becomes renewed,³ he ceases to be a child of bondage and ignorance, and attains to the full possession of knowledge and free self-determination,⁴ he

¹ *Apol.* 1, 66, p. 83, (p. 98, A.) τὸ ὑπὲρ ἁφίσαις ἁμαρτιῶν καὶ οἷς ἀναγίνωσιν λουτρον—“The bath on account of the remission of sins and for regeneration.”—1, 61, p. 79, (p. 93, E. 94, A.) ἔχοντες ὅφ' ἡμῶν, ἵδμε ὕδατος ἐνὶ καὶ τρεῖς ἀναγεννήσεις, ἐν καὶ ἡμῶς αὐτοὶ ἀναγεννηθῆμεν ἀναγεννώμεναι.—“They are led by us to a place where water is, after the manner of the regeneration by which we have been regenerated they are regenerated.” When compared with these passages, Tzschirner's mistake is surprising (*Fall des Heidenthums*, I. 260, Anm. 1.) “The view of baptism, that it not merely marks the solemn transition to Christianity, but also blots out past sins and imparts new powers for good, is not found in Justin, though it is in the earlier and later Fathers.”

² *Dial. c. Tr. c.* 43, p. 139, (p. 261, C.) ἡμῖς διὰ τοῦ βαπτίσματος αὐτὴν (πνευματικὴν περιτομήν) ἱσαδὴ ἁμαρτωλοὶ ἱερογυμνίμ, διὰ τὸ ἴλιος τὸ παρὰ τοῦ Θεοῦ ἱλάσμεν καὶ πᾶσιν ἰφίτον ἰμοίς λαμβάνειν.—“And we, through baptism, receive it (spiritual circumcision)—since we were sinners, through the mercy that comes from God,—and all are allowed to receive it alike.”

³ *Apol.* 1, 61, p. 79, (p. 93, D.) ἐν τρεῖς ἀνιδήκαμεν ἑαυτοὺς τῷ Θεῷ, καινοποιήσιντες διὰ τοῦ Χριστοῦ, ἱεργισόμεθα.—In what manner we dedicate ourselves to God, being new made by Christ, we will explain.

⁴ *Apol.* 1, 61, p. 80, (p. 94, C.) ὅπως μὴ ἀνάγκης εἶναι μηδὲ ἀγνοίας μινωμεν, ἀλλὰ περιεργίας καὶ ἐπιστήμης, ἁφίσαις τε ἁμαρτιῶν. ὅπως ἂν προημάρεται τύχοντες ἐν τῷ ὕδατι ἱστομαζέται τῷ ἱλαμιν ἀναγεννηθῆναι καὶ μετανοήσαντι ἰπὶ τοῖς ἁμαρτημένοις τὸ τοῦ πατρὸς τῶν ὄλων καὶ δικτύου Θεοῦ ὄνομα.—“That we may not remain children of necessity and ignorance, but of choice and knowledge, and may obtain, in water, remission of sins, which we have before committed; on him who chooses to be regenerated, and has repented of his sins, ‘the name of the Father of all, and Lord God,’ is named.”

is purified from all his sins, even the most grievous. But Justin allows baptism to possess a sin-remitting power only in reference to sins that have preceded it.¹ Such a twofold, in part sin-remitting, and in part sin-destroying power of baptism, Justin viewed, indeed, as objective, but by no means elevated this objectivity to a magical, and, so to speak, mechanical irresistibility.² The faith and repentance of the person to be baptized were, in his view, essential conditions of the perception of the baptismal blessing; not as if he looked on that faith and that repentance as peculiarly the co-efficients of this blessing; he only required them as the subjective preparations by which the baptized was rendered capable of the baptismal consecration.³ "As many," he says, "as are persuaded and believe that our doctrines are true, and promise that they can live accordingly, are taught to pray, and, while fasting, to ask from God forgiveness of past sins; and we pray and fast with them."⁴ Farther on he declares, "It is also told by Isaiah the prophet, by what means they will escape from their sins who have sinned and repented." He expresses himself still more plainly in the Dialogue,⁵—"Those who, by water and faith, and the cross, are prepared, and repent of the sins they have committed, will escape the coming judgment of God." That baptism was followed by these wonderful results,—that it effected forgiveness of sins, and freedom from sin, Justin does not infer, as a passage already quoted in the larger Apology might seem to intimate,⁶ from any mysterious magic in the baptismal

¹ *Apol.* 1, 61, p. 80, (p. 94, A.)—*Dial. c. Tr. c.* 86, p. 184, (p. 314, A.)

² *Apol.* 1, 61, p. 79, (p. 93, E.) τῶν προσημαρτημένων ἁφίσις.—1, 61, p. 80, (p. 94, C.) ἁφίσις ἁμαρτιῶν ὑπὲρ ὧν προσημαρτήσαν.

³ *Apol.* 1, 61, p. 79, (p. 93, E.) compare 1, 65, p. 82, p. 97, B.

⁴ *Apol.* 1, 61, p. 80, (p. 94, A.)

⁵ *Dial. c. Tr. c.* 138, p. 229, (p. 368, A.) δι' ὕδατος καὶ πίστεως καὶ ἔργου οἱ προσημαρτυρούμενοι καὶ μετανοούντες ἐφ' οἷς ἁμαρτιὰν ἐκφυύουσιν τὴν μίλλουσαν ἐπαρχεισθαι τῷ Θεῷ κρίν.ν.

⁶ *Apol.* 1, 61, p. 80, (p. 94, C.) Nielsen de vi et effectibus baptismo ab ecclesiæ patribus tributis, p. 29.

formula, but, in part, he pre-supposes (as Hermas¹ before him, and after him the Clementine Eclogae,² Tertullian,³ Cyprian,⁴ and Cyril of Jerusalem,)⁵ a connection of the Divine Spirit with water baptism; and, in part, like Ignatius,⁶ Tertullian,⁷ and Gregory Nyssen,⁸ he considers baptism as the instrumental act by which the merits of the death of Jesus are appropriated by believers. The former reason is indicated in the designation which Justin frequently applies to Christians,⁹ "baptized with the Holy Spirit:" the latter is apparent from the repeated connection in which he places baptism with the death of Jesus.¹⁰ It serves to confirm the latter point, that the sin-remitting power of the death of Jesus, and of baptism, is equally confined to sins committed before the conversion of the baptized to Christianity.

Whenever Justin refers to baptism, *adults* appear as the objects to whom the sacred rite is administered. Of an *infant-baptism* he knows nothing. The traces of it, which some persons believe they have detected in his writings,¹¹ are groundless fancies, artificially produced.¹² In the words πολλοί τινες καὶ πολλαί, ἐξηγον-

¹ *Past.* 1, 3, 3, T. I. p. 79.

² *Eclog. ex Script. prophet.* c. 7, T. IV. p. 33.

³ *De baptism.* c. 4, T. IV. p. 161, Omnes aquæ de pristina originis prærogativa (Gen. i. 2,) sacramentum sanctificationis consequuntur, invocato deo. Supervenit enim statim spiritus de cœlis et aquis superest, sanctificans eas de semetipso, et ita sanctificatæ vim sanctificandi combibunt.

⁴ *Epistol.* 74, 5, T. I. p. 225.

⁵ *Cateches.* 3, 3, p. 40, (ed. Paris 1720)

⁶ *ad Ephes.* c. 18, T. II. p. 16.

⁷ *De baptism.* c. 11, T. IV. p. 169.

⁸ *Catech. orat.* c. 33; *Opera. Par.* 1615, T. II. p. 528.

⁹ *Dial. c. Tr.* c. 29, p. 127, (p. 246, C.)

¹⁰ *Dial. c. Tr.* c. 86, p. 184, (p. 314, A.)—c. 138, p. 229, (p. 367, D. 368, A.)

¹¹ See Walch, *Historia Pædobaptismi quatuor priorum seculorum.* Miscell. sacr. p. 496.

¹² Compare what is said on this head by Pertsch, (*Versuch einer Kirchenhistorie*, II. 225,) Rössler, (*Lehrbegriff der Christ. Kirche*, 208,) Münter, (*Handbuch der ältesten Christl.*

τοῦται καὶ ἐβδομηκοντούται, οἱ ἐκ παίδων ἐμαθητεύθησαν τῷ Χριστῷ ἄφθοροι διαμένουσι. *Apol.* 1, 15, p. 52, (p. 62, B.).—"Many men and many women, sixty and seventy years old, who, from children, have been disciples of Christ, preserve their continence."—Nothing more is said, than that many individuals of both sexes became disciples of Christ in early life. The idea of μαθητεύεσθαι does not necessarily include that of being baptized;¹ it merely brings before our minds a catechumenate. And even admitting that the baptismal rite was included in μαθητεύεσθαι, this by no means is decisive of a reference to infant-baptism. Ἐκ παίδων contrasted with ἐξηκοντούται and ἐβδομηκοντούται, may well denote the entrance on the period of youth.² When, moreover, Justin compares Christian baptism with Jewish circumcision, and then asserts that *all* may obtain the spiritual circumcision which Christians receive in baptism, he by no means extends that comparison to the *time* of the reception of circumcision and baptism;³ and by the term *all*, he refers merely to the yet unbaptized adults, both Jews and heathens, and not likewise to children.⁴

Nor can traces of *Ebionitism*, any more than of infant-baptism, be found in Justin's doctrine on this subject. There are indeed some points of similarity between them. Like Justin, the Ebionites thought that baptism was indispensably necessary for salvation,⁵ and grounded this necessity on Christ's language in John iii. 5;⁶ like him, they also considered an invocation of the triune

Dogmengeschichte, II. 2, 16,) Matthies, (*Baptismatis Expositio*, p. 187,) and Nielsen, (*de vi et Effectibus Baptismo*, &c. p. 30.)

¹ Suiceri *Thes. Eccles.* II. 286.

² See Starck, *Geschichte der Christ. Kirche des ersten Jahrhunderts*, III. 189, who not unsuitably quotes, as a parallel, Lucian's language about the philosopher Demonax, "that he loved philosophy, ἐκ παίδων."

³ *Dial. c. Tr.* c. 43, p. 139, (p. 261, C.)

⁴ As Credner (*Beiträge zur Einleitung*, &c. I. 98, 301,) and Otto (*de Justin. Mart. scriptis et doctrina*, p. 176, not. 52,) are disposed to think.

⁵ *Clem. Homil.* 13, 21, T. I. p. 716. *Recognit.* 1, 55, p. 501.

⁶ *Hom.* 11, 26, p. 698. *Recogn.* 1, 69, p. 503, 6, 9, p. 551.

God as essential to the sacred rite, and include among its (objective) effects, the forgiveness of sins,¹ especially those sins which had preceded the reception of baptism,² and regeneration,³ or purification from sin.⁴ But these are points which many, if not all the Catholics, held in common with the Ebionites. The indispensableness of baptism to eternal salvation was the universal conviction of the Church; all the Church-teachers require the invocation of the triune-God at the performance of this rite; they all speak of the forgiveness and removal of sin as its immediate effect. Some, at least, like Tertullian,⁵ infer the necessity of the sacred rite from John iii. 5; not a few, as Irenæus,⁶ and Origen,⁷ expressly call the moral transformation effected by baptism regeneration; many, as Clement,⁸ Origen,⁹ Tertullian,¹⁰ and Cyprian,¹¹ without disguise, limit the sin-remitting efficacy of baptism to sins committed before its administration. These coincidences cannot, then, be taken to indicate a leaning or an apostasy to Ebionitism; they are in part (as to their basis) purely biblical representations, impregnated, besides, with some elements of Jewish theology.¹² And it must not be overlooked that Justin

¹ *Hom.* 7, 8, p. 673, 9, 23, p. 685 — *recogn.* 1, 39, p. 496. 4, 32, p. 541.

² *Hom.* 8, 22, p. 679. 11, 24, 27, p. 698. — *recogn.* 3, 67, p. 531. 6, 9, p. 551.

³ *Hom.* 7, 8, p. 673. 11, 24, 26, p. 698. — *recogn.* 6, 8, p. 551, 9, 7, p. 674.

⁴ *Homil.* 8, 23, p. 679.

⁵ *De baptism.* c. 12, T. iv. p. 169, 172. — *de anim.* c. 39, p. 257.

⁶ *Adv. hæres.* 1, 18, p. 93, 3, 19, p. 208.

⁷ *Comment. in Matth.* 15, 23, T. iii. p. 686.

⁸ *Strom.* 2, 13, 58, T. ii. p. 159. 4, 24, 156, p. 363.

⁹ *In Jud. Homil.* 7, 2, T. ii. p. 473. — *Select. in Jerem.* 3, 7, T. iii. p. 288. — *in Matth. comment. ser.* c. 86, p. 899.

¹⁰ *De baptism.* c. 8, T. iv. p. 165. c. 15, p. 173. — *de predicet.* c. 16, p. 534.

¹¹ *De grat. dei.* c. 4, T. ii. p. 2. — *de oper. et eleemos.* c. 1, sq. p. 225, sqq.

¹² *Clem. homil.* 9, 19, T. i. p. 684. — *recognit.* 2, 71, p. 518.

had nothing of that which is peculiar to Ebionitism in the doctrine of baptism. He knew nothing of the power of baptism to expel dæmons, and to impart this power to the baptised. He does not place the necessity of baptism of prime importance, like the Clementines and Recognitions, where we often meet with such language as the following: "Think not that even if you are more pious than all the pious that ever existed,—but are unbaptised, that you can indulge hope (of eternal life)."¹ He did not approve of that rigid, magical objectivity with which the Ebionites regarded the efficiency of baptism; he required a believing penitent disposition on the part of the baptised as a basis for that efficiency.²

II. THE HOLY SUPPER.

In the ancient Church the Holy Supper was regarded more in a practical than a speculative light; it was not the Shibboleth of a party, but a leaven of brotherhood: instead of disputing about its meaning, they laid their hearts open to its power. Differences of opinion, respecting what was mysterious in it, were peacefully admitted. Along with the view, which regarded the presence of the Lord in the Supper, as a concrete real connection of the Logos with the elements, that theory met with acceptance which did not recognize such a pregnant presence, but looked on the bread and wine merely as signs and symbols of the body and blood of Christ, although possessed of objec-

4, 32, 541. The same representation occurs in *Eclog. ex script. proph.* c. 7, T. iv. p. 33. Within the pale of the Catholic Church it is delivered by Cyprian (*epist. ad Magn.* 69, 15, T. i. p. 198,) and in the *Apostolic Constitutions*, 6, 27, T. i. p. 356.

¹ Homil. 11, 25, p. 698. μή ται νομίζεις, ὅτι, ἰὰν πάντων τῶν ποτε γινομένων εὐσεβῶν εὐσεβέστερος γίνῃ, ἀβάπτιστος δὲ ᾖ, ἰλαπιδεσυχμαίνῃ δυνήσῃ ποτὶ — Similar statements are made in *Homil.* 11, 26, sq. p. 698. — *recognit.* 6, 8, sq. p. 551.

² *Homil.* 9, 19, p. 684. 11, 27, p. 698. 13, 21, p. 716.

tive value, of supernatural consecration and sanctification. Even the Alexandrians gave no offence, when they denied to the elements almost entirely an objective value for the inward life of believers, made the salutary effects of the Supper depend exclusively on the subjectivity of the communicants, and acknowledged the bread and wine only in a purely spiritual sense as the body and blood of Christ. While, as we have said, Christians attached less weight to the theory of the Supper, they resigned themselves more unreservedly to its operation. In their social relation to the church, as well as in their personal experience, they felt elevated and strengthened. They derived from it forgiveness of sins as well as power of amendment; their faith was strengthened; their views of divine truth were expanded and purified. But they were not satisfied merely with receiving at the Supper; they felt a duty to give something. The elements were furnished by free-will offerings, which believers presented at the meetings of the brethren, and placed at the disposal of the president; so that this sacred rite became a kind of offering of piety and brotherly love. Every celebration of the Supper was preceded and accompanied by a prayer of praise and thanksgiving for all blessings granted, both bodily and spiritual, especially for the blessing of redemption; so that, at first, this holy solemnity was held under the idea of a sacrifice of peace and thanksgiving. Thus the general notion of the Supper was formed as a sacrifice, which became gradually more and more restricted to the sacrifice of Christ, and under the operation of manifold circumstances, at length became so perverted from its original character as to end in the Catholic sacrifice of the mass.

Justin attaches to the doctrine of the Eucharist, both in an archæological and dogmatic point of view, a peculiar importance, of which he never lost sight. He gives a more exact description of the mode of its celebration than any of the Fathers, either before or after him, and presents the idea of it at once with

doctrinal distinctness. With this doctrinal conception alone we have to do at present. It has, confessedly, been an apple of discord for the whole church, partly because it has been the practice to consider it less as the private property of a single teacher, than as the conviction of the whole Romish Church, whose representative, in this point particularly, Justin has been supposed to be. Thus, the Catholic Church has produced it as the first witness for its dogma of transubstantiation; the Lutheran, as the most ancient surety for the real substantial presence of Christ in the Supper; the Reformed as the earliest vindication of the pure symbolic meaning of the elements. On the part of the Catholics this has been done by *Bellarmino*,¹ *Halloix*,² *Natalis Alexander*,³ *Nourry*,⁴ *Prudentius Maranus*,⁵ and *Döllinger*;⁶ "the acutest apologists of the Catholic doctrine, on the historical side." The Lutheran dogma of the Supper has been found in Justin, by *Bebel*,⁷ *Nifanius*,⁸ *Buddeus*,⁹ *Ernesti*,¹⁰ *Munter*,¹¹ and *Marheinecke*.¹² Lastly, the view taken

¹ *De controversiis Christ. fidei adversus hujus temporis hæreticos. Secundi Tomi tertia contrrov. general., de sacramento eucharist.* 2, 4, p. 144.

² *Vita et documenta Justinii*, p. 92, sqq.

³ *Histor. eccles. V. N. Ti. Dissert.* 12, in *secul.* 11, et 12, art. 6, T. VI. p. 904.

⁴ *Apparatus ad biblioth. maxim.* T. I. p. 408, sqq.

⁵ *Prolegomena*, p. xxxvii.

⁶ *Die Lehre von der Eucharistie in den drei ersten Jahrhunderten*, (Mainz. 1826.)

⁷ *Antiquit. eccles. in tribus prioribus p. n. Chr. seculis evang.* pp. 277, 283, 436.

⁸ *Justin. phil. et mart.* §c. 253.

⁹ *Miscell. sacra*, T. II. p. 73.

¹⁰ *Antimuratorijs. Opuscul. theol.* (Lips. 1773.) p. 31, 66, and *De præsentia corporis et sanguinis Jesu Christi in coena sacra. Opusc. theol.* p. 163.

¹¹ *Handbuch der ältesten Christ. Dogmengeschichten*, II. 2, 90, 119.

¹² *Sanctorum patrum de præsentia Christi in coena domini sententia triplex.* (Heidel. 1811,) p. 23. Neander (*Antignosticus Geist. der Tertullianus*, 524, and *Allgemeine Geschichte der Christ. Religion und Kirche*. I. 3, 722,) finds in Justin the

by the Reformed Church has been advocated by *Alber-
tinus*,¹ *Hospinian*,² *Basnage*,³ and *Grabe*.⁴ None of
the contending Churches deserve the prize; neither
the Catholic, nor the Lutheran, nor the Reformed doc-
trine of the Supper, finds a guarantee in Justin. But,
in the language of this Father, there is certainly some-
thing which each one of the Churches we have named
may, with some plausibility, claim for itself. The dis-
pute turns upon the following passage: Οὐ γὰρ ὡς
κοινὸν ἄρτον οὐδὲ κοινὸν πόμα ταῦτα λαμβάνο-
μεν, ἀλλ' ὃν τρόπον διὰ λόγου Θεοῦ σαρκοποιη-
θεὶς Ἰησοῦς Χριστὸς ὁ σωτὴρ ἡμῶν καὶ σάρκα
καὶ αἷμα ὑπὲρ σωτηρίας ἡμῶν ἔσχεν, οὕτως καὶ
τὴν δι' εὐχῆς λόγου τοῦ παρ' αὐτοῦ εὐχαρισ-
τηθεῖσαν τροφὴν ἐξ ἧς αἷμα καὶ σὰρκες
κατὰ μεταβολὴν τρέφονται ἡμῶν, ἐκείνου
τοῦ σαρκοποιηθέντος Ἰησοῦ καὶ σάρκα καὶ
αἷμα ἐδιδάχθημεν εἶναι. Οἱ γὰρ ἀπόστολοι ἐν
τοῖς γενομένοις ὑπ' αὐτῶν ἀπομνημονεύμασιν, ἃ καλεῖται
εὐαγγέλια, οὕτως παρέδωκαν ἐντετάλλαι αὐτοῖς τὸν Ἰησοῦν
λαβόντα ἄρτον, εὐχαριστήσαντα εἰπεῖν τοῦτο ποιεῖτε εἰς
τὴν ἀνάμνησίν μου, τουτέστι τὸ σῶμά μου καὶ τὸ ποτήριον
ὁμοίως λαβόντα καὶ εὐχαριστήσαντα εἰπεῖν. τοῦτό ἐστι αἷμά
μου, καὶ μόνοις αὐτοῖς μεταδοῦναι. *Apol. I. 66, p. 83,
(p. 98, A. B.)* “*For we do not receive these as common
bread nor common drink, but even as Jesus Christ, being
made flesh by the Word (Logos) of God, had flesh and
blood for our salvation; thus also we have been taught
that the food for which thanks have been given by the
prayer of the Word that is from him, by which our flesh*

representation of a connection and penetration of the substance
of the body and blood of Christ with the substance of the
bread and wine, though not decidedly in the Lutheran sense.

¹ *De eucharistiae sacramento* (Daventr. 1654,) p. 288, sqq.
p. 291, sqq.

² *Histor. sacrament.* Genev. 1681, 2, 6, T. I. p. 121, 5, 12,
p. 433.

³ *Histoire de l'église*, xiii. 2, 5, T. II. p. 792; xiii. 4, p.
797.

⁴ In his edition of the Larger Apology, 126.

and blood are nourished, by a transmutation, is the flesh and blood of the incarnate Jesus. For the apostles, in the Commentaries composed by them, which are called Gospels, have handed down that Jesus thus commanded them ; that taking bread, and having given thanks, he said, ‘ Do this in remembrance of me, this is my body ;’ and likewise taking the cup, and giving thanks, he said, ‘ This is my blood,’ and delivered it to them alone.”—The *Reformed Church* has the least reason for appealing to these words of Justin in defence of their exposition of the Supper. For not only a mere symbolic relation of the elements to the body and blood of Christ is never mentioned in them, but exactly the opposite is clearly expressed in the assertion, that the bread and wine of the Supper are not common bread and common wine, but the body and blood of Christ. The parallel which Justin draws between the incarnation of Jesus and the celebration of the Supper, makes it simply necessary, since the corporeity of the incarnate Redeemer was real, to take the bread and wine in a real sense for Christ’s body and blood. With greater right the *Lutheran* dogma may seek support from Justin. For unquestionably this maintains a real presence of Christ in the Supper ; and the parallel drawn between the Incarnation and the Supper, presupposes the connection of the two (the divine and the elementary) substances in the Supper. As in the person of Christ the divine and human natures were hypostatically united, so the advocates of the *Lutheran* view maintain not without plausibility, Justin means to say, the body and flesh of Jesus are unitedly connected in the Supper with the bread and wine. But this argumentation, however plausible, condemns itself, since it introduces surreptitiously the sacramental connection of the flesh and blood of Christ, which is the principal point in question. Of such a connection Justin knows nothing ; he puts in contrast the words *διὰ λόγου Θεοῦ σαρκοποιηθεὶς* and *δι’ εὐχῆς λόγου τοῦ πατρὸς αὐτοῦ* as corresponding members of the chosen equation, and moreover asserts distinctly that the bread and wine

are the very flesh and blood of Christ. The *Catholic* church has gladly seized with confidence on this last assertion, in order to point out Justin's acquaintance with its dogma of transubstantiation. If we grant that these expressions point to the real presence of the corporeal Christ in the Supper, in the sense of transubstantiation, as far as it is certain that their author was acquainted with the doctrine just named, yet we must designate it a gross *petitio principii*, if that meaning be given to it without this acquaintance being proved. Of this *petitio principii* the Catholic interpreters have been guilty; they allege that Justin, in the words "the consecrated food is the body and blood of Christ," has expressed their doctrine of transubstantiation, and yet they cannot show that Justin knew anything of a conversion of the elements into the flesh and blood of Christ, or even of the identity of the body present in the Supper, (*Identität des Abendmahlsleibes*) with the body of Jesus which was born of the Virgin Mary, crucified and carried up to heaven. Here their triumph ceases. If the older Catholic theologians believed that this transformation was marked by the words *κατὰ μεταβολήν*, yet a modern Catholic writer, Döllinger, has confessed that this meaning is impossible, or, as he says, forced; but he himself can substitute nothing better in its place. Hence it is clear that the Catholic dogma of the Supper has no real support in Justin, and the field is now open for proceeding to enquire what were Justin's real convictions respecting the nature of the Supper. They were, we conceive, the following: Justin regarded the Supper as a kind of repeated incarnation. As the incarnation was accomplished when the Divine Logos assumed flesh and blood, so he believes the presence of Christ in the Supper is effected when the Divine Logos enters into connection with the bread and wine as his flesh and blood. The bread and wine undergo no alteration in their physical properties, yet they do not continue to be *common* bread and *common* wine; they become, after the prayer of con-

secration, the vehicle as it were, in which the Divine Logos dwells; they are actually, though in a sense only figuratively, the body and blood of the Logos. "By Justin the εὐχὴ λόγος, i. e. the εὐχὴ as λόγος, is considered parallel, or more properly identified with the λόγος θεός. The Logos is in both cases the mediating principle (*das Vermittelnde*) for the flesh and blood of Christ; by means of the Word in the consecration of the elements, the bread and wine become the flesh and blood of Christ. But as the σαρκοποιηθῆναι διὰ λόγου is properly the incarnation of the Logos himself, so also the Logos in the Supper becomes flesh in the form of the prayer uttered over the bread and wine, since the blood and wine became his flesh and blood."¹ Justin accordingly adopted the same view which was given at a later period by Irenæus,² and more fully developed by Gregory of Nyssa;³ and the influence of which was felt even down to the eighth century by means of John of Damascus.⁴

The design and operation of the Eucharist is, according to Justin, threefold. The sacred rite is a sign of the covenant to the Church, the means of promoting brotherly unity and fellowship.⁵ No one could participate in it except a Christian; it was celebrated by the whole church, and those who were absent were enabled to partake of it by a por-

¹ Baur, *die Hauptmomente der Geschichte der Lehre vom Abendmahl*, Tübinger, *Zeitschrift f. Theologie*, 1839, ii. 96. See also Meier, *Versuch einer Geschichte der Transsubstantiationslehre* (Herlbronn, 1832.) It is, therefore, by no means uncertain in what sense Justin held the bread and wine to be the body and blood of Christ, as Cramer (*Fortsetzung zu Bossuet's Einleitung in die Geschichte der Welt und Religion*, v. 1, 157,) Starck, (*freimüthige Betrachtungen über das Christenthum*, 322,) and Hagenbach (*Lehrb. d. Dogmengeschichte*, i. 227,) complain. Every thing depends on making the comparison between the Incarnation and the Supper with sufficient distinctness.

² *Adv. hæres.* 4, 34, p. 251. 5, 2, p. 294.

³ *Catechet. orat.* c. 37, T. ii. p. 536.

⁴ *Exposit. orthodox. fid.* 4, 13, T. i. p. 270.

⁵ *Apol.* 1, 66, p. 83, (p. 97, E. 98, A.)

tion being sent to them of the consecrated bread and wine.¹ Its farther design was to be a commemorative feast of the incarnation and redemptive death of Christ. With this the feeling of thankfulness was awakened and cherished for the creation of the world, which had taken place for man's sake ;— for freedom from sin which Jesus had effected ; and lastly, for the ruin of the dæmoniacal powers, which was founded in the sufferings of Christ.² The third effect of the Eucharist is of a purely objective nature. When believers enjoyed the consecrated elements, when the Eucharistic body and Eucharistic blood of Christ was converted into the flesh and blood of the communicants, their sensuous nature experienced a change ; their bodies became prepared for the future resurrection and incorruptibility. This view of the Supper, which was known to Ignatius of Antioch,³ and which Irenæus⁴ and Gregory of Nyssa⁵ have explicitly given, forms the groundwork of Justin's expressions, which have already been quoted: τὴν δι' εὐχῆς λόγου τοῦ παρ' αὐτοῦ εὐχαριστηθεῖσαν τροφήν, ἐξ ἧς αἷμα καὶ σάρκες κατὰ μεταβολὴν τρέφονται ἡμῶν.—“The food for which thanks have been given by the prayer of the Word that is from himself, by which our blood and flesh are nourished by a transmutation.” In these words the nourishing of the flesh and blood of believers is unequivocally represented as a fruit of the participation of the Supper, and the object and advantage of this nourishing can be gathered from the

¹ *Apol.* 1, 66, p. 83, (p. 97, E.) 1, 67, p. 83, (p. 98, E.)

² *Dial.* c. Tr. c. 41, p. 137, (p. 259, D. 260, A.) c. 70, p. 168, (p. 296, D. 297, A.)

³ *Epist. ad Ephes.* c. 20, T. ii. p. 54, ἵνα ἄρτον πλῶντες. ὃ ἐστὶ φάρμακον ἁθανασίας, ἀντιδοτὸς τοῦ μὴ ἀποθανεῖν, ἀλλὰ ζῆν ἐν Θεῷ διὰ Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ.

⁴ *Adv. hæres.* 4. 34, p. 251, ὡς ἀπὸ γῆς ἄρτος προλαμβάνομενος τὴν ἐπίκλησιν τοῦ Θεοῦ ἐκίει κοινὸς ἄρτος ἐστίν, ἀλλ' εὐχαριστία, ἐκ δὲ πρᾶγματων συνιστηνῶσα ἱερίῳ τι καὶ ἁγίῳ οὗτος καὶ τὰ σώματα ἡμῶν μεταλαμβάνοντα τῆς εὐχαριστίας, μεταίτι ἵνασι φθαρτά, τὴν ἐλπίδα τῆς εἰς αἰῶνα ἀναστάσεως ἔχοντα.

⁵ *Catech. orat.* c. 37, T. ii. p. 634, εἰς.

most distinct expressions of the other Fathers of the church. The only doubtful term is *κατὰ μεταβολήν*. Baumgarten-Crusius,¹ Ernesti,² Münscher,³ Münter and Strauss, refer it to the bread and wine; but while the four last understand it in the grossly material sense of *digestion*, the former suppose a transmutation of the earthly food, after the participation, into the heavenly body of Jesus; and then an assimilation of the bread and wine with our collective nature. Marheinecke⁴ and Döllinger connect the words *κατὰ μεταβολήν* with *αἷμα καὶ σάρκες ἡμῶν*, and believe that they serve to indicate the change of our nature, that is, the preparation of our body for the resurrection and immortality. The latter construction deserves the preference, partly on lingual grounds, and partly it is not pressed by the practical difficulties which are attached to the former. If we take *μεταβολήν* in the sense of digestion, the whole phrase *κατὰ μεταβολήν* seems superfluous, since that idea is included in the verb *τρεφίσθαι*. But if *μεταβολή* is understood of a conversion of the elements after participation, into the glorified body of Christ, a doubt arises whether it be admissible, on the ground of a single ambiguous expression of Justin's, to found so important a dogmatic representation, which meets with no support elsewhere.

Justin sometimes presents the sacred Supper under the idea of a sacrifice; and upon this the Catholic dogmatists have grounded the assumption, that the apologist was already acquainted with their doctrine of the sacrifice of the mass,—that he, like themselves,

¹ *Lehrbuch der christl. Dogmengeschichte*, II. 1217.

² *Lehrbuch d. christl. Dogmengeschichte*, II. 340.

³ *Die christl. Glaubenslehre*, II. 563.

⁴ Yet Marheinecke is not altogether satisfied with the above-mentioned application of *κατὰ μεταβολήν*. Walch's notion is very strange, (*historia transsubstan. pontificæ Miscell. sacr.* p. 209,) who would understand by *μεταβολή* the accidental alteration which he supposes the bread and wine to undergo, when, by the consecration, they enter into the (Lutheran) sacramental union with the flesh and blood of Christ.

believed and taught, that in the Eucharist was a repeated unbloody sacrifice of Christ. Though this assumption has been often enough, with more or less success, been shewn to be what it is, a mere party fiction,¹ yet we cannot hesitate, once more, to bring forward the evidence, and to present it with additional corroboration, of the point of view in which Justin contemplated the Eucharist as a sacrifice, since the apologists of the Catholic dogma have not ceased, even to this day, to look for the rudiments of their sacrificial theory in Justin. In doing this, we put out of sight the sense in which, according to our former representation, Justin believed in the real presence of Christ in the Supper; for the mere presence of the Logos cannot constitute the Supper a sacrifice, in the sense of the (Roman) Catholic Church. We would rather admit for the moment, the dogma of transubstantiation, and shew that, even admitting the correctness of the dogma, we should not be justified in representing Justin as the first abettor of the unscriptural notion of the sacrifice of the mass. We, moreover, voluntarily give up the advantage which is offered us, by the circumstance that Justin was absolutely and entirely ignorant of the idea of a priesthood separated from the mass of the believers, who mediated for believers with God; that he only knew of a pre-

¹ For example, by Hospinian, (*Histor. Sacrament.* 5, 13, T. I. p. 487, sq.) Nifanius, (*Justin. Phil. Christ. et Mart. etc.* p. 260,) Buddeus, (*de Origine missæ Pontif.* c. 12, sq. 15, in the *Miscell. Sacr.* T. I. p. 13, sq.) Pfaff, (*de Oblatione Eucharistiæ in primitiva Ecclesia usitata.* c. 27, in *Synagma Dissertatt. Theolog.* Stutt. 1720, p. 316, sqq.) and Deyling, (*Errorem Pontif. novitas circa Eucharist. in Observatt. Miscell.* Lips. 1736, T. IV. p. 309.) Hoffling has lately, in a very masterly manner, refuted that assumption, (*Die Lehre Justin's des Märt. vom Opfer im Christ. Kultus.* Erlangen. 1839,) a refutation to which we might content ourselves with referring our readers, if it were not contained in a publication so fugitive, and so easily overlooked as a Programm. See also, *Der Versuch einer Geschichte des Dogma von dem Opfer des Abendmahls* in the Göttingen Bibliothek der neuesten Theol. Literatur. II. 2, 165.

sident who conducted the devotions in their religious assemblies;¹—that, in reference to God, he regarded all Christians as one man, and represented them in their collective capacity as the genuine priestly order of God.² But we ask, where has Justin propounded the doctrine of the sacrifice of the mass? There are two passages in his writings where (if anywhere) we might expect to meet with it. First of all, at the close of his larger Apology, where he accurately and fully describes the celebration of the Christian Supper.³ This passage is, indeed, adduced by the Catholic historians of dogmatics, as containing the doctrine in question. But where is their warrant for so doing? Döllinger writes,⁴ “Justin represents, in the Dialogue, the bread and wine as the peculiar sacrifice for Christians; but what this bread and this wine might be, he has explained in his larger Apology, namely, the body and blood of the incarnate Jesus; consequently, the body and blood of Christ in the Eucharist, is the sacrifice of Christians which is presented to God.”—In this statement, the first thing that strikes us is, that a combination must be attempted in order to make so plain a passage as that in the Apology fit for the purpose required. Could Justin, in a passage where it is his avowed design to give an open unvarnished account of the Christian Eucharist, pass over a point which, in the dogma ascribed to him, forms a prime article, so hastily that he does not bestow a syllable upon it,—if it be supposed that

¹ *Apol.* 1, 65, p. 82, (p. 97, C.) ὁ προϊστάμενος τῶν ἀδελφῶν.—1, 67, p. 83, (p. 98, D.)

² *Dial. c. Tr.* c. 116, p. 209, (p. 344, B. C.) ἡμῶς οἱ δια τοῦ Ἰησοῦ ἐνὸματός ὡς ἡμεῖς ἄνθρωποι πιστεύοντες δις τὸν ποιητὴν τῶν ὅλων Θεόν, . . . ἀρχιερατικὸν τὸ ἀληθινὸν γίνεσθαι ἰσμεν τῷ Σαῦ.

³ *Apol.* 1, 66, p. 83, (p. 97, E.; 98, A. B.)

⁴ *Die Lehre von der Eucharistie*, 104. Prudentius Maranus had before drawn the same conclusion, (*Prolegomena*, 2, 10, p. xlii.) See also Möhler's *Patrologie*, I. 247.

he was acquainted with that dogma? In that passage, not a word is said about a sacrifice, but only of tasting and receiving. There is not the slightest intimation that the bread and wine were consecrated, in order that, after the consequent transformation, they might serve as the materials of an unbloody sacrifice; nothing more is said, than that the flesh and blood of the communicants were nourished by the consecrated bread and wine! What sort of man must Justin have been, if he regarded the sacrifice of the sacramentally formed body and blood of Christ as the culminating point of the Eucharist, and, nevertheless, in a detailed representation of the sacred rite, never gave the slightest hint respecting such a sacrifice? And as to the combination we alluded to, the conclusion which it forms is a fallacy. It depends on confounding the bread as *ἄρτος τῆς εὐχαριστίας* and the wine as *ποτήριον τῆς εὐχαριστίας*, with the bread and wine as consecrated sacramental nourishment. It extends, in an unauthorised manner, over the moment of consecration, what was only true before it. Justin makes the act of sacrifice last only till the consecrating prayer is uttered over the bread and wine; he makes it terminate as soon as the bread and wine become the flesh and blood of the Logos. The elements of the Supper are, in his esteem, a sacrifice before the consequent consecration, on account of their presentation; the reason of giving them this appellation ceases after their consecration, from that instant they are a gift of God to the communicants. "What the assembled believers (*der Gemeinde*) present to God at the ordinance of the Supper, must not be mixed and confounded with what they receive from him, although the material substratum for both acts is one and the same. These earthly and visible substances, which, as the *ἄρτος* and *ποτήριον τῆς εὐχαριστίας*, serve as the material substratum, as the means of embodying and representing to the senses, the thank-offerings of the believers become as the *προφη εὐχαριστηθεῖσα* of God,

vehicle "to implant in the human body the germ of immortality."¹

A second passage in which the unbloody sacrifice of Christ must be mentioned, if Justin knew anything of it, is in the Dialogue. Justin there contrasts Christian sacrifices with the sacrifices of the Jews, and maintains that God preferred the former to the latter; and gives the reason, (with a reference to Malachi i. 10,) why God prefers the sacrifices of Christians to those of the Jews.² Unquestionably this would be

¹ Hofling, in the work already referred to, p. 5. The same writer admirably remarks: "When the church receive the body and blood of Christ, presented in the Eucharist, for their participation, it by no means follows that it has been given and presented by their God himself. Believers can present nothing to God but praise, thanksgiving, confession, and petition; their sacrificial act consists in *εὐχαριστῆν*, of which the bread and wine are the material substratum. Inasmuch as the sacrificial act of the church becomes completed in these substances, they are the *ἄρτος τῆς εὐχαριστίας* and *ποτήριον τῆς εὐχαριστίας*; but, inasmuch as it is already completed, they are the *τροφή εὐχαριστηθεῖσα*, and, as such, consequently Christ's body and blood for the purpose of "*διαδοσις* and *μεταληψις*." What the bread and wine are, in consequence of the sacrificial act of the church, that they are not already in this act and for themselves: The peculiarity which belongs to them as *τροφή εὐχαριστηθεῖσα*, belongs to them not absolutely and apart from the sacramental use of *τερίφισθαι*.

² *Dial. c. Tr. c.* 28, p. 126, (p. 246, A—C.) *Κἄν Σκύθης ἢ τις ἢ Πέρσης, ἔχει δὲ τὴν τῷ Θεῷ γνώσιν καὶ τῷ Χριστῷ αὐτῷ καὶ Φυλάσσει τὰ αἰώνια δίκαια, περιτέμνηται τὴν καλὴν καὶ ἀφίλιμον περιτομὴν καὶ φίλος ἐστὶ τῷ Θεῷ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῖς δώροις αὐτῷ καὶ ταῖς προσφοραῖς χαίρει. Παρίξω δὲ ὑμῖν, ἄνδρες φίλοι, καὶ αὐτῷ ῥήματα τῷ Θεῷ, ὅπου τὸν λαὸν ἔπει διὰ Μαλαχίῃ, ἰδοὺ τῶν δώδεκα προφητῶν (Mal. i. 10,) "Ἐστὶ δὲ ταῦτα· οὐκ ἔστι δίλημά μου ἐν ὑμῖν, λίγαι κούριοι, καὶ τὰς θυσίας ὑμῶν οὐ προσδίχαμαι ἐκ τῶν χειρῶν ὑμῶν· διότι ἀπὸ ἀνατολῆς ἤλιον ἔως δυσμῶν τὸ θυμὸς μου διδέξασθαι ἐν τοῖς ἱεροῖς, λίγαι κούριοι, ὑμεῖς δὲ βιβηλοῦτε αὐτο, . . . Δοξάσωμεν τὸν Θεὸν ἅμα σὰ Ἰσθν συνελθόντα, ὅτι καὶ ἡμεῖς ἱεροποιῶμεν. Δοξάσωμεν αὐτὸν διὰ τοῦ βασιλείου τῆς δόξης, διὰ τοῦ κυρίου τῶν δυνάμεων. Εὐδόκησε γὰρ καὶ εἰς τὰ ἱθνη καὶ τὰς θυσίας ἡδίων παρ' ἡμῶν ἢ παρ' ὑμῶν λαμβάνει.*—"For though a man were a Scythian or a Persian, if he has the knowledge of God and of his Christ, and observe the eternal laws of justice, he is circumcised with an honourable and

the right place for mentioning the unbloody sacrifice of Christ, as the contrast to the bloody animal sacrifices of the Jews; for by nothing else could the pre-eminence of the Christian over the Jewish presentations be proved, but in the purity and excellence of the objects presented being beyond all comparison greater. Yet Justin neglects wholly and entirely this method of proof: he takes the disposition of the offerers as the only point of distinction. To the Christians (he says), God is friendly, and has pleasure in their gifts and offerings, because they acknowledge him and his Christ, and do what is eternally right, and make his name glorious among the Gentiles. On the contrary, he rejects the sacrifices of the Jews, because they profane his name. Is it conceivable that Justin could know anything of the sacrifice of the mass in the Eucharist, and be altogether silent upon it in such a connection?

But if Justin on no occasion shows himself acquainted with a repeated sacrifice of the crucified Christ in the Supper, and yet connects with this Sacrament, the idea of sacrifice, *in what sense did the Eucharist appear to him a sacrifice?* An answer to this question is contained in a passage of the Apology, which, though it stands in no immediate connection with the Supper, points out, as from a distance, in what respect Justin considered the Eucharist a sacrificial act. It is as follows: ἄλλοι ὡς οὐκ ἐσμέν, τὸν δημιουργὸν, τοῦδε τοῦ παντὸς σεβόμενοι ἀνευδεῖαι αἱμάτων καὶ σπονδῶν καὶ θυ-

useful circumcision, and is dear to God, and pleases him with his gifts and offerings. I will set before you, my friends, the words of God himself, when he spoke to the people by Malachi, one of the twelve prophets: they are these. 'My will is not in you, saith the Lord, and your sacrifices I will not accept at your hands: wherefore, from the rising of the sun unto the west, my name shall be glorified among the Gentiles, saith the Lord, but you have profaned it.' We will glorify God with the assembled nations, because he hath looked upon us. For he is well pleased with the nations, and he receives sacrifices with more pleasure from us than from you."

μιαιμάτων, ὡς ἐδιδάχθημεν, λέγοντες, λόγῳ εὐχῆς καὶ εὐ-
 χαριστίας ἐφ' οἷς προσφερόμεθα πᾶσιν, ὅση δύναμις, αἰνοῦντες,
 μόνην ἀξίαν αὐτοῦ τιμὴν ταύτην παραλαβόντες, τὸ τὰ ὑπ'
 ἐκείνου εἰς διατροφὴν γενόμενα οὐ πυρὶ δαπανᾶν, ἀλλ' ἑαυ-
 τοῖς καὶ τοῖς δεομένοις προσφέρειν, ἐκείνῳ δὲ εὐχαρίστους ὄντας
 διὰ λόγου πομπᾶς καὶ ὕμνους πέμπειν, ὑπὲρ τε τοῦ γεγοί-
 ναι καὶ τῶν εἰς εὐρωστίαν πύρων πάντων, ποιότητων μὲν
 γενῶν καὶ μεταβολῶν ὡρῶν, καὶ τοῦ πάλιν ἐν ἀφθαρ-
 σίᾳ γενέσθαι διὰ πίστιν τὴν ἐν αὐτῷ αἰτήσεις πέμπον-
 τες, τις σωφρονῶν οὐχ ὁμολογήσει; Apol. 1, 13, p.
 50, (p. 60, C. D.)—"What considerate man will
 not acknowledge that we are not atheists—we who
 worship the Maker of this universe, who, as we
 have taught, requires not blood and libations and
 incense, to whom we use words of supplication and
 thanksgivings in all that we present, praising him to
 the utmost of our power, for we think that this
 honour alone is worthy of him, not to consume by fire
 what has been created by him for our nourishment, but
 to distribute them to ourselves and to those that need
 them, and, in gratitude to him, to offer solemn prayers
 and hymns by word of mouth; on account of our
 creation, and the supplies for our well-being, and the
 qualities of things, and the changes of the seasons, and
 for being made incorruptible, we offer up our petitions
 by the faith we have in him."—In these words Jus-
 tin describes and explains, for an apologetic purpose,
 the nature of the Christian Cultus; he makes it con-
 sist, generally, in a spirituality free from the material-
 ism of the heathen sacrifices—in the presentation to
 God of prayer and thanksgiving suitable to his
 peculiar character, and in beneficence towards our
 fellow men. While the heathen, such is his declara-
 tion, bring material offerings to their gods, Christians
 offer to their God, the Creator of the world, praise and
 thanksgiving; while the heathen consume by fire the
 natural productions intended for our sustenance, Chris-
 tians employ them for their own use, and for the relief
 of their brethren. Christians, whenever they partake
 of food, offer up prayer, in which they refer to their

own existence and health, their circumstances, and the gifts of nature, and, lastly, their future immortality. Justin consequently recognizes no other sacrifice than the sacrifice of prayer and beneficence; he considers it the only Cultus worthy of God, to approach the Creator in praise, prayer, and thanksgiving, and to take care of our needy brethren. If, in this connection, the two branches of Christian sacrifice, prayer and benevolence, stand out of all connection with the Supper; yet, at the close of the Apology, where Justin describes the celebration of that rite, they are placed in immediate connection with it. Justin thus expresses himself; "When bread and a cup of water and wine has been brought to the president, having taken them, he offers with a loud voice, praise and glory to the Father of all, through the name of the Son and the Holy Spirit, and offers up thanksgiving at length for the gifts received from him. When this prayer and thanksgiving are concluded, all the people express their concurrence by saying, Amen! . . . Those among us who are called deacons, distribute to each of the persons present a portion of the consecrated bread and wine and water, and carry it to those who are absent." Justin afterwards adds, (with a partial repetition,) "When we, (at our meetings on the Sunday,) have finished praying, bread and wine and water are brought, and the president offers up, with the utmost distinctness, prayer and thanksgiving, and the people exclaim, Amen! Then distribution is made, to each one present, of the elements thus consecrated, and they are sent to the absent by the deacons. The wealthy contribute each according to their choice, and the sum collected is placed in the hands of the president, and from this fund he relieves the widows and orphans, and those who are suffering from illness or from any other cause, besides those who are in bonds, and strangers, in short all who stand in need of assistance." No one can fail to observe the agreement (in part verbal) between this account and the passage

before quoted from the Apology. If now Justin in this passage, where he fully describes the celebration of the Supper, which he regards as a sacrifice—although he does not expressly mention the idea of sacrifice—very prominently exhibits the acts of prayer and benevolence connected with that celebration—acts which in a former passage he had represented as the specific mark of Christian worship—as the Christian sacrificial service in opposition to the sacrifices of the heathen ;—what conclusion can be more pressing than that he calls the Supper a sacrifice on account of the acts of prayer and benevolence connected with it? In truth, Justin calls the Eucharist a sacrifice, because a thanksgiving preceded and accompanied the consecration of the elements, and because these elements were taken from the oblations which the wealthier Christians brought to their assemblies in sympathising love for their poor brethren. With this conclusion drawn from the Apology, all the passages in the Dialogue agree, in which mention is made of the Supper as a sacrifice. The only peculiarity of these passages is, that the topic of benevolence is less prominent, and the thanksgiving is made to refer not principally to the gifts of nature, but contains a distinct reference to the death of Jesus and the blessings of redemption. We would direct the attention of our readers to the following passage :

ἡ τῆς σπεινιδάλειως προσφορά, ἡ ὑπὲρ τῶν καθαρικομένων ἀπὸ τῆς λέπρας προσφέρεσθαι παραδοδεῖσα, τόπος ἦν τοῦ ἄρτου τῆς εὐχαριστίας ὃν ἐς ἀνάμνησιν τοῦ πάθους, οὗ ἐπαθεν ὑπὲρ τῶν καθαιρομένων τὰς ψυχὰς ἀπὸ πάσης ποιηρίας ἀνθρώπων, Ἰησοῦς Χριστὸς ὁ κύριος ἡμῶν παρέδωκε ποιεῖν, ἵνα ἅμα τε εὐχαριστώμεν τῷ θεῷ ὑπὲρ τε τοῦ τὸν κόσμον ἐκτικέναι σὺν πᾶσι τοῖς ἐν αὐτῷ διὰ τὸν ἀνθρώπον καὶ ὑπὲρ τοῦ ἀπὸ τῆς κακίας, ἐν ᾗ γεγόναμεν, ἡλευθερωθέναι ἡμᾶς καὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς καὶ τὰς ἐξουσίας καταλελυθέναι τελείαν κατὰλυσιν διὰ τοῦ παθητοῦ γενομένου κατὰ τὴν βουλὴν αὐτοῦ Περὶ τῶν ἐν παντὶ τόπῳ ὑφ' ἡμῶν τῶν ἐθνῶν προσφερομένων αὐτῷ θυσιῶν, τουτέστι τοῦ ἄρτου τῆς εὐχαριστίας προλέγει τότε εἰπὼν (Mal. i. 10,) καὶ τὸ ὄνομα αὐτοῦ δοξάζειν ἡμᾶς, ὑμᾶς δὲ βεβηλοῦν.

Dial. c. Tr. c. 41, p. 137, (p. 259, D. 260, A. B.)—
 “And the offering of flour which was commanded to be presented for those who were cleansed of leprosy was a type of the bread of the Eucharist, which Jesus Christ, our Lord, commands to be observed in remembrance of the passion which he endured for those who are cleansed in their souls from all wickedness; that we may, at the same time, thank God for creating the world, with all things that are in it, on account of man, and for freeing us from the iniquity in which we were born, and for having overthrown, with an utter overthrow, the principalities and powers by him who was made possible according to his counsel.
 Concerning the sacrifices offered in every place by us Gentiles, that is, the bread of the Eucharist and the cup likewise of the Eucharist, he then predicts, saying that we glorify his name, but that you profane it.”—Justin, in this passage, indisputably applies the appellation of *sacrifice* to the ἄρτος τῆς εὐχαριστίας, and the ποτήριον τῆς εὐχαριστίας. To take these expressions in the sense of τροφή εὐχαριστηθεῖσα,—to find in them a designation of the body and blood of Christ, which had taken the place of the productions of nature, by means of the consecrating prayer,—is forbidden by the parallel of the sacrifice of the Supper with the Old Testament sacrifice of flour. But the elements of bread and wine can as little be regarded as the sacrifice presented to God, for Justin maintains that God does not require, nor receive from Christians, material offerings; the elements, therefore, can only be the outward vehicles, the material substratum for the actual sacrifice. As a sacrificial constituent of the Supper, nothing remains but the thanksgiving by which the sacramental consecration of the bread and wine is introduced and completed; the sacrifice of the Supper is one of thanksgiving. This view of the idea of a sacrifice is supported by the purpose for which the rite of the Supper was originally instituted. It was a commemorative rite, designed to remind believers of the redemptive sufferings of Christ, and thus

it gave an opportunity of thanking God for the creating of the world, for freedom from the pressure of sin, and for the subjugation of the dæmons. Can the idea of a sacrifice of thanks be expressed more distinctly? Even the relation in which the prophetic passage, Malachi i. 10, is placed to the sacrifice of the Supper, tends to shew that this was a sacrifice of thanksgiving. For how does Justin suppose that prophetic announcement to be fulfilled? By Christians bringing *δόξα* to God in the Eucharist.

On another occasion, Justin refers to the prophetic expression in Mal. i. 10, and thereby gives a fresh attestation, that he placed the sacrificial character of the Supper, not in the presentation of a sacramentally and repeatedly created corporeal Christ, but simply in the thanksgiving connected with the Eucharist. He says ; πάντας οἱ διὰ τοῦ ὀνόματος τούτου (προσφέροντες) θυσίας, ὡς παρέδωκεν Ἰησοῦς ὁ Χριστός γίνεσθαι, τουτέστιν ἐπὶ τῇ εὐχαριστίᾳ τοῦ ἄρτου καὶ τοῦ ποτηρίου, τὰς ἐν παντί τόπῳ τῆς γῆς γινομένας ὑπὸ τῶν Χριστιανῶν προλαβόντων ὁ Θεός, μαρτυρεῖ εὐαρίστους ὑπάρχειν αὐτῷ· τὰς δὲ ὑφ' ὑμῶν καὶ δι' ἐκείνων ὑμῶν τῶν ἱερέων γινομένας ἀπαναίνεται, λέγων, (Mal. i. 10.) *Dial. c. Tr. c. 117, p. 209, (p. 344, C.)*

"We present in this name all the sacrifices which Jesus Christ enjoined to be made, that is, at the Eucharist of the bread and of the cup, which are made by Christians in every part of the earth ; God anticipating them, testifies that they are acceptable to him ; but those made by you and by them your priests he rejects, saying," &c. According to this passage, Justin considers that the sacrifices which Christians, in all places, make, agreeably to the appointment of Jesus and this prophetic declaration, take place *ἐπὶ τῇ εὐχαριστίᾳ τοῦ ἄρτου καὶ τοῦ ποτηρίου*, "at the Eucharist of the bread and the cup." The sacrifices took place not *after* the consecration of the bread and wine by the thanksgiving, but contemporaneous with and in that act ; their material and object is the thanksgiving itself, which includes the consecration. What, then, can the sacrifice of the Supper be but one of

thanksgiving? But Justin does not stop here. For while applying the prophecy in Mal. i. 10, to the Christian sacrifices at the Supper, he recollects the Jewish exposition of this passage, according to which the rebuke of the prophet was directed, not against the sacrifices of the Jews in general, but merely against the material offerings of the Jews living at that time in Jerusalem, while, on the other hand, it assumed that the prayers of the Jews, scattered through different lands, which are termed tropical sacrifices, would be pure and acceptable offerings to God. Justin proceeds to refute this exposition, and begins with the following concession :—ὅτι μὲν οὖν καὶ εὐχαὶ καὶ εὐχαριστίαι, ὑπὸ τῶν ἀξίων γινόμεναι, τέλειαι μόναι καὶ εὐάρεστοί εἰσι τῷ Θεῷ θυσίαι, καὶ αὐτός φημι. Ταῦτα γὰρ μόναι καὶ Χριστιανοὶ παρέλαβον ποιεῖν, καὶ ἐπ' ἀναμνήσει τῆς τροφῆς αὐτῶν ξηρᾶς τε καὶ ὑγρᾶς, ἐν ᾗ καὶ τοῦ πάθους, ὃ πέπονθε δι' αὐτοὺς ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ Θεοῦ, μὲνῃνται. *Dial. c. Tr. c. 117, p. 210, (p. 345, A.)*—“That prayers and thanksgivings when made by the worthy, are the only sacrifices that are perfect and acceptable to God, I myself also say. For the Christians are commanded to make these alone even at the commemoration of their dry and moist food, in which, also, they remember the suffering which the Son of God suffered on their account.” This concession is beyond all contradiction the most decided attestation against the Catholic theory of the mass, and in favour of the idea of a sacrifice of thanksgiving. Justin concedes to his Jewish opponents, that prayers and thanksgivings presented by worthy persons, are the only sacrifices that are perfect and acceptable to God. He not merely puts this sentiment in a general form, but applies it most expressly to the Christian Eucharist. Christians he allows, are enjoined to bring such sacrifices only, among others, at the commemoration of the dry and moist nutriment, by which they are reminded of the sufferings which the Son of God endured on their behalf. In this delineation, it is impossible not to recognize the rite of the Supper. The whole an-

cient Church considered the elements of the Supper as representatives of dry and moist nutriment in general, and the gifts of nature were included, as Justin tells us, in the prayer offered up at the Supper. The blessings of redemption, in an equal degree, as we have described above, belonged to the contents of the thanksgiving at the Eucharist. Every other sacrifice besides that of prayer and thanksgiving, of which benevolence forms only the practical side, is, therefore, according to Justin's views, entirely excluded from the celebration of the Supper.

ARTICLE III.

THE SUBJECTIVE CONDITIONS OF THE APPROPRIATION OF SALVATION.

However decidedly the ancient Christians regarded salvation as something objectively based and given to man, they were at the utmost remove from excluding the free co-operation of the recipient, in order to its individual possession. Faith and repentance were universally considered as the indispensable and constantly necessary premises in order to enter into saving fellowship with the Redeemer, and to continue in it. If faith, in general, was valued only for the conviction of the truth of Christianity, for the knowledge and confession of Christianity as a divine doctrine and institution—while, on the other hand, the later protestant idea of saving faith was only occasionally brought within sight—it was never made so abstract as not to be kept before the mind—faith in the Redeemer, and a moral vital communion with him, were looked upon as ideas essentially connected. Repentance was considered, indeed, according to its true idea, as an internal process, as a spiritual renouncement of sin, yet it was seen with pleasure, and importance attached to it, when the inward conflict incorporated itself, as it were, in the outward signs of

repentance, and the adjuncts of penitence appeared outwardly, which, in later times, were so preponderant. The ancient Church justly regarded sanctification as the never-ending business of life, yet it considered sinlessness, after baptism, not as absolutely impossible, though, in practice, it could be attributed only to those who had received the bloody baptism of martyrdom. Since water baptism was, in general, acknowledged as having a retrospective power, so for the sins committed after baptism, personal means of reconciliation to God, of various kinds, were appointed, and the continued repetition and efficacy of these, to the end of life, was acknowledged. Only in reference to very heinous offences, the rule existed that for them a single repentance was admissible and efficacious. The relation of human self-activity to divine grace, in the process of sanctification, remained at first undetermined; only the Alexandrians, Clement and Origen, made an attempt to reduce it to a definite idea. But, generally, on this point, the difference was apparent, that the teachers of the Greek church, without denying the necessity and efficacy of the operations of divine grace, laid peculiar stress on the moral self-activity of man; while the Latins dwelt by preference on the necessity and influence of divine grace, without meaning to exclude the self-subsistent co-operation of man for salvation.

Justin adhered to the prevalent belief of the Church, in maintaining that faith, repentance, and sanctification were essential subjective requisites, without which an individual could have no part in the Christian salvation.¹ "If you repent of the sins you have committed," he exclaims to Trypho and his companions, "acknowledge Jesus as the Christ, and keep his commands, you will obtain forgiveness of sins."² By

¹ Heubner, *Hist. antiq. dogmatis de modo salutis tenendæ et justificationis seu veniæ peccatorum a deo impetrandæ instrumentis*, (Witten. 1805,) I. p. 18.

² *Dial. c. Tr. c. 95, p. 192, (p. 323, B.)* εἰ μετανοήσῃς καὶ τοὺς ἐντολὰς αὐτοῦ τηρήσῃς καὶ ἐννοήσῃς τὸν Χριστὸν καὶ φυλάξῃς.

faith, which he places at the head of the subjective conditions of salvation, he understands, in most cases, merely the sincere acknowledgment of Jesus as the Messiah and Son of God, and of Christianity as a divine doctrine and institution; as when he says, "Christ redeems those who do not cease to believe in him."¹ But yet he connects with these words a stricter idea, when he speaks of faith in the atoning death of Christ. "Whoever believes in the Crucified,"² he says, "attains thereby security from the bites of the serpent." And, in another passage:³ "Christians become purified no more by the blood of goats and of sheep, no more by the ashes of a heifer, or offering of flour, but through faith, by means of the blood and death of Christ, who died for that purpose." In reference to this faith Justin allows the existence of different degrees; and on this difference he makes the greater or less participation of the individual in the blessings of Christ's atoning death to depend. "According to the measure of their faith," he declares,⁴ "believers anoint themselves with the blood of Christ." Repentance is conceived by Justin in the original purity of its idea as a change of disposition; as in the assertion, "the goodness and philanthropy of God, and the immensity of his riches, embrace him who repents of his sins, as well as the righteous and the sinless." But yet he is in danger of substituting the outward for the

σοις αὐτοῦ τὰς ἰστολάς, ταῦτα φησιν, ἄφισι ὑμῖν τῶν ἁμαρτιῶν ὅτι ἴσται, προῦπον—c. 44, p. 140, (p. 263, B.)

¹ *Dial. c. Tr. c. 111, p. 204, (p. 338, B.)* See also c. 100, p. 196, (p. 327, D.)—c. 119, p. 212, (p. 347, C. D. 348, A.) and *Apol. 1, 19, p. 55, (p. 66, B.)*

² *Dial. c. Tr. c. 94, p. 191, (p. 322, A.)* compare c. 96, p. 192, (p. 323, C.) and c. 116, p. 209, (p. 343, D.)

³ *Dial. c. Tr. c. 13, p. 113, (p. 229, E.)* ἵπτι τοῖς μεταγιώσκουσιν καὶ μηκέτι αἵμασι τράγων καὶ προβάτων ἢ σποδῷ δαμάλιῳ ἢ σιμιδάλινῃ προσφοραῖς καθαρίζομένοις, ἀλλὰ πίστι διὰ τοῦ αἵματος τοῦ Χριστοῦ καὶ τοῦ θανάτου αὐτοῦ ὅς διὰ τῆτο ἀπὸ θανάτου.

⁴ *Dial. c. Tr. c. 40, p. 136, (p. 219, A.)* οὗ τῷ αἵματι κατὰ τὸν λόγον τῆς εἰς αὐτὸν πίστεως χρίσονται τοὺς οἴκους ἑαυτῶν, τουτίστιν ἑαυτούς, εἰ πιστεύουσιν εἰς αὐτόν.

inward, of overvaluing sensible signs at the expense of the spiritual contents. The internal conversion of the heart is, indeed, the principal thing with him, but yet he attaches an importance to tears and lamentations, the outward exponents of inward sorrow, which must necessarily tend to obscure the point of highest value. Thus he speaks of prayer, "who does not know that that prayer most of all conciliates God which is offered with lamentations and tears, with a prostrate body or with bended knees?"¹ In reference to repentance he says, "If they repent, all who wish may partake of the divine mercy, and the Scripture calls them blessed, for it says, "Blessed is the man to whom the Lord imputeth not iniquity,"²—that is, whoever, after repenting of his sins, receives forgiveness of God; but not as you deceitfully persuade yourselves and many others, who resemble you in this, who maintain that God imputes to them no sin, if they only know him."³ A proof of this we have in the fall of David, which was occasioned by his vain-glory. He first found forgiveness when he wept and lamented, as it stands written. But if forgiveness was not granted this man till after repentance,—if this great king and anointed person and prophet did not find grace till after he had wept and acted as is described,—how can the impure and abandoned hope that the Lord will not impute sin to them, when they have not wept, and smitten their breasts and repented?" Justin lays great stress on the character of the life after baptism: he decidedly connects the possession or the loss of Christian salvation, with the abiding

¹ *Dial. c. Tr. c. 47*, p. 143, (p. 267, A.)

² *Dial. c. Tr. c. 90*, p. 188, (p. 318 A.)

³ *Dial. c. Tr. c. 141*, p. 231, (p. 370, C. D.) The whole external penance of the later Church appears, in its principles and main outlines, in the Shepherd of Hermas, 3, 7, T. I. p. 108: *Namquid protinus putas aboleri delicta eorum, qui agunt pœnitentiam? Non proinde continuo; sed oportet eum qui agit pœnitentiam affligere animam suam et humilem animo se præstare in omni negotio et vexationes multas variasque perferre.*

purity or impurity of moral conduct. Not only does he represent it as the great problem of life for Christians to be free from sin,¹—not only does he state, in evident allusion to the practice of the Church in his own times,² “since we long for an everlasting and pure life, we seek for intercourse with God, the Father and Maker of all things, and hasten to confess ourselves Christians, since we are convinced and believe, that those persons will partake of this happiness, who, by their lives, have testified to God that they have followed him, and sought after a residence with him, where evil shall not contend against them:” he goes farther; he represents unflinching and scrupulous fidelity to the Divine commands as the highest and indispensable condition of actual participation in the life of eternal blessedness with God. Such sentences as the following often recur: “Men will become like God, impassible and immortal if they keep his commands.”³

But since Justin represents Faith and Repentance as the essential subjective requisites for individual participation in the Christian salvation; since he requires an (approximative) freedom from sin as an indispensable preliminary to future blessedness, he places the moral self-activity of man in such a relation to the salvation sought for, that one appears to be a co-operative cause of the other. We do not now appeal to the expression which has often been quoted on this subject, “Every man will be saved by his own righteousness,”⁴ for this is more of an Apologetical than Dogmatical character. But to this subject belongs the following statement,⁵ “If,” says Justin, “men shew themselves

¹ *Dial. c. Tr. c. 44*, p. 140, (p. 263, C.)—c. 111, p. 205, (p. 338, D.)

² *Apol. 1*, 8, p. 47, (p. 57, A.)

³ *Dial. c. Tr. c. 124*, p. 217, (p. 353, D. 354, A.)—*τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ, τὸς καὶ διὰ ἑαυτοῦ ἀπαθῆς καὶ ἀθανάτους ἰὰν φυλάξουσιν τὰ προστάγματα αὐτοῦ γιγινῆναι.*

⁴ *Dial. c. Tr. c. 45*, p. 141, (p. 263, Γ.) c. 140, p. 231, (p. 369, D.)

⁵ *Apol. 1*, 10, p. 49, (p. 58, B. C.)—*οἱ γὰρ ἀξίως τῷ ἰσχύει*

by their works, worthy of the Divine counsel, they will, as we have been taught, be judged worthy of intercourse with God, so that they will reign with him, being made immortal and impassible. For, as God in the beginning created men when before they were not, in like manner, those who choose the things that are well-pleasing to him, on account of that choice, will be deemed worthy of immortality and of intercourse with him. Our original birth did not depend upon ourselves; but that we choose and strive after what is agreeable to him, by means of the rational powers which he has given us, this convinces and brings us to the faith." Justin, in these words, manifestly attributes a certain meritoriousness to the virtuous exertions of men; and grants it a causal relation to future blessedness. But this is not as if he wished, in so doing, to obscure the divine grace, or push it into the back ground, on the contrary, he has the firmest conviction that eternal happiness or salvation must be a gift of the divine compassion,¹ only he would adjudge to man, a character bearing a relation to this gift, as far as by freely consenting to the divine will, he aspires after a moral relationship to God. His conviction is that which the whole ancient, especially the Greek Church, acknowledged, which without regarding human virtue as absolutely without merit, yet, on the other hand, did not allow the sense of the divine mercy to be lost in Pelagian overvaluation of self.

βελούματι ἑαυτὸς δι' ἔργων δείξωσι τῆς μετ' αὐτῷ ἀνατροφῆς καταξιωθῆναι προσελήφμεν συμβασιλεύοντας αἰθάλας καὶ ἀπαθείς γινώμευς. "Ὅν τρόπον γάρ τὴν ἀρχὴν ἐκ ὧτας ἱσίοις. τὸν αὐτὸν ἡγούμεθα τρέπον διὰ τὸ ἐλίσθαι τὴν αἰρεσίαν· τὰ αὐτῷ ἀρεστά, καὶ ἀφθαρσία καὶ συνείας καταξιωθῆναι. Τὸ μὲν γὰρ τὴν ἀρχὴν γινώσκοντες, ἐχ' ἡμίτερον ἢ· τὸ δ' ἐκκελευθῆσαι οἷς φίλον αὐτῷ αἰρεσίαν, δι' ὧν αὐτὸς ἰδωρῆσθε λογικῶν δυνάμεων, πείθει τι καὶ εἰς πίστιν ἔργα ἡμῶν.

¹ Dial. c. Tr. c. 32, p. 129, (p. 249, D.) ἐλπίζον τινὰ ἐξ ὧν δύνασθαι εὐρεθῆναι ἐκ τοῦ κατὰ χάριν τὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ κυρίου σαβαὶθ παρρησιασθέντες (σπέρματος) εἰς τὴν αἰώνιον σωτηρίαν.—c. 47, p. 143. (p. 267, A.) ἡ χρηστότης καὶ ἡ φιλανθρωπία τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ τὸ εὐμετερον τοῦ πλάτη αὐτοῦ τὸν μετανοοῦντα ἀπὸ τῶν ἀμαρτημάτων εἰς δικαίον καὶ ἰναμώτερον ἔχει.

In determining the share which human self-activity on the one hand, and divine grace on the other, had in the work of conversion and sanctification, Justin proceeded, so that he regarded goodness as an act of the free-will of man, and yet derived the power for it from God, and placed those who were converted under the constant protection and guardianship of Christ. That Justin held goodness to be the pure act of the free-will of the individual, we have already shown in numerous examples; that he derived the power of improvement from God, the last of the passages quoted in the text plainly indicates. That he regarded Christ as the constant guardian and protector in the present and actual attainment of moral excellence, is evident from the two following declarations.¹ "After baptism we lead the baptized into the assembly of the brethren, offering up common prayers for ourselves and for the illuminated one (τοῦ φωτισθέντος), and for all others in every place, that we, having gained a knowledge of the truth, may be judged worthy to prove ourselves in our works as good citizens and guardians of the commands we have received, and thereby may be saved with an eternal salvation,"—and,² "we always pray to God, that we may be protected through Jesus Christ, from the dæmons whom once we worshipped; that we, after being converted to God through him, may abide without fault; for we call him helper and Redeemer."

This definition of the relation between divine grace and the moral self-activity of man is in principle no other than the later Pelagian. Justin is here the forerunner of Pelagianism. For it is admitted that Pelagius so determined that relation, that he attributed to God *the ability*, (*das Können*), to man *the willing*, (*das Wollen*), and to both *the acting*, (*das Handeln*).³

¹ *Apol.* l. 65, p. 82, (p. 97, C.)

² *Dial. c. Tr.* c. 30, p. 128, (p. 247, C.) Compare c. 116, p. 209, (p. 344, A.)

³ In Augustin. *de grat. Christ.* c. 4, T. VII. p. 305, prim.

CHAPTER VII.

THE DOCTRINE OF THE FINAL CONSUMMATION.

In no part of dogmatics has a poetic fancy exercised a stronger and more varied influence than in Eschatology. Existence after death is a problem involved in profound darkness; the inquiring reason has little firm ground to stand upon. Yet it is not merely the prompting of sober inquiry which attempts the solution; the heart attempts to grasp the obscure object with irresistible urgency. It cannot, therefore, be thought strange if the ancient Church, in its Eschatological delineations, indulged too much in the style of poetry. And it is easy to conceive, on what account the Church was so partial to sensible images respecting the condition of mankind after death. The present state was one of tribulation and suffering; the hearts of believers naturally indulged without reserve, in the hopes of a better future; the speedy return of Jesus from heaven was expected, and their thoughts were fixed with delight on the happiness which was supposed to be connected with that event. Two points are most decidedly prominent in the eschatological views of the ancient Church, the resurrection of the dead, and the millennial reign, both in close relation to each other. Chiliasm, a plant belonging to the Jewish soil, and

loco posse statuimus, secundo velle, tertio esse. Posse in natura, velle in arbitrio, esse in effectu locamus. Primum illud, id est posse, ad deum proprie pertinet, qui illud creaturæ suæ contulit, duo vero reliqua, hoc est, velle et esse, ad hominem referenda sunt, quia de arbitrii fonte descendunt. Ergo in voluntate et opere bono laus hominis est, imo et hominis et dei, qui ipsius voluntatis et operis possibilitatem dedit quique ipsam possibilitatem gratiæ suæ adjuvat semper auxilio.—c. 31, p. 310, ad peccandum et ad non peccandum integrum liberum arbitrium habere nos dicimus, quod in omnibus bonis operibus divino semper adjuvatur auxilio.

transplanted into the Christian Church, partly by means of the Apocalypse, constituted in the second century so decidedly an article of faith, that Justin held it up as a criterion of perfect orthodoxy. The doctrine of the resurrection of the flesh was modified by Chiliasm, not as if the latter gave birth to the former, or brought it into repute; for it was truly scriptural in its basis and authority. But in consequence of millenarian anticipations, a two-fold resurrection was framed, and the resurrection (except by the Alexandrians) was conceived of in the coarsest manner.¹ Respecting the condition of the soul immediately after (physical) death the Fathers vacillated considerably; but they all agreed in this, that they transported souls not immediately to heaven or hell, but, in adherence to the heathenish and ancient Hebrew representations of a subterranean world, to an intermediate abode, in which, either separated or in company, they awaited with indistinct forebodings their future allotment at the day of judgment. The martyrs alone enjoyed the pre-eminence of having the gates of Paradise thrown open to them immediately after death. At the end of the Chiliastic age the Fathers fixed the general resurrection of all men, and the final judgment. At this period, and with this scene, they expected the full and permanent separation between the good and the bad. The former, they believed, would then enter on the full enjoyment of the promised blessedness; this blessedness was generally viewed negatively as immortality and impassibility, or positively as communion with God; only by the Alexandrians, it was distinctly considered as a perpetual progression in knowledge and holiness. The bad, on the contrary, they consigned to eternal suffering, which was generally attributed to material fire, but, by the same Alexandrians, was first apprehended

¹ Müller de resurrectione Jesu Christi, vita cam excipiente et ascensu in cælum sententiæ, quæ in ecclesia christiana ad finem usque seculi sexti viguerunt, p. 75, sq.

as internal, and having its seat in the conscience. Clement and Origen dissented from the views that generally prevailed, by hoping for the return to God of all fallen beings, even of Satan himself, and denying (though with cautious reserve) the eternity of future punishments. Finally, the Fathers annexed to the judgment the end of the world, which they most usually expected would be by fire, and far more frequently as a transformation, than as an annihilation of the world.

The manner in which Justin sketches his views on these points plainly indicates the influence which the sentiments of the age had upon his mind. He opens his eschatological aphorisms with a (paraphrastic) definition of death, which he simply regards as the separation of the soul from the body. "Man," he says, "does not always exist, nor is the body always connected with the soul, but, as soon as harmony is dissolved, the soul leaves the body, and the man is not."¹ The soul does not share in the dissolution of the body; it continues even when that perishes. Justin, indeed, does not ascribe to the soul an immanent and absolute immortality, since he considers this incompatible with its nature as a created being: but yet he does not allow it to perish; he repeatedly and emphatically asserts that it continues sensible after death.² This earnestness has a moral basis. "If," says Justin,³ "there were an end of consciousness at death, this would be a gain to all the impious; but since consciousness remains to all the dead, and everlasting suffering is in reserve, delay not to convince yourselves of the truth of what I have said." As the continued

¹ *Dial. c. Tr. c. 6*, p. 109. (p. 224, C.) ἀνθρώπος οὐ διαπαντός ἔστιν οὐδὲ σύνισιν αἰὲς τῇ ψυχῇ τὸ σῶμα, ἀλλ' ὅτι ἂν δέη λυθῆναι τὴν ἀρμονίαν ταύτην, παταλίσαι ἡ ψυχὴ τὸ σῶμα καὶ ὁ ἀνθρώπος οὐκ ἔστιν — *de resurrect. c. 10*, p. 595.

² *Apol. 1*, 18, p. 54, (p. 65, A.) καὶ μετὰ θάνατον ἐν αἰεθροῖσι εἰσὶν αἱ ψυχαί.

³ *Apol. 1*, 18, p. 54, (p. 64, E. 65, A.)

existence of the soul possessed this moral importance, Justin did not content himself with a mere assertion of its truth; he hastened to stamp it with the authority of the divine word. "When it was said, out of the bush, to Moses, I am THE BEING, the God of Abraham, and the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob, and the God of thy fathers, it was an evidence that these men continued to exist, and belonged to Christ himself." "That souls continue,"¹ he elsewhere remarks, "I have shown you from the fact, that the soul of Samuel, at the desire of Saul, was called up by the ventriloquist," 1 Sam. xxviii. 8.

Justin's sentiments respecting the condition of souls, after their separation from the body, do not differ essentially from those of the ancient Church in general. He does not suppose that they attain, at once, after this separation, the full enjoyment of their salvation,

¹ *Dial. c. Tr. c.* 105, p. 200, (p. 333, A.) ὅτι μίνουσιν αἱ ψυχαί, ἀπιδείξα ὁμῶν ἐν τοῦ καὶ τὴν Σαμουὴλ ψυχὴν κληθῆναι ὑπὸ τῆς ἰγγασσεμύθου, ὡς ἠξίωσιν ὁ Σαούλ. The occurrences at Endor frequently engaged the attention of the Fathers; especially the question, whether the apparition, called forth by the witch, was the real soul of Samuel, or a mere deceitful vision caused by the dæmon who inspired her. Origen, (*homil. in 1 Reg.* 28, T. II. p. 490. Sulpicius Severus, (*hist. sacr.* 1, 36, p. 111.) Anastasius of Sinai, (*quæstiones et responsiones de variis argumentis quæst.* 112,) and others, have, like Justin, no hesitation in deciding in favour of the former opinion; while Tertullian, (*de anim.* c. 57, T. IV. p. 285, sq.) Philastrius (*de hæres.* c. 26, p. 48.) Eustathius of Antioch, (*Eustathii in hexæmeron commentarius ac de eugastrimytho disert. adv. Orig. &c.* Leo Allatius, *primus in lucem protulit, latine vertit.* Jerome, *comm. in Jes.* vii. 10, T. V. p. 30,—*in Ezech.* xiii. 17, p. 347.—*in Matt.* vi. 31, T. IX. since they consider this explanation as unworthy, would rather consider it as an act of dæmoniacal jugglery. See Leo Allatius *de eugastrimytho Syntagma*, c. 10, (in an appendix to an edition of Eustathius' treatises,) p. 422, and Dailé *de usu patrum*. The same difference of opinion has continued in modern times; though very lately a third opinion has been started, according to which the appearance at Endor was the effect of the personal adroitness of the witch in producing optical illusions.

or the full feeling of their condemnation, but remain till the resurrection and the judgment in a kind of intermediate state. He regarded as heretical the doctrine that souls are received into heaven immediately after death.¹ He was evidently influenced by the heathenish and ancient Hebrew representations of Hades, but modified in this respect, that the inhabitants of the subterranean world were not mere shades incapable of action, but endowed with feeling and life; and that their residence in Hades was not perpetual, but only temporary. All souls, in his opinion, must depart to Hades as soon as they are released from the body, whether they are good or bad.² There they await the resurrection and the judgment, with a presentiment of their future destiny, but are separated according to their moral characteristics.³ The good dwell in a better place, but the bad in a worse. At their departure from this life, they are immediately in danger of falling into the power of hostile evil angels.⁴ Indeed Justin is of opinion, that all the souls of the Old Testament saints and prophets had fallen into the hands

¹ *Dial. c. Tr. c. 80, p. 178, (p. 307, A.)*

² *Dial. c. Tr. c. 99, p. 195, (p. 326, C.)* καὶ οὐκ ἀνδρωσκον ἐν ἄδου μένου.

³ This presentiment Justin attributes, with peculiar distinctness, to unbelieving and wicked souls. *Col. ad Gr. c. 35, p. 32, (p. 33, A.)* οὐδὲν ἔσται παρ' ὑμῶν οὐδὲ πάλιν τοὺς προγόνους ὑμῶν πλημμυλίας, εἰ εἰς τὴν ἰσταντίαν τρέψασθαι νυνὶ τῆς ἐξ ἐκείνων βούλεισθαι πλάτης. οὐ, εἰκός ἐν ἄδου νυνὶ ἐκπρόθερμον μετανοίας μετανοῦντας ἀθύρεισθαι οἷς εἰ δυνατόν ἦν ἐκείθιν δηλοῦν ὑμῖν τὰ μέγα τιμιωτάτην σῶσι τῷ βίῃ συμβεβηκότα αὐτοῖς, ἵγνωσι ἂν, ὅσον ὑμῶς ἀπαλλάξαι κακῶν προέλιντο.

⁴ *Dial. c. Tr. c. 5, p. 107, (p. 223, B.)* φημί . . . τὰς μὴ τῶν ἰουδαίων (ψυχὰς) ἐν κρίσει ποι χάρις μένειν, τὰς δὲ ἀδίκους καὶ ποιητὰς ἐν χρίσει, τὸν τῆς κρίσεως ἰδιόχρηστος χρόνον τῷ. — Irenæus (*adv. hæres. 5, 31, p. 331.*) Tertullian (*de anim. c. 58, T. IV. p. 287.*) Hippolytus (in the fragments of his treatise against the Greeks, in *Fabrie. opera Hippolyt. Hamb. 1716, p. 221.*) and others express the same opinion. See Cave, *Antiquitates patr. et eccles. p. 331, sq.* and Waage *de ætate articuli quo in symb. apost. traditur Jesus Christi ad inferos descensus, p. 155, sq.*

of spirits, one of whom spoke and acted through the witch of Endor. He therefore recommends to pray to God, in the name of Jesus, at the end of life, to render the plots of (evil) angels abortive.¹ Justin arrived at these singular conclusions, which, (if we except their adoption by Anastasius, the patriarch of Antioch,²) were countenanced by no other of the Fathers, by an unfortunate combination of the prayer of Christ on the cross, "Father, into thy hands I commend my spirit," with a literal understanding of the account of the witch of Endor. As he believed in a real apparition of Samuel's soul, he imagined that this implied a sub-

¹ *Dial. c. Tr. c.* 105, p. 300, (p. 332, D. 333, A.) τὸ ἀπὸ βωμολοχίας καὶ στίματος λίαντος καὶ ἐν χειρὶ αὐτοῦ αἰτῶν αὐτὸν τὴν ψυχὴν σωθῆναι (Ps. xxii. 21) ἵνα μηδὲς κυριεύῃ τῆς ψυχῆς αὐτοῦ, αἰτησις ἦν ἵνα, ἅπαντα ἡμῖς πρὸς τῇ ἐξόδῳ τοῦ βίου γινώμεθα, τὰ ἀπὸ αἰτῶναι τὸν θέν, τὸν δυνάμειον ἀποστρέψαι πάντα ἀναιδῶ, ποιεῖν ἀγγέλους μὴ λαβείναι ἡμῶν τῆς ψυχῆς . . . φαίνεται καὶ ὅτι πᾶσαι αἱ ψυχὴ καὶ τῶν ὅντων δικαίων καὶ περὶ τῶν ἐν ἐξουσίᾳ ἱστίων τῶν τοιούτων δυνάμειον ἵπαια δὴ καὶ ἐν τῇ ἰγνωση-μοθῇ ἐκείνῃ ἐξ αὐτῶν τῶν πραγμάτων ἡμολογῶνται. "Ὅθεν καὶ οὗτος διδάσκει ἡμᾶς καὶ διὰ τοῦ οὐ τοῦ πάντως ἀγωνίζεσθαι, δι' οὗ γίνονται, καὶ πρὸς τῇ ἐξόδῳ αἰτῶν μὴ ἐπὶ τοιαύτην τινὰ δύναμιν ὑποπίπτειν εἰς τῆς ψυχῆς ἡμῶν. Καὶ γὰρ ἀποδοῦναι τὸ πνεῦμα ἐν τῇ σταυρῇ, ὡς· πάτερ εἰς χεῖράς σου παρατίθεται τὸ πνεῦμά μου.— "That passage, in which he implores that his life may be saved from the sword and from the mouth of the lion, (Ps. xxii. 21,) and from the paw of the dog,—it was his request that none might gain the mastery of his life; that when we come to depart from life we may ask the same things of God, who is able to keep off every daring evil angel, that he may not take our life. And it appears, that all the souls of such righteous men and prophets fell under the authority of such powers, as, it appears, from the facts themselves, confessedly existed in that ventriloquist. Whence also God by his Son teaches us, for whose sake this happened, to strive to the utmost that, at our exit, our souls may not fall under any such power. For, when he gave up his spirit on the cross, he said, "Father, into thy hands I commit my spirit."

² *Quæst. et respons. de variis argumentis, quæst.* 112. ἐπὶ τὴν χεῖρα τοῦ διαβόλου ὑπὸ χειρὸς πᾶσαι αἱ ψυχὴ καὶ τῶν ἁγίων καὶ τῶν ἁμαρτωλῶν, ὡς οὐ κατελθὼν ἐν τῇ ἀγῇ ἡ Χριστοῦ εἴτε τοῖς ἐν δισκοῖς ἐκείνῃ.

jection of this soul to the influence of the dæmon that operated through the witch, and since Christ, on the cross, committed his spirit to God, it appeared to him, that he must have dreaded similar influence in his own case. But if the soul of Samuel was under the power of a dæmon, it was a matter of course to assume the same of the souls of all the Old Testament saints and prophets, and if Christ was in dread for his own spirit, it was self-evident that Christians had cause to tremble for their own souls.

After the lapse of the appointed time which the prophet Daniel had prophesied, Justin expected the visible return of Christ to earth. The prophets, he affirms, foretold two advents, (*παρουσίαι*) One had already taken place. In that Christ appeared as a sufferer, in a mean and despised form, dishonoured, and at last crucified. The elders and priests of the Jewish people treated him like the goat on the day of atonement, (which was driven into the wilderness;) they laid hands on him, wounded and killed him. It will be otherwise at his second appearing. Christ will come to the earth in splendour and glory, on the clouds of heaven, and surrounded by the angelic hosts, as the judge of mankind. In the very place where he was crucified, his murderers will recognise him whom they pierced.—and all the tribes shall mourn, tribe by tribe, the women apart, and the men apart.¹

¹ *Apol.* 1, 52, p. 74, (p. 87, A. B.) δύο αὐτοῦ παρουσίας προεικόνευσαν οἱ προφῆται. μίαν μὲν, τὴν ἥδη γινομένην, ὥς ἀτίμου καὶ παθόντος ἀνθρώπου· τὴν δὲ διυτίραν, ὅταν μετὰ δόξης ἐξ οὐρανῶν μετὰ τῆς ἀγγελικῆς αὐτοῦ στρατιᾶς παραγινήσεται καὶ κηρυχθῇ. *Dial. c. Tr. c.* 31, p. 128, (p. 247, D.) ὡς υἱὸς ἀνθρώπου ἰσάων νεφελῶν ἰλιύσεται, ὡς Δανιὴλ ἐμήνυσεν (*Dan. vii. 13*) ἀγγέλων σὺν αὐτῷ ἀφιπνυμένων.—*c.* 32, p. 129, (p. 249, c.) δύο παρουσίας αὐτοῦ γινήσεται ἐξηγησάμεν, μίαν μὲν, ἐν ᾗ ἐξικιντήθη ὑφ' ὧν, διυτίραν δὲ, ὅτε ἐπιγνώσεται, εἰς ᾗ ἐξικιντήσεται καὶ κόψονταί αὐτὴν οἱ ἄνθρωποι, φυλὴ πρὸς φυλὴν, αἱ γυναῖκες κατ' ἰδίαν καὶ οἱ ἄνδρες κατ' ἰδίαν.—*c.* 40, p. 137, (p. 259, C.) οἱ ἐν τῇ νηστείᾳ τρέγοντες δύο ὅμοιοι κελυσθίντες γίνονται, ὃν ὁ εἰς ἀποσπομπαῖος ἱγνίτο, ὁ δὲ ἕτερος εἰς προσφοράν, τῶν δύο παρουσιῶν τοῦ Χριστοῦ καταγγελία ἦσαν· μίαν μὲν, ἐν ᾗ ὡς ἀποσπομπαῖον αὐτὴν παρισπύσαντο οἱ

But before this advent takes place, Elias will come,¹ agreeably to the prophecy in Mal. iv. 5; also the man of apostacy and iniquity, who will utter blasphemies against the Most High, and commit outrages against the Christians, must precede the reappearance of the Son of Man. This will soon happen, for already the adversary is at the door.²

The immediate object of this return of Christ is the erection of the millennial kingdom.³ Christ, Justin says,⁴ will come again in order to make a new heaven

πρεσβύτεροι τοῦ λαοῦ ὑμῶν καὶ οἱ ἱερεῖς, ἐπιβαλόντες αὐτῷ τὰς χεῖρας καὶ θανατῶσαντες αὐτόν· καὶ τῆς δευτέρας δι' αὐτοῦ παρουσίας, ἔτι ἐν τῇ αὐτῇ τόσῃ τῶν Ἱεροσολύμων ἐπιγινωθῆσθαι αὐτόν, τὸν ἀτιμωθίστα ὑφ' ὑμῶν, καὶ προσφορὰ ἦν ἐπὶ τῶν . . . ἁμαρτωλῶν·

¹ Dial. c. Tr. c. 49, p. 145, (p. 268, B.) ἰὰν ὁ λόγος ἀναγκάζῃ ἡμολογῆναι ὅτι δύο παρουσίαι τοῦ Χριστοῦ προφητιούνται· γνησιόμιναι, μία μὲν, ἐν ᾗ παθητὸς καὶ ἄτιμος καὶ αἰδὴς φανήσεται, ἡ δὲ ἑτέρα, ἐν ᾗ καὶ ἰσχυρὸς καὶ κρείττης ἀπάντων ἰλιούσεται, . . . ὡς τῆς φοβερῆς καὶ μεγάλης ἡμέρας τουτίσσι τῆς δευτέρας παρουσίας αὐτοῦ, πρόδοιεν γινῆσθαι τὸν Ἠλίαν νοήσομεν τὸν λόγον τοῦ Θεοῦ κληρυχῆναι;

² Dial. c. Tr. c. 32, p. 129, (p. 250, A.) νοήσεται . . . τὸν κύριον πάντων πατέρα ἀνάγοντα αὐτὸν (Χριστὸν) ἀπὸ τῆς γῆς καὶ παρ' Ἰζόντα αὐτὸν ἐν διεξῆ αὐτοῦ, ἵνα ἂν θῇ τοὺς ἰχθυοὺς ὑποπόδιον τῶν ποδῶν αὐτοῦ, ὅπερ γίνεται, ἔξοτον εἰς τὸν οὐρανὸν ἀνιέλφθῃ. . . . ὁ ἡμίτερος κύριος Ἰησοῦς Χριστός, τῶν χρόνων συμπληρουμένων καὶ τοῦ βλάσφημου καὶ τολμηροῦ εἰς τὸν ὕψιστον μίλλοντος λαλεῖν ἤδη ἐπὶ θύραις ὄντος . . . Τὸν τῆς ἀνομίας ἀνδρωπον . . . Βασιλεύσαι δι.—c. 110, p. 203, (p. 336, D.) ἐν ᾗ (δευτέρῃ παρουσίᾳ) μετὰ δόξης ἀπὸ τῶν οὐρανῶν πάρεσται Χριστός ὅταν καὶ ὁ τῆς ἀποστασίας ἀνδρωπος ὁ καὶ εἰς τὸν ὕψιστον ἔξαλλα λαλῶν, ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς ἀνομα τολμήσῃ εἰς ἡμᾶς τοὺς Χριστιανούς.

³ Dial. c. Tr. c. 51, p. 147, (p. 271, A.)

⁴ Dial. c. Tr. c. 113, p. 206, (p. 340, C. D.) Ἰησοῦς ὁ Χριστὸς τὴν διασπορὰν τοῦ λαοῦ ἰπιστρέψει καὶ διαμεμεῖ τὴν ἀγαθὴν γῆν ἐκάστω. . . . Μετὰ τὴν ἀγίαν ἀνάστασιν αἰώνιον ἦμιν τὴν κατὰχρῃν δώσει . . . οὗτός ἐστιν, ἃς οὐ καὶ τὸν οὐρανὸν καὶ τὴν γῆν καὶ δι' οὐ ὁ πατὴρ μίλλει κινουεργῆν· οὗτός ἐστιν, ὁ ἐν Ἱεροσολύμοις αἰώνιος φῶς λάμπειν μίλλων. οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ κατὰ τὴν τάξιν Μετὰ τὴν ἀνάστασιν βασιλεὺς Σαλὶμ καὶ αἰώνιος ἱερεὺς ὕψιστος ὑπάρχων.—c. 139, p. 230, (p. 369, A.) ὁ Χριστὸς παρὶγνίστα, εἰς φιλίαν καὶ εὐλογίαν καὶ μετάνοιαν καὶ συνοικίαν καλῶν, τὴν ἐν τῇ αὐτῇ γῇ τῶν ἁγίων πάντων μίλλουσαν γίνεσθαι. . . . διακατάσχεσιν· ἐπαγγέλλεται. Ὅθεν οἱ πάντοθεν ὀνθρωποι, εἴτε δούλοι εἴτε ἐλεύθεροι

and new earth, to reign as king over Salem, and to shine in Jerusalem as an unchangeable light. The fallen city will be restored, enlarged and beautified ; all the saints, that is, believing Christians, whether

πιστεύουσιν ἐπὶ τὸν Χριστὸν καὶ ἠγωνιάσιν τὴν ἐν τοῖς λόγοις αὐτοῦ καὶ τῶν προφητῶν αὐτοῦ ἀλήθειαν, ἐπίσταται, ἅμα αὐτῷ ἐν τῇ γῇ ἰαίῃ γεννησόμενοι καὶ τὰ αἰῶνα καὶ ἄφθαρτα κληρονομήσουσιν.—
 “Jesus the Christ will cause the dispersion of the people to return, and will apportion the good land to each one After the holy resurrection he will give us the eternal possession. This is he, after whom and by whom the Father is about to renew heaven and earth ; this is he, who will shine as an eternal light in Jerusalem ; this is he who is the king of Salem according to the order of Melchisedek ; who is also the eternal priest of the Most High. . . . Christ came, inviting to friendship and blessing, and repentance, and fellowship ; and promised that there should be in that same land a possession of all the saints . . . Whence men from every quarter, whether slaves or free, who believe in Christ and know the truth of his words, and the words of the prophets, know that they shall be with him in that land, and inherit eternal and immortal blessings.” . . The passage which relates especially to the doctrine of the millenium, is in *Dial. c. Tr. c. 80*, p. 1177, (p. 306, B. 307, B.) To Trypho's question, εἰπὶ μοι ἀληθῶς ὑμῖς ἀναπαυομένηται τὸν τόπον Ἱερουσαλὴμ τοῦτον ἐμολογῶντι, καὶ συναχθῆναι τὸν λαὸν ὑμῶν καὶ εὐφρανθῆναι σὺν τῷ Χριστῷ ἅμα τοῖς πατριάρχασι καὶ τοῖς προφήταις καὶ τοῖς ἀπὸ τοῦ ἡμετέρου γένους ἢ καὶ τῶν περὶ αὐτὸν γινομένων, περὶ ἰλθῆν ὑμῶν τὸν Χριστὸν προσδοκᾶντι ; —“Tell me truly, do you avow that this place, Jerusalem, will be rebuilt, and do you expect that your people will be gathered together and rejoice with Christ, and with the patriarchs and prophets, and with those of our race, and of those who become proselytes before the coming of your Christ?” Justin thus replies, ἰγὼ μὲν καὶ ἄλλοι πολλοὶ ταῦτα φρονοῦμεν, ὥς καὶ πάντες ἐπίστασθαι τοῦτο γεννησόμενον πολλοὺς δ' αὖ καὶ τῶν τῆς καθαρῆς καὶ εὐσεβῆς ὄντων Χριστιανῶν γνωμῆς τοῦτο μὴ γνωρίζειν ἰσχυρά μοι. Τοὺς γὰρ λεγομένους μὲν Χριστιανούς, ὄντας δὲ ἄθιους καὶ εὐσεβεῖς αἰρισιώτας, οὗτοι κατὰ πάντα βλάσφημα καὶ ἄβια καὶ ἀνόητα διδάσκουσιν, ἰδὲ λωσά σοι Εἰ καὶ συνιβάλλει ὑμῖς τισὶ λεγομένοις Χριστιανοῖς καὶ τοῦτο μὴ ἐμολογεῖσιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ βλάσφημῶν τολμῶν τὸν θιόν Ἀβραάμ, καὶ τὸν θιόν Ἰσαὰκ καὶ τὸν θιόν Ἰακώβ, οἳ καὶ λίγουσι μὴ εἶναι νικρῶν ἀνάστασις μὴ ἀπολάβηται αὐτοὺς Χριστιανούς Ἐγὼ δὲ καὶ εἴ τινες εἰσιν ἐρογνώμονες κατὰ πάντα Χριστιανοί, καὶ σεκεῖς ἀνάστασις γινήσεται ἱεριστῆμα, καὶ χίλια ἔτη ἐν Ἱερουσαλὴμ εὐκοδομηθῆναι καὶ

slaves or free, with the Patriarchs, Prophets, and other pious Jews and proselytes, will rise from the dead and be assembled in Jerusalem and the Holy Land, in order to take possession of it, there to receive the

καταστάσις καὶ πλατυνῆσις [ὅτι] οἱ προφηταὶ Ἰερουσαλὴν καὶ Ἡραίας καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι ἠμολογοῦσιν.—“I and many others held these sentiments, and believe assuredly that thus it will come to pass; but again, I have intimated to you that many Christians who are of pure and pious dispositions, do not acknowledge it. For as to those who are called Christians, but who are impious and profane heretics,—I have shown to you, that they teach altogether blasphemous, and impious, and absurd doctrines. . . For if you meet with some that are called Christians, and do not acknowledge this, but even dare to blaspheme the God of Abraham, and the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob, and say that there is no resurrection of the dead . . . do not imagine that they are Christians . . . But I and those Christians who are in all things of a correct judgment, know that there will be a resurrection of the flesh, and a thousand years in Jerusalem built and adorned and enlarged, as the prophets Ezekiel, and Isaiah, and the others declare.”—Many learned men among the older writers, Daillé (*de usu patrum*. p. 287, sq. *de pœnis et satisfaction. human.* p. 493,) besides two mentioned by Thirlby, (*Opera Justin.* p. 311,) and among the moderns, Münscher, (*historische Entwicklung der Lehre vom tausend-jährigen Reiche in den drei ersten Jahrh.* in Henke's *Magazin f. Religionsphilosophie*, vi. 241, with which compare *Handbuch d. christl. Dogmengeschichte*, II. 420.) Münter, (*Handl. d. ältesten christl. Dogmengeschichte*, II. 2, 256,) and Schwegler, (*der Montanismus u. die christ. Kirche des Zweiten Jahrhunderts*. Tnb. 1841, 137,) are disposed to find a contradiction in the passage last quoted, inasmuch as Justin ascribes the millenarian doctrine to all sound thinking Christians, and then again denies it to a part of them; and they think that this contradiction must be removed by inserting the particle *μή* before *πάντες καθεσθῆναι*. That contradiction does not exist, therefore this insertion is unnecessary, and can only produce confusion. The seeming contradiction vanishes as soon as the proper import is attached to the phrase *κατὰ πάντα* in the words *ἡ τῆς αἰῶνος ἐξουσίαν κατὰ πάντα Χριστιανοί*. Justin says, I and many others believe in the millenarian reign; but, on the other hand, there are many even among those who hold pure doctrine, who do not share in that belief. That the heretics reject millenarianism can excite no wonder, for their whole doctrine is blasphemous and absurd. I—Justin goes on to say—I, and if there are Christians who in all points *κατὰ πάντα* are orthodox,

eternal and unchangeable blessings promised to them, and to rejoice in communion with Christ. Justin dwells with deep emotion on this hope. It was, in his esteem, a sacred fire at which he kindled afresh his Christian faith and practice. That this hope (in its pure millenarian character and extent) might possibly be vain, never entered his thoughts. He believed that it was supported by Scripture. He expressly appealed to the New Testament Apocalypse, and such passages in the Old Testament as Isaiah lxv. 17, in evidence of the personal reign of Christ in Jerusalem. From the Apocalypse, and Isaiah lxv. 22, (in connection with Genesis ii. 17, and v. 5, and Ps. xc. 4,) he deduced the millennial period.¹ How could he doubt it? As to the specific mode in which he conceived that hope, he held the mean between the gross materialism with which the Ebionites,² Pa-

believe in the resurrection of the flesh, as well as in the millenarian reign. Justin, therefore, maintains not that all—but the perfectly (*allseitigen*) orthodox were millenarians. He considers millenarianism a part of the Church orthodoxy, and distinguishes accordingly two classes of the orthodox, those who are so in the fullest sense, because they believe in the millenarian reign, and those who, though in other respects they hold fast pure doctrine, yet dissent so far from the standard of correct belief, in rejecting millenarianism. Thus the supposed contradiction is completely obviated. Who were the persons belonging to this class of imperfect believers to whom Justin refers, cannot be ascertained. But it is known, that neither in the Epistles of the Roman Clement, Ignatius, and Polycarp, nor in the Apologetical writings of Tatian, Athenagoras, and Theophilus of Antioch, can any trace be found of millenarian opinions.

¹ *Dial. c. Tr. c.* 81, p. 178, sq. (p. 307, B. 308, A.)

² Jerome, *comment. in Jes.* lxv. 20, T. V. p. 209.—*in Jes.* lxvi. 20, p. 217.—*in Zachar.* xiv. 9, T. VI. p. 227. To brand Justin's millenarianism as Ebionitish, which Credner has done, is perfectly unjustifiable. The millenarian representations of Justin have, it is true, a certain similarity to those of the Ebionites, but only as far as millenarianism has in general a Jewish impress, (*Jerome de vir. illust.* c. 18, T. I. p. 177.—*Mille annorum judaica durigoris.*—*comment. in Jes.* L. xviii. *proem.* T. V. p. 203,) and not in a higher degree than can be affirmed of all Catholic millenarian representations.

pias,¹ Irenæus,² and Lactantius³ explained it, and the spiritualizing in which Barnabas⁴ and Tertullian⁵ indulged. He certainly expected physical enjoyments, and believed that Christ would eat and drink with the members of his kingdom;⁶ but he denied the continuance of the sexual functions, being assured from Luke xx. 34, that those who rose again would "neither marry nor be given in marriage, but be as the angels;"⁷ and depicted the state of the elect under the personal reign as one of blissful unchangeableness, repose, and exemption from pain. Thus he says, "At his glorious advent Christ will, in every way, confound those who have hated him, and unrighteously apostatized from him; but his own people he will bring to enjoy repose, and to fulfil all their expectations."⁸ And in another passage, "Whoever is faithful to the doctrine of Jesus, him will Christ raise from the dead at his second ad-

¹ Iren. *adv. Hæres.* 5, 33, p. 333, and Euseb. *hist. eccles.* 3, 39, T. I. p. 284.

² *Adv. Hæres.* 5, 33, p. 332.

³ *Institut. divin.* 7, 14, sqq. 7, 24.

⁴ *Epist. c.* 15, T. I. p. 46i.—ἰλθὼν ὁ υἱὸς αὐτοῦ καὶ καταργήσει τὸν καιρὸν ἀνομίας καὶ κρινεῖ τοὺς ἁγίους καὶ ἁλλαξίει τὸν θάλλον καὶ τὸν σιλήην καὶ τοὺς ἁσπίρας. Compare Henke *de epistola quæ Barnabæ tribuitur authenticâ*, Jen. 1827, p. 67, and Hefele, *das Sendschreiben des Apostels Barnabas*, 109, 257.

⁵ *Adv. Marc.* 3, 24, T. I. p. 152.—Hanc (the New Jerusalem) dicimus excipiendis resurrectione sanctis et referendis omnium bonorum utique spiritualium copia in compensationem eorum, quæ in seculo vel despezimus vel amisimus, a deo prospectam.—*de resurrect. carn.* c. 26, T. III. p. 204. See Schwegler, *der Montanismus und die Christl. Kirche des zweiten Jahrhunderts*, 73.

⁶ *Dial. c. Tr.* c. 51, p. 147, (p. 271, A.) διὰ αὐτὸν . . . πάλιν παραγγιῆσθαι ἐν Ἱερουσαλὴμ καὶ τίτις τας, μαθηταῖς αὐτοῦ συμποῖν πάλιν καὶ συμφαγεῖν.

⁷ *Dial. c. Tr.* c. 81, p. 179, (p. 308, B.) *de resurrect. c.* 3, p. 590, A.

⁸ *Dial. c. Tr.* c. 121, p. 214, (p. 350, B.) ἐν παντὶ χρόνῳ ἐν τῇ ἰδιότητι αὐτοῦ παρεῖναι καταλύσαι πάντας τοὺς μισησαντας αὐτὸν καὶ τοὺς αὐτοῦ ἀδίκως ἀποστάντας· τοὺς δὲ ἰδίως ἀναπαύσει ἀποδοῖς αὐτοῖς τὰ προσδοκώμενα πάντα. Compare c. 138, p. 229, (p. 3618, A.); τῇ λαφύ τῃ ποιμένι . . . ἀνάπαυσιν πρηστομασίῃ ἐν Ἱερουσαλὴμ.

vent, and make him immortal, unchangeable, and free from all sorrow."¹

At the close of the thousand years of the personal reign, Justin expected the second act of the great drama of the resurrection. The first resurrection extended only to the members of that reign, the believers and the saints, on whose account it is called *holy*.² But after the lapse of that reign of peace, the resurrection of all men, without exception, will take place.³ In form and nature the two acts of the resurrection will not differ from one another: in both, the bodies will rise with the same form and substance, with the same component parts and members, from their graves, as they possessed while alive. Justin believed in a perfect identity of the deceased and risen body; the only difference, he admitted, was, that mutilated bodies would rise with their limbs restored.⁴ In this opinion he faithfully reflects that of the ancient

¹ *Dial. c. Tr. c. 69*, p. 168, (p. 296, A. B.)

² *Dial. c. Tr. c. 113*, p. 206, (p. 340, C.)

³ *Dial. c. Tr. c. 81*, p. 179, (p. 308, A. B.) *παρ' ἡμῶν ἀνὴρ τις ὃ ὄνομα Ἰωάννης, οἷς τῶν ἀποστόλων τῷ Χριστῷ, ἐν ἀποκαλύψει γινόμενῃ αὐτῷ χίλια ἴσθι παύσαι ἐν Ἱερουσαλὴμ τοὺς τῷ ἡμετέρῳ Χριστῷ πιστεύσαντας περιφύγειν, καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα τὴν καθολικὴν καὶ (συλλέοντι φάναι) αἰώνιας ἡμεθυμαδὸν ἅμα πάντων ἀνάστασιν γινέσκειν καὶ κρίσιν.*—"A certain man belonging to us, named John, one of the apostles of Christ, prophesied, in a revelation made to him, that the believers in our Christ will spend a thousand years in Jerusalem; and after that the general, and (speaking summarily) the eternal resurrection of all will take place simultaneously, and the judgment."—This passage serves to correct Münter's statement (*Handbuch d. allgem. Christl. Dogmengeschichte*, II. 2, 269), "Justin deviates from the general representation, in making the happiness of the millennial reign not to precede the judgment, but to follow it immediately." The learned inquirer was led into this error by a passage in the *Apology* (I, 52, p. 74, [p. 87, B.]), where Justin takes no notice of the millenium (whether by accident or for apologetic reasons is uncertain), but connects the general resurrection of the dead, and the judgment, with the mention of the second coming of Christ.

⁴ *V. Vol. i. p. 182*, also *Apol. I, 8*, p. 48, (p. 57, B.) *τοὺς αὐτοῖς σώμασι μετὰ τῶν ψυχῶν γινέμεναι.*

Church, which believed, that bodies at the resurrection would differ in no respect from what they were before, except in the restoration of the mutilated parts.¹

The universal resurrection of the dead had for its object *the judgment*, the final and complete realization of the moral system. This judgment, which will extend to all mankind, (Adam not excepted),² and will be executed by Christ in the name, and by the authority of the Father,³ passes the irrevocable decision on the destiny of angels and men, and brings eternal blessings or curses on the good and the bad,⁴ according to the merit or demerit of their actions, and the measure

¹ Prudentius expresses this conviction of the ancient church in very forcible and explicit terms, and may be considered as speaking for the whole body:—

Nosco meum in Christo corpus resurgere. Quid me Desperare jubes? Veniam quibus ille revenit Calcata de morte viis. Quod credimus, hoc est; Et totus veniam, nec enim minor aut alius quam Nunc sum restituar. Vultus, vigor et color idem, Qui modo vivit, erit. Nec me vel dente vel ungue Fraudatam revomet patefacti fossa sepulcri.

See Zehrt, *über die Auferstehung der Todten* (Göttingen, 1835,) 38.

² *Dial. c. Tr. c.* 118, p. 211, (p. 346, A.) ὅτι πρὸς ζῶντων καὶ νεκρῶν πάντων αὐτὸς οὗτος ὁ Χριστός, ὥσων ἐν πολλοῖς.—*c.* 182, p. 224, (p. 362, A.) τὸν Ἰησοῦν, ἐν καὶ ἡμῖς ἐπίγνωμεν Χριστὸν υἱὸν τοῦ θανοῦσιν καὶ ἀναστάντα καὶ ἀνελλυδύστα εἰς τοὺς οὐρανοὺς καὶ πάλιν παραγινώσκουσιν πρὸς τὴν πάντων ἑτέρας ἐκθρόνισαι μίχους αὐτοῦ Ἄδαμ.—“I have repeatedly said that this Christ himself will be the judge of the living and of all the dead.—Jesus whom we acknowledge as Christ the Son of God, who was crucified, and rose again, and returned to heaven, and who will come again to be the judge of all men, absolutely, even including Adam himself.”

³ *Dial. c. Tr. c.* 58, p. 154, (p. 289, B.) ὅπως μὴ . . . κρίνῃ ἐφ' ὧν, ἐν ᾧ μίλλῃ κρίνῃ διὰ τῷ κυρίου μου Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ ὁ σωτὴς τῶν ὅλων τοῦ σώζεσθαι.—“That I may not be condemned in the judgment which God, the maker of all things, will hold by my Lord Jesus Christ. *Apol.* 1, 8, p. 48, (p. 57, B.) 1, 53, p. 74, (p. 88, A.)

⁴ *Apol.* 1, 12, p. 49, (p. 59, B.) δεξιζόμεν . . . ἵνασται ἐν αἰωνίᾳ κόλασιν ἢ σωτηρίᾳ κατ' ἀξίαν τῶν πράξεων περιούσια.—1, 45, p. 70, (p. 82, B.)—*Dial. c. Tr. c.* 47, p. 143, (p. 267,

of their individual powers.¹ Not that God acts judicially for the first time at the last day ; during the course of the world's developement he has often shown the truth and inviolability of the moral system ; he has frequently held general or partial judgments.² But the moral system, on the great universal day of judgment, will first attain its perfect manifestation ; then it will first appear with the fullest evidence, that "a holy God lives and cares for men ; that virtue and vice are not mere empty notions ; and that human lawgivers have good reason for punishing those who insult the public morality."³ Such a judgment is admissible, because angels and men, the objects of it, are endowed with freedom. "Since God,"⁴ argues Justin, "created angels and men free at first, it is right that they should be punished for their misdeeds with

A.) διὸ καὶ ὁ ἡμῖν κύριος Ἰησοῦς Χριστὸς εἶπεν· ἐν οἷς ἂν ὑμεῖς καταλάβω ἐν τοῖς αἰῶσι καὶ ἐν τούτοις καὶ ἐν τοῖς αἰῶσι.—"We believe that every man will go into eternal punishment or happiness according to the desert of his actions—Wherefore our Lord Jesus Christ said, in whatever I detect you, in these I will judge you.

¹ *Apol.* 1, 17, p. 54, (p. 64, D.E.) ἡμῶς· . . . πιστεύοντες μᾶλλον δὲ καὶ πεπεισμένοι κατ' ἀξίαν τῶν πράξεων ἕκαστος τίσειν διὰ πυρὸς αἰωνίου δίκης, καὶ πρὸς ἀναλογίαν ὧν ἔλαβεν δυνάμεων παρὰ τοῦ ἐν λόγῳ ἀπαγγελήσεσθαι, ὡς ὁ Χριστὸς ἡμῖν, (Luke xii. 48.)—"We . . . believing, or rather being persuaded that every one, according to the desert of his deeds, shall receive the punishment of eternal fire, and that an account will be required, in proportion to the powers he received from God, as Christ has declared."

² *Dial. c. Tr. c.* 102, p. 197, (p. 329, A.) ἐποίησεν αὐτοῦς πρὸς δικαιοσυνὴν καὶ ἀγγέλους καὶ ἀνθρώπους, καὶ χεῖρας ὄρεσι μέχρῃ οὐ γινώσκουσι καλὸν εἶναι, τὸ αὐτοῦς εἶναι αὐτοῦς καὶ ὅτι καλὸν εἶναι ἡμῶς· γινώσκουσι, καὶ καθολικὰς καὶ μερικὰς κρίσεις ποιεῖν, πεφυλαγμένῃ μίμνῃ τῇ αὐτοῦ.—"He made both angels and men self-governing, for the practice of righteousness, and appointed the times till when he knew it would be well for them to have this self-governing power ; and because he knew that it was also fit, he made both general and partial judgments, this self-governing power being preserved."

³ *Apol.* 2, 9, p. 94, (p. 47, D. E.)

⁴ *Apol.* 2, 7, p. 93, (p. 45, E.)

eternal fire." On another occasion he says,¹ "God has created angels and men free, on the condition that they are to be judged, in case they act against sound reason." The difference, and in part, contrariety of moral notions and laws which exist among men, form only an apparent objection against this judgment. For bad laws are the genuine offspring of fallen angels, and of like-minded men, and every one possesses a sufficient power of reason to distinguish between good and bad opinions and regulations. That difference does not take away the possibility and righteousness of the judgment.

When the great act of the judgment is over, then comes the end of the world, and the judged partake, according to the decision passed upon them, of salvation or damnation. Justin certainly expected that the end of the world would be by a conflagration, as did the other Fathers, but he differed from them in believing that the world would be transformed, but in a sense annihilated. The brief allusion which we find in the first Apology, intimates this; "the Sibyll and Hystaspes have said that there will be a consumption of perishable things by fire;"² and this obscure hint is confirmed by a distinct statement in the second Apology,³ "God delays the breaking-up and dissolu-

¹ *Dial. c. Tr.* c. 141, p. 231, (p. 370, B.) compare c. 88, p. 186, (p. 316, A.)

² *Apol.* 1, 20, p. 55, (p. 66, C.) καὶ Σύβυλλα καὶ Ὑστάσπης γινώσκουσαι τῶν φθαρτῶν ἀνάλωσιν διὰ πυρὸς ἵφασθαι.

³ *Apol.* 2, 7, p. 93. (p. 45, B. C.) ἱερμίναι δ' εἶδὸς τῆν σύγχυσιν καὶ καταλύσιν τοῦ παλῆς κόσμου μὴ ποιῆσαι ἵνα καὶ οἱ φαῦλοι ἀγγέλοι καὶ δαίμονες καὶ ἄνθρωποι μηκέτι ᾔσιν, διὰ τὸ σπέρμα τῶν Χριστιανῶν. ὁ γινώσκων ἐν τῇ φύσει ὅτι αἵτιον ἐστίν. Ἐπεὶ δὲ μὴ τῷτο ἦν, οὐκ ἂν οὐδὲ ὕμιν ταῦτα ἴσιν ποιῆν καὶ ἐνεργῆσθαι ὅπερ τῶν φαύλων δαιμόνων δυνατὸν ἦν, ἀλλὰ τὸ πῦρ τοῦ κρείστους κατελθὼν ἀνίδην πάντα διέκρινεν ὡς καὶ πρὸττερον ὁ κατακλυσμός μωδὶνα λιπῶν ἀλλ' ἢ τὸν μόνον ἐν τοῖς ἰδίοις παρ' ἡμῶν καλούμενοι Νῶε, παρ' ὕμιν δὲ Διουκαλίωνα Οὕτως γὰρ ἡμῶς τῇ ἐκπύρωσιν φάμεν γινώσκουσαι, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὡς οἱ Σίβυλλοί, κατὰ τὸν τῆς αἰς ἀλλήλων πάντων μεταβολῆς λόγον, ὁ ἀποχριστὸν ἵφάνη. There is evidently something wanting in the clause ὁ γινώσκων ἐν τῇ φύσει ὅτι αἵτιον ἐστίν; but whatever emendation may

tion of the whole world, so that evil angels, and dæmons, and men, might be no longer on account of the seed of the Christians, in which, as he knows, is the foundation of nature. For were it not so, it would not be possible for you to do these things, and to be operated upon by evil dæmons, but the fire of judgment coming down, would destroy all things without distinction, as formerly the flood, which left no one except Noah, (whom you call Deucalion), with his family. For in this sense we say that a conflagration will take place, but not as the Stoics, by a transmutation of all things into one another, which is most absurd." Justin here speaks undeniably of a destruction of the world. The conflagration which he announces, is not to be a Stoical one, therefore not a dissolution of the terrestrial substances into the original material for the production of a new world out of the ruins of the old. The fire of the judgment must be of a kind as thoroughly destructive as Noah's deluge, which left nothing remaining on the earth, save the Patriarch, and "they that were with him in the Ark." But this amounts to nothing less than a destruction of the world. When Justin includes in the range of this destruction, evil angels and wicked men, this must be looked upon merely as an inconsiderate hyperbole, thrown off in a momentary excitement, which must be corrected by statements in other parts of his writings.

The blessedness to which Christians, believers, and all the pious men are to be admitted at the close of the judgment, Justin regards, for the most part, as a continuation of the joys of the millenium. Immortality, impassibleness, freedom from sorrow, eternal dominion, are the epithets by which he most frequently distinguishes it. On one occasion he says, "Christ will admit those (Jews) who merit it, to his everlasting kingdom with the Patriarchs and Prophets; but the rest he threatens

be suggested, the meaning is obvious enough. Justin alludes to a sentiment often brought forward by him, that God created the world for the sake of its rational inhabitants, or with a still more partial view (*noch einseitiger*) for the sake of Christians.

(Matt. viii. 11,) to send with the unbelieving and incorrigible from all the Gentiles, to the condemnation of unquenchable fire." *Dial. c. Tr. c.* 120, p. 213, [p. 349, B.] At another time he says exultingly, "The soiled garments with which you (Jews) have clothed all who, through the name of Jesus, have become Christians, you will behold taken away from us, when God will raise all from the dead, and place some in his eternal and indissoluble kingdom, incorruptible, deathless, and impassible, while the rest he will dismiss to the punishment of eternal fire." (*Dial. c. Tr. c.* 117, p. 210, [p. 345, B.]) In a third passage he declares that "at Christ's second advent, death will be dispersed by those who have believed on Christ and lived according to his good pleasure, and for them entirely cease and be no longer, and while others are sent to judgment, and the condemnation of suffering eternal fire, they shall live together impassible and incorruptible, and free from sorrow, and immortal."¹ Justin admits only of one point of distinction and superior enjoyment compared with the millennial state in the condition of the pious after judgment, namely, their immediate communion with God. Without noticing the innumerable passages in which communion with God is promised to believers in general

¹ *Dial. c. Tr. c.* 45, p. 141, (p. 264, A.) Χριστός . . . διὰ τῆς παύσεως . . . γινησθῆναι σωτηρίας ὑπέσταντο, ἵνα διὰ τῆς εὐκαιρίας ταύτης . . . ὁ θάνατος καταφρονηθῇ καὶ ἐν τῇ διουσίᾳ αὐτοῦ τοῦ Χριστοῦ παύσῃ ἀπὸ τῶν πιστευόντων αὐτῷ καὶ ὑπακούοντων ζῶντων παύσεται τίλιν, ὕστερον μηκέτ' ὄν, ἵνα οἱ μὴ δις περὶ καὶ καταδικῇ τοῦ πυρὸς ἀπαύσεως κέλευσιν ἀποθανόντων, οἱ δὲ ἐν ἀπαθείᾳ καὶ ἀφρασίᾳ καὶ ἀλυσίᾳ καὶ ἀθανασίᾳ συνῶσιν.—The freedom from death, which in this passage is promised to believing and virtuous Christians, as a constituent of their future blessedness, relates as much to the period subsequent on the millenium as during that state. But by the death, freedom from which is promised to Christians, it is naturally to understand not merely earthly decease, but the death of the substance of man. Yet with this conception of death the other metaphorical notion of it is indistinctly mingled, which involves the unhappiness of man internally dead.

terms without specifying the time of their entrance upon it; we find this accession of enjoyment distinctly expressed in the following avowal: "Christians believe that the unrighteous and profligate will be punished in eternal fire, on the contrary, the virtuous, and those who have lived as Christ did, will enjoy communion with God in an impassible state." The collocation of the divine communion of the pious with the punishment of the wicked, shows that he is referring to the period after the judgment. But Justin, in representing the saved as in immediate communion with God after the judgment, assures them at the same time of a pure, sinless life; for with God no evil dwells; with him is a pure eternal life.¹

To those who are condemned at the day of judgment, Justin assigns a very material and external punishment; he makes it to consist, by an erroneous interpretation of the imagery of Scripture, in material fire. He mentions fire whenever he speaks of the punishment of the lost; eternal inextinguishable fire, the fire of judgment, the punishment of fire, are the constant forms in which he depicts those pains.² How far he was from taking this imagery merely as imagery, with what distinctness the element of fire was present to his thoughts, is evident, not only from his speaking of the damned being shut up, enveloped in eternal fire,³ and of the

¹ *Apol.* 1, 8, p. 47, (p. 57, A.) τῷ αἰωνίῳ καὶ καθάρῳ βίῃ ἐκ-
συμῶντες. τῆς μετὰ θεοῦ τοῦ πάντων πατρὸς καὶ δημιουργοῦ διαγωγῆς
ἀντιστοιχίᾳ . . . τῆς παρ' αὐτῷ διαγωγῆς, ἵνα κακία οὐκ
ἀντιτυπῶ.—"Being desirous of a pure and endless life, we are
ambitious of intercourse with God the Father and Maker of
all things,—intercourse with him in a place where evil assails
not."

² Διόνιον πῦρ. *Apol.* 2, 1, p. 88, (p. 41, C.) 2, 2, p. 89, (p. 41,
E.) 2, 7, p. 93, (p. 45, E.)—ἄσβεστον πῦρ. *Dial.* c. *Tr.* c. 130,
p. 223, (p. 359, D.)—τὸ πῦρ τὸ τῆς κρίσεως. *Apol.* 2, 7, p. 93,
(p. 45, C.)—καταδίκη τῷ πυρὶ. *c. Tr.* c. 45, p. 141, p. 264,
B.)—c. 120, p. 213, (p. 349, B.)—καλασις αἰωνίος πυρὸς. *c. Tr.*
c. 117, p. 210, (p. 145, B.)

³ *Apol.* 2, 8, p. 94, (p. 46, C.) εἰ (δαίμονι;) τὴν ἀξίαν κόλασιν
καὶ τιμωρίαν κομίσονται, ἵν' αἰωνίῳ πυρὶ ἰγχεσθῶσιν.

punishment of eternal fire,¹ but most clearly from the exposition which he gives of Isa. i. 20.² "When it is said, 'a sword shall devour you,' it means not that they who are disobedient shall perish by the sword; but the sword of the Lord is the fire, whose food they shall become who choose to do evil." In accordance with this view, he considers hell not as a state, but a place. "Hell,"³ says he, "is a place where those shall be punished who have lived unrighteously, and have not believed that the things shall come to pass which God hath taught through Christ." To this place he supposes that bad men and angels will be consigned, and endure their pains together. This appears from the following denunciations:⁴ "Christ will raise the bodies of all men who have ever lived, and shall clothe the worthy with incorruption, but shall send the unrighteous in eternal sensibility, with the evil dæmons, into eternal fire;"—and, "Christ has predicted that Satan, with his host, and the men who followed them, shall be sent into the fire."⁵

In reference to the duration of future punishment,

¹ *Apol.* i, 12, p. 49, (p. 59, B.) αἰωνία διὰ πυρὸς καταδίκη.—1, 17, p. 54, (p. 64, D.) διὰ πυρὸς αἰωνία δίκαι.—1, 45, p. 71, (p. 83, B.) To the same subject belongs what Justin says, (*Apol.* i, 57, p. 77, [p. 91, C.]) of an ἐκπύρωσις ἐπὶ κολάσει τῶν ἀσιβῶν; from the connection, it appears, that he considers the fire of hell as identical with that of the final conflagration.

² *Apol.* i, 44, p. 69, sq. (p. 81, D.)

³ *Apol.* i, 19, p. 55, (p. 66, B.)

⁴ *Apol.* i, 52, p. 74, (v. 87, B.) τὰ σώματα ἀνιγίγῃ πάντων τῶν γεννημένων ἀνθρώπων καὶ τῶν μὴ ἀξίων ἰδύσει ἀφθαρσίαν. τῶν δ' ἁδίκων ἐν αἰσθήσει αἰωνία μετὰ τῶν φαύλων δαιμόνων εἰς τὸ αἰῶνιον πῦρ τίμψαι.

⁵ *Apol.* i, 28, p. 60, (p. 71, B.) ὃν (διάβολον) εἰς τὸ πῦρ πηρῆσθαι μετὰ τῆς αὐτοῦ στρατιᾶς; καὶ τῶν ἱερομένων ἀνθρώπων . . . προσημύσει ὁ Χριστός. With this we may compare the fragment which Andrew of Cæsarea, in Cappadocia (*comment. in apocal. Ioan.* c. 60. *Serm.* 21. *Opera Chrysostom. ed. Franc. ad M.* 1697, T. ii. p. 689,) has preserved from a lost treatise of Justin's. ὁ μίγας Ἰουστίνος φησιν ἐν τῇ τῷ Χριστῷ παρουσίᾳ πρῶτως γινῆναι τὸν διάβολον, ὅτι καταδικάζεται εἰς τὴν ἄβυσσον καὶ εἰς τὴν τῷ πυρὶ γέενναν.

Justin is equally far from adopting the individual opinion of Arnobius,¹ who believed in a final annihilation, as from the expectation of Origen,² who believed in the final reformation, and consequent salvation of the damned; Justin regarded the punishment as without end. He had no conception of a possible reformation of the wicked after the day of judgment. He calls repentance in Hades too late;³ he warns the Jews,⁴ "only a short time is left for your coming over to us; if Christ should hasten his coming, in vain would be your repentance—in vain would ye lament; he would not listen to you." And, referring to future punishment, he says,⁵ "And then shall they repent when it will avail them nothing." In one passage of the Dialogue, it is true, he seems to teach the final destruction of the damned by fire, and on this passage those writers have generally depended, who, like Huet,⁶ Rossler,⁷ Munscher,⁸ Munter,⁹ Daniel,¹⁰

¹ *Adv. Gent.* 2, 14.

² See Munscher (*Handbuch der Christl. Dogmengeschichte*, ii. 39, 505,) and Strauss, (*J. Christ. Glaubenslehre*, ii. 691.)

³ *Coh. ad Gr.* c. 35, p. 32, (p. 33, A.) ἡ ἀπονομή ἐν τῷ ᾧ οὐκ ἔστιν ἔτι ἡ μετανοία. The same views are also decidedly taken by Clement, *Epist.* 2, c. 8, T. i. p. 187. μετα τὸ ἐλθεῖν ἡμᾶς ἐν τῷ αἵματι, οὐκ ἔτι δυνατόν ἐστιν ἱερομολογήσασθαι ἢ μετανοῆν. And by Cyprian, *Ep. ad Demetr.* c. 25, T. ii. p. 224. quando istinc excessum fuerit, nullus jam poenitentiae locus est nullus satisfactionis effectus.—c. 24, p. 223, erit tunc sine fructu poenitentiae dolor poenae, inanis ploratio et inefficax deprecatio.

⁴ *Dial. c. Tr.* c. 28, p. 126, (p. 245, C.)

⁵ *Apol.* 1, 62, p. 74, (p. 87, C.) καὶ τὴν μετανοήσαν, ὅτε οὐδὲν ὠφελήσεται. Baumgarten-Crusius justly observes (*Lehrbuch der Christl. Dogmengeschichte*, II. 1287.) "Justin includes, in the μετανοία, which he ascribes to the lost, only anguish and remorse."

⁶ *Origeniana*, 2, 2, quæst. 11, No. 25, in the Appendix to Origen's Works edited by De la Rue, T. IV. p. 231.

⁷ *Lehrbegriff der Christl. Kirche*, 202, and *Bibliothek der Kirchenväter*, I. 141.

⁸ *Handbuch der Christl. Dogmengeschichte*, II. 483, 516.

⁹ *Handbuch der ältesten Christl. Dogmengeschichte*, II. 2, 191, 279.

¹⁰ *Tatianus der Apologet.* 225, 229.

Hase,¹ Starck,² Kern,³ and others, have ascribed to him the belief in the final cessation of future punishment, in the sense of a final annihilation of the wicked. He says, ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰδὲ ἀποδινήσκειν φημί τὰς ψυχὰς ἐγὼ εἰς μαίον γὰρ ἢ ὡς ἀληθῶς τοῖς κακοῖς. Ἀλλὰ τί, τὰς μὲν τῶν εὐσεβῶν ἐν κρείττονί ποι χῶρῳ μένειν, τὰς δὲ ἀδίκους καὶ πονηράς ἐν χείρονι, τὸν τῆς κρίσεως ἐκδεχομένης χρόνον τότε. Οὕτως αἱ μὲν, ἄξιαι τοῦ θεοῦ φανεῖσθαι, οὐκ ἀποδινήσκειν ἐνι, αἱ δὲ κολάζονται, ἐστ' ἂν αὐτάς καὶ εἶναι καὶ κολάζεσθαι ὁ θεὸς θέλῃ, c. Tr. c. 5, p. 107, (p. 223, B.)—"But, indeed, I deny that souls die, for that would be truly a gain to the wicked. But what then? the souls of the pious remain in a better place, but the unrighteous and wicked in a worse, expecting the time of judgment. Thus, those souls that appear worthy of God will not die, but these are punished as long as God shall will them to be and to be punished." But the opinion expressed in this passage, of the final annihilation of the wicked, represents this annihilation only as possible, not as real. Justin introduces the possibility, in order to give a stronger emphasis to the sentiment he had before expressed, that the imperishability of the soul is not immanent, but a donative. How little he believed in an actual realization of the acknowledged possibility, not only the first clause of the quotation shows, in which the perpetuity of all souls (those of the wicked, therefore, as well as of the good) is maintained and urged on moral grounds;⁴ but still more those other passages,

¹ *Lehrbuch der evangel. Dogmatik*, (2 Aufl.) 126.

² *Freimüthige Betrachtungen über d. Christenthum*, 345, 347

³ *Der Christl. Eschatologie in d. Tübinger Zeitschrift f. Theologie*, 1840, III. 82.

⁴ That clause ought not to be translated, as is sometimes done, "I do not maintain that all souls die," so that the souls of the wicked might, by implication, be considered as subject to mortality. The following words decidedly oppose this interpretation, εἰς μαίον γὰρ ἢ ὡς ἀληθῶς τοῖς κακοῖς. According to this latter clause, the former must be translated, "I deny that souls will ever die." No grammatical reasons can be urged against this translation.

in which an eternal duration is expressly assigned to the punishment and persons of the wicked. If we do not reckon among these passages those in which the predicate eternal is attributed to that punishment, in parallel to the eternity of the happiness of the saved; if we also pass over what Justin, in one passage denounces, that the wicked will be punished a boundless duration;¹ yet such confessions as:² "Plato has, in like manner, said that Rhadamanthus and Minos will punish the unjust who appear before them; we maintain the same thing, but that it will be done by Christ, and that their souls will suffer with their bodies an eternal punishment, and not for a millennial period only, as he said;" and,³ "we have learnt from Isaiah that the limbs of transgressors will be gnawed into by a worm and an unquenchable fire, continuing immortal so as to be a spectacle to all flesh,"—confessions such as these testify most incontrovertibly for the unlimited eternal duration of the wicked, and of the punishment to which they will be consigned. More especially the expression ἀθάνατα μένοντα is decisive.

But the condemnation of Satan and the dæmons runs parallel with the condemnation of men; what Justin asserts of the punishment of the latter, both in extent and duration, must apply with still greater force to the former; for, if no hope can be entertained of the redemption of human transgressors, assur-

¹ *Apol.* 1, 28, p. 60, (p. 71. B.) πολασθησόμενοι τὸν ἀπείρατον αἰῶνα.

² *Apol.* 1, 8, p. 48, (p. 57, B.) Πλάτων ἡμῶς ἴφη, Ραδῖμανθον καὶ Μίνω πολᾶσαι τοὺς ἀδίκους παρ' αὐτοῦς ἰλθόντας· ἡμῖς δὲ τὸ αὐτὸ πρᾶγμα φαρὶν γινώσκουσι, ἀλλ' ὑπὸ τοῦ Χριστοῦ, καὶ τοῖς αὐταῖς σώμασι μετὰ τῶν ψυχῶν γινώσκουσι καὶ αἰώνιον κίλασιν πολασθησόμενοι ἀλλ' οὐχὶ χιλιονταετῇ περιόδῳ, ὥς ἡμεῖς ἴφη μόνον.

³ *Dial.* c. Tr. c. 130, p. 223, (p. 359, D.) ἴγνωμι καὶ διὰ ἡσάτου τὰ πᾶσα τῶν παραβιβηκότων ὑπὸ σκώληκος καὶ ἀπαύτου πυρὸς διαβιβρώσκεισθαι μίλλων, ἀθάνατα μένοντα, ὥστε καὶ οὕτως εἰς ἔρασιν πάσης σαρκός.—Müncher's attempt at a middle course founders on this passage, (*Handbuch der christl. Dogmengeschichte*, II. 484.)

edly the punishment of Satan and his angels must be without end.¹

¹ The principal passages in proof of this point have already been quoted. (*Apol.* i, 28, p. 60, [p. 71, B.]—i, 52, p. 74, [p. 87, B.]—2, 8, p. 94, [p. 46, D.]) What Münscher adduces in proof that Justin did not entirely reject the final reformation of Satan, will not apply to these passages. How unalterably firm the whole ancient Church (the Alexandrians excepted) held the incorrigibility, and consequent eternal condemnation of Satan, Tatian will show in name of all the rest. *Orat. c. Gr. c.* 15, p. 257, (p. 154, C.) ἡ τῶν δαιμόνων ὑπόστασις οὐχ ἔχει μεταβολῆς τόπον.—c. 14, p. 256, (p. 153, C.) ὅσοι δ' ὄντι ἐν αὐτοῖς περιττοὶ ἐν τῇ νῦν, μὴ ὁμοίως τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἀπαθνήσκουσιν, τοῦτο ὅτι· ἐν μίλλωσι καλεῖσθαι παρὸν αὐτοῖς, οὐ μισθίζουσιν ἀΐδιον ζωῆς ἀντὶ θανάτου ἐν ἀθανάτῃ μεταλαμβάνοντες
 "Ἐξουσιν τὴν ἀθανασίαν ὁμοίαν τῇ παρ' ὃν ἔχουσιν χρόνον. κατὰ δὲ τὴν σύστασιν ὁμοίαν ἀνθρώποις. τοῖς κατὰ γνώμην διαπραγμαμένοις, ἅπασιν αὐτοῖς παρ' ὃν ἔχουσιν χρόνον νομοθετήκασι.

THE END.